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Better practices do exist and are currently being implemented in other jurisdictions. 
We concluded that adapting a number of these practices and incorporating them 
into Australian laws, subject to local need and conditions, would be appropriate. 
Environmental Defenders Office, Submission No 56 to the Select Committee on 




The development of the coal seam gas industry in Queensland has created an intense public 
debate concerning the coexistence of agricultural land and unconventional gas (UG) 
extraction. This debate is particularly relevant to Queensland, which from the early 2000s 
onwards has dominated the UG extraction and production sector in Australia. The UG 
industry has thrown into sharp relief the role of the state in creating effective natural resource 
regulation. Namely, the interconnection between economic development, land use and 
conflicting interests in UG extraction and production. 
This thesis is confined to an analysis of the regulatory frameworks that govern land use, 
compensation and access to the extraction of UG. In extracting unconventional gas resources 
(UGR), it is necessary for the state and private resource companies to enter into a long-term 
relationship. This brings challenges to other sectors which, under state law, must enter into 
agreements to provide access to the land under which the resource resides. This, in turn, 
creates tension between the private interests of commercial resource companies, private 
landholders and the role of the state in balancing the interests of competing sectors. 
This thesis considers these challenges in Queensland, the largest and sole Australian UG 
producer and exporter outside of the United States and Canada, as to whether current 
regulation demonstrates coexistence by effectively managing conflicting interests. Where an 
absence of effective regulation is identified, this thesis analyses other jurisdictions to 
determine whether there are lessons from these jurisdictions. In particular, this thesis focuses 
on how British Columbia has been able to utilise legal and regulatory frameworks to 
encourage coexistence and develop UG resources in tandem with other sectors and to the 
benefit of all citizens. 
This thesis explores the question; to what extent is Queensland’s current regulatory 
framework for UGR development effective in managing conflicting land interests in the 
extraction of UG in Queensland?  
Firstly, this thesis considers these challenges in Queensland, analysing whether UG regulation 
has managed competing interests and identifying that, although there has been regular reviews 
of legal frameworks which govern conflicting interests, Queensland’s policies still lack 
transparency, clarity and certainty relating to the management of conflicting interests. It is 
iii 
argued that the commercial focus of Queensland’s UG policy prevails, encouraging 
exploration that privileges the interests of resource companies over those of private 
landholders.  In contrast, an analysis of British Columbia’s land use and resource policies 
demonstrates a different policy focus—providing greater state control over the exploitation of 
natural resources and balancing conflicting interests in the exploitation of UG.  The tenets and 
policy principles underlying British Columbia’s approach provide valuable lessons for 
Queensland, by demonstrating the need to ensure coexistence of different sectors. 
An analysis of Queensland’s UG regulatory regime suggests it is prescriptive, rule-based and 
creates unnecessary gaps and burdens on landholders. In contrast, an analysis of the 
legislative frameworks of another jurisdiction, namely British Columbia, indicates a 
principles-based legislative framework with broad enabling legislation and complementary 
regulatory administrative bodies, reducing regulatory burden and providing greater oversight 
to manage coexistence. This type of legislation encourages the protection of other land uses to 
meet the interests of other sectors and positions the state as an effective arbiter of multiple 
interests, allowing petroleum titleholders to realise economic gain without detriment to other 
sectors. Therefore, this analysis identifies the need for a single regulatory authority operating 
under a memorandum of understanding based on collaborative regulation as part of the 
legislative framework to encourage effective development of UGR in Queensland’s 
agricultural regions. 
The authorisation of development approvals is important for the development of UGR in 
Queensland. It is crucial, as it not only identifies agricultural areas that must be zoned for 
protection, but establishes the relationship between the state as owner of the resource, 
petroleum titleholders as the commercial developers of the resource and private landholders 
as the surface owners of the land. It is through the allocation of approvals that the interests of 
titleholders and landholders are aligned as closely as possible. The chosen methods of 
approval and land use zoning demonstrate that where a state seeks to gain economic return for 
its resources, while minimising impact of UG exploitation on agricultural land, the use of land 
use approvals for resource activities is an appropriate tool to regulate conflicting land uses. 
However, where a state seeks to privilege the resource sector, the land zoning system itself is 
inadequate. 
To ensure an effective approval regime, a regulatory administrative agency body with a strong 
compliance approach, beyond monitoring, may align policy with overall governmental 
iv 
regulation to achieve effectiveness in the approvals process for petroleum titleholders. The 
current process in Queensland for the approval of UG activities in priority agricultural areas 
encourages neither certainty nor coexistence. An analysis of British Columbia’s collaborative 
system of land use and a single regulatory administrator demonstrates that an integrated 
regulatory approach meets the policy objectives of the State. 
This thesis finds that, although the Queensland Government has attempted reforms to 
encourage greater coexistence, in practice these reforms have created greater confusion 
between differing legislation, lack of transparency and an onus on individual landholders to 
undertake costly and time-consuming legal action to prove the impact and effect of resource 
activity on their lands. Ultimately, the current process to determine land access and 
compensation agreements does not improve the position of landowners or encourage greater 
coexistence. 
The law is correct as at 30 October 2017. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THESIS PROBLEM 
1.1 Introduction 
Australia has a pressing need for gas. Decades of reliance on dwindling Bass Strait resources 
combined with unconventional gas resource (UGR) development for export markets has 
resulted in a severe gas shortage in eastern Australia, requiring unprecedented government 
intervention to ensure security of supply.
1
 Yet, at the same time, Australia will shortly 
overtake Qatar as the world’s biggest gas exporter as exports of coal seam gas (CSG) on the 
East Coast and conventional gas on the West Coast significantly increase.
2
 Despite these large 
exports, the Australian East Coast is facing a gas shortage.
3
 To address the domestic shortage, 
the Australian Government has negotiated an agreement with its largest UGR corporates, 
Santos, Origin and Shell, to fill domestic needs without Government regulation of export 
limits and diverting export UGR supply from Queensland into the local market.
4
 
In early 2017, the Australian Government signalled a major policy shift in domestic energy to 
a renewed focus on energy security—a departure from the fossil fuel ‘extract and export’ 
mantra of previous administrations. In a speech at the National Press Club, Prime Minister 
Malcolm Turnbull declared that increasing Australian energy supplies from UGR, primarily 
CSG at present, is vital for the nation’s energy future.
5
 He highlighted the need to overcome 
the barrier of state moratoriums of hydraulic fracturing (or ‘fracking’) in Victoria, the 
Northern Territory and Tasmania to develop onshore unconventional gas (UG) basins: ‘now, 
                                                 
1 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (Cth), Gas Inquiry 2017–2020. Interim Report (September 
2017)<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Gas%20Inquiry%20-%20Interim%20Report%20-
%20September%202017.pdf>. 
2 By 2018, Queensland could be the world’s fourth largest LNG exporter and, by the end of the decade, Australia 
has the potential to be the world’s leading LNG exporter (Curtis Pitt, $60 Billion Industry Passes Another 
Milestone (Media Statement, 30 June 2016) <http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2016/6/30/60-billion-
industry-passes-another-milestone>. 
3 Rod Sims, ‘Shining a Light: Australia’s Gas and Electricity Affordability Problem’ (Address to National Press 
Club, 20 September 2017) <https://www.accc.gov.au/speech/shining-a-light-australia%E2%80%99s-gas-
and-electricity-affordability-problem>. Note that Western Australia has a long-standing domestic gas 
reservation policy (‘DomGas Reservation’) that requires 15% percentage of all gas produced or landed in 
Western Australia to be reserved for domestic consumption (Department of Treasury (WA), Production 
(2017) <http://www.treasury.wa.gov.au/Public-Utilities-Office/Gas-industry/Production/>). 
4 Prime Minister of Australia the Honourable Malcolm Turnbull MP, National Energy Guarantee to Deliver 
Affordable, Reliable Electricity (Media Release, 17 October 2017) <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2017-10-
17/national-energy-guarantee-deliver-affordable-reliable-electricity>. 
5 Phillip Coorey, ‘Malcolm Turnbull says Coal, CSG and Renewables Vital for Energy Future’, The Australian 
Financial Review (Online), 1 February 2017 <http://www.afr.com/news/malcolm-turnbull-says-coal-csg-and-
renewables-vital-for-e.nergy-future-20170131-gu2q40>. 
2 
we’re willing to sit down with the states to determine the right incentives to enable 
desperately-needed, sustainable onshore gas development’.
6
 
Given the constitutional constraints on federal control over onshore gas extraction, the federal 
government will need to work closely with state and territory governments to review their 
current respective legislative positions on CSG to achieve its objective of energy security 
from CSG. In Victoria, Northern Territory and Tasmania, state governments have reacted to 
public perceptions of environmental damage and water contamination relating to the 
extraction of CSG by either banning or placing moratoriums on hydraulic fracturing—a 




The depth of public sentiment in Victoria, particularly from farming communities, led the 
state government to permanently ban hydraulic fracturing as a CSG extraction technique in 
2017.
8
 As such, only Queensland is currently undertaking the commercial exploitation of 
UGR, though this is confined to CSG at present. Although currently only 20–40% of CSG 
wells must be fracked to access UG,
9
 CSG has become synonymous with a threat to valuable 
farming land. This threat is partly due to the need to dewater coal seams to produce the UG 
and the subsequent depletion of aquifers and high level of water pollution resulting from such 
dewatering. Consequently, public sentiment and opposition to CSG is highly divisive in 
regional areas where the industry has been vilified for its practices in developing CSG on 
farming lands. 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ching H Yew and Xiaowei Weng, Mechanics of Hydraulic Fracturing (Gulf Professional Publishing, 2014). 
8 See the Resources Legislation Amendment (Fracking Ban) Act 2017 (Vic) pt 1 s1: 
The main purposes of this Act are— 
(a) to amend the Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990— 
 (i) to prevent the exploration for and mining of coal seam gas; and 
 (ii) to ban hydraulic fracturing; and  
 (iii) to enable the Minister to pay for the surrender of certain mining licences, exploration licences and 
retention licences for coal seam gas; and 
(b) to amend the Petroleum Act 1998— 
 (i) to ban hydraulic fracturing; and 
 (ii) to impose a moratorium on petroleum exploration and petroleum production in the onshore areas of 
Victoria until 30 June 2020; and 
 (iii) to enable the Minister to pay for the surrender of certain exploration permits, retention leases and 
production licences; and 
(c) to make consequential amendments to the Resources Legislation Amendment (BTEX Prohibition and Other 
Matters) Act 2014 to repeal provisions that will be made redundant by this Act. 
9 Catriona Ross and Paige Darby, ‘Unconventional Gas: Coal Seam Gas and Tight Gas’ (Research Paper No 2, 
Parliamentary Library, Victoria, December 2013) <https://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/publications/research-
papers/send/36-research-papers/13717-unconventional-gas-paper-final>.  
3 
Queensland has not enacted a moratorium on fracking and has been the only active state to 
develop its unconventional petroleum resources (exclusively CSG). Due to the nature of the 
geology, such CSG development has occurred in sedimentary basins in Queensland’s 
agricultural regions where farming has been the dominant economic land use since federation. 
This is the primary conundrum for Queensland’s agricultural areas; CSG extraction is 
incredibly lucrative and an election winner. Since 2010, the CSG industry has directly 
contributed A$10.6 billion to Queensland’s economy.
10
 The Surat Basin and the southern 
Bowen Basin in Queensland contain projected CSG well numbers of 15,000 to 40,000, 
equating to 150 years of active CSG production.
11
 
Over the past decade, Queensland has continued to transition from a conventional resource 
state to embracing the unconventional natural gas sector both for its domestic gas and 
electricity supply and to export Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). LNG is UG, including CSG, 






The focus on LNG has morphed into a focus on the gas export market, leading to a domestic 
gas shortage.
13
 This shift in focus is reflected in the Queensland Government’s recent policy 
strategy of focusing on LNG exports to Asia with the first LNG export terminal in 
Queensland opening in 2015.
14
 As highlighted by Senator Canavan, Minister for Resources 
and Northern Australia, in 2016: 
Forecasts estimate the value of Australia’s LNG exports will increase by 41 per cent 
to $23 billion in 2016–17, supported by higher LNG prices and export 
volumes…The Australian Government will continue to put in place policies that 




                                                 
10 Senator Matthew Canavan, ‘Queensland’s LNG Sector Driving Investment and Jobs’ (Media Release, 10 
October 2016) <http://www.mattcanavan.com.au/queensland_s_lng_sector_driving_investment_and_jobs>. 
11 Oswald Marinoni and Juan Navarro Garcia, ‘A Novel Model to Estimate the Impact of Coal Seam Gas 
Extraction on Agro-Economic Returns’ (2016) 59 Land Use Policy 351. 
12 Philippe A Charlez, Our Energy Future Is Not Set In Stone: How Can The Demand For Oil And Gas In 2035 Be 
Met? (TECHNIP, 2014) 106. 
13 Australian Energy Market Operator, ‘National Gas Forecasting Report for Eastern and South-Eastern Australia’ 
(8 December 2016) <https://www.aemo.com.au/-
/media/Files/Gas/National_Planning_and_Forecasting/NGFR/2016/2016-National-Gas-Forecasting-Report-
NGFR-Final.pdf>. 
14 The ‘unconventional natural gases’ comprise sources of methane which include shale gas, CSG (also known as 
coal-bed methane) and ‘tight gas’ trapped in rock formations. The scope of this thesis is limited to a legal 
analysis of CSG in Queensland and shale gas in British Columbia, Canada. 
15 Canavan, above n 10. 
4 
Despite the Queensland Government’s support for the industry, conflicts between agriculture 
and CSG have become apparent in some of Australia’s most productive farming areas, 
including the Darling Downs in Queensland,
16
 and threaten the exceptionally fertile Liverpool 
Plains in New South Wales.
17
 The Darling Downs region, situated over the large reserves of 
CSG in the Surat Basin, is ‘one of Queensland’s most important agricultural assets’.
18
 It 
comprises 11% of Queensland’s area and produces around a quarter of Queensland’s 
agricultural output.
19
 The landholders of the Darling Downs produce 88.1% of egg 
production, 65% of total cotton value, 95.7% of pome fruit value, 66.6% of grain sorghum 
production, 48.2% of wheat production and 64.5% of pig production.
20
  
According to Measham and Fleming, ‘The development of [Australian] unconventional gas 
has been described as having more potential to change local economies and social relations in 
rural areas than any other phenomenon in recent history’.
21
 Overall, in Queensland, the 
agricultural sector represents an estimated 30,500 business contributing nearly A$20 billion in 
2016–2017 to the State’s economy— 20% greater than the agricultural sector average of 
Queensland since 2011.
22
 Traditionally, agriculture has been a mainstay of Queensland’s 
economy since its colonisation by the British Crown until deregulation in 1980s during the 
period of tariff protection and market regulation.
23
 The advent of market-led economic 
                                                 
16 Kim de Rijke, ‘The Agri-Gas Fields of Australia: Black Soil, Food, and Unconventional Gas’ (2013) 35(1) 
Culture, Agriculture, Food and the Environment 41; Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (Cth), 
Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas in Queensland 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) <https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-
Economist/Publications/Documents/coal-seam-gas/Socioeconomic-impacts-of-coal-seam-gas-in-
Queensland.pdf>. 
17 NSW Government, Chief Scientist and Engineer, Final Report of the Independent Review of Coal Seam Gas 
Activities in NSW (2014) <http://www.chiefscientist.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/56912/140930-
CSG-Final-Report.pdf>. 
18 Queensland Government, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, ‘<Darling Downs 
Regional Plan’ (October 2013) http://www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/darling-
downs/darling-downs-regional-plan.pdf>. 
19 Ibid, 3. 
20 AEC Group, Analysis of Agricultural Production and Issues in the Darling Downs: Surat Gas Project 
Supplementary Report to the Environmental Impact Statement Report prepared for Arrow Energy Pty Ltd 
and Coffey Environments Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 
<https://www.arrowenergy.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/8670/Appendix_14.pdf> 5. 
21 Thomas G. Measham and David Fleming, ‘Impacts of unconventional gas development on rural community 
decline’ (Working Paper, Ecosystem Sciences and Minerals Down Under Flagship, CSIRO, November 2013) 
5. 
22 Queensland Government, Business Queensland, The Queensland Cabinet and Ministerial Directory, Minister for 
Agriculture and Fisheries and Minister for Rural Economic Development the Hon. Bill Byrne, Queensland’s 
Agricultural Sector Closes In On $20 Billion Mark  (September 28 2017) 
<http://statements.qld.gov.au/Statement/2017/9/28/queenslands-agricultural-sector-closes-in-on-20-billion-
mark>.  
23 See Australian Government, Productivity Commission, Regulation of Australian Agriculture (2016) 
<https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/agriculture/report/agriculture.pdf> for an outlook on the 
minimal regulation remaining in Australia’s agricultural sector>. 
5 
policies and deregulation has witnessed a decline in the role of agriculture as the State’s 
dominant economic sector in favour of other competing interests, including resources which 
frequently lie underneath fertile farmland. 
The economic opportunities for Queensland in this sector are conservatively estimated at 
generating A$3.8 million in royalties and federal petroleum resource rent tax and 
A$4.9 million in company taxes for each LNG export tanker.
24
 It is estimated 360 LNG 
tankers will leave Gladstone per annum. Consequently, the policy stance by the state and 
federal government is to reconsider how CSG extraction might be made safe, environmentally 
responsible and, above all, sensitive to the needs and requirements of property owners in rural 
regions affected by CSG extraction.
25
 This is particularly true for Queensland, which has 
already enthusiastically embraced CSG, but has also created an alliance of landowners and 
environmentalists who believe the regulatory framework to protect rural landowners requires 
review. 
The relationship between CSG and agricultural activity in Queensland and the possibility of 
further development in other states and territories has raised concerns about the impact of 
CSG particularly and UG development on farmland generally.
26
 The main concerns include 
the impact on food production, the use and contamination of underground and surface water 
resources, agricultural landholders’ rights over land, the effects on the socio-economic 
environment in the affected regions and the future viability of farming in these areas.
27
 
The rapid development of the current UGR framework in Queensland since 2004 has led the 
Queensland Government to a regulatory ‘crossroads’.
28
 The state must effectively regulate the 
development of UGR in a manner that addressees conflicting issues arising from UGR 
development in predominantly agricultural areas. This provides the platform to examine the 
regulatory tools utilised by Queensland and other comparative jurisdictions to establish a 
framework to maximise opportunities for the coexistence of CSG and agricultural land. 
                                                 
24 Natural CSG, Economic Benefits (2017) < http://www.naturalcsg.com.au/benefits/economic-benefits/>.  
25 For a detailed outline of the impacts of CSG extraction on agricultural farmland see Chapter three. 
26  Neil I. Huth, Brett Cocks, Neal Dalgliesh, Perry L. Poulton, Oswald Marinoni, Javier Navarro Garcia,  
Farmer’s perceptions of coexistence between agriculture and large scale coal seam gas development (2014) 
<https://gisera.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/ag-proj-2-farmer-perception-workingpaper.pdf>; Amanda 
Kennedy, Environmental Justice and Land Use Conflict: The Governance Of Mineral And Gas Resource 
development (Routledge, 2017). 
27 Australian Government, Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas 
in Queensland (2016) <https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-Economist/Publications/Documents/coal-
seam-gas/Socioeconomic-impacts-of-coal-seam-gas-in-Queensland.pdf>.  
28 Tony Wood, Gas at the Crossroads Australia’s Hard Choice (2014) Grattan Institute 
<https://grattan.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/817-gas-at-the-crossroads.pdf>.  
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The suite of newly enacted primary legislation concerning, among other regulatory issues, 
UGR activities on agricultural land over the past four years—namely, in the introduction of 
the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) (RPIA), Mineral and Energy Resources 
(Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) (MERCPA) and Land Access Code 2016 (Qld) 
(LAC)—may be evidence of regulatory gaps identified by the Queensland Government and a 
continued attempt to create more effective regulation to address a complex multitude of 
concerns. This thesis will examine these newly enacted legislative instruments, identify their 
effectiveness and consider whether alternative regulatory tools exist to potentially aid in 
creating an effective land use and land access regulatory framework to manage conflicting 
interests. 
1.2 Thesis Research Questions 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that there are aspects of Queensland’s current regulatory 
framework for UGR development that are ineffective in managing conflicting land interests in 
the extraction of UG and that a more effective regime could be identified. To address this 
hypothesis, this study addresses a fundamental question: to what extent is Queensland’s 
current regulatory framework for CSG extraction effective in managing conflicting land 
interests? To answer this research question, which underlies the hypothesis, there are five sub-
questions to be answered: 
1) What are the land use conflicts associated with UG extraction on agricultural land? 
2) What is the current regulatory framework for the regulation of UG extraction in 
Queensland? 
3) Are the current regulatory tools utilised by Queensland effective in managing 
conflicting land interests in the development of UGR? 
4) Are there alternative regulatory tools effective in managing these conflicts of interest? 
5) Could these regulatory tools be applied to Queensland? 
To test the hypothesis, research question and research sub-questions of this thesis, a number 
of fundamental legal tools
29
 are examined within the two aspects of conflict in land use. 
                                                 
29 The ‘Regulatory Toolbox’, applied to a functional legal methodology, is referred to where regulation occurs 
through the combination of a number of differing tools and methods, rather than relying upon a single 
instrument. Brownen Morgan and Karen Yeung, An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials 
(Cambridge University Press, 2007) 9; Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (2017, The Federation Press). 
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First, the coexistence of agriculture and CSG extraction and the capacity of the landholder to 
gain effective compensation and control over their land during such extraction activities 
(known in Queensland as Conduct and Compensation Agreements (CCAs)) are examined. To 
achieve this, this thesis analyses the existing regulatory framework in Queensland for 
coexistence of CSG and agriculture, and the rights for landholders regarding access and 
compensation during CSG activities. 
Second, the analysis of the existing Queensland regulatory framework will be undertaken by 
an examination of the law itself in relation to good regulatory practice and through a 
comparative study with British Columbia, Canada, to identify new ways for farming and 
UGR extraction to coexist. Given that there is a study of both the Queensland law itself and 
that of British Columbia, it is also necessary to examine key regulatory and governance 
concepts and theories including adaptive management and principles-based regulation. 
Third, Queensland’s regulatory framework is unique in that, at the commencement of CSG 
extraction in the early 2000s, there was an active choice to utilise the environmental 
management theory of adaptive management as a regulatory tool to address the regulatory 
issues arising from CSG extraction. Therefore, the environmental management concept of 
adaptive management necessarily features in the assessment of the Queensland regulatory 
framework. 
Where this analysis identifies regulatory burden, gaps and weaknesses in Queensland’s 
regulatory framework for UGR land use and land access, this thesis will consider whether 
there are more effective regulatory tools that may be utilised to address issues of coexistence. 
This will include a compare, contrast and assessment exercise to assess the effectiveness of 
Queensland’s regulatory framework with the UGR regulatory framework of British Columbia 
in particular.
30
 The comparative functional analysis of other UGR regulatory frameworks and 
comparing similar regulatory issues of land access and land use may provide opportunities in 
Queensland’s UGR regulation to achieve more effective management of conflicting land 
interests in the extraction of UGR. 
                                                 
30 Although, where appropriate this thesis considers other regulatory jurisdictions. The relevant comparative 
example of the United States will be analysed in the context of Collective Bargaining in Chapter Five. 
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1.3 Methodological Basis 
1.3.1 Functional Comparative Methodology 
This thesis does not aim to discuss in comprehensive detail all the legal questions pertaining 
to Queensland’s petroleum regulation. Rather, this thesis will analyse the functioning of 
regulation and the possible legal tools that may be utilised to achieve effective regulation of 
conflicting interests in the UGR sector. This analysis will be primarily based on a functional 
comparative methodology, using different alternative models and tools of regulation in other 
jurisdictions as a contextual background and benchmark for analysis.
31
 
The comparison of two similar legal regimes is of fundamental importance to the theoretical 
perspective and methodology of this thesis. To have utility for this thesis, the methodological 
framework must address the multiple dimensions of coexistence and examine aspects of 
natural resource regulation such as petroleum licensing obligations and compensation 
procedures for agricultural landholders. 
Zweigert postulated a methodological approach in 1971 premised on the fact that ‘The basic 
methodological principle of all comparative law is that of functionality’.
32
 The functionalist 
method is one of the best-known working tools in comparative law, having become both the 
mantra and bête noire of the comparative law discipline.
33
 Functionalism can be defined as 
‘law that responds to human needs and therefore all rules and institutions have the purpose of 
answering these needs’.
34
 The problem-solving method as a technique of the functionalist 
approach is applied in this thesis and asks the question, ‘How is a specific social or legal 
problem, encountered in both society A and society B, resolved?’ That is, ‘Which legal or 
other institutions cope with this problem?’
35
 
                                                 
31 Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (2017, The Federation Press). 
32 Konrad Zweigert, ‘Methodological Problems in Comparative Law’ (1972) 7 Israel Law Review 465; Konrad 
Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 1998) 34. 
33 Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’ in Reinhard Zimmermann and Mathias Reimann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 340. 
34 Esin Örücü, The Enigma of Comparative Law: Variations on a Theme for the Twenty-first Century (Springer, 
2013) 28. 
35 Ibid, 25. 
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Functionalist comparatists agree the following elements are necessary in expropriating a 
functionalist comparative law methodology: 
1) Functionalist comparative law is factual and so focuses on the effects of rules, not 
purely on doctrinal structures 
2) The objects of examination are legal systems compared by considering their various 
regulatory responses to similar situations 
3) Functionalist comparative law combined this factual approach with the theory that its 
objects must be understood in light of their functional operation in the jurisdiction in 
which it operates 
4) Institutions both legal and non-legal are comparable if they are functionally equivalent 
in different legal systems, even if the institutions are doctrinally different 




This approach springs from the disposition that legal problems have similar solutions across 
comparable legal systems, though reached by different routes. It is acknowledged by legal 
comparative scholars that ‘the fact that the problem is one and the same warrants the 
comparability’.
37
 However, this thesis employs the comparative law ‘functional equivalence’ 
in which the enquiry is, ‘Which institution in system B performs an equivalent function to the 




The exploratory nature of this legal thesis provides a functionalist legal approach. The basis of 
this approach is to examine the differences and commonalities between legal systems to better 
integrate policy with regulatory analysis—‘In this way, researchers can draw on sociological, 
                                                 
36 Michele Graziadei, ‘The Functional Heritage’, in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds), Comparative 
Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 100; Hugh Collins, ‘Methods 
and Aims of Comparative Contract Law’, (1989) 11 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 396; Vernon Valentine 
Palmer, ‘From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of Comparative Law Methodology’ (2005) 53(1) The 
American Journal of Comparative Law 261. 
37 Esin Örücü, ‘Methodology of Comparative Law’ in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law 
(2012, Edward Elgar, 2nd ed) 442, 443. 
38 Maurice Adams and Jacco Bomhoff, ‘Privileging (some forms of) interdisciplinarity and interpretation: Methods 
in comparative law’ (2014) 12(3) International Journal of Constitutional Law 786; Jan Smits (ed), Elgar 
Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (2012, Edward Elgar, 2nd ed).  
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Adams and Griffiths define the following three steps in comparative methodology: 
(a) The legal norms (broadly understood) concerned and how they have changed in 
recent years, (b) their social effects, and (c) explanations for the similarities and 
differences of the norms and their effects in different jurisdictions.
40
 
Given the complexity and explanatory challenges of this thesis, no comprehensive general 
methodology theory fully explains the contours of natural resource regulation. Thus, similar 
legal problems in jurisdictions with similar legal institutions that are naturally or functionally 
comparable,
41
 as ‘like must be compared with the like’ (similia similibus) as the objects of 




The functional comparability of this thesis lies in the comparison between the RPIA and 
Agricultural Land Reserve (ALR) systems in Queensland and British Columbia respectively. 
Both the RPIA and ALR represent land use zoning systems and institutions in a comparable 
Commonwealth legal environment that seeks to regulate onshore petroleum extraction and 
protect prime agricultural land, representing its functional comparability.
43
 
According to Örücü, the underlying assumption for this methodology is that there are ‘shared 
problems or needs in all the societies under comparison, that they are met somewhere in the 
society and that the means of solving these problems may be different but comparable, their 
functions being equivalent’.
44
 Further, Zweigert and Kötz state comparable legal problems 
and institutions may only be compared effectively if they solve the same factual problem.
45
 In 
both Queensland and British Columbia, the contestation between arable agricultural land use, 
UG activities and the resulting effect on agricultural landholders and laws is evidence of the 
central problem analysed in this thesis. 
                                                 
39 Koen Lemmens, ‘Comparative Law as an act of Modesty: A pragmatic and realistic approach to comparative 
legal scholarship’ In Maurice Adams, Jacco Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 
302,323.  
40Maurice Adams and Jacco Bombhoff, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2012), 282. 
41 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Clarendon Press, 3rd ed, 1998), 34. 
42 Esin Örücü, Comparability: Theories and Presumptions (Springer, 2004), 19. 
43 Michaels, above n 33, 22. 
44 Esin Örücü, Comparability: Theories and Presumptions (Springer, 2004) 562. 
45 Zweigert and Kötz, above n 41. 
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The problem the law addresses and regulation it provides for ‘dealing with these problems are 
always embedded in a particular social and institutional context’.
46
 Regulation is the first 
layer of analysis in this thesis. However, without taking account of historical, institutional, 
political, cultural and social environments, the meaning of legislation cannot be understood.
47
 
The second and third layers of comparison in this thesis are concerned specifically with the 
agricultural land protection and UG regimes of Queensland and British Columbia and their 
socio-cultural context. 
Örücü states: 
For those concerned with law in action and law in interaction with social and 
cultural systems, however, rule-based research is not satisfactory since it may lead to 
only partial truth and a misleading picture. Creative comparative law research, 
therefore, may be interested in suggesting ‘core concepts’ and point the way to 
‘ideal systems’, or at least to the ‘better law’ approach.
48
 
The comparative analysis of this thesis is confined to analysing how British Columbia 
manages the contestation of UG petroleum tenements and agricultural land protection to 
encourage effective regulation of its UGR. Analysing these regulations provides valuable 
lessons for the adaptive management of CSG on agricultural land in Queensland. By 
providing a regulatory analysis of one jurisdiction, addressing the same fundamental legal 
question of UG and agricultural land preservation, this thesis provides a more enriched and 
comprehensive examination, rather than a more superficial analysis of multiple jurisdictions. 
British Columbia’s UGR regulatory system has been selected as the comparative jurisdiction 
and regulation of this thesis, as it offers valuable insight into possible strategies and practices 
in regulating prime agricultural land and petroleum activities.
49
 Canada is the world’s fifth-
largest producer of natural gas with a total shale resource estimate of 6.3 1012m3 (222 Tcf),
50
 
with Alberta currently accounting for 80% of Canada’s existing natural gas production.
51
 
However, British Columbia is also poised become one of the country’s largest UGR 
                                                 
46 Maurice Adams, Jacco Bomhoff, Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
293. 
47 Jan M. Smits, Elgar Encyclopaedia of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2nd ed, 2012). 
48 Örücü, above n 44, 571. 
49 Diane Katz, Studies in Risk & Regulation: The BC Agricultural Land Reserve: A Critical Assessment (The 
Fraser Institute, 2009). 
50 National Energy Board, Canada’s Energy Future 2016 <https://www.neb-
one.gc.ca/nrg/ntgrtd/ftr/2016/2016nrgftr-eng.pdf> 61. 
51  Allan Ingelson, ‘Strategic Planning for Energy Development in Canada’ (2015) 6(2) Journal of Energy and 
Environmental Law 35. 
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producers and exporters, with an estimated 1,237 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of UG and 335 Tcf 
of risked technically recoverable reserves.
52
 Further, British Columbia was one of the first 
jurisdictions in North America to implement large-scale agricultural land zoning and is 
considered one of the most established examples of public control over development and 
subdivision of land for non-farm uses since the creation of its ALR in 1973.
53
 
This does not mean that British Columbia’s system offers a one-size-fits-all model for UGR 
regulation.
54
 Rather, a comparison with British Columbia suggests that some aspects of its 
regulatory regime encourage effective regulation throughout the land use and land access 
process. These aspects include flexible principles-based regulation, transparent and 
accountable bureaucracy and collaborative and coordinated state policy.
55
 
By using a comparative functional approach, it is possible to compare the regulation of land 
use and land access of UGR activities on agricultural land to ascertain the capacity of each 
regulatory framework to effectively promote coexistence between two sectors, but with 
starkly different regulations and policy outcomes. According to Adams: 
It is especially when foreign legal systems and circumstances seem familiar and 
even self-evident that the comparative researcher can be lead to draw ‘obvious’ but 




Both jurisdictions have responded to the regulatory challenges of UGR coexistence with 
agriculture by using the same regulatory tools, including an agricultural land protection and 
zoning approval system framework and land access compensation agreements within a 
general UGR regulatory framework. However, both states have used different approaches to 
apply these regulatory tools and this thesis analyses how these tools have been applied to 
encourage effective regulation of UGR activities on agricultural land. 
                                                 
52 Silke Popp, ‘Unconventional Gas Regulation in Canada’ (2014) 12(3) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 1.  
53 Michael Krauss, ‘The Perils of Rural Land Use Planning: The Case of Canada’ (1991) 23(1) Case Western 
Reserve Journal of International Law 65. 
54 It is important to realise that British Columbia does not necessarily provide an example of the ‘best’ agricultural 
protection regulation. Rather, British Columbia provides an example of a successful system which promotes 
principles-based regulation.  
55 OECD, Principles for the Governance of Regulators (21 June 2013). These principles will be explored within 
Chapters four and five of this thesis.  
56 Maurice Adams, ‘Doing what doesn't come naturally. On the distinctiveness of comparative legal Research’ in 
Mark van Van Hoecke (Ed), Methodologies of legal research. Which kind of method for what kind of 
discipline? (Hart Publishing, 2011) 229, 230. 
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1.3.2 Doctrinal Methodology 
The doctrinal study of law is understood as a discipline that produces information about the 
law and systematises legal norms.
57
 The doctrinal method lies at the basis of the common law 
and is the core legal research method. According to Hutchinson and Duncan: 
A doctrine has been defined as [a] synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, 
interpretive guidelines and values. It explains, makes coherent or justifies a segment 




It follows that doctrinal research is research into the law and legal concepts. This method of 
research was the dominant influence in nineteenth and twentieth century views of law and 
legal scholarship, and still tends to dominate legal research design.
59
 Theoretical doctrinal 
studies analyses, on a conceptual level creates, linkages that constitute personal relationships 
becoming legal relationships and, further, legal statutes and institutions. Legal relationships, 
therefore, form the framework of the pre-understanding that guides interpretation and this 
framework can include an implicit ‘picture of society’.
60
 
Doctrinal law scholarship is employed in this thesis to analyse legal normative sources in 
Queensland—such as statutory texts, treaties, general principles of law, customary law, 
binding precedents and authoritative sources such as case law and scholarly legal writings—
and perform an analysis of these texts.
61
 This thesis will execute doctrinal evaluative 
scholarship, defined as: 
Providing an assessment of the way the [legal] world is, and, either implicitly or 
explicitly, subjecting the law to appraisal either from the point of view of coherence 
with earlier law, other areas of law, or from an external viewpoint, and where 
shortfalls are identified, suggesting how things might be improved.
62
 
                                                 
57 Aulis Aarnio, ‘What is the Doctrinal Study of Law?’ in Aleksander Peczenik, On Law and Reason 
(Springer,1989) 19. 
58 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and describing what we do: doctrinal legal research’ (2012) 17(1) 
Deakin Law Review 83, 84. 
59 Desmond Manderson and Richard Mohr, ‘From Oxymoron to Intersection: An Epidemiology of Legal Research’ 
(2002) 6(1) Law Text Culture 159, 161; Desmond Manderson, ‘Law: The Search for Community’ in Simon 
Marginson (ed), Investing in Social Capital (University of Queensland Press, 2002) 15. 
60 Aulis Aarnio, ‘Essays on the Doctrinal Study of Law’ (2011) 96 Law and Philosophy Library 20.  
61 Ibid, 20, 23. 
62 Tamara Hervey, Robert Cryer, Bal Sokhi-Bulley, Alexandra Bohm, Research Methodologies in EU and 
International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011) 9. 
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Traditional doctrinal models of legal research need to be supplemented by methodologies 
used in other disciplines, particularly social research methods.
63
 As stated by McCrudden, 
‘law is not a datum; it is in constant evolution, developing in ways that are sometimes 
startling and endlessly inventive’.
64
 The law exists in, is developed through and reflects the 
society it arises from and seeks to shape and improve it. Law is a social practice, as law and 
society are deeply entwined. This thesis observes ‘law in action’, as opposed to ‘law in the 
books’,
65
 and the way the law and legal institutions contribute to regulation of UGR. 
Doctrine is defined as ‘a synthesis of rules, principles, and norms, interpretive guidelines and 
values. It explains, makes coherent or justified a segment of the law as part of a large system 
of law. Doctrines can be abstract binding of non-binding’.
66
 The doctrines analysed in this 
thesis are limited to the rules, principles and tools related to UGR development in Queensland 
and British Columbia. Utilising this doctrinal research approach, this thesis provides a 
systematic exposition of the regulations governing UGR development and places these 
doctrines within the specific social context in which they have developed. 
1.4 Thesis Context 
Arguably, the most pressing challenge facing Australia is how to plan for a future that is 
economically productive, preserves agricultural land and provides energy in an increasingly 
energy-hungry country.
67
 The focus on rural Australia is an increasing political imperative, as 
significant economic growth is likely to come from these regions due to their significant CSG 
reserves.
68
 This, in turn, requires regulation that accommodates both the need for energy and 
the need to maintain existing agricultural lands that have been the mainstay of the Australian 
economy for almost 200 years.
69
 
In many countries, the transition from indigenous agricultural practices to colonised pastoral 
agrarian cultivation and, finally, industrial agriculture is well underway and mining has 
                                                 
63 Sharon Hanson, Legal Method and Reasoning (Routledge, 2012). 
64 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) 122 Law Quarterly 
Review 632, 648.   
65 Tamara Hervey, above n 67, 86. 
66 Trischa Mann and Audrey Blunden, Australian Law Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
67 Ian Gray and Geoffrey Lawrence, A Future for Regional Australia: Escaping Global Misfortune (Cambridge 
University Press, 2001). 
68 Peter Hannam, ‘'Sitting ducks': Santos’ CSG gaps highlighted by farmers, government agencies’ (12 June 2017) 
The Sydney  Morning Herald (Online) <http://www.smh.com.au/environment/sitting-ducks-santos-csg-gaps-
highlighted-by-farmers-government-agencies-20170612-gwp93t.html> 
69 Tobin Gorey, ‘Feeding the ‘Dining Boom’ on Commonwealth Bank Blog (5 May 2016) < 
https://www.commbank.com.au/guidance/blog/feeding-the-dining-boom-201605.html>.  
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reduced in relative importance as being emblematic of the post-industrial economic model 
(even where it remains a large industry in absolute terms). This is in contrast to some 
developed nations, such as Australia and Canada that are still expanding their mining 
industries as according to Everingham: 
a handful of nations—Australia and Canada amongst them—have not undergone 
this transition and continue to actively expand exploitation of their rich mineral 
resources as a significant part of their national economies. For instance, Australia’s 
mining and energy sectors have recently experienced a massive escalation such that 
their production constituted over half the value of Australia’s total exports and, at 
8%, the industry was the fourth largest contributor to the nation’s total gross 
domestic product in 2010–2011.
70
 
Australia remains a dominant mining nation and the social, environmental, scientific and 
regulatory scope of mining and energy have been the subject of six recent Commonwealth 
and state inquiries in Australia. In May 2016, the Senate Select Committee on Unconventional 
Gas Mining (the Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry) released its Interim Report.
71
 The 
Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry terms of reference included the intention to: 
Inquire on the adequacy of Australia‘s legislative, regulatory and policy framework 
for unconventional gas mining including coal seam gas (CSG) and shale gas mining’ 
with reference to a variety of current approaches to regulation including: a national 
approach to the conduct of unconventional gas mining in Australia; the health, 
social, business, agricultural, environmental, landholder and economic impacts of 
unconventional gas mining; government and non-government services and 
assistance for those affected and compensation and insurance arrangements.
72
 
Chapter Four of the Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry Interim Report is dedicated to an 
analysis of the property, mineral and petroleum rights issues in Australia, with a particular 
examination of documented experiences of landholders affected by UG mining. The report 
commented on the current state of landholder rights in the Australian petroleum regulatory 
system: 
Landowners are owners of the surface of the land and have no automatic right to the 
minerals and petroleum, including unconventional gas, which may be on the land. 
                                                 
70 Jo-Anne Everingham,‘Transformations of Rural Society and Environments by Extraction of Mineral and Energy 
Resources’ in David Brown and Mark Sucksmith (eds), Routledge International Handbook of Rural Studies 
(Taylor and Francis, 2016) 10, 10.  
71 Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Unconventional Gas 
Interim Report (2016). 




They do not receive any royalties and cannot refuse access to holders of petroleum 
exploration or mining permits, licences or leases. Should landholders refuse access, 
the resource companies involved can force access and enter negotiations for damage 
to their property or livelihood associated with the property.
73
 
Queensland’s CSG land use and access regulatory regime seeks to balance the interests of the 
agricultural sector with UGR activities while protecting ‘priority agricultural land’.
74
 The 
National Farmers Federation (NFF) offered criticism of the increasing rigidity between land 
access arrangements and CSG activities in Australia during the Unconventional Gas Senate 
Inquiry: 
Land access agreements may be the only time where landholders can actually seek 
to positively influence the process, and receive some protections and assurances 
from the mineral and petroleum industries… However, it is worthwhile noting that 
farmers may be overwhelmed, confused and under stress.
75
 
The NFF policy position is ensuring that land use and land access of UGR activities on 
agricultural land is effectively regulated by emphasising the protection of farmland and ability 
for sustainable agricultural operations during CSG exploration and extraction: 
The debate around CSG is moving at a rate of knots. Our position, and that of our 
members, is not about preventing mining and CSG exploration or extraction – but 
rather ensuring that agriculture, CSG and mining can coexist, so as to guarantee the 
long-term sustainability of our food and fibre production…We recognise that this 




Without exception, all UGR activities in Australia occur on land. The recovery of UGR is 





 and South Australia
79
) and CSG (found primarily in the Bowen Basins 
and Surat Basins of Queensland and the Gunnedah Basin and Sydney Basins of New South 
Wales). 
                                                 
73 Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas, Parliament of Australia, above n 71, 21.  
74 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8(2).  
75 National Farmers Federation, Submission No 171 to Select Committee on Unconventional Gas Mining, Inquiry 
into Unconventional Gas Mining, 14 March 2016, 3. 
76 National Farmers Federation, Senate Inquiry Explores Coal Seam Gas (19 July 2011) 
<http://www.nff.org.au/read/2140/senate-inquiry-explores-coal-seam-gas.html?hilite=coal+seam+gas>. 
77 In Western Australia, the Canning Basin and Perth Basin. 
78 In the Northern Territory, the Amadeus Basin, Georgina Basin and Beetaloo Sub-Basin. 
79 In South Australia and Queensland (in part) the Cooper-Eromanga Basin. 
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Primary CSG activity is, to date, confined to Queensland due to its high permeability of coal 
seams, where commercial limited, small-scale CSG production commenced in 1996 to 
provide gas for domestic electricity consumption.
80
 Since 2015, the large-scale development 




There is a lack of legal consensus in Australia on how to manage the complex regulatory 
issues associated with UGR, an important present and future economic contributor for 
resource states such as Queensland.
82
 The Senate Inquiry has had the effect of further 
polarising political debate on UG in an effort to ensure that equity between energy companies 
and agricultural landholders is achieved.
83
 The Australian Government submission to the 
Senate Inquiry states that its Domestic Gas Strategy
84
 reflects the Government’s commitment 
to balancing competing land uses, as identified in the principles articulated in the Agricultural 
Competitiveness White Paper
85
 which states: 
Access to agricultural land should only be done with the farmer's agreement, and 
that should they agree, they should be fairly compensated; there must be no long 
term damage to water resources used for agriculture and local communities; and 




CSG is a dual porosity system, whereby blocks of subsurface coal have micropores filled with 
methane separated by a water-filled fracture structure. Subsurface water is extracted to 
depressurise the coal seam and allow gas to flow through the production well to the surface.
87
 
The extracted gas and water are then separated into individual surface pipelines and pumped 
                                                 
80 Tina Hunter, ‘The Development of Shale Gas and Coal Bed Methane in Australia: Best Practice for 
International Jurisdictions?’ (2016) 38(2) Houston Journal of International Law 367. 
81 As will be comprehensively examined within Chapter three of this thesis.  
82 Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland Gas Supply and Demand 
Action Plan Discussion Paper (2016). 
83 The Senate, Select Committee on unconventional Gas Mining, Interim Report (2016). 
84 Australian Government Department of Industry and Services, Domestic Gas Strategy Australian Government 
Policy and Actions (2015) < http://industry.gov.au/energy/energymarkets/documents/domestic-gas-
strategy.pdf>. 
85 Agricultural Competitiveness Taskforce, Parliament of Australia, Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper 
(2015). 
86 Senate Standing Committee on Environment and Communications, Australian Parliament, Inquiry into the 
Landholder’s Right to Refuse (Gas  and Coal Bill) (2015), 3. 
87 Stuart Khan and Geena Kordek, Coal Seam Gas: Produced Water and Solids (2014) < 
http://www.chiefscientist.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/44081/OCSE-Final-Report-Stuart-Khan-
Final-28-May-2014.pdf>; Mary O’Kane, Initial Report On The Independent Review Of Coal Seam Gas 




to a processing facility to be further dehydrated and compressed into LNG where it is 
liquefied for export to international gas markets. CSG wells are depleted of natural gas faster 
than conventional wells due to relatively low permeability, connectivity and continuity in the 
coal seams. Therefore, to make the development of a CSG field economically viable, wells 




As Australia is the world’s second-driest continent,
89
 with an average annual rainfall below 
600 mm for over 80% of the continent, water is a highly valued resource and commodity. 
Concerns of CSG extraction of water surrounding the coal seam has been well documented by 
the Australian Senate Management of the Murray-Darling Basin Inquiry, which highlighted: 
 the potential impact on underground aquifers associated with the extraction of CSG 
and its impact on the Great Artesian Basin (GAB) as a water source for agricultural areas 
with low rainfall 
 potential pollution of aquifers caused by hydraulic fracturing chemical fluids 
 the insufficient compensation paid to landholders for the impact of CSG extraction 
 the inability of landholders to control access of CSG activities on their land.90 
While the issues associated with CSG water are significant in its potential impacts to 
groundwater aquifer contamination, this is not the focus of this thesis. This thesis focuses on 
land use and land access and its significance for the regulation of UGR activities, considering 
water only insofar as it relates to land use and agricultural land use regulation. 
CSG has a ‘dispersed geospatial footprint’
91
 partly due to the large amount of associated 
infrastructure required. Pipeline transport systems (for water and gas) and CSG extraction 
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activities necessitate land use and access for processing and transportation for CSG to 
domestic and international gas markets for up to 20 years. The application and grant of 
various licenses, authorities and leases is required to explore, survey and extract CSG on 
private land or government land held under a pastoral lease.
92
 The Inquiry into 
Unconventional Gas
93
 noted a number of common concerns rendering agricultural land 
incompatible with agricultural activities including: 
 potential groundwater impacts 
 potential impacts of CSG on individual farm groundwater supplies/bores 
 weed and biosecurity risks on property from CSG 
 time taken away from agricultural activities to negotiate land access agreements or 
management CSG activities 
 cropping and livestock land allocated to UG mining rather than agricultural production 




This thesis utilises the notion that some aspects of CSG extraction, such as the depletion of 
water from aquifers and the high volume of produced water that can have devastating effects 
on agricultural farmland, are in conflict with agricultural activities if left unregulated. 
Therefore, the focus of this thesis is to determine how the legal framework can effectively 
regulate UGR activities to protect productive farmland, ensure long-term viability of such 
lands and protect the rights and interests of the farmers who own or use that land. 
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1.5 Queensland’s Unconventional Gas Resources 
CSG, previously thought of as a fugitive gas waste product from conventional coal mining, is 
now the largest onshore UG industry in Australia due to the international technological 
developments of hydraulic fracturing.
95
 CSG activities have rapidly developed in Queensland 
since the commencement of mining in 1996, while ‘exploration for shale and tight gas in 




UG, of which CSG is a type, is distinct from conventional gas which is found as gas during 
CSG exploitation, rises towards the earth’s surface and trapped as gas formations within 
deposits of sedimentary rock. Conversely, UG is formed within impermeable rock formations 
and is consequently trapped in a rock formation, rather than by a covering rock formation.
97
 
As encapsulated by Geoscience Australia: 
Unconventional resources are natural resources that require greater than industry-
standard levels of technology or investment to exploit. In the case of unconventional 
hydrocarbon resources, additional technology, energy and capital has [sic] to be 
applied to extract the gas.
98
 
CSG is UG, consisting mostly of methane, trapped in underground coal seams by water and 
ground pressure. CSG can be extracted vertically and/or horizontally by constructing a well 
and drilling to a depth of up to 300 to 1,000 metres to reach a coal seam.
99
 A CSG well 
consists of: 
Cement and steel casings to protect from leakage and groundwater contamination. 
Water in the coal seam is pumped out in order to release stored gas, however, when 
the CSG cannot be accessed easily, hydraulic fracturing techniques can be used to 
increase the gas pressure and speed of access to the CSG.
100
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In 2013–2014, a record 1,634 CSG wells were drilled in Queensland consisting of 
exploration, appraisal, injection and development wells.
101
 
The shift towards supplying CSG to international markets, with the first LNG exportation 
commencing in Queensland in January 2015, has fundamentally altered the Australian CSG 
sector.
102
 Queensland’s LNG export industry has forced the CSG industry to compete against 
foreign exporters of shale gas such as the United States (US) for supply, pushing prices higher 
and shortening contract lengths. Robb defines shale gas as distinct from CSG, as ‘shale gas is 
natural (unconventional) gas that has not migrated to a reservoir rock because it is trapped 
within an impermeable layer of rock, giving rise to its low permeability characteristics’.
103
 
Consequently, Australian gas consumers are increasingly subject to scarcity pricing due to 
LNG exporters struggling to fulfil their LNG export contracts. As acknowledged by the Joint 
Department of Industry and Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics study into Eastern 
Australian gas markets: 
The current development of LNG in eastern Australia and the expected tripling of 
gas demand are creating conditions that are in stark contrast to those in the 
previously isolated domestic gas market. The timely development of gas resources 
will be important to ensure that supply is available for domestic gas users and to 
meet LNG export commitments. Such is the scale of the LNG projects that even 
small deviations from the CSG reserve development schedule could result in 




The laws of the Australian states and territories requires the Crown, as the owner of petroleum 
resources in Commonwealth legal jurisdictions, to grant access to private land and enable the 
relevant petroleum tenement holder to recover the applicable CSG resources. Crown land is 
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owned and managed by the relevant state government and, therefore, does not require a land 
access agreement with a private landholder.
105
 As stated by Hepburn: 
The common law scope of private land ownership has been modified by legislation 
enacted in each state and territory which purports to vest the ownership of minerals 
and resources back to the state. Indeed, all Australian states and the Northern 
Territory have legislatively declared that petroleum in situ is owned, without 
exception, by the Crown regardless of when the land containing the petroleum 
passed into private ownership.
106
 
The Petroleum and Gas Production and Safety Act 2004 (Qld) (PGPSA) defines CSG as 
‘petroleum (in any state) occurring naturally in association with coal or oil shale, or in strata 
associated with coal or oil shale mining’.
107
 Therefore, the exploration for and production of 
CSG in Queensland is principally regulated by the PGPSA and PA, as CSG is a naturally 
occurring gaseous hydrocarbon principally comprised of methane formed as part of the 
transformation process of peat to coal. CSG falls within the statutory definition of ‘petroleum’ 
in all Australian jurisdictions other than Victoria.
108
 
One of the main purposes of the PGPSA is to ‘create an effective and efficient regulatory 
system for the carrying out of petroleum activities and the use of petroleum and fuel gas while 
ensuring petroleum activities are carried on in a way that minimises conflict with other land 
uses’.
109
 It is against this purpose and UG policy that the current UGR regulatory regime of 
Queensland is assessed. 
The recent repeal of the Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 (Qld) (SCL Act) and the 
concomitant introduction of the RPIA and the Regional Interests Development Approval 
(RIDA) regime is a direct result of the increasing regulatory concerns around protecting and 
sustaining agricultural activities during and after CSG activities. The RPIA aims to provide a 
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single integrated legislative framework that ‘manages the impact of resource activities on 
areas likely to contribute to Queensland’s economic, social and environmental prosperity’.
110
 
This legislation is intended to protect and preserve the most valuable agricultural land and 
manage impacts of development on that land by providing a transparent and accountable 
process of proposed resource activity.
111
 Priority Agricultural Areas (PAAs) are defined in the 
RPIA as including: 
One or more areas used for a priority agricultural and use, whether it also includes 
other areas or features, including, for example, a regionally significant water source; 
and is either (i) shown on a map in a regional plan as a priority agricultural area; or 
(ii) prescribed under a regulation.
112
 
Further, a Priority agricultural land use is defined as ‘highly productive agriculture of a type 
identified in a regional plan for an area of regional interests; or of a type prescribed under a 
regulation for an area of regional interest’.
113
 However, non-agricultural uses are not defined 
or considered in the RPIA. Rather, agricultural land uses are simply defined as being: 
Highly productive agricultural areas, or agricultural land uses with significant 
infrastructure investment or agricultural land uses that have the potential to be 
significantly impacted by resource activities and have limited scope to modify their 
agricultural practices in response to these impacts.
114
 
Regional plan areas may further define PAAs. For example, the Darling Downs Regional 
Plans identifies the agricultural industries of the region as including: 
Grain production, intensive livestock and cattle grazing as well as some horticultural 
and broad acre cropping. The region’s major agricultural products include cotton, 
wheat, barley, sorghum, sunflower and soy beans. In 2011, the region’s production 
of cotton, sorghum, and wheat contributed more than 70 per cent of Queensland’s 
production for each crop. Over the five years to 2011 the total gross value of 
agricultural production from the region increased by six per cent to over $2.5 
billion—equating to over a quarter of the state’s agricultural production
115
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The RPIA holds the broad purpose of protecting PAAs, priority living areas (PLAs), strategic 
cropping areas (SCAs) and strategic environmental areas, each of which are classified as 
‘areas of regional interest’.
116
  
Currently, five resource Acts are applicable to Queensland’s oil and gas regulatory regime—
the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (MRA Act), PGPSA, PA Act, Greenhouse Gas 
Storage Act 2009 (Qld) and Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld). For the purpose of this 
thesis, both the PGPSA and PA Act are the primary applicable legislation governing CSG 
operations on rural land in Queensland. In recognising the lack of transparency, collaboration 
and efficiency in its current UGR regime, the Queensland Government noted: 
Landholders and other groups such as environmental and community groups who 
regularly deal with resource companies will benefit from a single resources Act as 
they will gain a better understanding of processes, rights and responsibilities through 
a single, simplified reference point.
117
 
As a response to the continued contestation between agricultural landholders and mineral 
titleholders and lack of regulatory efficiency, the MERCPA commenced operation September 
2016. The MERCPA regulatory framework seeks to create a common resources Act by 
migrating the first suite of provisions from existing resources Acts, including the PGPSA, to 
‘reduce complexity, volume and duplication’.
118
 
A dedicated new land access chapter is found in the MERCPA, containing the previous CCA 
regulatory provisions and adding opt-out and deferral agreements to manage land access of 
resource activities on private land. It is intended that this land framework will ‘allow 
landholders and resource companies to easily understand their rights and obligation in gaining 
access to private land’.
119
 Chapter 5 of this thesis analyses the new MERCPA and examines 
whether the new regime achieves its aim ‘to bring equity and certainty to land access and 
compensation agreements for both landholders and resource companies’.
120
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1.6 Competing Interests in Unconventional Gas Contexts 
Scientific, social and legal research has extensively documented the unease between the 
agricultural and mining land uses. As stated by Williams, Milligan and Stubbs, ‘It is a 
defensible proposition that the only development activities that should be acceptable in a 
region are those that allow the landscape to maintain its function indefinitely. It would be 
folly to secure one natural resource while putting at risk renewable long-term resource use’.
121
 
The UGR sector has grown rapidly in Queensland over the last six years and relationships 
with local communities are improving and continue to evolve. The transition from primary 
agricultural production to mixed production and interests on agricultural land where UGR 
activities take place has been challenging for some agricultural landholders. These challenges 
include dramatically changing market conditions, less affordable gas pricing as the East Coast 
of Australia faces a gas shortage and the need to improve coexistence with competing land 
uses. It is the role of the law to attempt to balance and protect the interests of both the 
agricultural and UG industries. Agricultural landholders are understandably reluctant to allow 
their prime agricultural land to be used for CSG extraction. 
The stated UGR policy of the Queensland Government is to ‘maximise the sector’s potential 
[…] and be internationally competitive, while balancing the needs of landholders’.
122
 The 
UGR regulatory framework aims to create ‘coexistence’
123
 in the exploration and production 
of UGR on agricultural lands to ensure ‘the social, economic, environmental and heritage 
values of land use are promoted and retained for current and future generations’.
124
 
This thesis does not intend to definitively answer the question of whether agriculture and UG 
exploitation can coexist harmoniously without any detrimental social, cultural, or 
environmental consequences. This thesis also does not comprehensively and exhaustively 
examine the geological and ecological impacts of UG exploitation on agricultural lands in 
Queensland or British Columbia. Rather, this thesis focuses on the regulatory framework that 
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Queensland currently operates when managing the multiple interests of the State in 
developing its UGR tenements. 
1.7 Regulatory Framework of British Columbia as a Benchmark for the 
Evaluation of Queensland’s Regulation 
British Columbia has much larger UG reserves relative to Queensland, consisting mostly of 
shale gas, with an estimated 2,933 Tcf, primarily situated in the northeast region of the 
province in the Horn River Basin, the Montney, the Liard Basin and the Cordova 
Embayment.
125
 As of 2012, 1,400 shale gas wells produce over 2 billion cubic feet of gas per 
day in British Columbia.126 CSG is geologically distinct to shale gas as ‘shale is much harder 
than coal, is much more impermeable, and is usually found deeper underground. Shale gas 
always requires hydraulic fracturing to allow the gas to flow, simply because it is so 
impermeable’.
127
 Further, shale gas is usually best accessed via horizontal drilling techniques, 
rather than the vertical drilling techniques used for CSG drilling.
128
 As further clarified by 
Ross and Darby: 
The low permeability nature of shales also means that the amount of water produced 
is lower than coal seams, and since the gas is induced to flow by hydraulic 
fracturing, produced Hence, shale gas extraction requires larger quantities of water 
for fracking than coal seam gas extraction does, but it does not produce the large 
quantities of water that CSG extraction does through the ‘dewatering’ process.
129
 
Over the past five years, the Provincial Government of British Columbia has launched a 
campaign to promote the development of an LNG industry in the province. LNG proponents 
in British Columbia argue that shale gas will bring significant economic benefits and, 
interestingly, strengthen British Columbia’s environmental leadership since UG, in 
comparison to coal, is a ‘cleaner energy source and can therefore serve as a ‘bridge’ fuel 
between fossil fuels and renewables’.
130
 However, an equally vocal legal campaign has 
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contested these claims, such as the Gitxsan First Nation, one of four Federal Court challenges, 
lodging a judicial review of the Pacific Northwest LNG project in January 2017.
131
 
Historically, in British Columbia, conventional natural gas was primarily extracted for 
domestic industrial and household usage and its price and production scale were relatively 
stable. Over the last decade, however, two key developments have changed the economic 
calculus around the industry. First, the application of hydraulic fracturing techniques has 
dramatically increased the UG industry’s capacity to exploit shale gas basins in North 
America, resulting in a sharp decline in the price of the commodity in the US and Canadian 
markets.
132
 Second, rapid economic growth in Asia significantly increased demand for 
energy, including natural gas, generating a sharp elevation in UG prices.
133
 
Alongside the development of the LNG industry in British Columbia is the land use clustering 
and zoning system regulating restrictions on all non-farm activities on protected agricultural 
land to encourage farming and safeguard farmland with the enactment of the province-wide 
ALR in 1973.
134
 Public sentiment to maintain the ALR stems from a desire to secure local 
food production, maintain the local agricultural economy and protect the environment. 
Environmental groups have expended significant effort encouraging the government and the 
general public to increase protection of agricultural land.
135
 
As at June 2015, in British Columbia there is currently 4,620,858 ha (11,418,388.79 ac) 
included in the ALR, representing 5% of the total provincial area, only half of which is 
currently engaged in agricultural production.
136
 Twenty-seven per cent of British Columbia’s 
total ALR land is located in the Peace River Regional District (PRRD) where most hydraulic 
fracturing in the province takes place.
137
 The largest amount of ALR land in the Regional 
District is in the communities of Fort St John and Dawson Creek. According to the 2011 
Census of Agriculture, 823,498 ha (203,4907.87 ac) are being farmed in the PRRD which 
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accounts for 64% of the region’s ALR.
138
 Fort St John and Dawson Creek are situated above 
the Montney Shale Gas Basin. Consequently, resource development of shale gas and ALR 
lands must coexist. 
The UGR regulatory framework for the approval of petroleum titles on agricultural lands in 
British Columbia will serve as a comparator to Queensland in assessing whether any lessons 
can be learned from other jurisdictions facing similar challenges in managing competing land 
interests. 
1.8 Thesis Conceptual Underpinnings 
1.8.1  Coexistence 
Coexistence seeks to recognise and equitably manage the interests of different stakeholders, 
regulatory bodies and private companies. This ensures effective regulation of competing land 
uses, rather than one sector being privileged to the disadvantage of another. The stated 
purpose of Queensland’s UGR framework is to ‘achieve coexistence of landholders, regional 
communities and the onshore gas industry in Queensland’.
139
 Consequently, coexistence is 
fundamental to achieving effective regulation of UGR exploration and extraction with one 
specific stakeholder group, agricultural landholders.
140
 
According to Everingham et al, coexistence in the context of CSG and community 
sustainability, conservation of biodiversity and integrated approaches to land use planning 
includes, ‘effective management by resource companies, and by regulators, of operating 
practices, off-site impacts, and the distribution of benefits’.
141
 Coexistence and the 
distribution of benefits from the industry as it affects agricultural landowners and the UG 
industries in Queensland is therefore the decisive intention of the RPIA. 
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The National Multiple Land Use Framework (MLUF),
142
 released in 2013, defines 
coexistence as a: 
Principle that acknowledges and respects the rights of all land users and the potential 
of all regulated land uses, while ensuring that regulated land is not restricted to a 
sole use without considering the implications or consequences for other potential 
land uses and the broader benefits to all Australians.
143
 
This definition of coexistence at the national level is applicable as a benchmark in the 
management of competing interests during UGR activities. It is in the interests of the state, 
petroleum titleholders and landholders to coexist given that UGR production activities may be 
ongoing for the next 20–30 years. It is noted that the use of the term coexistence in this thesis 
does not extend to the argument of environmentalists relating to soil, water and land 
degradation as a result of hydraulic fracturing. This is primarily a scientific and highly 
technical discussion outside the scope of this thesis. 
1.8.2 Regulation 
Regulation is intended to influence the behaviour of individuals, organisations and 
governmental actors to promote specific community objectives including those relating to 
social and environmental concerns.
144
 Historically, economists have asserted that regulation is 
efficient when it maximises wealth and economic outcome.
145
 However, this view provides no 
ethical basis for action and cannot justify the distinction of rights in society. Thus, it cannot be 
used as a yardstick to measure regulatory decisions affecting society. Legitimate or ‘good’ 
regulation and regulatory regimes involve reference to two or more of the following five key 
inquiries: 
 Is the action of regime supported by legislative authority? 
 Is there an appropriate schema of accountability? 
 Are procedures fair, accessible, and open? 
 Is the regulator acting with sufficient expertise? 
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 Is the action or regime efficient?146 
The mechanisms utilised to regulate behaviour include rules, expectations and codes of 
conduct. Regulations are often administered by an authoritative administrative body that 
promotes and monitors compliance through the imposition of sanctions or other penal options. 
Regulation is devised and recognised in three distinct yet overlapping categories, including 
economic regulation relating to market decisions to promote efficiency, social regulation 
promoting the public interest where the economic implications are likely to be secondary, and 




Baldwin, Cave and Lodge make the additional distinction of regulation comprising of a 
specific set of commands where regulation involves the promulgation of a binding set of rules 
to be applied by a body devoted to this purpose and includes: 
A deliberate state influence—where regulation has a more broad sense and covers 
all state actions that are designed to influence business or social behaviour; and all 
forms of social or economic influence—where all mechanisms affecting behaviour, 




Effective regulation is defined by the Council of Australian Governments as ‘standardising 
the exercise of bureaucratic discretion, so as to reduce discrepancies between government 
regulators, reducing uncertainty and lowering compliance costs. Regulatory measures should 




For the purpose of this thesis, the protection of agricultural land and improvement of 
agricultural landholders bargaining position during CCA negotiations are classified as social 
regulation due to the classification of agricultural assets and natural resource development as 
being in the public interest. UG is classified as both administrative and economic in 
regulatory nature as the promotion of resource activities and exploration promotes market and 
economic efficiency for the state and its citizens. Further, the administrative bodies and 
                                                 
146 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, above n 144, 27. 
147 Peter Drahos, Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (ANU Press, 2017). 
148 Jacint Jordana and David Levi-Faur, The Politics of Regulation: Institutions and Regulatory Reforms for the 
Age of Governance (Edward Elgar, 2004). 
149 Council of Australian Governments, Best Practice Regulation: A Guide for ministerial Councils and National 
Standard Setting Bodies (2007) 3.  
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tribunals, such as the Gasfields Commission (GC) in Queensland, act as direct monitors of 
UG activities via approvals and decisions as administrative policy bodies. It is recognised that 
regulation is required to safeguard the interests of parties with unequal bargaining power so 
they may negotiate effectively to protect their interests. As inequalities of bargaining power is 
the result of relative positions in the marketplace and asymmetries of information. 
This thesis will critically analyse a number of fundamental aspects of Queensland’s petroleum 
regulation to evaluate whether the current land access and land use regulatory framework is 
suited to achieve effective management of competing interests. In particular, this thesis will 
analyse how Queensland’s petroleum policy, the legislative framework granting petroleum 
titles,
150
 the award of land use approvals and the regulation of land access agreements have 
addressed the numerous challenges in exploiting UGR resources on agricultural land. 
Therefore, regulatory theory is a critical underpinning for the analysis of the legal framework 
and is considered in detail in Chapter 2. 
1.8.3 Adaptive Management 
The current regulatory approach to UGR in Queensland is largely based on adaptive 
management. Therefore a consideration of adaptive management is essential to provide a 
context for the use of adaptive management in regulation. Coglianese and Lazer recognise 
that management-based regulation: 
Does not specify the technologies to be used to achieve socially desirable behavior, 
nor does it require specific outputs in terms of social goals. Rather, a management-
based approach requires firms to engage in their own planning and internal rule- 




Ecologists in British Columbia coined the term ‘adaptive management’ in the 1970s as ‘a 
systematic process for continually improving ecological management policies and practices 
by learning from the outcome of operational programs’.
152
 One of the most critical elements 
of natural resource regulation is recurrent decisions, defined as decisions that need to be made 
on a regular basis in response to changing conditions and priorities with the aim of reducing 
                                                 
150 Queensland’s legislative framework includes the Principle Acts, enabling Regulations and the contractual 
framework between the participants. In Australia, petroleum titles are granted by the relevant government in 
advertised licencing rounds. 
151 Cary Coglianese and David Lazer, ‘Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private Management to 
Achieve Public Goals’ (2003) 3(4) 7 Law & Society Review 691, 692.  




 Two alternating approaches in the adaptive management framework 
to achieve the reduction of uncertainty in those decision-making processes exist, namely, 
passive and active. 
A passive adaptive management approach is based on optimisation by selecting differing 
management models and actions at a specific point in time.
154
 The underlying assumption is 
that optimisation continues to be stable and constant over differing time periods. Conversely, 
active adaptive management anticipates optimisation via ‘learning’ and the underlying 
assumption that changes will occur and reoccur over time. Consequently, the anticipation of 
change and adaptation to it is the hallmark of active adaptive management.
155
 
The adaptive management process begins with ‘determining the management objectives and 
articulating clear statements of management intent against each objective e.g. through formal 
statements of Key Desired Outcomes. With the objectives and key desired outcomes clearly 
articulated, management can focus on developing and implementing appropriate strategies 
and actions to achieve the objectives and deliver the desired outcomes’.
156
 Therefore, to be 
successfully applied as a regulatory approach, adaptive management must ensure flexibility, 
responsiveness and transparency within the roader regulatory framework to allow a state to 
alter its regulator approach in response to a changing regulatory climate, resource contains 
and, often, in sectors with scientific uncertainty.
157
 This thesis will provide a critical review of 
adaptive management as a basis for creating regulatory tools to manage conflicting land 
interests in the development of UGR.
158
 
1.9 Limitations and Scope of Thesis 
This thesis is confined to an analysis of the Queensland regulatory framework for resource 
contestation and conflict between agriculture and CSG extraction. It necessarily requires the 
                                                 
153 Byron Williams and Eleanor Brown, ‘Adaptive Management: From More Talk to Real Action’ (2014) 53(2) 
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Management 972. 
156 Glenys Jones, ‘The Adaptive Management System for The Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area – 
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157 Robert Argent, ‘Components of Adaptive Management’ in Catherine Allan and George Stankey (eds), Adaptive 
Environmental Management (Springer, Netherlands, 2009) 26. 
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functional analysis of such conflict in other jurisdictions, namely British Columbia, that have 
already addressed similar issues on ALR lands relating to shale gas extraction. The 
similarities in the impacts of shale gas and CSG extraction on agricultural land enable such a 
comparison to occur. 
The scope of this thesis does not extend to a regulatory examination of tight gas and shale gas 
reservoirs and activities either onshore or offshore in Queensland since, to date, none of these 
resources have been developed or are likely to be developed in the near future. Therefore, it is 
limited and primarily concerned with landholder arrangements and land use conflict in areas 
of active operations where conflict already exists. Concomitant, but nonetheless important 
regulatory issues such as water usage, environmental risks and scientific analysis are outside 
the scope of this thesis. Similarly, native title land ownership and rights are outside this scope 
of this thesis, since it is confined only to conflict and contestation with agricultural lands and, 
by the very definition of native title in Australia, agricultural activities are outside the scope 
of native title. 
While the myriad of environmental regulation regarding CSG extraction also falls outside the 
confines of this thesis, the concept of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) as a 
regulatory tool is explored in Chapter 2 as it underpins the key legislative instruments for land 
use and agricultural lands. 
1.10 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. Chapter 1 provides an introduction, thesis hypothesis 
and research questions, methodology and contextual background to regulating UGR activities 
on agricultural land. 
Chapter 2 examines the theoretical underpinnings and principles relating to UGR regulation, 
essential to analysing and comparing UGR regulatory systems of Queensland and British 
Columbia. Chapter 2 analyses the theoretical differences between rule-based and principles-
based regulation and the appropriate selection of regulatory tools to deliver effective 
regulation. An analysis of regulatory failures due to regulatory burden is then discussed in 
identifying factors of poor regulatory design and tool choice in UGR regulation. Adaptive 
management theory, as the regulatory framework selected by Queensland for the regulation of 
UGR, is then analysed to highlight any potential regulatory failures in the current UGR 
regulatory regime of Queensland. 
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Chapter 3 provides a comparative analysis of Australia and Canada and their respective legal 
systems—essential if their respective UGR regulatory systems are to be compared. Firstly, 
Chapter 3 examines the role and importance of UGR and agriculture in each jurisdiction, 
including the parallel historical and political history of UGR activities in each state. The 
chapter then compares a number of indicia of each state, including the political system, UGR 
policy and legal framework. The intention of this comparison is to demonstrate the capacity to 
compare the UGR regulatory frameworks of the two jurisdictions based on their similar 
jurisprudential histories and socio-political systems and their similarities in regulating 
petroleum. The chapter also provides an analysis of Queensland’s current UGR policy, 
seeking to identify whether an adaptive management approach has weaknesses, thereby 
discouraging the effective regulation of UGR activities on agricultural lands. As part of this 
analysis, the chapter examines the UGR framework of British Columbia, using the example of 
British Columbia’s recent UGR policy to suggest potential changes in Queensland’s UGR 
policies to encourage effective coexistence of competing interests. 
Chapter 4 focuses on agricultural land use regulation. The chapter analyses the legislative 
approaches to regulating UGR in agricultural land use zoning regulations in Queensland and 
British Columbia. The chapter also compares whether the regulation of land use approvals for 
UGR activities on agricultural land through oversight administrative bodies or through 
regulatory administrative authorities is more likely to create effective regulation for 
implementing coexistence objectives. The chapter then analyses whether providing strong 
regulatory oversight and protection mechanisms in a specialised agricultural land protection 
administrative body and tribunal would be beneficial in achieving coexistence UGR 
objectives in Queensland. 
Chapter 5 considers the role of UGR land access agreement regulation as a tool in managing 
conflicting interests. The chapter analyses whether Queensland’s current regulation of land 
access and compensation agreements enables the State to optimise transparency, collaboration 
and regulatory effectiveness. Collective bargaining as an alternative regulatory tool is also 
analysed to determine whether it would be beneficial in reducing regulatory burden to 
agricultural landholders. 
Chapter 6 provides a conclusion to the thesis, summarising the discussion and providing a 
final consideration of the thesis findings. 
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1.11 Thesis Contribution 
The contribution of this thesis is in the application of alternative UGR regulatory tools in 
managing coexistence to improve Queensland’s current UGR regulatory framework. With 
CSG to be developed in New South Wales to ease the East Coast Gas shortage, examination 
of Queensland’s legislative framework’s ability to protect land interests is timely.
159
 It is 
intended this thesis will also contribute to the wider study of UGR regulation in considering 
how land has developed and exists in Queensland in response to legal issues related to UGR 
development, namely the impact of UGR on agricultural land and concerns over land use, 
access and compensation. 
While significant empirical research exists in Australia relating to the sociological and 
scientific impacts of CSG and agricultural coexistence, there has been little functional 
comparative legal research concerning Queensland’s UGR framework at both land use and 
land access levels. Therefore, this thesis is the first in providing an in-depth functional 
analysis relating to coexistence and land use. 
Regulatory concern about the development of UGR in Queensland relating to land and 
incorporated damage to productive farming land, land access and compensation are not 
unique to Queensland. It is intended that the insights provided by this thesis may hold 
relevance for future regulatory directions in managing conflicting interests and avoiding 
regulatory burdens in Queensland and other jurisdictions undertaking the development of 
UGR, as it provides an examination of varying styles of regulation for these activities.
160
 
For Queensland to sustain a position of global competitiveness, the Queensland Government 
recognises the pressing need to create a cross-government regulatory system that encourages 
industry development, improves appliance and will not result in a diminution of landholder 
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 This thesis provides an analysis of Queensland’s current UGR regulatory framework 
to identify any regulatory gaps and considers alternative regulatory tools to achieve the 
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CHAPTER 2: PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE REGULATION 
OF UNCONVENTIONAL GAS RESOURCES 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 discussed the general parameters, comparative functional methodology and 
regulatory scope of this thesis. Prior to analysing and comparing regulatory functions in two 
jurisdictions, it is useful to evaluate the regulatory principles and concepts underlying such a 
comparative analysis.
1
 The foundational theoretical basis of this thesis is discussed in this 
chapter, including and drawing upon the concepts of principles-based and rule-based 
regulation that a state may employ in regulating its respective UGR sector while managing a 
multitude of legal interests. 
Regulations of UGR define the role and conduct regulating UGR exploitation and encompass 
legal instruments such as primary legislation, subordinate legislation and policy guidelines. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine and outline differing regulatory theories and tools as 
fundamental in the administration of UGR activities by the state. Such an examination of 
regulation and the associated principles is essential to provide a theoretical and contextual 
framework for the functional comparative analysis of current UGR regulation of land use and 
land access in Queensland. 
This chapter commences with an examination of differing regulatory theories and tools that 
may be utilised in the state administration and regulation of UG activities. The Queensland 
Government has asserted its UGR regulation is based on the principles of adaptive 
environmental management. The hallmarks of an effective adaptive management approach 
will then be outlined and assessed, examining whether this regulatory approach is effective in 
addressing the multiple interests associated with UGR exploitation. 
The question of what constitutes an effective regulatory framework for UGR development in 
managing conflicting land interests in the extraction of UG in Queensland is divided into two 
main questions addressed in this chapter. First, is the question of intention—what is the 
explicit legislative objective of the regulation? Such a question is examined by comparing and 
contrasting two types of regulatory frameworks—principles-based and rule-based regulation. 
                                                 
1 Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü, Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Academic, 2002). 
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Second, is the question of the effect of ineffective regulatory tools giving rise to regulatory 
failure in the form of regulatory burdens and gaps? 
Finally, this chapter observes the notion of public and private ownership applicable to 
petroleum under the guidance of state to exploit and develop its UGR ‘in the public interest’. 
In doing so, this chapter addresses the many roles of the state as arbiter, legislator, advocate, 
monitor, contractor and service provider in the context of UGR development and the shifting 
role of the state in responding to changing political, social, economic and environmental 
factors. 
2.2 Better Regulation as Effective Regulation 
Regulation, as defined by Selznick, concerns the ‘sustained and focused control exercised by 
a public agency over activities that are valued by the community’.
2
 The important elements of 
sustained and focused regulatory action implied in this definition illustrate intention taken 
with an explicit regulatory aim. As stated by Freiberg: 
The action is taken after a process, in which the goal, the regulatory action, and the 
consequences of taking the action, are related in meaningful ways. In other words, 
regulation is purposive and instrumental. It is intended to solve problems.
3
 
Black’s definition of regulation expands upon Selznick’s explanation in her widely cited 
definition of regulation as ‘the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards and purposes with the intention of producing a broadly 
identified outcome or outcomes’.
4
 Regulatory intention, as defined by Freiberg, is considered 
a primary purpose of regulation.
5
 
Regulation is distinguished from the larger scope of public policy consisting of government 
processes to identify and respond to social problems.
6
 This is opposed to regulation as a form 
or subset of public policy designed with an emphasis on intervention in the public policy 
                                                 
2 Phillip Selznick, ‘Focusing Organisational Research on Regulation’ in Roger Noll, Regulatory Policy and the 
Social Sciences (University of California Press, 1985) 363, 363. 
3 Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (The Federation Press, 2017) 4. 
4 Julia Black, ‘Regulatory Conversations’ (2002) 29(1) Journal of Law and Society 163, 170.  
5 Freiberg, above n 3. 
6 Sarah Maddison, Richard Denniss, An Introduction to Australian Public Policy: Theory and Practice 




 Therefore, regulation occupies a narrower scope than governance. As discussed by 
Braithwaite, Coglianese and Levi-Faur, governance differs from regulation: 
Government and governance are about providing, distributing, and regulating. 
Regulation can be conceived as that large subset to government that is about steering 
the flow of events and behaviour, as opposed to providing and distributing. Of 
course, when regulators regulate, they often steer the providing and distributing that 




A core concept defining contemporary regulation is the management of conflicting interests 




Snir describes the regulatory task of the state as increasingly ‘orchestrated’ in pursing ‘public 
goals by promoting and empowering a network of public, private sector, and civil society 
actors and institutions, all of which are encouraged to engage in various “regulatory” 
(including self-regulatory) activities’.
10
 This differs significantly from the interwar period, 
when the state acted solely as arbiter of the command and control economy and was highly 








Since this period, Australia has steadily moved to a market-led economy creating a 
‘deregulated’, ‘modern regulatory state’
14
 where the state acts as a ‘light touch’ regulator to 
facilitate and monitor the activities of a market-led economy.
15
 From the post-war period 
onwards, Australian regulatory reform encouraged the lowering of tariff barriers and abolition 
of state-controlled trade boards encouraging a reinterpretation of the state’s role in the public 
                                                 
7 Michael Howlett, Designing Public Policies: Principles and Instruments (Routledge, 2010) 16. 
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10 Reut Snir, ‘Trends in Global Nanotechnology Regulation: The Public-Private Interplay’ (2014) 17 Vanderbilt 
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12 Industries Assistance Omission Act 1973 (Cth).  
13 See for example State Owned Corporations Act 1989 (NSW); Stephen Bottomley, Kath Hall, Peta Spender, 
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14 John Braithwaite, Neoliberalism of capitalism (2005) 
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Emergence of the Modern Regulatory State (Public Affairs Press, 1963). 
15 David Osborne & Ted Gaebler, Reinvesting Government (Addison-Wesley, 1992). 
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and private sphere, which ‘efficiently delivered and exposed (market) competition’.
16
 Guided 
by the emergence of neoliberal deregulation philosophies, Australian regulators have ascribed 
to the regulatory norms proposing that governments must ‘steer’ rather than ‘row’ economies 
in its regulatory policymaking.
17
 
‘Steering’ the flow of events in regulation necessarily involves decisions about outcomes as 
they relate to the public and private sphere—that is, what is ‘good’ and, consequently, 
‘effective’ regulation. A response to the question of ‘good regulation’ is offered by Breyer.
18
 
Breyer’s methodology is essentially linear and functional in defining a problem, method and 
objective in regulation. However, this is a broad framework focusing on economic regulation 
and does not offer a sophisticated analysis of the impact of the regulatory objective. Breyer’s 
methodology has been criticised as insufficient to manage contemporary regulatory issues that 
are presented to legislators.
19
 
Kolieb introduces the concept of enforcement as an aspect of regulatory intention, to compel 
and hold accountable actors within the regulatory system.
20
 However, while compliance is an 
element of the regulatory process, it is not, in and of itself, the definition and exclusive use of 
‘good regulation’ regulation.
21
 The ‘better regulation’ movement has emerged over the past 
two decades as an attempt to make a terminological and philosophical switch from 
deregulation to ‘better regulation’.
22
 The concept argues that ‘better regulation’ is necessary 
and that only bad regulation, as opposed to regulation in general, was burdensome.
23
 Freiberg 
identifies the development of ‘better’ regulatory strategies, including responsive regulation 
and risk-based regulation which has given recognition to the importance of ‘evidence and 
consultation in the regulatory cycle and a more systematic and principled approach to 
compliance and enforcement’.
24
 In contrast, Levi-Faur confines the definition of regulation to 
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24 Freiberg, above n 3, 157.  
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‘prescriptive rules and the monitoring and enforcement of these rules by social, business and 
political sectors on other social, business and political actors’.
25
 
The elements to encourage ‘better’ and more effective regulation include: 
1) clarifying regulatory objectives and definitions of problems 
2) ensuring that regulatory objectives are achieved effectively 
3) identifying alternative options for achieving desired objectives.26 
The regulatory objectives of the State in Queensland’s UGR regulatory regime is analysed in 
Chapter 3 and alternative regulatory tools as options for change in Chapters 4 and 5. 
2.3 Rule-Based and Principles-Based Regulation Compared 
The regulation of UGR resources can be characterised by the use of either rule-based 
regulation, typically consisting of detailed prescriptive and coercive rules, or principles-based 
regulation, which is outcome orientated relying on broadly stated principles or objectives. 
Formal rules are an efficient way to organise modern and complex communities. As Freiberg 
states, rules ‘guide behaviour, communicate information or values and can represent public 
declarations of principles or policies’.
27
 Rules can also enhance legitimacy via increased 
compliance and elevating a regulatory decision beyond the decision-makers. 
However, rule-based regulation holds limitations. The simple adoption of rules in legislation 
does not necessary ensure compliance nor does rule-based regulation demonstrate 
measurement or consideration of alternative, less interventionist controls in enforcement 
strategy.
28
 Rules are not self-interpreting or self-enforcing and, thus, there is often a 
difference between legislation as ‘law in the books’ and the application of ‘law in action’—
legislation operative in managing specific regulatory problems.
29
 Therefore, the formal design 
of rule-based regulation may not attend to implementation and enforcement issues. 
                                                 
25 David Levi-Faur, Handbook on the Politics of Regulation (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011) 122.  
26 Robert Baldwin, ‘Better Regulation: Tensions Abroad the Enterprise’ in Stephen Weatherill, Better Regulation 
(Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007) 27, 34. 
27 Arie Freiberg, The Tools of Regulation (Federation Press, 2010). 
28 Baldwin, above n 23. 




 also notes the problems of a lack of responsiveness inherent in rule-
based regulation: 
There is a natural tension between designing specific laws and regulations to deal 
with problems that emerge at a point in time and building in flexibility to cope with 
changing market circumstances as they arise. Laws that are less predictable in their 
immediate application may nevertheless prove more reliable over time as they are 
adapted through the judicial process to encompass novel developments…the more 
tightly specified our laws, the more likely they are to lag behind developments in 
markets and possibly act against the long-term interest.
31
 
Rules are defined by Baldwin as a ‘general norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a 
given type of situation’.
32
 The purpose of rule-based legislation can be broadly described as 
detailed and prescriptive ‘command and control’
33
 regulation. Rule-based legislation has 
historically been adopted and supported by the petroleum sector, borne out of the need to 
ensure coercive compliance of natural resource sectors. This creates a petroleum regulatory 
landscape consisting of a suite of primary and subordinate legislation and administrative and 
policy decisions to regulate the licensing, exploration and development of petroleum. 
According to Freiberg, rule-based or prescriptive regimes are most appropriate where there is 
a single, commonly agreed means of controlling a hazard or risk.
34
 However, rule-based 
natural resource legislation tends to require new rules ‘every time a new regulatory situation 
arises’,
 35
 such as the creation of new technologies giving rise to new stakeholder conflicts of 
interest, which may add complexity, delay and duplication in a regulatory framework. 
Traditionally, regulators have relied upon rule-based regulation as a statement of a rule that 
specifies in relatively precise terms what is required to be done. In this case, enforcement 
focuses upon adherence to the rules and standards that are presumed to bring about the 
regulatory aim.
36
 Traditionally, rule-based regulation has been adopted in sectors where risks 
to public health, safety and wellbeing are an issue.
37
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In contrast, principles-based regulation is outcome orientated and describes the method of 
achieving a regulatory outcome by setting a general objective, standard or duty without 
specifying the means of achieving that outcome in absolute terms. This encourages 
consideration of alternative regulatory methods in the ‘better regulation toolkit’,
38
 in which 
other administrative bodies and quasi-judicial entities may interpret the meaning of regulatory 
principles and drive enforcement of regulation. As stated by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission: 
Principles-based regulation can be distinguished from rules-based regulation in that 
it does not necessarily prescribe detailed steps that must be complied with, but rather 
sets an overall objective that must be achieved. In this way, principles-based 
regulation seeks to provide an overarching framework that guides and assists 
regulated entities to develop an appreciation of the core goals of the regulatory 
scheme. A key advantage of principles-based regulation is its facilitation of 
regulatory flexibility through the statement of general principles that can be applied 
to new and changing situations. It has been said that such a regulatory framework is 
exhortatory in that it emphasises a ‘do the right thing’ approach and promotes 
compliance with the spirit of the law.
39
 
The application of rule-based compared to principles-based regulation has been an ongoing 
scholarly debate applied to the measure of effective regulation.
40
 Specifically, in the context 
of the petroleum sector, a regulatee may be the subject of overlapping or competing rules 
derived from federal, state and local governments or from different government agencies in 
respect of one activity or business. It is this tendency towards prescription rather than 
interpretation that creates the main criticism and limitation of a rule-based legislation system. 
A central critical element of rule-based regulatory systems is the promulgation of detailed 
rules to regulate behaviour which can give rise to regulatory inconsistencies, rigidity and the 
event of ‘creative compliance’ and ‘box ticking’ exercises and, thus, undermine the regulatory 
objectives of the regime while following detailed rules ‘to the letter’ and finding ways to 
‘evade their spirit’.
41
 Thus, Baldwin identifies rule-based regulation as inappropriate to 
address regulatory issues in a changing and complex sector.
42
 This is due to the nature of 
over-prescriptive regulation encouraging ‘legalism’ and promoting delay by inhibiting a 
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dynamic approach in which regulatory strategies stay attuned to changing circumstances 
without the need to constantly revise regulation. However, the opposite it also true; under-
inclusive regulation will allow undesired activity to continue through incorrect problem 
identification, inadequate information or poor legislative drafting. Consequently, there is 
ongoing tension between the over-prescriptive and under-inclusive role of regulation and the 
role of the state in finding the correct balance between two extremes in creating ‘better’—that 
is, effective—regulation. 
Effective regulation states principles or objectives to set the standards by which natural 
resource companies conduct their operations.
43
 Principles are defined as ‘general rules…(that 
are) implicitly higher in the implicit or explicit hierarchy of norms than more detailed rules: 
they express the fundamental obligations that all should observe’.
44
 Under this form of 
regulation, there is a reference to general rules that express fundamental obligations that the 
participants should observe.
45
 Black illustrates that principles-based regulation relies on and 
reinforces the image of the self-observing responsible organisations.
46
 This involves a 
continuing regulatory discussion between regulators and proponents regarding the meaning 
and application of the rules. A measure of success of regulation is the trust in the competence 
and responsibility of the regulatees. 
Principles-based regulation encourages regulatees to assume responsible approaches beyond 
box-ticking by private stakeholders and towards ‘firms and their management [being] free to 
find the most efficient way of achieving the outcome required’.
47
 Principles-based regulation 
helps to avoid the practice of ‘creative compliance’ by incorporating reflexive, dynamic and 
continuous regulatory coordination and change, rather than the operation of a single fixed 
design.
48
 This produces a regulatory system that is more effective and sustainable in the face 
of changing circumstances and complex technological developments in industries such as 
petroleum exploration. Effective principles-based regulation also requires a close engagement 
relationship between regulators and stakeholders based on mutual trust, transparency and 
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encouraging proponents to go beyond minimal compliance. For example, dialogue, regulatory 
requirements, outcomes and goals are clearly communicated, understood and interpreted and, 




Principles-based regulation has received criticism as ‘light-touch’ regulation and, as such, is 
sufficiently discredited to demand a change of regulatory tack.
50
 Baldwin defends the 
principles-based regulatory paradigm in arguing that effective principles-based regulation 
allows regulators to concentrate not on compliance with precise rules, but on the proponent 
finding ways to manage the relevant risks to serve principles governing the system.
51
 
Conversely, rule-based regulation places the proponent as an adversary, constantly testing and 
finding methods to check and reinterpret regulatory inconsistencies, requiring constant 
amendments and updates to accommodate new legal issues. Whichever system of regulation a 
state chooses, it must be able to regulate the specific industry, but also respond to unique 
issues and conflicting stakeholder interests effectively.
52
 
Therefore, the principles of effective regulation suggests that opportunities for a ‘win-win’ 
regulatory outcome can be maximised so that, for instance, oil and gas corporations can 
behave responsively while maximising profits and rental return to the state.
53
 Regulatory 
implementation tools set the standards by which UGR activities are conducted and can form 




2.4 Regulatory Tools 
The concept of regulatory tools and approaches gained prominence in the 1990s as a theory 
used to analyse the extent to which regulatory behaviour and style is linked to the relationship 
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and distance between regulators and regulatees.
55
 Regulatory tools are defined as the wide 
array of instruments deployed by the state to deliver effective regulation and are often used as 
an indicia of the impact of regulatory measures.
56
 The Australian National Audit Office 
upholds the notion of regulatory instruments as ‘a key tool for achieving the social, economic 
and environmental policy objectives of governments’.
57
 
The concept of a regulatory tool or instrument of government action is broadly defined by 
Salamon as ‘an identifiable method through which collective action is structured to address a 
public problem’.
58
 Landry and Varone also offer a wide-ranging definition of regulatory tools 
as a ‘means of intervention by which government attempts to induce individuals and groups to 
make decisions and take actions compatible with public policies’.
59
 Morgan and Yeung 
classify regulatory tools via a number of differing instruments based on the modality of 
control of the sector being regulated, including command (rule-based legislation), competition 
(economic instruments), communication (social norms), consensus (contracts and self-
regulation) and code (techno regulation).
60
 
The rule-based regulation command and control style, previously discussed in Section 2.3, is 
a historically grounded tool of regulation whereby the state acts as legislator in its role of 
creating and enforcing laws.
61
 As previously discussed, Freiberg articulates that this style of 
regulation is flawed, based on the concept of government as rule-maker, as it fails to 
recognise state regulation of complex and non-linear approaches to achieving regulatory 
outcomes.
62
 A second flaw identified in the state as sole regulator is the failure to recognise 
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In comparison to rule-based regulation, theorists argue the role of effective and ‘better’ 
regulation incorporates the principle of the state for not only legislators, but also contractors, 
grantors, purchasers and controllers of the flow of information.
64
 This predisposes regulators 
to collaborate with other stakeholders to regulate and influence through a myriad of tools 
other than rules. Therefore, principles-based regulatory tools may be ongoing or continuous, 
through the granting of licensing approvals to undertake activities in specifically zoned areas, 
as is the case in the petroleum sector in agricultural land zones, to achieve a continuous 
regulatory effect to monitor private actors.
65
 
As highlighted by Wiseman in the US context, effective regulation must select the appropriate 
regulatory tool to create efficient regulation: 
If we are to rely on experimentation as a justification for federalism, as well as a tool 
to create better, more efficient, and fairer policy, then we must ensure that a solid 
information baseline emerges along with the experiment. Without this guarantee, the 
regulatory islands described here will continue to experiment blindly and in 
isolation, to the detriment of their constituents and the nation as a whole.
66
 
Within the theoretical underpinnings of rule-based or principles-based regulation are the 
specific functional tools that may be selected by regulators to enact regulatory policy and 
improve the quality of the regulatory environment. According to Freiberg, governments can 
be regarded as having many roles—‘as authorisers, facilitators, economic actors, trading 
partners and information providers’.
67
 The tools of government that can be employed to 
produce behaviour change include economic, transactional, authorisation, informational and 
structural. 
Regulatory tools for the oversight of petroleum exploitation selected by the state traditionally 
incorporates ‘authorisation’.
68
 The authorisation method deploys six key regulatory tools—
licensing, permits, registration, certification, accreditation and litigation.
69
 Chapters 4 and 5 of 
this thesis provide a detailed analysis of authorisation regulatory tools utilised in Queensland 
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such as petroleum licensing, registration of land use zoning permits, land access agreements 
as contractual certification to undertake UGR activities on agricultural land and litigation 
avenues during land use and land access agreements. 
2.5 Regulatory Failures 
Regulatory failure, considered broadly, occurs when ‘the law imposes unnecessary 
complexity costs on diffuse, poorly organized groups to the advantage of politically 
influential groups that benefit from that complexity…by re-evaluating existing regulations 
agencies can simplify their rules and ease unnecessary regulatory burdens’.
70
 Black classifies 
regulatory failures as a subset of policy failures resulting from the ‘unintended and unforeseen 
consequences of the design and/or operation of a regulatory system and its interactions with 
other systems’.
71
 Regulatory failures typically arise from poor regulatory design, poor 
regulatory tool choice and failure to achieve a broadly defined goal or set of goals.
72
 
Regulatory failure then broadly encompasses the inability to satisfy underlying policy 
objectives, creating unnecessary costs and eroding the general confidence in the regulatory 
system and the rule of law itself.
73
 Freiberg identifies the key attributable attributes of 
regulatory failure as: 
1) regulatory bad design 
2) inadequate consultation 
3) poor or ineffective implementation 
4) conflict and confusion 
5) failure to clearly identify appropriate targets for regulation 
6) poor tool choice 
7) poor or ambiguous rules or laws 
8) ambiguity in forms of regulation 
9) procedural injustice 
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10) regulatory capture.74 
These ten attributes provide a comprehensive framework to identify and codify regulatory 
failure. 
Thus, regulatory failures inherently stems from bad regulatory design and poor tool choice 
and results in ambiguous rules, poor of ineffective implementation, failure of clear targets and 
conflict and confusion and procedural injustice. 
First, regulatory conflict emerges when regulation of the same conduct is applied by 
numerous different regulators at the local, state and federal level. This can result in differing 
objectives, techniques and tools which may create duplication, complexities and 
contradictions that work against the achievement of the regulatory outcome.
75
 Second, poor 
tool choice emerges where the regulatory tool chosen does not align with or deliver a 
successful and effective framework to achieve the specific policy objective of the state.
76
 
Learning from regulatory failure due to poor tool choice and bad regulatory design in 
particular creates a basis for functional exchange between jurisdictions with similar 
institutional structures, socio-historic foundations and sector-specific regulatory imperatives, 
forming readily transferrable alternative regulatory designs.
77
 By undertaking an analysis of 
the Queensland regulatory framework in the following chapters it is possible to learn from 
regulatory failures to ensure improvement in future regulation of land use and land access. 
Regulatory gaps appear when regulatory responsibilities between multiple legislation and 
governmental agencies are not clear and regulatory failure, due to bad regulatory design and 
poor tool choice, is evident.
78
 One of the outcomes of regulatory gaps in the petroleum sector 
is highlighted by the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association (APPEA): 
There has been considerable public confusion around the respective responsibilities 
of the Federal and State Governments, and of State Departments, for overseeing 
regulatory inspections, assessments and approvals. It is essential for effective and 
efficient regulation of critical supply industries, and for effective and efficient 
                                                 
74 Freiberg, above n 3, 489. 
75 Peter Grabosky, ‘Counterproductive Regulation’ (1995) 17(3) Law and Policy 257.  
76 Freiberg, above n 3. 
77 Clifford Winston, Government Failure versus Market Failure: Microeconomics Policy Research and 
Government Performance (2006, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies).  
78 Australian Productivity Commission, Review of Regulatory Burden on the Upstream Petroleum (Oil and Gas) 
Sector 2009 < https://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/upstream-petroleum/report/upstream-
petroleum.pdf>209. 
50 
governance, that the public and other stakeholders are able to identify and have 
confidence in the responsible regulator.
79
 
By identifying regulatory gaps and reviewing regulations, regulatory burdens can be 
identified to ascertain the basis of regulatory needs not being met by certain stakeholders. 
Regulatory burdens are defined as ‘burdens that can be removed without compromising 
desirable outcomes such as relating to resource management, the environment, heritage, 
development, land access and occupational health and safety’.
80
 The Australian Productivity 
Commission (PC) proposes criteria to reduce unnecessary regulatory burden through 
regulatory reforms: 
 streamline regulation by reducing the need for multiple agency approvals and remove 
duplication of assessment and reporting requirements 
 avoid, where possible, arrangements that involve multiple agencies and, where 
multiple agencies have to be involved, have in place clear administrative arrangements to 
avoid or minimise unnecessary overlap in regulatory functions 
 avoid unnecessary inconsistencies in regulatory requirements or decision-making 
within and across jurisdictions 
 provide regulators with clear regulatory objectives and minimise unnecessary conflicts 
of interest 
 consolidate specialist expertise and promote efficient use of resources.81 
Although these reforms were proposed and outlined by the PC in relation to the upstream 
offshore petroleum sector in Australia, the concepts of regulatory burden and gaps are equally 
applicable to Queensland’s upstream onshore UGR due to the similarities in licensing 
procedures, departmental oversight and regulatory overlap in both offshore and onshore UGR 
sectors in Australia. 
The upstream petroleum sector licensing regime involves a number of processes as described 
by Bunter: 
The identification by government of potential (upstream) petroleum investment 
opportunities in the national territory, their subdivision into discrete contract areas of 
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prospective size, their offering to the international oil companies by a suitable 
tendering process and the establishment and negotiation of technical, financial and 
contractual terms and conditions (for award) consistent with their petroleum 
prospectively and with the national interest.
82
 
Wiseman categorises ‘regulatory islands’ within the US, particularly in relation to oil and 
development, as regulatory states with inherent regulatory burden and gaps due to poor 
regulatory design. The classification of regulatory islands recognises the complexity of 
overlapping regulatory tools as ‘each state (in the US) has hundreds of regulations and 
statutory provisions, housed within hundreds of different portions of codes and statutes. Many 
local governments, too, have detailed oil and gas codes’.
83
 
A testament to Queensland as a regulatory island, within the Australian regulatory context, is 
the numerous UG regulatory reviews,
84
 legislative amendments and land access regime 
assessments commencing in the early 2000s.
85
 This may lead to the assessment of 
Queensland’s UGR regulatory regime as arguably one of the most complex, prescriptive and 
rule-based natural resource states in Australia, as examined in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
This thesis is confined to an analysis of petroleum authorisation regulatory tools in managing 
conflicting land interests in Queensland to ascertain whether any regulatory gaps or burdens 
are evident in Queensland’s current UGR regulatory regime. 
2.6 Petroleum Regulation 
The state holds sovereignty over its natural resources, as conferred in international law 
instruments such as the United Nations Human Rights Permanent Sovereignty over Natural 
Resources Resolution.
86
 Therefore, each state has at its disposal a suite of regulatory tools to 
implement its petroleum policy objectives through its selected legal framework. Petroleum 
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titles, approvals and contracts are examples of common regulatory tools of oil and gas 
activities involving overlapping and interjecting regulations.
87
 
As previously examined in Section 2.4, the regulator tool often applicable to natural resource 
sectors, including that of petroleum, is authorisation. Authorisation generally refers to the 
process of permitting a certain activity to take place, the absence of which would be a 
contravention of regulation.
88
 The petroleum industry authorises activities through the 
licensing and leasing system to allow certain activities to be undertaken and permitted, while 
some authorisations are exempt from certain activities. Exploration licences are a licence to 
‘explore for oil and gas in a particular area issued to a company by the governing 
jurisdiction’
89
 and a production licence
90
 is a licence to ‘produce oil or gas in a particular area 
issued to a company by the governing state authority’.
91
 Depending on a state’s regulatory 
framework, a number of state government departments, administrative authorities and judicial 
bodies may enforce and issue petroleum licences and permits.
92
 Authorisations recognise and 
legitimise state power over many forms of activities and ownership and control over natural 
resources. Authorisation is also a primary means of addressing information asymmetries, 
creating an environment of trust and is an essential element in preventative risk management. 
Freiberg identifies multiple objectives of an effective licensing system: 
 protecting the community 
 addressing information asymmetries 
 enhancing probity 
 promoting market stability 
 minimising or preventing harm 
 promoting order and facilitating enforcement 
 providing redress 
 recovering costs.93 
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Petroleum licensing systems, therefore, require regulators to assess the risk posed by a 
petroleum activity and differing levels of licenses and exclusions applicable based on the level 
of risk identified. The consequences of discrete risk levels relate to different regulatory 
oversight measures, differential fees and publication of petroleum licences for public scrutiny. 
This is compared to negative licensing as a form of regulation, where no licence or permit is 
required to enter a market, but a serious breach will be reprimanded with exclusive 
sanctions.
94
 Finally, the common elements and procedures in licensing schemes are as 
follows: 
 a regulatory authority 
 application procedures 
o setting out the methods of granting, amendment, transfer, renewal restoration and 
replacement of licences 
 determination of applications 
 specification of minimum standards 
 awarding of licences 
 specification of conditions 
o conditions attached to a licence are variable as to the requirements of the activity 
or industry 
 enforcement and sanctioning provisions 
o Licensing schemes contain specific enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms. 
Internal disciplinary procedures may be provided for either by the regulatory 
department of by semi-judicial tribunals and provide for the cancellation, 
suspension and variation of licences and disqualification form obtaining licence in 
the future. 
 appellate or review systems or bodies.95 
Petroleum legislation is a particular and specific form of natural resource regulation and 
consists of primary and subordinate legislation, policy decisions and guidelines. Petroleum 
legislation must not only regulate petroleum activities, but optimise the extraction of UGR in 
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a manner that is ‘transparent, predictable and consistent with the overarching petroleum 
objectives of that State’.
96
 
2.7 Petroleum Regulation in Queensland 
In the case of Queensland, since the early 2000s, successive state administrations have 
enacted petroleum policies that support the growth of the UGR industry as a major contributor 
to the state’s domestic and export economy via amendment to existing petroleum legislation. 
This leads to two specific considerations in respect to petroleum regulation in Queensland: 
1) the state has consistently encouraged the optimal extraction of petroleum to increase 
its resource base and LNG exports 
2) the state is also responsible for managing the extraction of petroleum and addressing 
conflicting interests, for example, the interests of agricultural land owners. 
Queensland’s current regulatory framework was developed in response to the rapid growth of 
the LNG industry since the mid-1990s.
97
 Petroleum policy in Queensland facilitates and 
regulates ‘the carrying out of responsible petroleum activities and the development of a safe, 
efficient and viable petroleum and fuel gas industry’.
98
 
Onshore UGR activities and production in Queensland falls within the scope of its petroleum 
legislation and is defined as petroleum in s 76K of the Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld) (PA Act) 
and s 299 of the PGPSA. The regulation of CSG, as a component of petroleum, falls under the 
scope of the PGPSA as the regulatory framework for the issuance of onshore petroleum 
permits for UG in Queensland. 
The PGPSA grants petroleum leases, as an example of a regulatory authorisation tool, to 
allow the petroleum tenure holder to explore for or produce petroleum or to test, develop or 
use a natural underground reservoir for storage of petroleum or a prescribed storage 
development in s 800 of the PGPSA. A petroleum tenure holder may construct and operate 
petroleum pipelines in the area of the petroleum lease according to s 803 and construct 
petroleum facility according to s 804 of the PGPSA.
99
 Depending on the licensing regulatory 
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framework, a petroleum licence may confer exclusive rights, for as long as the licence is 
valid, subject to certain conditions, the license holder is authorised to exercise the rights 
conferred in the license against third parties.
100
 
In Queensland’s case, the legislative framework for UGR activities land use and land access is 
characterised as a rule-based legislation. As previously discussed in this chapter, although 
both the PA Act and the PGPSA apply to the regulation of the extraction of UGR in 
Queensland, regulation primarily occurs under the PGPSA, as the PA Act only operates in 
some native title areas. The PGPSA operates by authorising the undertaking of petroleum and 
UGR projects upon private land.
101
 The PGPSA prohibits activities under the scope of the 
legislation, such as petroleum activities, and then grants firms a lease and administrative 
approval to conduct ‘authorised resource activities’ in a command and control rule-based 
regulatory system. By comparison, The Oil and Gas Activities Act
102
 (OGAA) in British 
Columbia permits application to the Oil and Gas Commission (OGC), in the form and manner 
required, for a permit for an oil and gas activity.
103
 
The rule-based UGR framework in Queensland requires the enactment of new legislation each 
time a new regulatory issue arises as ‘the PGPSA outlines, in minutiae, the “rules” for the 
extraction of UGR. Such rule-based regulation relies on legislatively entrenched rules to 
regulate petroleum activities’.
104
 As at 2017, the PGPSA consists of over 808 pages and 992 
sections and is just one of the seven resource Acts applicable to Queensland’s oil and gas 
regulatory regime.
105
 The PA Act, as the first instance of petroleum legislation in Queensland, 
was seen was seen as ‘inadequate’ for the regulation of the development of UGR, leading to 
the introduction of the much longer and more detailed amendments in the PGPSA.
106
 As a 
result of the changes to petroleum licensing and activities, the detailed PGPSA has required 
over 1,000 amendments with more than 40 consolidated versions released.
107
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There are various other regulatory instruments specific to the UGR industry in Queensland, 
including: 
a) Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) (P&G) Regulation 2004 
b) Code of Practice for Constructing and Abandoning Coal Seam Gas Wells and 
Associated Bores in Queensland 2013 
c) Code of Practice for Upstream Polyethylene (CSG) Gathering Networks 2011 
d) Competency Standard for the Petroleum and Gas Drilling Industry 2011 
e) Code of Practice for CSG well head emissions, detection and reporting 2011 
f) SafeOp for Petroleum and Gas 2013 
g) Underground Water Impact Report and Final Report Guideline 2013 
h) Baseline Assessment Guideline 2013 
i) Bore Assessment Guideline 2013 
j) Recycled Water Management Plan and Validation Guidelines 2008 
k) Recycled Water Management Plan Exemption Guideline 2011 
l) Coal Seam Gas Recycled Water Management Plan Guideline 2013 
m) Guideline Approval of a Resource for Beneficial Use 2012 
n) Coal Seam Gas Water Management Policy 2012 
o) Financial Assurance Guideline 2013.108 
In Queensland, the responsible overlapping regulatory bodies for the development of 
petroleum and administration of authorisation-based regulatory tools are the Department of 
Environment and Heritage Protection; Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and 
Planning (DILGP); and Department of Natural Resources and Mines. Petroleum licences are 
distinguished by area of control (premise and the nature of the public resource) and by time 
(the length of the authorisation).
109
 
2.8 The Application of Rule-Based and Principles-Based Approaches to 
Petroleum Regulation 
The myriad of overlapping legislation, regulatory instruments and administrative organs has 
led to ‘unnecessary regulatory burden’ creating ‘highly prescriptive regulations (which) may 
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not necessarily provide the confidence to the wider community being sought, particularly 
where the regulations are complex and not easily understood’.
110
 The rule-based suite of 
regulation in Queensland has ‘proven ineffective in achieving the desired policy objective’
111
 
of adapting to new regulation, creating a ‘steady accretion of new regulatory belts and 
braces’.
112
 This has resulted in the growing risk of unintended consequences and ‘perverse 
incentives’ as the original outcomes are buried ‘under sedimentary layers of fresh red tape’.
113
 
An example of the prescriptive nature of Queensland’s rule-based petroleum regulatory 
framework is evident in its Request for Tender (RFT) authorisation regime. The RFT process 
uses the work program method of legislation set out in ss 35–63 of the PGPSA. Division 3 of 
the PGPSA provides a general outline of work programs: 
45 Function and purpose 
(1) The work program for an authority to prospect gives detailed information about 
the nature and extent of activities to be carried out under the authority. 
(2) The purposes of giving the information are to— 
(a) allow resource management decisions to be made; and 
(b) ensure appropriate development of the authority. 
Subdivision 2—Requirements for proposed initial work programs 
46 Operation of sdiv 2 
This subdivision provides for requirements (the “initial work program 
requirements”) for a proposed work program for a proposed authority to prospect. 
47 Program period 
(1) The proposed program must state its period. 
                                                 
110 The relevant legislation for the regulation of petroleum activities in Queensland for the purpose of this thesis 
includes: the Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld); Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) and the 
Regional Planning Interest Act 2014 (Qld) which will be analysed comprehensively within Chapters four and 
five. 
111 Queensland Competition Authority (Qld), Final Report: Coal Seam Gas Review (January 2014) 
<http://www.qca.org.au/getattachment/aaaeab4b-519f-4a95-8a65-911bc46cc1d3/CSG-investigation.aspx> 20. 
112 Ibid, 22. 
113 Ibid, 26. 
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(2) The period must be the same as the required period under the relevant call for 
tenders. 
48 General requirements 
(1) The proposed program must provide for each of the following— 
(a) an overview of the activities proposed to be carried out under the authority or 
proposed authority during all of its term; 
(b) for each year of the program period— 
(i) the extent and nature of petroleum exploration and testing for petroleum 
production proposed to be carried out during the year; and 
(ii) generally where the activities are proposed to be carried out; and 
(iii) the estimated cost of the activities; 
(c) maps that show where the activities are proposed to be carried out; 
(d) any other information relevant to the matters mentioned in section 49; 
(e) reasons why the program is considered appropriate; 
(f) another matter prescribed under a regulation. 
(2) A regulation may impose requirements about the form in which the 
matters mentioned in subsection (1) must be given. 
(3) In this section—“year”, of the program period, means— 
(a) the period starting on the day the program period starts and ending on the first 
anniversary of that day; and 
(b) each subsequent period of 12 months or less during the program period, starting 
on each anniversary of that day and ending on— 
(i) the next anniversary of that day; or 




Subdivision 3—Criteria for deciding whether to approve proposed initial work 
programs 
49 Criteria 
(1) The matters that must be considered in deciding whether to approve a proposed 
initial work program include the appropriateness of the tenderer’s proposed work 
program, having regard to each of the following— 
(a) the potential of the proposed area of the authority to prospect for petroleum 
discovery; 
(b) the extent and nature of the proposed petroleum exploration; 
Examples— 
• proposed geological, geophysical or geochemical surveying 
• the number of petroleum wells the tenderer proposes to drill, and their type 
(c) when and where the tenderer proposes to carry out the exploration. 
(2) The matters mentioned in subsection (1) are the “work program criteria”. 
Subdivision 4—Requirements for proposed later work programs 
50 Operation of sdiv 4 
This subdivision provides for requirements (the “later work program 
requirements”) for a proposed work program for an authority to prospect. 
51 General requirements 
The proposed program must— 
(a) other than in relation to the program period, comply with the initial work 
program requirements; and 
(b) state the extent to which the current work program for the authority to prospect 
has been complied with; and 
(c) if there have been any amendments to the authority or the current work program, 
state— 
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(i) whether the changes have been incorporated in the proposed program; and 
(ii) any effect the changes have on the proposed program; and 
(d) state the effect of any petroleum discovery on the proposed program. 
52 Program period 
(1) The proposed program must state its period. 
(2) The period must not be longer than— 
(a) if the term of the rest, or the renewed term, of the authority is less than 4 years—
the rest of its term; or 
(b) if the term of the rest, or the renewed term, of the authority is 4 years or more, 
the following— 
(i) generally—4 years from the start of the period; 
(ii) if the Minister approves a longer period—the longer period. 
(3) However, the Minister can not approve a period longer than the rest 
of the term of the authority. 
The work programs regulations in the PGPSA are highly prescriptive in outlining detailed 
initial work programs (sub-div 2), the requirements for proposed later work programs (sub-
div 4) and the ministerial powers to approve or refuse the proposed program.
114
 Further, the 
footnotes indicate an applicant cross reference with a number of other provisions of the 
PGPSA detailing further information and document requirements including s 79 (Obligation 
to lodge proposed later work program), s 100 (Minister may add excluded land) and s 790. 
An example of a comparative petroleum regulatory framework that endeavours to use a 
principles-based regulatory approach is the granting of petroleum permits in British 
Columbia. Sections 23 and 24 of the OGAA contain the regulations relating to the grant of a 
petroleum permit: 
                                                 
114 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 57. 
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Application for permit and authorization 
24 (1) Subject to subsection (4), a person may apply to the commission for a permit 
by submitting, in the form and manner the commission requires, 
(a) a description of the proposed site of the oil and gas activity, 
(b) the information, plans, application form and records required by the commission, 
(c) a written report, satisfactory to the commission, regarding the results of the 
consultations carried out or notification provided under section 22, if any, 
(d) the prescribed information, 
(e) the prescribed records, and 
(f) the security required under section 30. 
(2) An application for a permit under subsection (1) may be consolidated with an 
application for an authorization. 
(3) Despite anything in a specified enactment, the commission may not grant an 
authorization to a person for a related activity unless the person holds, or has applied 
for, a permit for the oil and gas activity related to that related activity. 
(4) A person may not submit an application for a permit to drill or operate a well, 
other than a water source well, unless 
(a) the person is the owner of the petroleum and natural gas rights or is the holder of 
the location in respect of the well, 
(b) the person has an agreement with the owner or the holder of the location referred 
to in paragraph (a) authorizing the drilling or operation, as applicable, 
(c) the person is the holder of a storage reservoir lease issued under section 130 of 
the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, or 
(d) the minister has approved the submission under subsection (5). 
(5) For the purposes of subsection (4) (d), the minister may 
(a) approve the submission by a person of an application for a permit to drill a well 
if the well is to be drilled for exploratory or research purposes only, and 
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(b) in approving a submission under paragraph (a), declare that, if a permit is issued 
to the person on the basis of the submission, the person is not required to be an 
owner or holder referred to in subsection (4) or have the agreement referred to in 
that subsection in order to drill or operate the well for the purposes referred to in 
paragraph (a). 
Permits and authorizations issued by commission 
25 (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a person under section 24 and 
after considering 
(a) written submissions made under section 22 (5), if any, and 
(b) the government’s environmental objectives, if any have been prescribed for the 
purposes of this section, 
the commission may issue a permit to the person if the person meets the 
requirements prescribed for the purposes of this section. 
(1.1) The Lieutenant Governor in Council, by regulation, may issue a direction to 
the commission with respect to the exercise of the commission’s power under 
subsection (1), and the commission must comply with the direction despite any other 
provision of this Act, the regulations or an order made under this Act. 
(2) In issuing a permit under subsection (1), the commission 
(a) must specify the oil and gas activities the person is permitted to carry out, and 
(b) may impose any conditions on the permit that the commission considers 
necessary. 
(3) A permit and any authorizations granted to the applicant for the permit may be 
issued as a single document. 
(4) If the commission issues a permit under subsection (1), the commission must 
provide notice, in accordance with subsection (5), to the land owner of the land on 
which an operating area is located. 
(5) A notice under subsection (4) must 
(a) advise the land owner of the issuance of the permit and of the location of the 
proposed site of an oil and gas activity on the land owner’s land, and 
(b) state that the land owner may appeal under section 72 the decision to issue the 
permit, and include an address to which an appeal may be sent. 
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(6) A permit holder must not begin an oil and gas activity on a land owner’s land 
before the expiry of 15 days from the day the permit was issued, unless the land 
owner consents in writing to the activity beginning before the expiry of that period. 
The simplified principles-based approach of petroleum legislation in British Columbia creates 
a streamlined, transparent and predictable petroleum licence process. 
The OGAA contains comparatively brief principles-based petroleum legislation consisting of 
207 sections. The details for the regulation of oil and gas activities are outlined, including the 
administrative powers of the OGC, Oil and Gas Appeal Tribunal, permits for oil and gas 
activities, rights and obligations, compliance and enforcements, inspections and audits and 
contraventions and administrative penalties. Part 3 of the OGAA regulating oil and gas 
activities is split into two divisions representing 23 sections. The PNGA similarly consists of 
181 sections and regulates entry onto private land in 15 distinct sections. A comprehensive 
functional comparative analysis of land use and land access tools adopted in Queensland is 
provided in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
2.9 Environmental Regulatory Tools 
2.9.1 Environmental Impact Assessments 
The primary regulatory tool in relation to managing environmental impacts of UGR activities 
in Queensland is the EIA.
115
 The EIA is intended to create a proactive methodical process that 
investigates and predicts the potential direct, indirect and cumulative impacts of proposed 
project activities on environmental receptors, ideally from project initiation to 
decommissioning, and offers mitigation strategies.
116
 EIAs have been broadly employed as 
proactive decision support tools to diminish or mitigate the potential impact connected with 
any developmental activities.
117
 The EIA has three key features to manage environmental 
impacts of resource activities including: 
                                                 
115 Major mining and petroleum projects can be required to undergo an environmental impact statement (EIS) 
process preceding, and additional to, the draft environmental authority stage. The Environmental Protection 
Act 1994 (Qld) regulates the Environmental Impact Assessment Process.  
116 European Commission Directorate-General XI, Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection. Study on the 
Assessment of Indirect and Cumulative Impacts, as well as Impact Interactions NE80328/D2/2 (1999) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/eia/eia-studies-and-reports/pdf/volume1.pdf>.  
117 Judith Pini, Statutory Obligations for Environmental Impact Assessment in Queensland (Queensland 
Parliamentary Library, 1997); Samantha Hepburn, Mining and Energy Law (Cambridge University Press, 
2015); Michael Walton, ‘Climate change, coal mining and environmental impact assessment: are new Galilee 
Basin coal mines required to assess downstream greenhouse gas impacts?’ (2011) 17(80) Queensland 
Environmental Practice Reporter 287.  
64 
1) helping to identify the positive and negative impacts to the environment in the short- 
and long-term 
2) decreasing or offsetting the undesirable impacts of an activity leading to a reduction in 
environmental degradation 
3) monitoring to control and manage the level of project implementation and the degree 
of successfulness of the environmental protection measures.
118
 
An application for a petroleum authority under the PGPSA will be considered in parallel with 
an application for the required Environmental Authority (EA) under the EPA. Before a 
petroleum titleholder can be given an EA, the EPA requires that the project’s likely 
environmental impacts be assessed and measures proposed to avoid or minimise any adverse 
impacts.
119
 The broad aim of the EPA is to achieve an ‘integrated management program that 
is consistent with ecologically sustainable development’.
120
 
An Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) may be carried out voluntarily or where it meets 
the ‘trigger criteria’ under the guidelines of the EPA. Petroleum resource activities may only 
be carried out by a person holding or operating under an EA issued under the EPA and a 
resource tenement granted under the PGPSA. The trigger criteria for petroleum activities are 
contained in s 143 of the EPA, stating that an EIS may be required for a site-specific 
application for a petroleum activity if: 
 s 142 does not apply121 
 the application does not relate to a coordinated project under the State Development 
and Public Works Organisation Act 1971(Qld) 
 an EIS under the EPA has not been submitted. 
EA applications for resource activities may either be standard applications, variation 
applications or site-specific applications. Only site-specific applications for new resource 
activities (‘greenfield’ sites) or the amendment of existing EAs (‘brownfield’ sites) require a 
                                                 
118 Navid Rikhtegar, Nabiollah Mansouri, Amir Adhadi Oromemieh, Simona Kildiene, ‘Environmental impact 
assessment based on group decision-making methods in mining projects’ (2014) Economic Research 27(1) 
278. 
119 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) ch 5. 
120 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 3. 
121 Section 142 of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) states that an EIS must be required for a site-
specific mining application in a wild river high preservation area or in a wild river special flood management 
area, unless: it is for specified works under the Wild Rivers Act 2005 (Qld); the application relates to a 
coordinated project under the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) (SDPWO 
Act); or an EIS under the EP Act has already been submitted. 
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decision to be made whether an EIS is required under the EPA. Large-scale impacts 
associated with a resource project commonly require site-specific applications that trigger 
assessment by EIS. The scale (i.e., relative magnitude) of an impact is determined by its 
intensity, duration, irreversibility and the risk of environmental harm and social and economic 
impacts. 
The EPA will require an EIS if a UGR project holds ‘state significance’ pursuant to the State 
Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) s 55: 
If it appears to the Governor in Council in respect of a proposal for the development 
of the mineral or energy resources of the State or a proposal for the processing or 
handling of such resources that— 
(a) such development, processing or handling will be of major economic 
significance to the State; or 
(b) the provision of infrastructure for or in relation to such development, processing 
or handling— 
(i) would place an excessive financial burden on the resources of the State or on the 
residents of the State or of any part thereof; or 
(ii) would significantly affect the priorities as existing at the material time for the 
provision of services and facilities by the Crown or any local body; the Governor in 
Council may, on the recommendation of the Minister, approve that an investigation 
of the proposal be undertaken by the Coordinator-General with a view to 
establishing whether the proposed development, processing or handling should be 
declared to be a prescribed development. 
The EIA of petroleum activities is undertaken by the Department of Environment and 
Resource Management in issuing the necessary EA under the EPA. Where the petroleum 
activity is classified as a ‘level 1 chapter 5A activity’, being one that bears a medium to high 
risk of causing serious environmental harm, an EA application must be accompanied by an 
environmental management plan. After receipt of the application, a decision is made by the 
determining authority as to whether an EIS is required.
122
 
Petroleum activities are exempt from the need for local government development approvals 
which would otherwise be required under the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) and, as with mining 
activities, do not require state agency vegetation clearing approval. The environmental impact 
                                                 
122 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 310E. 
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of UGR exploitation is not the focus of this thesis. Rather, a detailed analysis of the 
authorisations process to undertake UGR activities on agricultural land
123
 is considered 
throughout Chapters 4 and 5. 
2.9.2 Adaptive Management 
One of the most critical elements of natural resource regulation is recurrent decisions—
decisions that need to be made on a regular basis in response to changing conditions and 
priorities with the aim of reducing ecological uncertainty.
124
 Adaptive management holds its 
origins as technical scientific environmental management methodology for the management 
of complex ecosystems by ‘monitoring the results of a suite of management initiatives’.
125
 
Adaptive management was first described by Beverton and Holt in the environmental sector 




 and Walters and 
Hilborn
128
 further refined and theorised the framework for ‘adaptive resource management’. 
Adaptive management continues to be applied frequently to the monitoring and mitigation of 
risks in the fisheries, forestry and engaged species sectors.
129
 
Adaptive management is traditionally an environmental management theoretical approach 
which, ‘seeks insights into the behavior of ecosystems…and incorporates and integrates 
concepts such as social learning, operations research, economic values, and political 
differences with ecosystem monitoring, models, and science’.
130
 The concept is designed to 
support action in environmental management issues facing limitations of scientific knowledge 
and complexities of large ecosystems.
131
 Therefore, adaptive management is typically utilised 
as an overarching management goal without the context of creating environmental 
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management policies to assist in learnings of ‘complex ecological systems by monitoring the 
results of a suite of management initiatives’.
132
 
Adaptive management theory was expanded significantly by Lee, who positioned adaptive 
management beyond the environmental sector in his application of the theory to the political 
and social sciences.
133
 However, according to Williams, ‘many in natural resources 
conservation now claim, sometimes inappropriately, that adaptive management is the 
approach they commonly use in meeting their resource management responsibilities’.
134
 
William’s statement alludes to the fact that adaptive management is not correctly categorised 
as an approach to guide regulation—rather, it is an environmental management protocol.
135
 
Two alternating approaches in the application of adaptive management framework by states 
have been classified as either passive or active adaptive management.
136
 Passive adaptive 
management outlines a single preferred course of action based on existing information and 
understanding. Outcomes of management actions are then monitored and subsequent 
decisions are adjusted based on the outcomes.
137
 This approach contributes to environmental 
management, but it is limited in its ability to enhance scientific and management capabilities 
for conditions that exceed the course of action selected.
138
 By contrast, an active adaptive 
management approach reviews information before management actions are taken. A range of 
competing alternative system models of ecosystem and related responses (e.g., demographic 
changes and recreational uses), rather than a single model, are then developed. Utilising an 
active adaptive management approach, options are then chosen based upon evaluations of 
these alternative models. 
Adaptive management has been identified as a concept of environmental management ‘widely 
promoted and widely misunderstood’.
139
 This is due to adaptive management being adopted 
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by states without clear identification of appropriate measures and targets for regulation 
creating ineffective implementation and ambiguity in the application of the concept. To be 
successful, adaptive management must have clear measures and objectives, rather than 
serving as a measure to create excessive regulation creating burdens and gaps. A stated by 
Jones, adaptive management: 
[it i]s an approach that ensures management not only plans and carries out actions to 
achieve objectives, but also measures the results so that everyone can see what’s 
working and what’s not, and consequently make informed decisions and adjustments 
to enhance the achievement of objectives and the delivery of desired outcomes.
140
 
Therefore, when applying an adaptive management approach to regulation, it is important to 
ensure sufficient flexibility and responsiveness within the broader regulatory framework. As 
examined in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, regulation grounded in objective principles must adopt a 
sufficiently flexible approach in creating a regulatory framework that can remain objectively 
applicable and relevant in a variety of changing conditions. Similarly, active adaptive 
management approach must ‘embrace complexity’
141
 by presenting broad objective principles 
that allow for responsiveness to a range of regulatory conditions without the state needing to 
amend its regulatory approach. The absence of an appropriately flexible adaptive management 
regulatory scheme can create ‘costly implementation failures’,
142
 for example, through 
legislative overhauls and the administration of multiple regulatory agencies. 
Therefore, although a key motivation of adaptive management is to improve regulation by 
reducing structural uncertainty, its success can be impeded by a failure to adapt to social and 
institutional changes that inevitably occur over time. A well-designed active adaptive 
management regulatory approach provides the opportunity for learning at both levels, 
recognising that learning often occurs on different time scales. Thus, technical learning occurs 
in a context of relatively short-term objectives, alternatives and predictive models. However, 
learning about the decision process itself occurs through periodic, but less frequent 
assessment of these factors as they evolve in response to management actions and 
environmental conditions. 
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Consequently, effective active adaptive management regulation has been typically confined to 
small-scale projects limited to environmental management issues, for example, water 
management of the Murray-Darling Basin. Regulation with an inflexible, prescriptive and 
rule-based approach is unlikely to provide effective petroleum regulation as adaptive 
environmental management is not a ‘one size fits all solution’.
143
 Swayne also identifies that 
adaptive management is not automatically classified ‘an active decision-making framework 
nor does it make the decision making process easier’
144
 as an active adaptive management 
approach ‘evaluates alternative options on the assumption that decisions will be made and 
enacted, rather than avoided’.
145
 Swayne identifies the hallmarks of evaluation for successful 
and active adaptive managing including clearly defining: 
 What are the management objectives and the key desired outcomes for the regulatory 
system? 
 What are the appropriate strategies and actions to be taken to achieve the objectives 
and key desired outcomes? 
 What range of potential performance indicators can be used to monitor or measure the 
effectiveness of the management approach? 
 How will what is learnt be used in deciding what to do? And critically, who will be 




2.9.3 Queensland’s Adaptive Management Regulatory Approach 
As a regulatory technique, adaptive management was adopted by Queensland regulatory 
bodies as an ‘off the shelf’ solution to the technical nature of natural resource legislation. This 
regulatory approach was likely selected due to adaptive management theory holding its 
origins in scientifically challenging policy and regulatory issues operating in a regulatory 
environment of uncertainty surrounding the cumulative impacts and multitude of stakeholder 
interests the state is required to manage. Issues of scientific uncertainty have continually faced 
UGR, as evident in the establishment of the Independent Expert Scientific Committee on Coal 
Seam Gas and Large Coal Mining Development in 2012, established by the Environment 
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Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBCA), providing scientific 
advise the State on the impact that UGR activities may have in Australia’s water resources. 
Queensland states its adaptive management approach recognises the uncertain impacts of 
UGR activities and puts in place a system ‘to monitor the industry and instigate change where 
required’.
147
 The object of this approach is to ‘ensure the government is able to respond to 
what happens on the ground and protect the environment’.
148
 Queensland’s current UGR 
regulation operates a myriad of amendments superimposed onto the existing legal duties. 
Queensland’s adoption of adaptive management as the overarching approach to its UGR 
regulation may be passive and inflexible, as evident in its enactment of numerous 
retrospective and overlapping regulations after specific UGR inquiries, such as the MERCPA 
in response to the Land Access Committee Report of 2012.
149
 
To illustrate this point of retroactive regulatory enactment, a 2006 internal report by the 
Principal Policy Officer of the Queensland Department of Mines and Energy claimed, ‘the 
evidence has grown that this industry (UGR) is being developed faster than the capabilities of 
the authorities to moderate the potential downsides’.
150
 As examined in Sections 2.3 and 2.5 
the use of rule-based regulation creates high administrative and compliance costs due to 
uncertainty and conflict in a regulatory framework. Passive adaptive management is arguably 
an output of an ineffective rule-based approach which results in inappropriate tool selection, 
regulatory bad design and poor implementation due to ambiguity in regulation.
151
 
Consequently, Queensland’s approach does not necessarily exhibit all the necessary hallmarks 
of an active adaptive management approach due to its rule-based nature, evident in multitude 
of amendments to the PGPSA since its enactment in 2004.
152
 
Application of an adaptive management amendment is also found in the 2013 amendments to 
the EPBCA s 25 to include a ‘water trigger’ of UGR and large coal mine developments that 
have or are likely to have a ‘significant impact’ on a water resource. However, the EPBCA 
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amendments were without the benefit of a Regulation Impact Statement—prepared to assess 
the impact and benefits of legislative amendments. Due to a lack of scrutiny of the ‘water 
trigger’ amendments and the large application in scope of the new provisions encompassing 
48 existing projects, an independent review was undertaken of the operation, appropriateness, 
effectiveness and efficiency of the new amendments. The review identified that the ‘water 
trigger’ conditions applied to the impacts to water development are often uncertain and carry 
significant risks in terms of consequences.
153
 
Although an active adaptive management approach, when properly implemented into 
regulation, can create an objective principles-based framework and provide assistance in 
complex and uncertain sectors, without clear objectives, performance indicators or criteria for 
evaluation adaptive management is likely to be classified as passive and ineffective.
154
 
The Queensland Government considers that the current approach of adaptive management 
will allow UGR projects to proceed while protecting the environment and stakeholders.
 155
 
However, it is clear that the Queensland regulatory approach is designed to facilitate these 
resource extraction projects while assuming the regulatory approach will be changed, to an 
appropriate level and within a sufficient timeframe, to avoid any adverse impacts or 
outcomes. 
2.10 The Public and Private Ownership Divide and its Application to UGR 
Natural resources are subject to a state’s property regime under either public or private 
ownership. The adoption of one of these ownership regimes for the management and 
exploitation of natural resources is largely a consequence of history and legislative context. 
The public ownership of subsurface natural resources is formally justified on the grounds that 
it provides governments with economic benefits that may be distributed for community 
benefit. On this basis, a public resource framework assumes that while land may be subject to 
public or private ownership, the natural resources residing within the land are owned by the 
state and this entitlement is formalised through the implementation of explicit statutory 
vesting provisions. 
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Private landowners in a public resource framework retain common law entitlements to the 
surface estate. Public resources are conceptually disaggregated from the bundle of rights that 
make up the land estate despite corporeal integration. Onshore petroleum resources are owned 
by the Crown in Commonwealth legal jurisdictions. However, the exploitation of these 
resources is rarely undertaken by the state alone due to the high investment of public capital 
and risk. Therefore, the development of petroleum establishes a relationship between state and 
private corporations granted petroleum exploration and production titles or leases. 
However, in assigning property rights to the private sector for the exploration, development 
and production activities in return for royalties as capital to be expended for the public good, 
the Crown still owes a ‘duty of development’ in the public interest.
156
 The core objective of a 
public resource system is for the state to encourage cooperation and, in so doing, minimise 
conflicting interests and satisfy public interest duties. Under these circumstances, the 
challenge for the government regulator involves allocating and managing resources in the 
public interest for financial and economic returns and protecting natural resources on an 
ongoing basis. 
Public resource ownership in Australia and Canada is grounded on the principle that resource 
rents and royalties collected by the state in the private development of petroleum will be 
managed for the benefit of the public as a whole. As argued by Hepburn, the assumed role of 
the state as ‘public guardian’ of resources must necessarily include a thorough evaluation of 
all competing interests.
157
 A critical element in this process is the inclusion of any affected 
private landholders. Public interest responsibilities must be satisfied where it is clear that 
resource development decisions are not subject to equitable and transparent land access 
arrangements with private landholders.
158
 Due to a presumption ‘grounded in coded 
behaviour’,
159
 it is presumed the public regulatory framework and state ownership of natural 
resources is preferable to private ownership. This raises the question of whether fairness in the 
costs and benefits of management to all members of society is maximised and achieved by 
controlled ownership of public resources in the state. 
                                                 
156 Samantha Hepburn, ‘Public Resource Ownership and Community Engagement in a Modern Energy Landscape’ 
(2017) 34 Pace Environmental Law Review 379, 379. 
157 Hepburn, ibid, 379. 
158 Hepburn, ibid, 379. 
159 Hepburn, ibid, 379, 382. 
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The complexity of onshore UGR expansion has given rise to academic discourse to expand 
the public interest responsibilities owed by the state as a public resource owner.
160
 This is due 
to the lack of regulatory oversight and thorough evaluation of all competing interests in a 
vigorous investigation by the state of the benefit and utility of each resource development 
proposal. Therefore, public interest in the development of resource development naturally 
leads to precautionary principles-based regulation to manage conflicting stakeholder interests. 
The current regulation of UG activities between the state, as the owner of all onshore 
petroleum resources vested by relevant legislation in the state and the Commonwealth as 




As the state must not only regulate petroleum exploration and activities, but also respond to 
the unique conflicting interests between private firms and private landholders, principles-
based regulation takes into consideration variable petroleum policies and the need for 
certainty and transparency of conditions for private landholders engaging with petroleum 
firms. Therefore, the legal and administrative framework of UGR must be constructed as a 
function of state petroleum frameworks to accomplish the effective management of its 
petroleum resources. 
Sovereignty is tightly linked to the emergence of the modern state and the peculiarities of the 
powers it exercises.
162
 Due to its doctrinal underpinnings, sovereignty operates as a 
legitimising concept depending on who is deemed to be the holder of sovereignty. The legal 
dimension of sovereignty refers to the limits of power exercised by the holders of 
sovereignty.
163
 These three elements of sovereignty may be viewed in conjunction with the 
principle of exclusivity, in that the sovereign state is a territorial institution due to its 
exclusive authority within the geographic perimeter of its territory, both horizontally and, in 
the case of UG, vertically.
164
 Sovereignty remains a complex topic, particularly in nations 
with indigenous native title territories that are not subject to Crown law. 
                                                 
160 Frederick Cubbage, Jay O’Laughlin, M. Nils Peterson, Natural Resource Policy (Waveland Press, 2016); 
Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Sarah F. Bates, The Evolution of Natural Resources Law and Policy (American 
Bar Association, 2010); James R. Rasband, James Salzman, Mark Squillace, Sam Kalen, Natural Resources 
Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 2016). 
161 The comparative law and legal structures of Australia and Canada is analysed in Chapter three of this thesis. 
162 Bertrand de Jouvenel, Sovereignty: An Inquiry Into the Political Good (Cambridge University Press, 1957). 
163 Barbara Delcourt, ‘Sovereignty’ in Mark Bevir (ed) Encyclopaedia of Governments (SAGE Knowledge, 2014).  
164 Karen Litfin, ‘Sovereignty in world Ecopolitics’ (1997) 41 Mershon International Studies Review 167. 
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Following from early critiques of the notion of sovereignty, a challenge to the concept of 
‘absolute’ sovereignty led to the conception of political power, asserting that a political 
society is a voluntary association of people who are the genuine holders of sovereignty.
165
 The 
concept of sovereignty gives the state the right to declare ownership, as compared to the 
Commonwealth sovereign right to offshore natural resources beyond the territorial sea of 12 
nautical miles and to the outer limits of the continental shelf.
166
 This redefinition of the shift 
of political power challenged the notion of the ‘top down’ institutional sovereignty approach 
to governance in favour of the ‘bottom up’ approach granting power to civic society with 
collective rights.
167
 The national dimension of external sovereignty can also be viewed 
through the same lens. 
According to the principle of self-determination, external political authorities are not entitled 
to interfere in the political, social and economic choices made by the citizens of a country—
termed negative sovereignty.
168
 Foreign policies and diplomatic activities are supposed to 
serve the interests of the nation as positive sovereignty and national interests are also deemed 
to determine the conditions under which a state will participate in international organisations 
or activities as operational sovereignty.
169
 
Federal and state/provincial governments hold two roles in the development of their 
petroleum and natural gas resources. Firstly, as owners of resources, the federal government 
has a responsibility to develop the mineral and petroleum resources for the benefit of the state 
and its citizens. As the regulator, the various state governments have a responsibility to 
develop these resources legally and equitably. The development of a Commonwealth state’s 
UGRs are typically undertaken by private companies. Governments grant various types of 
mining titles over natural resources to private companies so that resource exploration and 
production can be undertaken. Additionally, the government regulates the mining activities to 
ensure the safety of the activities and compliance with relevant mining laws in each state. In 
return for providing mining companies with access to these resources, the relevant 
government collect taxes and/or royalties. 
                                                 
165 Dusan Pavlovic, Rousseau’s Theory of Sovereignty (PhD Thesis, Department of Political Science, Central 
European University, 1997).  
166 Offshore Petroleum Act 2006 (Cth) s 3. 
167 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of 
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2.11 Conclusion 
The theoretical and regulatory conceptual underpinnings of this thesis have been detailed in 
this chapter. The leading theories of principles-based and rule-based regulation applied to 
petroleum regulation have been examined in conjunction with an analysis of the evolving 
concept of adaptive environmental management now applied as a regulatory approach to 
exploiting UGRs. This chapter also explored the importance of the state ensuring that UGR 
exploitation takes place in a balanced regulatory regime that manages public and private 
interests. 
Active adaptive management can be an appropriate and successful tool to aid in regulating 
UGR land use and land access. However, in its current manifestation in Queensland it does 
not contain clear objectives, performance indicators or criteria for evaluation or response. 
This passive adaptive management approach applied in Queensland codifies new conditions 
into amendments and additions to rules that are already complex and confusing to administer. 
The current UGR regulatory framework of Queensland is a ‘complex legal web’
170
 in regards 
to allowing UGR projects to proceed, reporting and adjustment of industry practices to 
minimise impacts on the natural environment and land used for other purposes. 
Chapter 3 will analyse the conflict in the use of land for UGR production in agricultural areas 
in Queensland, the divide between agricultural and petroleum policy and its contrast of 
private ownership of agricultural lands and Crown ownership of UGR. 
 
  
                                                 




CHAPTER 3: UNCONVENTIONAL GAS ACTIVITIES IN 
AGRICULTURAL AREAS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 reviewed the theoretical principles underpinning regulation, including principles-
based and rule-based regulation, consequential regulatory tools selected by the state to control 
the activities of individuals and corporations, and regulatory failures resulting in inappropriate 
tool selection and regulatory design. This examination defined and developed key concepts 
which emerge and are applied throughout this thesis—namely, regulatory gaps and burdens 
associated with petroleum regulation and the role of the state in managing different interests 
alongside the desire to develop the economic potential of UGR for the benefit of citizens. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the jurisdictions and respective legal frameworks of 
British Columbia and Queensland to establish how both jurisdictions face similar policy 
objectives in embracing UGR while aiming to balance land conflicts. In conducting an 
analysis of a state’s policy, it is important to examine the current legal framework of a 
jurisdiction to provide a comprehensive understanding of its regulatory approach to managing 
conflicting interests of stakeholders in developing petroleum and UGR. Such an examination 
provides a fundamental basis from which a detailed critical analysis of the regulation of UGR 
exploitation on agricultural land can occur. A similar examination of a comparative 
jurisdiction is essential to determine that a comparator legal system operates in a sufficiently 
similar policy and socio-political environment to enable an effective functional analysis to 
occur. Therefore, British Columbia’s UGR policy and legal framework will be examined to 
compare and contrast the structure and function of the central elements in its regulatory and 
legislative approach. 
This chapter commences with a general examination of both domestic legal systems, before 
moving to specific regulations governing the UGR sector. In so doing, the chapter provides a 
comparative analysis of similarities and differences prior to a more detailed analysis of the 
UGR sector in both jurisdictions. The chapter identifies the commonalities between the state 
as regulator, petroleum property rights, petroleum licensing and contractual-based systems 
and observes critical differences. This analysis then demonstrates how both countries have 
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sufficient political, economic and legal ‘likeness’
1
 to enable an effective comparison of 
functions undertaken in their regulatory systems. In the latter half of the chapter, the 
administration, regulation and political management of the agricultural and petroleum sector 
is analysed in detail, providing a comparative analysis of both systems. Finally, the model 
developed in British Columbia to preserve and protect agricultural land is reviewed to 
determine whether there are opportunities to adopt similar administrative and structural 
arrangements in the context of Queensland. 
3.2 Commonality of Internal Systems 
A comparative assessment of the role of the state, constitutional foundations, property law and 
regulatory tools of licensing and contractual-based authorisation provides a functional 
foundation to identify similarities and differences between Australia and Canada. This 
provides the necessary background for the two UGR regulatory regimes to be analysed and 
compared and for inferences to be drawn.
2
 
3.2.1 Law and Legal Structure 
3.2.1.1 Australia 
Historically a colony of the United Kingdom (UK), the Australian legal system is derived 
from English common law, drawing heavily on English constitutional law, statute and case-
based precedent. Until 1985, the Australian states continued to be influenced by the UK, 
which retained legal sovereignty over the Australian colonies and extended legislation enacted 
over the colonies so that the colonial parliaments could not legislate inconsistently.
3
 Prior to 
1986,
4
 the legislation of the Australian colonies was subject to the scrutiny of the UK 
Government and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council functioned as the final court of 
appeal from the Supreme Court of each Australian colony.
5
 
The Australian judicial and constitutional system currently comprises nine jurisdictions, 
consisting of six states—New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria 
                                                 
1 Pier Giuseppe Monateri, Methods of Comparative Law (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
2 A detailed comparison of land use and land access functions and regulatory tools utilised by both Queensland 
and British Columbia is found within Chapters four and five. 
3 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 (Imp), 28 & 29 Vict, c 63, s 2. 
4 See Australia Act 1986 (Cth) and Australia Act 1986 (UK). The passage of both Acts through the respective 
parliaments terminated the power of Parliament of United Kingdom to legislate for Australia.   
5 Judicial Committee Act 1833 (IMP). 
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and Western Australia—two territories—the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital 
Territory—and the overarching federal legal system. Each of the states holds its own 
Constitution Act concerned with the structure and process of the institutions of government—
parliaments, executive governments and State Supreme Courts.
6
 The Constitution Acts are 
generally subject to amendment or repeal by the state parliaments in the same way as other 
legislation and do not govern structural or functional issues confined to federal jurisdiction. 
At the federal level, the doctrine of separation of powers has an important impact for law-
making in Australia. The doctrine is assumed in Chapters I, II and III of the Commonwealth of 
Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) where the legislative, executive and judicial powers of 
the Commonwealth are respectively vested in the Parliament, the Executive Government and 
the Judicature.
7
 Since 1985, the judicial power of the Commonwealth must be vested in a 
federal court, namely the High Court of Australia or other Chapter III courts, such as the 
Family Court of Australia and the Federal Court of Australia, and state courts exercising 
federal jurisdiction.
8
 However, federal tribunals may not exercise judicial power of the 
Commonwealth.
9
 Conversely, in the states and territories, a strict doctrine of separation of 
powers does not emerge either from constitutions or from the common law.
10
 
Under the doctrine of ministerial responsibility, ministers are responsible not only for the 
implementation of Cabinet decisions, but for the proper functioning of departments and 
agencies for which they have responsibility, including receiving complaints about 
administrative decisions.
11
 However, the introduction of statutory reform
 
and the development 






 in a state is formally vested in the legislature or Parliament of that 
state. While the grant of power is plenary,
14
 as it is subject to express and implied limitations 
found in the Commonwealth Constitution,
15
 Queensland holds a Constitutional unicameral 
                                                 
6 The Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld) is the governing constitutional act of Queensland. 
7 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) ss 1, 61, 71. 
8 Attorney-General (Cth) v R (The Boilermakers’ Case) (Boilermakers’ case) (1957) 95 CLR 529. 
9  R v Trade Practices Tribunal; Ex parte Tasmanian Breweries Pty Ltd (1970) 123 CLR 361. 
10 Building Construction Employees and Builders’ Labourers Federation of New South Wales v Minister for 
Industrial Relations(1986) 7 NSWLR 372. 
11 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) s 24. 
12 R v Toohey; Ex parte Northern Land Council (1981) 151 CLR 170. 
13 Constitution of Queensland 2001 (Qld) s 2 (‘peace, welfare and good government’). 
14  Durham Holdings Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2001) 205 CLR 399; 75 ALJR 501, 503-4.  
15 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) Ch V. 
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legislature system—the legislature extends to only one House of Parliament, being the 
Legislative Assembly.
16
 The unicameral model makes policy development in Queensland 
beholden to the Premier as legislative power is vested in the Queen and the Legislative 
Assembly only.
17
 Therefore, since 1922, Queensland has only had one legislative chamber. 
Together with the Commonwealth Parliament, all other state and territory legislatures are 
bicameral. In the case of Queensland and its unicameral constitutional system, when 
introducing a statute into the legislature in the form of a bill in Queensland, the passage of all 
public bills through the parliamentary processes need only be passed by one legislative 
chamber for enactment. 
The unicameral model was criticised in the Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry Report: ‘Any 
(Queensland) Government may use its dominance in the Parliament and its control of public 
resources to stifle and neuter effective criticism by the Opposition’.
18
 The party holding the 
majority in the Legislative Assembly may create a monopoly on policy development. This can 
give rise to imbalances of power in policy priorities depending on the will of the 
governmental party in power, such as during the Newman Government in 2012–2015 in 
relation to rapid CSG development in Queensland. 
3.2.1.2 Canada 
Canada consists of ten provinces—Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, New Brunswick, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Nova Scotia, Ontario, Prince Edward Island, Quebec and 
Saskatchewan—and three territories—the Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Yukon. With 
the exception of Quebec as a former French colony,
19
 the provinces were all British 
colonies.
20
 Similar to Australia, Canada was granted independence and autonomy by the UK 
in the Statute of Westminster 1931 (UK).
21
 The Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 also upheld 
                                                 
16 The Queensland, Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and Northern Territory (NT) legislatures 
are unicameral, consisting of only one house, the Legislative Assembly. Scott Prasser and Nicholas Aroney, 
‘Real Constitutional Reform After Fitzgerald Still Waiting for Godot’ (2009) 18(3) Griffith Law Review 596. 
17 Although legislation is reviewed by Committees. Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) s 2A.  
18 G.E Fitzgerald, Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associate Police Misconduct, Report 
of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council (3 July 1989) 123. 
19 Quebec holds a juridical legal system under which civil matters are regulated by French civil law. However, 
public law, criminal law and other federal law operates according to Canadian common law.  
20 Although Canada was under French dominion from 1534-1763 commencing with the exploration of 
Newfoundland and came under British dominion from 1763-1931. See Bob Bothwell, Penguin History of 
Canada (Penguin Canada, 2007) for an in depth analysis of Canadian history.   
21 The Statute of Westminster clarified the powers of Canada’s Parliament and of other Commonwealth 
Dominions, giving the former colonies full legal freedom, except in areas in which a dominion wishes to 
remain subordinate to Britain. Kenneth Clinton Wheare, The Statute of Westminster, 1931 (Clarendon Press, 
1933). 
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the validity of colonial laws that were in contradiction with the laws of the Imperial 
Parliament. 
Canada has implemented a Bill of Rights
22
 and entrenched rights within the Chapter of Rights 
and Freedoms,
23
 which is one of the guarantees afforded by the Canadian Constitution.
24
 This 
is in contrast to Australia, which does not hold an express statutory form outlining rights of its 
citizens. The Constitution Act, 1867
25
 provides that the Executive Government and authority 
over Canada is vested in the Queen and that all the powers vested in the Governor General 
will be exercisable with the advice and consent of the Privy Council.
26
 Effectively, executive 
decisions are made by the Cabinet which represents the Governor General.
27
 Despite the 
principle of the Crown’s indivisibility, the decisions of the federal executive and the 
provincial executives are distinct and unrelated.
28
 As outlined in the Constitution Act, 1867,
29
 
Parliament consists of the Crown, the House of Commons and the Senate. Parliament enjoys 
the power to legislate and no legislation may be made except by Parliament or a provincial 
legislature. As with Crown prerogatives, parliamentary privilege shields decisions made by 
the Parliament from court supervision, as it enjoys constitutional protection. 
The federal courts are the Supreme Court of Canada, the Federal Court, the Federal Court of 
Appeal and the Tax Court of Canada. Section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 guarantees the 
existence of ‘superior courts’ as one of the ultimate safeguards of the rule of law. Section 96 
was designed to ensure existence of the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary.
30
 It 
gives the Governor General the power to appoint all superior court judges and ‘establishes the 
                                                 
22  Canadian Bill of Rights, SC 1960, c 44. The Constitution Act, 1982 being sch B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 
1982, c 11 contains the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and other provisions, including the 
procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada. 
23 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict c 3, Pt I. 
24 See also Ernst v. Alberta Energy Regulator 2017 [2017] 1. R.C.S. in which a landholder in Alberta claimed the 
Alberta Energy Regulatory had breached their right to freedom of expression under s. 2 (b) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms  by punishing her for publicly criticizing the Board and by preventing her, 
for a period of 16 months, from speaking to key offices within it. The majority held and dismissed the appeal 
on the basis that  Charter  damages could never be an appropriate and just remedy for Charter  breaches by 
the Board, s. 43 does not limit the availability of such a remedy under the Charter  and the provision cannot 
be unconstitutional. See also Ernst v. Alberta (ERCB) 2014 A.B.C.A 285 and Ernst v EnCana Corporation 
2013 A.B.Q.B 537.  
25 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3 (formerly the British North America Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 
Vict, c 3), together with amendments made to it since its enactment, and the text of the Canada Act 1982 
(UK) c 11 sch B (‘Constitution Act, 1982’), as amended since its enactment are now presented in 
consolidated form.  
26 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 3. Peter Oliver, Patrick Macklem, Nathalie Des Rosiers, The 
Oxford Handbook of the Canadian Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2017). 
27 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 9 and 10. 
28 Jeremy Webber, The Constitution of Canada: A Contextual Analysis (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015). 
29 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 17. 
30 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. 
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primary and specially entrenched place of the superior courts of the country in the function of 
interpreting and applying law’.
31
 Section 92(14) of the Constitution Act, 1867 allocates 
provinces the jurisdiction to enact laws relating to the administration of justice, including the 
power to constitute, maintain and organise provincial courts of civil and of criminal 
jurisdiction, even if criminal law is under federal jurisdiction pursuant to s 91(27). 
Similarly to Australia, Canadian provinces also hold constitutions and hold legislative power 
over the province or territory.
32
 Provincial courts hold a wider gambit of powers in the 
establishment and amendment of both federal and provincial law-making. This is in contrast 
to Australian state courts being limited to the regulatory powers of state-based legislation and 
cases. This power is established pursuant to provincial jurisdiction with law-making powers 
over provincial and federal statutes. However, the courts established pursuant to s 92(14) 
confer jurisdiction to provincial courts over a wide range of cases, regardless of whether the 
statute was enacted pursuant to federal or provincial jurisdiction.
33
 
3.2.1.3 Comparison of Legal Traditions 
The legal origins of British colonialism demonstrate the common legal foundation and 
similarities between the systems of Australia and Canada. Both countries are constitutional 
monarchies that place democracy and the separation of powers at the apex of the political and 
legal framework. The role of the judiciary and a statute-based legal system through state and 
federal parliaments are similar. Arguably, Australia is increasingly dependent on statute as a 
law-making device evident in the high volume of Commonwealth legislation passed in the 
Senate—120 bills passed in the Australian Senate from January to September 2017,
34
 
compared to 36 bills passed by the Parliament of Canada in the same period.
35
 
The most evident difference between the evidently similar legal systems of Australia and 
Canada is in constitutional power. It is the Commonwealth Government in Australia that 
holds enumerated powers and the states have plenary powers subject to inconsistency with 
Commonwealth powers. Conversely, Canada has provinces with enumerated powers, the 
Federal Government having plenary powers. Consequently, in Canada, the Constitution Act, 
                                                 
31 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 96. 
32 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 96 Ch V. 
33 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(14). 
34 Parliament of Australia, Senate Statistics (2017) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Statistics/Senate_StatsNet/legislation/passed/2017>.  




 provides additional rights to the provinces with respect to lands, mines, minerals and 
royalties. Parliament does not have authority pursuant to s 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 
1867
37
 to take up provincial land for solely provincial purposes, including forestry, settlement 
or mining. On the other hand, the federal government has a general power to legislate with 
respect to natural resources upon federal lands. In addition to its general power over sea coast 
and fisheries, parliament may also obtain jurisdiction over certain provincial works by virtue 
of its declaratory power. 
The key differences between the jurisdictions include the specific powers granted to the 
provinces, granting the residue of government power to the federal government.
38
 The 
Australian Constitution lists the powers of the Commonwealth and tacitly leaves the 
remaining powers with the states and territories. Consequently, the powers of the Australian 
Federal Government are considerably broader, particularly via operation of ss 51(xxix) and 96 
of the Australian Constitution (‘the Constitution’), than that of the Canadian Federal 
Government. In both jurisdictions the constitutional monarchy and the separation of powers is 
integral to law-making allowing a comparative approach to UGR and agricultural policies. 
3.2.2 Role of the State as Regulator of Petroleum Resources 
It is the basic premise of petroleum resource development and management that the state in 
Commonwealth countries is the in situ owner and regulator of its UGR industry.
39
 As the 
owner of its petroleum resources, it is assumed the state will develop its natural resources for 
the benefit of its citizens, as examined in Section 2.10. The ownership and management of 
state resources is affirmed in its petroleum policy to maintain and enforce an effective 
regulatory framework for the exploitation of its UGRs. Accordingly, this framework must 
‘assert adequate control over petroleum production, the producers (the participants), and the 
environment while at the same time seeking to implement national petroleum objectives’.
40
 
The Constitution allocates specific powers to the Commonwealth and residual powers to the 
Australian states as previously examined in Section 3.2. This is reiterated in state onshore 
                                                 
36 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3.  A fundamental principle of law in Canada is the supremacy of 
the Constitution which is enshrined in the Constitution Act, 1982.  All laws, whether common or legislative, 
must comply with the Constitution.  The Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 
1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
37 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3. 
38 British North America Act 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91 and 92. 
39 David Mercer, A Question of Balance: Natural Resources Conflict Issues in Australia (Federation Press, 2000) 
Ch 5. 
40 Tina Hunter and John Chandler, Petroleum Law in Australia (Lexis Nexis, 2013) 29. 
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petroleum legislation, specifically ss 9 and 26 of the PA Act which vests the ownership of 
petroleum in the Crown in Queensland. Consequently, the Commonwealth does not have a 
specific power to legislate for the production and exploration of mineral and petroleum 
resources, although s 51 of the Constitution expressly highlights that onshore petroleum and 
mineral resources do not fall within the domain of the enumerated powers. 
UGR activities are regulated by the states and territories in Australia, given that there are no 
enumerated powers for the Commonwealth Crown to regulate petroleum and mineral 
activities under the Australian Constitution. However, two sections that could apply to the 
regulation of UGR are s 51(i) Interstate and Overseas Trade and Commerce or s 51(XX) the 
power to regulate Corporations within the Constitution. In Murphyores, the High Court 
interpreted the trade and commerce power as ‘purpose’, thereby allowing the Minister to 
create legislation effectively prohibiting the activities of a company exporting mineral sands, 
pending the outcomes of an environmental inquiry.
41
 Murphyores provides a case example of 
s 51(i) applicability to natural resource law cases by the High Court, holding that the Minister 
was within his power to prohibit activities of a company exporting certain items due to the 
commerce and trade powers in the Constitution.
42
 Secondly, the High Court held by a 
majority in New South Wales v Commonwealth
43
 that the Commonwealth could enact a 
comprehensive regime of industrial relations law, thus widening the scope of the Corporations 
Power within the Constitution. However, the External Affairs power of s 51(xxix) of the 




The Australian states and territories hold the Constitutional plenary power or the Imperial 
empowering legislation
45
 to make legislation for the ‘peace, order (or welfare) and good 
government’ of the state or the Commonwealth.
46
 This power was interpreted by BLF v 
Minister for Industrial Relations
47
 with the effect of imposing a general limitation on the 
                                                 
41 Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 3; Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 
1900 (Cth) s 51(i).   
42 Murphyores Inc Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1976) 136 CLR 3. 
43 New South Wales v Commonwealth [2006] HCA 52.   
44 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) s 51(xxix). 
45 Australian state constitutions derive their authority from Imperial empowering legislation. Attorney-General 
(NSW) v Trethowan (1931) 44 CLR 394, 424-5. 
46 Constitution Act 1867 (Qld) s 2. 
47 BLF v Minister for Industrial Relations (1986) 7 NSWLR 372. 
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legislature’s power to enact legislation that interferes with fundamental democratic rights.
48
 
Each state in Australia regulates its licensing and contracting systems to dispose of petroleum 
production to be developed by private petroleum license holders. Therefore, a petroleum 
license awarded by a state ‘fetters’ the property rights on the licensee temporarily (exclusive 
or non-exclusive rights) by granting a petroleum title over the license area.
49
 Once a license 
has expired, the state is free to grant an authorisation or transfer proprietary rights. This has 
led to the classification of petroleum licences as constitutional rights, dependent on the 
conditions of petroleum exploitation to be possessed or exercised.
50
 Petroleum licenses are 
similar to all proprietary rights that may be readily transferrable and can be sold, as is the case 
with other real proprietary rights such as the transfer of land title. 
The historical development of petroleum regulation has a similar trajectory in Canada. The 
key natural resource states of provinces of Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British 
Columbia acquired mineral and petroleum rights from the federal government in 1930 by 
virtue of the Natural Resources Transfer Acts, 1930
51
 which rendered the Dominion Lands 
Act 1872 obsolete. The Canadian Constitution provides for the allocation of exclusive ‘heads 
of power’ between the federal government and provincial governments.
52
 Section 92(5) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 provides provincial governments with the power to regulate the 
management and sale of provincial public lands, including timber and wood and other natural 
resources.
53
 Other sources of provincial constitutional authority to regulate energy projects 
include municipal institutions;
54
 local, municipal and provincial revenue;
55
 and the 
enumerated enforcement powers.
56
 Additionally, s 92A of the Constitution confers on each 




a) exploration for non-renewable natural resources in the province; 
                                                 
48 Ian D. Killey, ‘Peace, Order and Good Government: A Limitation on Legislative Compliance’ (1989) 17(2) 
Melbourne University Law Review 24, 24. 
49 In Canada, the standard term for the right to search for and produce petroleum or shale gas is a surface lease and 
petroleum lease. Surface leases and rights are examined within Chapter five. 
50 Tina Hunter, Regulation of the Upstream Petroleum Sector: A Comparative Study of Licensing and Concession 
Systems (Edward Elgar, 2015). 
51 Which by scheduled and individual Memorandums of Agreement transferred natural resources regulation to the 
various Western Canadian provinces.  
52 Allan Ingelson, ‘Strategic Planning for Energy Development in Canada’ (2015) 6 Journal of Energy and 
Environmental Law 35, 38; Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92A(b-c). 
53 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(5). 
54 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(8). 
55 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(9). 
56 Constitution Act 1867 (IMP), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 92(15). 
57 Laws respecting non-renewable natural resources include specifically forestry resources and electrical energy. 
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b) development, conservation and management of non-renewable natural resources and 
forestry resources in the province, including laws in relation to the rate of primary 
production therefrom; and 
c) development, conservation and management of sites and facilities in the province for 
the generation and production of electrical energy.
58
 
However, s 92A does not derogate power from the authority of the Canadian Parliament to 
enact laws in relation to natural resources and where such a law of the federal parliament and 
a law of a province conflict federal jurisdiction will prevail.
59
 Further, the federal government 
has a general power to legislate with respect to natural resources upon federal lands. In 
addition to its general power over sea coast and fisheries, Parliament may also obtain 
jurisdiction over certain provincial works by virtue of its declaratory power. Certain natural 
resources which would typically fall within provincial jurisdiction can be federally regulated 
through Parliament’s declaratory power. Parliament can declare works situated in the 
province ‘to be for the general Advantage of Canada or for the Advantage of Two or more of 
the Provinces’.
60
 The regulatory authority of the federal government relates to interprovincial 
and international trade, falling within the regulation of trade and commerce.
61
 
Under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 2012,
62
 the regulations designating 
physical activities clearly identifies UGR projects on federal lands that may be subject to 
federal EAs, focusing on projects with potential for significant adverse environmental 
effects.
63
 These include offshore natural gas and oil exploration and production; gas 
processing plants; LNG facilities; and natural gas pipelines regulated by the National Energy 
Board (NEB).
64
 The National Energy Board Act 1985
65
 establishes the NEB as the 
overarching responsible authority with respect to environmental assessment reports as 
designating projects that require a certificate be issued for an energy project to proceed.
66
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Therefore, the NEB provides an advisory and authoritative power over the exploration for and 
the production of energy and energy sources in and outside Canada.
67
 
The Constitution Act, 1867
68
 gives the provinces jurisdiction over works and undertakings 
within their boundaries. In situations where oil and gas facilities are within a province but part 
of a pipeline system, the regulation will fall under federal jurisdiction as it is constructed 
between two provinces and carries natural gas between two provinces. The Supreme Court of 
Canada has indicated how oil and gas facilities such as pipelines, gathering and tie-in facilities 
all within one province may come under federal jurisdiction. According to Westcoast Energy 
Inc v Canada (National Energy Board):
69
 
It is well settled that the proposed facilities may come within federal jurisdiction 
under s 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act 1867 in one of two ways.
70
 First, they are 
subject to federal jurisdiction of the Westcoast mainline transmission pipeline, 
gathering pipelines and processing plants, including the proposed facilities, together 
constitute a single federal work or undertaking. Second, if the proposed facilities do 
not form part of a single federal work or undertaking, they come within federal 
jurisdiction if they are integral to the mainline transmission pipeline. 
Petroleum rights granted in respect of Crown-owned petroleum rights are by virtue of Crown 
leases at the provincial level. In British Columbia, the Ministry of Energy and Mines (Title 
Division) administers Crown petroleum and natural gas rights, and dispositions (permits, 
drilling licences and leases), by public tenure, are made once a month.
71
 The Land Act
72
 also 
expressly states that no granting of Crown land conveys the right to any petroleum, gas, coal, 
mineral or geothermal resource found in the land.
73
 
3.2.3 Petroleum Property Rights 
Historically, petroleum resources in Australia and Canada were bundled together with 
freehold grants to land for landholders, permitting them access at common law to both 
subsurface metals and topsoil rights. Exceptions to this were gold and silver, unless the 
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Crown had reserved the right to the minerals in a deed of grant.
74
 Consequently, the state had 
largely been content to dispose of land for the purposes of mining, thereby permitting the 
property in the minerals to pass to the land freehold owner.
75
 
Land granted in fee simple does not equate to absolute ownership in Queensland. This differs 
to the US, where ownership of subsurface rights in a private ownership framework parallels 
the UGR leasing process being a private transaction between landowners and UGR 
titleholders.
76
 The framework for land and mineral ownership in the US stems from the 
fundamental common law maxim, cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, 
meaning whoever owns the soil also owns ‘up to the sky and down to the depths’.
77
 In most 
states of the US, the maxim continues to function as the primary and paramount regulatory 
mechanism for surface estate ownership over in situ subsurface minerals such as coal.
78
 
However, specific to UG, the US judiciary has upheld the common law principle of ‘the rule 
of capture’ as the fundamental ownership principle on which the entire framework for oil and 
gas law.
79
 The rule of capture also allows a landowner who has induced the gas to their 
possession to claim the gas even though it may have formerly been deposited under another’s 
land. Once captured, the holder will retain full common law ownership of the gas subject only 
to public policy obligations and regulatory restrictions.
80
 
In contrast, the doctrine of tenure and the subsequent legislative implementation of these 
principles in Australia and Canada bestows ownership of all land with the Crown,
81
 which is 
charged with granting a fee simple interest in land to landholders. As a consequence, UGR 
licenses are issued over fee simple estates of private landholders.
82
 Crown pastoral leasehold 
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is common in rural Australia,
83
 with a long history as a flexible proprietary instrument to 
secure economic and social development of agriculture.
84
 
Title to petroleum is generally transferred from the Crown to an oil and gas company with the 
issue of a licence or lease and ‘ownership’ of that resource transfers from the Crown to the 
titleholder at the wellhead, which is also when royalties are calculated and paid to the state.
85
 
The state’s petroleum legislation then requires a petroleum licence holder to pay a petroleum 
royalty and the annual rent prescribed under the relevant regulation being the PGPSA in 
Queensland and the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act,1996
86
 (PNGA) of British Columbia. 
The Torrens system of private land titles is applicable both in Australia and the four western 
Canadian provinces and is intended to give certainty to the title.
87
 Under the Torrens system, 
the party named as the owner in a certificate of title possesses an indefeasible title ‘against all 
the world’,
88
 subject to fraud and certain specified common law and statutory exceptions. It 
follows that the current certificate of title, bearing the name of the registered owner, is 
conclusive evidence of title in favour of any party dealing with the owner in good faith and 
for valuable consideration.
89
 Torrens legislation operates at the provincial and state level in 
both Australia and Canada.
 90
 
Three broad categories of onshore petroleum titles exist under legislation in Queensland and 
British Columbia—permitting exploration (authority to prospect in Queensland is the 
authority to prospect), permitting production and permitting pipelines. The formal 
requirements of a petroleum production title vary in Queensland and British Columbia. 
Nevertheless, both jurisdictions require the applicant for an UG tenement to detail the 
application area; proposed program of work and expenditure, including environmental 
protection measures; evidence of financial and technical capacity; and a specified or 
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 Further, in Queensland, the applicant must declare that deposits of petroleum 
have been discovered and must lodge a proposed development and production program.
92
 
Surface rights in British Columbia are governed by the PNGA, including all aspects of 
exploration, development and production, providing for the entry, occupation or use of 
publicly held land for the purposes of exploration and development of UGR. To exercise 
subsurface rights to develop a UGR well, a surface lease must be negotiated with existing 
land owners which, in British Columbia, generally means the Crown or Aboriginal peoples. 
In both jurisdictions, once extracted, the proprietary rights of the UG are vested in the 
petroleum titleholder rather than the fee simple landholder. The right to exclude others from a 
landowner’s property is fundamental to the ownership of real property in Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, with the absence of consent (whether implied or express) creating a possible 
action in trespass.
93
 However, petroleum titleholders already have this consent via the relevant 
petroleum Act and, therefore, this entitlement is largely void in Queensland and British 
Columbia. 
As discussed in Section 1.5, the PGPSA defines CSG as ‘petroleum (in any state) occurring 
naturally in association with coal or oil shale, or in strata associated with coal or oil shale 
mining’.
94
 Therefore, the exploration for and production of UGR in Queensland is principally 
regulated by the PGPSA. Accordingly, UG falls within the statutory definition of ‘petroleum’ 
in most Australian jurisdictions.
95
The Petroleum and Other Legislation Amendment 
Regulation 2011 (Qld) introduced the requirements for holders of tenure under the PA Act 
and the PGPSA to give to each owner and each occupier of land, on which the relevant UGR 
activities are to be carried out, at least ten business days’ notice prior to commencement of 
petroleum exploration and a form of land access agreement prior to exploitation activities, 
such as drilling a well and hydraulic fracturing activities.
96
 These notice periods are in 
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addition to notice of completion of the hydraulic fracturing activities which must be served 
within ten business days.
97
 
The exploitation of UGR has generated considerable landowner antagonism in Queensland, 
particularly in agricultural areas, prompting the need for a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
core division between surface rights and Crown petroleum ownership.
98
 The legislature 
responded by introducing landowner CCAs as regulated by the PGPSA.
99
 This initiative has, 
however, created dense multi-layered review processes and complex regulatory interactions 
that have arguably not satisfied the UGR industry or the affected communities, as evident in 
recent introduction and overhaul of previous land access agreement provisions into a single 
regulation, the MERCPA. 
In British Columbia, UGR development is primarily governed by the OGC through a three-
phase approval process established in accordance with the PNGA,
100
 together with the OGAA 
and the Code of Practice for the Discharge of Produced Water from Coalbed Gas Operations 
promulgated under the Environmental Management Act.
101
 The OGAA enables regulation of 
surface land use primarily through the Environmental Protection and Management Regulation 
(EPMR). The EPMR regulates actions a permit holder and a person carrying out an oil and 
gas activity must take, or refrain from taking, to protect and/or effectively manage the 
environment. 
The PNGA states petroleum and natural gas rights are the property of the British Columbia 
Crown. The rights granted depend on the nature of the Crown disposition, however, a lease 
grants to the lessee the exclusive right to produce both petroleum and natural gas
102
 from the 
location of the lease. The PNGA defines petroleum as meaning ‘crude petroleum and all other 
hydrocarbons, regardless of gravity, that are or can be recovered in liquid form from a pool 
through a well by ordinary production methods or that are or can be recovered from oil sand 
or oil shale’.
103
 Natural gas is defined as ‘all fluid hydrocarbons, before and after processing, 
that are not defined as petroleum, and includes hydrogen sulphide, carbon dioxide and helium 
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produced from a well’.
104
 The Coalbed Gas Act
105
 states that ‘a natural gas tenure, whether 
made before or after the coming into force of this Act, includes any coalbed gas rights’.
106
 
The freehold petroleum and natural gas lease is the document that governs the relationship 
between a freehold owner of mineral rights and a party contracting to exploit and develop the 
petroleum and natural gas and related substances owned by the freehold owner. The standard 
freehold petroleum and natural gas lease in use in the oil and gas industry in Canada is the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Landmen (CAPL) lease, ‘which enjoys almost universal 
acceptance in the industry’.
107
 
In Canada, the basic purpose of a freehold petroleum and natural gas lease is to establish a 
contractual arrangement between the registered owner, or the party entitled to become the 
registered owner, and the lessee, which allows the lessee to explore for petroleum and natural 
gas and to produce the petroleum and natural gas if those substances are found.
108
 The oil and 
gas company who enters into a petroleum and natural gas lease benefits due to the payment of 
an initial bonus consideration for entering into the lease and receipt of a stipulated royalty 
percentage if leased substances are ultimately produced. The freehold lease must provide 
security to the lessee that the lease will continue if a successful well is drilled and must ensure 
from the lessor’s perspective that the lands are developed or become available for re-leasing. 
The main provisions of the lease are concerned with balancing the interests of the lessor and 
lessee. 
Regardless of the particular form of a freehold petroleum and natural gas lease, certain clauses 
typically appear in all freehold leases: 
a) a granting clause, which conveys an interest in the leased substances for a primary 
term 
b) a ‘thereafter’ or ‘habendum’ clause, which provides for continuation of the lease so 
long as production or operations continue 
c) a delay rental clause, which provides for periodic payments to continue the lease in the 
absence of the drilling of a well in the first lease year and any succeeding year during the 
primary term 
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d) a shut-in royalty clause, which provides for a payment in the amount of the delay 
rental to continue the lease if there is a failure or interruption of production during a lease 
year 
e) royalty payments based upon production from the leased lands and compensatory 
royalty payments based upon production from an offsetting well located on a spacing unit 
laterally adjoining the leased lands 
f) a surrender clause, which allows the lessee to terminate its obligations under the lease 
at any time 
g) provisions dealing with the effect of poolings and unitizations 
h) provisions relating to the effect of a default by the lessee under the lease and the 
actions that must be taken by the lessor to obtain a remedy due to a default.
109
 
3.2.4 Regulatory Harmonisation in Australia 
The Standing Council of Energy and Resources (SCER) developed the Harmonised 
Regulatory Framework for Natural Gas from Coal Seams (the Harmonised Framework), 
released in 2013, to address issues of regulatory inconsistency among states and providing a 
set of guiding principles in the management of CSG to ensure regulatory regimes are ‘robust, 
consistent and transparent across all Australian jurisdictions’.
110
 The Harmonised Framework 
addresses including issues of community concerns, including, well integrity, water 




The Harmonised Framework consists of non-binding policy recommendations in relation to 
UGR, as to opposed to binding regulation or binding regulatory advice, as the Commonwealth 
does not have an inherent power to regulate UGR.
112
 The Harmonised Framework, although 
titled a regulatory framework, does not regulate these aspects of UGR development. This 
would be incompatible with the Constitutional position that natural resource regulatory 
powers lies with the states and territories. The Harmonised Framework seeks to identify 
leading practices to guide regulators to provide a harmonised approach to managing UGR in 
                                                 
109 Michael A. Thackray, Oil and Gas (Lexis Nexis, 2013) 40. 
110 Standing Council on Energy and Resources, The National Harmonised Regulatory Framework for natural Gas 
from Coal Seams (2013) 
<http://www.coagenergycouncil.gov.au/sites/prod.energycouncil/files/publications/documents/National-
Harmonised-Regulatory-Framework-for-Natural-Gas-from-Coal-Seams_1.pdf >3.  
111 Ibid, 15. As discussed in Section 3.1 above. 
112 Tina Hunter, ‘The Development of Shale Gas and Coal Bed Methane in Australia: Best Practice for 
International Jurisdictions?’ (2016) 38(2) Houston Journal of International Law 367. 
94 
Australia. These identified leading practices aim to provide policy guidance to the state in 
developing regulatory tools required for effective UGR regulation. 
The SCER recognises the following principle as creating ‘good’ or effective regulatory 
practice for UGR in Australia by ‘ensuring that regulation remains relevant and effective over 
time’.
113
 It also recommends the adoption of principles-based or ‘objective’ regulation, as 
examined in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The SCER recognises regulators should ‘steer’ away 
from prescriptive rule-based regulation towards principles-based objective regulation to 
provide ‘discretion (for) regulators, which potentially creates regulatory uncertainty, however 
it also provides an environment that fosters more innovative practices and developments’.
114
 
As a result of the Harmonised Framework, SCER released the MLUF specifically aimed at 
providing guidance on challenges arising from competing land use, land access and land use 
change.
115
 The MLUF seeks to provide an ‘adaptive’
116
 management approach to land use 
development.
117
 Similar to the Harmonised Framework, the MLUF provides non-binding 
guiding principles for activities to achieve multiple sequential land use outcomes including: 
 best use of resources 
 coexistence 
 strategic planning 
 tailored participation of communities and landholders 
 engagement and information 
 decision-making and accountability 
 efficient processes 
 accessible relevant information.118 
The MLUF recognises that development of many Australian industry sectors is reliant on 
access to land, inclusive of multiple stakeholder needs covering economic, environmental, 
heritage, societal and cultural values. The MLUF proposes an adaptive management, rather 
                                                 
113 Standing Council on Energy and Resources, above n 108, 15. 
114 Ibid, 75. 
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid, 2. 
117 Adaptive management is the current regulatory approach to UGR regulation in Queensland as discussed in 
Chapter 2. 




than a technical, approach to regulation is needed: ‘a blend of adaptive and technical 
responses is needed to achieve multiple and sequential land use outcomes’.
119
 However, the 
MLUF solely relies upon existing regulations and case studies as adequate and in satisfaction 
of its guiding principles as: 
The MLUF does not propose any significant change in existing accountabilities, 
roles and responsibilities of the different State and Territory government agencies. It 




The MLUF restates and relies upon many of the provisions already in place in the regulatory 
environment as successful in protecting and balancing land uses in Australia. It reiterates that 
it is the responsibility of the states and territories to envisage practical solutions to translate 
the aspirational ideas of the MLUF into regulation as ‘The State and Territories resource 
agencies will be the driver for designing the implementation model’.
121
 
This policy position adheres to the doctrine of government agendas with the concept of 
adaptive management for regions to implement and create regulations from aspirational policy 
ideas. For example, it is stated the MLUF aims ‘to enable the minerals and petroleum sector 
to effectively and efficiently meet the land access and use challenges, expectations and 
opportunities confronting the sector’.
122
 Use of such language does not engender wider 
support, particularly when one of the major challenges is access to private land.
123
 Queensland 
has not expressly adopted or supported either the Harmonised Framework or MLUF. 
Therefore, both frameworks do not feature in the detailed analysis of Queensland’s land use 
and land access regimes undertaken in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
3.2.5 Licensing and Contractual-Based Authorisation 
By reserving petroleum resources, the Crown authorises the grant of titles (exploration and 
production licences) over land owned in fee simple (a type of freehold interest) or held as 
leasehold estates. The state-based ownership framework in Queensland and British Columbia 
is known as the dominial or regalian system and originates ‘from the right imposed by the 
sovereign monarch, upon the owner of the mining fields, to secure payment or participation in 
                                                 
119 Standing Council on Energy and Resources, Ibid, 18. 
120 Ibid, 30. 
121 Ibid, 19. 
122 Ibid, 10. 
123 Taylor, Madeline, ‘Trends in Current Australian Agricultural Policy and Land Resource Management’ (2015) 
33 Corporate Governance eJournal 1. 
96 
the extracted mining product’.
124
 At a broad level, Canada and Australia have similar 
licensing systems that underpin the states’ proprietary regulation to manage the exploitation 
of petroleum resources. Such commonalities derive from both jurisdictions’ origins as a 
British colony, subject to the common law legal system. 
A state-based ownership regime depends upon the constitutional legitimacy of the legislative 
provisions that confer ownership in subsurface minerals upon the state. In both Australia and 
Canada, the mining and petroleum legislation has a state or provincial focus and this 
precludes the vesting provisions from being subject to any application of their respective 
Constitutions. The statutory vesting of mineral ownership gives the state the power to issue 
titles to oil and gas companies over privately held freehold land, Crown leases and land that is 
subject to native title claims.
125
 This has been described as the ‘concession system’, whereby 
the state, as the original owner of mineral resources, grants rights for the exploration and 
exploitation of minerals to an applicant, provided the applicant meets objective and 
impersonal legal requirements.
126
 The concession framework allows the state to confer 
permissory rights to extract subsurface minerals to private mining companies who acquire 
rights to access, explore and produce subsurface UG. 
In this respect, petroleum licenses do not constitute ownership interests in the subsurface 
strata nor do they constitute incorporeal hereditaments. Rather, they amount to statute-based 
permissory entitlements that allow the holder to carry out specific exploration, retention or 
production rights. The granting of a petroleum license by the state is generally only a 
temporary right to exploit a mine or reservoir, rather than severing the state right altogether—
once a petroleum license has expired, the subsurface rights of the estate will continue to be the 
property of the state.
127
 Once a subsurface natural resource is actually produced, however, 
ownership of the produced resource is then transferred from the state to the license holder via 
statutory vesting provisions, being the PGPSA in Queensland and the PNGA and OGAA in 
British Columbia. 
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In Queensland, petroleum titleholders must negotiate land access agreements with landholders 
(including Indigenous native titleholders),
128
 as regulated by the LAC and PGPSA. In British 
Columbia, once the province has granted a petroleum and gas tenure agreement, the 
titleholder is required to negotiate a surface lease agreement with the private landholder as 
regulated by the Surface Rights Board (SRB) and PNGA.
129
 
The surface lease agreement governs the terms of entry and access on private fee hold land. If 
a landowner surface lease agreement cannot be reached through negotiation, a PNGA tenure 
holder may apply for a SRB Right of Entry Order or a land expropriation agreement whereby 
the municipal government compulsorily acquire by the ‘taking of land by an expropriating 
authority under an enactment without the consent of the owner’.
130
 
In Queensland, an authority to prospect, while it remains in force, authorises the title holder to 
explore exclusively for petroleum and to carry out such operations and execute such works as 
are necessary for that purpose in the title area.
131
 However, in Queensland, there is no express 
prohibition to explore for petroleum except under and in accordance with an exploration title 
or as otherwise permitted by the PGPSA. Unlike other Australian states and territories, 
Queensland does not limit the area over which the title is renewed or prescribed portion of the 
area over which the exploration title was originally granted. An annual expenditure 
requirement for drilling and operations must be conducted ‘in a good and skilful manner in 
accordance with recognised and approved methods and practice to the satisfaction of the 
Minister’.
132
 The holder of a lease must take all reasonable precautions to prevent ‘waste of 
petroleum; and must carry out all reasonable directions of the Minister specifically regarding 
prevention of waste; and generally, regarding methods of operation’.
133
 
The award of petroleum licenses, leases and proprietary rights are similar in Queensland and 
British Columbia. Both jurisdictions regulate onshore UGR activities under the relevant 
petroleum legislation and develop regulatory tools accordingly to manage the development of 
UGR. The longstanding practice of ‘cooperative federalism’ in which the federal and 
provincial governments have coordinated their activities within their respective spheres of 
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jurisdiction to address UGR issues is evident in Canada.
134
 However, due to its lack of 
federally held Crown lands, the Australian Federal Government is in a different position to the 
Canadian Federal Government. The residual constitutional power in Australia is explicitly at 
the state level, with most natural resources also subject to proprietary ownership at the state 
level. Ownership (and, therefore, the regulation) of mineral and petroleum resources fall 
within the regulatory jurisdiction of the individual states and territories. Australia’s division 
of powers concerning UGR is more ‘decentralised’ than in Canada.
135
 
3.3 Unconventional Gas Market 
There has been a dramatic increase over the past two decades in both the production and 
exploitation of natural gas with recent advances in the exploitation of UGR hailed as a ‘game 
changer’
136
 in the global energy market. World LNG trade is forecast to increase at an average 
annual rate of 7.4% a year and projected to reach 320 million tonnes in 2019.
137
 Australia is 
an important global supplier of natural gas and a top supplier of LNG. The development of 
Australia’s natural gas resources in recent years has seen a 50% rise in the volume of LNG 
produced since 2015, with 45 million tonnes of LNG exported in 2016 to meet the seemingly 
insatiable appetite of Japan, South Korea and China.
138
 Indeed, the size of Australia’s onshore 
UGR, in combination with its conventional offshore gas reserves, has seen it move from the 
world’s sixth-largest LNG exporter in 2013 to the second-largest LNG exporter as of June 
2017.
139
 The value of Australia’s LNG exports increased by 8% in 2014–2015 to 
1,363 petajoules (32 million tonnes) and is forecast to increase from an estimated A$23 
billion in 2016–2017 to A$37 billion in 2018–2019.
140
 
Over 90% of Australia’s CSG reserves (around 42,000 petajoules) are located in 
Queensland’s Bowen and Surat Basins, while smaller reserves are located in the Clarence–
Moreton, Gunnedah, Gloucester and Sydney Basins in New South Wales.
141
 Queensland’s 
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UGRs are primarily located on privately owned agricultural land in the Darling Downs 
agricultural region in Queensland. Consequently, Crown reservation over mineral resources 
occurs and the fee simple titleholder is required to grant access to petroleum titleholders. 
UGR development has a dispersed geospatial footprint as a result of the broad distribution of 
the natural resource, the geology of the reservoirs containing the gas, the manner in which the 
gas is extracted and the technologies and associated infrastructure required to develop it. As a 
result of these factors, the commercialisation of LNG for export and the concurrent 
development of this industry have had a significant impact on local communities, including 
economic impacts and changes to demographics and social structures, with flow-on effects 
evident in measures of community wellbeing.
142
 Land access and land use in predominantly 
agricultural regions of Queensland when exploiting UGR are significant regulatory issues 
facing all resource developments. However, in contrast to coal mining, where the land to be 
mined is purchased and all other activities halted due to the large-scale strip mining, existing 
land uses continue to cohabit over a large area where UGR activities occur—that is, UGR 
wells are being drilled on active farms and grazing properties. The overlap of activities 
exposes a larger number of people to the social and economic impacts of the resource 
development. 
Canada is ranked as the world’s fifth-largest natural producer, with marketable natural gas 
production in 2018 expected to equate to 437 106 m³/d (15.4 Bcf/d),
143
 representing 4.7% of 
world production.
144
 As at 2016, Alberta holds the largest marketable gas production by 
province, accounting for 71% of gas production, followed by British Columbia at 26%, 
Saskatchewan at 2% and Nova Scotia at 1%.
145
 
British Columbia’s wealth of emerging sources of shale and tight gas are changing the 
dynamics of Canadian supply, accounting for 30% of Canada’s natural gas resources, 90% of 
which is found in the Montney Shale (a tight UGR play) and the Horn River Basin (a shale 
UGR play).
146
 The four major UGR regions—the Horn River Basin, the Liard Basin, the 
Cordova Embayment and the Montney play region—are in Northeast British Columbia. The 
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Westcoast natural gas pipeline system is primarily in British Columbia, but extends into 
Alberta, Yukon and the Northwest Territories. The 2,800 km system connects to several 
pipelines at Sumas in Washington, including the Northwest Pipeline, feeding Canadian 
natural gas into the Pacific Northwest. Wellhead production of marketable gas in British 
Columbia in 2016 was 1.7 tcf per year, with 56% delivered to other regions of Canada 33% 
exported to the US and 11% used domestically.
147
  
3.4 Policy Development and Influence on Unconventional Gas Resource and 
Agricultural Regulation 
Klein and Marmor define policy as ‘what governments do and neglect to do’.
148
 Policy is the 
term used to describe specific choices by a state, but the notion also embraces general 
directions and philosophies. Given the wide array of definitions for policy, policy is described 
in three different but compatible ways by Althaus, Bridgman and Davis: 
First, policy can be an authoritative choice of a government. Second, policy is a 
hypothesis, an expression of theories about cause and effect. Finally, policy is 
explored as the objective of governmental action.
149
 
A state’s petroleum policy represents the current position and focus of the relevant 
government in developing its petroleum resource including political, fiscal and economic 
policies. Consequently, petroleum policy is developed through a complex network of factors 
including the geolocation of a country, petroleum potential, political development, 
infrastructure and its regulation. The basis of a successful exhaustible natural resources policy 
is premised upon four cornerstones according to de Sa: 
1) a competitive, stable and fair fiscal regime 
2) a transparent legal and regulatory framework 
3) strong institutions to implement them 
4) sound environmental management systems.150 
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Dworkin’s theory of policy taxonomy also comprises the legal theory of principle, policy and 
rules related to the development of natural resource policy comprising: 
 principles, the norms protecting individual rights 
 policies, the norms promoting collective goals 
 rules, implementing the principles and policies.151 
In particular, Dworkin sees policy as a kind of standard that sets out a goal to be reached, 
generally an improvement in some economic, political or social feature of the community in 
that they stipulate that some present feature is to be protected from adverse change.
152
 
Therefore, both policy and principles are set apart from rules, which are the legislative 
instruments that outline what the law is.
153
 As each state has the sovereign right to develop its 
natural resources, its policy and tools to develop its corresponding regulation will develop and 
implement economic diversification of its natural resource sector.
154
 
Regulation based on petroleum policy that governs petroleum development is based upon the 
taxonomy of principles, policy and rules as summarised by Hunter and Chandler: 
Principles are the overarching values that exist, allowing a sovereign state to exploit 
its resources. Policies are generally the current position or focus of a government in 
developing a natural resource, and will encompass political and fiscal 
policies…rules are the actual legislation established by the parliament.
155
 
An effective petroleum policy, which by extension gives rise to effective regulation (as 
explored in Chapter 2), must balance the interdependence between the state as owner of 
petroleum resources and private natural resource companies as petroleum explorers and 
exploiters.
156
 Therefore, a petroleum policy must secure possession of and access to its 
petroleum resources effectively in allowing the development of its resources by private actors 
while ensuring long-term sustainability of land use and land access in the exploited area. 
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3.5 Comparative Context of Australian and Canadian Unconventional Gas 
Policy and its Implications for Landholders 
Australia’s current petroleum policy, established in 1998 and outlined in the Minerals and 
Petroleum Resources Policy Statement, seeks to provide investors with a positive, strong and 
stable framework of government policies to ensure certainty for investors, minimise 
investment impediments and promote investment.
157
 The aim of this policy is to ensure that 
Australia remains a reliable long-term supplier to the world’s resources and energy markets. 
The current Australian gas policy strategy is outlined as follows: 
1) improving gas markets to enable better access and price discovery for all market 
participants including customers 
2) understanding and responding to potential social impacts to build confidence that 
community needs and expectations will be properly considered 
3) understanding and communicating the science to build confidence in the community 
that risks and environmental impacts can be managed 
4) attracting investment and encouraging steady and predictable supply through better 
regulation 
5) tailoring production technologies for Australia to ensure we are making the most of 
our resources 
6) establishing an Oil, Gas and Energy Resources Industry Growth Centre to accelerate 
advancements within the industry 
7) improving access to geo-scientific precompetitive data to understand our resources 
and attract investment 
8) demonstrating the macroeconomic benefits to build community confidence 




The EPBCA gives practical effect and enactment to environmental treaties to which Australia 
is a party in a wide variety of environmental law contexts including biodiversity protection. 
However, the EPBCA does not apply as a broad Commonwealth power to regulate all 
petroleum activities. It applies only where a petroleum activity falls within the scope for 
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referral under the EPBCA. Therefore, the EPBCA by default does not regulate the petroleum 
activities in states and territories, however, it is applicable to matters that has, will have or is 
likely to have ‘a significant impact on a matter of environmental significance pursuant to 
ss 11 and 130’.
159
 A ‘significant impact’ is defined by the Commonwealth Department of 
Environment and Energy as ‘an impact which is important, notable, or of consequence, 
having regard to its context or intensity’.
160
 
Matters of Environmental Significance (MNES) are specified in ch 2 of the EPBCA as: 
 world heritage properties 
 national heritage places 
 wetlands of international importance (listed under the Ramsar Convention) 
 listed threatened species and ecological communities 
 migratory species protected under international agreements 
 Commonwealth marine areas 
 the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
 nuclear actions (including uranium mines) 
 a water resource, in relation to CSG development and large coal mining development 
(Water Trigger). 
In the event that a project is classified as a MNES, the project can be referred by either the 
project proponent, Minister or a state or Commonwealth government agency to determine 
whether an action is within the ambit of assessment under the EPBCA. Once a project is 
referred, the application is assessed as to whether the Minister must assess an action on the 
grounds of the project posing a ‘significant risk and impact’ to a MNES listed. If it is deemed 
there is no likelihood of a significant risk the project will not be referred to the Minister for 
EPBCA assessment. In the alternative, where an action is classified as a ‘controlled action’,
161
 
the project is referred to the Minister and will be assessed for approval. If approved, the action 
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The ‘Water Trigger’ amendments to the EPBCA introduced protection of water resources 
from CSG developments and large coal mining developments with a ‘significant impact’ on 
water resources.
163
 However, it must be noted the Water Trigger is limited to water resources, 
not agricultural land and soil resources, in relation to CSG and coal projects. Further, CSG 
wells are typically dewatered, with only 8% requiring hydraulic fracturing, in comparison to 
shale gas wells requiring 100% hydraulic fracturing and often involving multiple fractures per 
well. Therefore, the regulatory scope of the Water Trigger is arguably limited.
164
 
As examined in Section 3.2, each state and territory in Australia creates its UGR policy and 
enacts its corresponding regulation as each of the Acts defines petroleum as a natural 
occurring hydrocarbon or mixture of hydrocarbons (in a gaseous, liquid or solid state). 
Therefore, despite Australia the national petroleum policy, states and territories hold their 
own petroleum policies and carte blanche over their UGR resources and corresponding 
regulation. 
The Queensland Gas Supply and Demand Action Plan Discussion Paper outlines the current 
UGR policy to maximise Queensland’s UGR potential and create a strong export market. The 
policy’s intent is to address and balance the needs of landholders, local communities and 
traditional owners while ensuring environmental safeguards are maintained.
165
 The 
aspirational policy goals to be met by 2025 includes Queensland becoming a ‘best-practice 
leader in environmental and social performance, and an important contributor to local 
community wellbeing; highly attractive to domestic and foreign direct investment; typified by 
a high level of innovation and collaboration and actively exploring frontier/greenfield 
basis.’
166
 Further, the vision for Queensland’s UGR sector is to ‘maximise its potential and be 
internationally competitive, balancing the needs of landholders, local communities and 
traditional owners while ensuring environmental safeguards are maintained’.
167
 It is 
significant that the policy framework includes aspects of a principles-based regulatory 
framework mentioning ‘collaboration’, ‘community’ and ‘best practice leadership’.
168
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As stated in Section 1.7, the application of hydraulic fracturing techniques dramatically 
increasing exploitation of shale gas basins in North America (and the associated price drop in 
UG in US and Canadian markets) and the growing resource demand of Asia has changed the 
economics of the British Columbian UG industry. The period from 1975 to 1984 marked the 
rapid development of PetroCanada under the Liberal Federal Government. The new federal 
oil company’s objectives until 1979 were outlined in the Ministry of Energy, Mines and 
Resources document An Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for Self-Reliance published on 
1 January 1976. The 1976 policy stressed the need to stimulate domestic production to reduce 
dependence on foreign oil: 
We must accelerate the search for new sources of energy and for new technologies 
for the production, distribution, conversion and utilization of energy. We must 
intensify our efforts to maintain control of our energy future, by minimizing our 
dependence on sources of supply that are not secure.
169
 
Canada is a natural resource nation, similar to Australia, and has seen the development of its 
petroleum policy as a significant UGR producer. The progressive discovery of oil in the first 
half of the twentieth century and the technical facility to extract conventional onshore oil led 
to the progressive growth of Canada’s petroleum policy. 
According to Doern and Toner, the period from the Leduc discovery in 1947 to the 1973 oil 
crisis is characterised by a ‘reasonable consensus’ between the federal government and 
resource-producing provinces over the management of the oil and gas reserves.
170
 Energy was 
readily available and very cheap, barely rising above US$2 per barrel throughout the period. 
Both levels of government encouraged production to stimulate growth in the domestic 
industry. The federal and provincial governments agreed on the construction of pipelines from 
the producing provinces to the consuming provinces, creating a favourable fiscal climate to 
attract investment and to develop exports. 
The rise in international oil prices altered the structure of the Canadian energy market with a 
significant hike in oil import prices affecting the oil-importing provinces east of the Ottawa 
Valley. This altered the political landscape and produced political consensus surrounding the 
passage of the 1961 National Oil Policy in a legislative response designed to make Canada 
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‘self-sufficient’ in oil and oil product-based products. As hydrocarbon resources in Canada 
are mostly geographically concentrated in Alberta and British Columbia, self-sufficiency 
implied some form of transfer from producing provinces to consuming provinces. This 
transfer was to take place with the creation of a single national market for Canadian oil, the 
extension of the pipeline network to Montreal, the establishment of a pricing mechanism to 
stimulate domestic production while distributing benefits among producing and consuming 
provinces and the creation a national oil company.
171
 
British Columbia is Canada’s second leading natural gas–producing province, accounting for 
24% of total production and 47% of Canada’s total natural gas reserves. British Columbia has 
much larger UGR reserves compared to Queensland, consisting mostly of shale gas, with an 
estimated 2,933 Tcf, primarily situated in the northeast region of the province in the Horn 
River Basin, the Montney, the Liard Basin and the Cordova Embayment.
172
 As of 2012, 1,400 
shale gas wells produce over 2 billion cubic feet per day of gas in British Columbia.
173
 
British Columbia’s Natural Gas Strategy states the province aims to become a ‘global leader 
in secure and sustainable gas investment, development and export’.
174
 The Natural Gas 
Strategy outlines the policy aims to achieve this vision by: 
 maintaining current and developing new markets 
 ensuring a reliable, abundant supply 
 maintaining competitiveness 
 maximising the benefits of natural gas development 
 ensuring environmentally responsible development 
 building partnerships to promote development.175 
As at November 2017, 17 LNG export projects have been proposed with all export licenses 
being approved by the National Energy Board and nine federal EAs have been completed 
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 Clearly, Canada is gearing up for the lucrative export market and will 
emerge as a key competitor to Australia in this sector. The British Colombian Government 
has sought to create an attractive and internationally competitive investment climate by, for 
example, issuing C$830 million in infrastructure royalty credits to oil and gas companies 
since 2004 while streamlining oil and gas legislation and regulation to enable faster 
development of projects.
177
 This represents a strong LNG export policy focus for British 
Columbia to ‘promote the use of high efficiency natural gas electricity generation in export 
markets, and in specific markets in B.C., to meet the demand for capacity’.
178
 
While British Columbia does not hold the experience of commercial LNG production for 
export,
179
 as all projects are yet to have overall approval, British Columbia’s LNG policy 
seeks to balance that of landholders as evident in its stringent environmental approvals 
process. Further, as a traditional resource extraction province, British Columbia’s UGR 
regulatory framework comes from a ‘mature’ resource state policy standpoint. 
3.5.1 Controlled Development and Export of Unconventional Gas Resources 
Two divergent energy policies exist in energy-importing and energy-exporting states. Firstly, 
a statist approach dictates a state takes active participation in its energy market and ‘steer’ 
markets to provide optimal energy outcomes for the benefit of the state.
180
 The statist 
approach is based on the securitisation theory, where a policy must have ‘supreme policy 
priority’ where an ‘existential threat’ exists.
181
 A statist approach emphasises state control of 
resources and regulation and favours a major role by the government in sponsoring energy-
related activity, such as support for specific energy sources and direct participation in the 
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Although Australia is rich in energy resources, Schott and Campbell find it surprising that its 
energy policy documents do not address diversion of energy to export markets or demand 
security as a threat to Australia’s overall economic future.
183
 Australian energy policy 
documents raise no concerns about energy security in markets that are not open, transparent 
and do not have clear and competitive price signals, without which energy trade is dictated by 
geopolitical processes.
184
 Australia’s complacency about energy security appears inconsistent 
with other regional and international views. A bipartisan ‘hands-off’ approach and general 
public complacency regarding Australia’s energy future may not serve the national interest in 
the long run. 
A market-based policy approach seeks to mitigate the risks of potential market supply 
disruption by promoting efficiency of domestic markets without intervention. According to 
proponents of this approach, energy is another commodity conceived on equal footing to all 
other traded commodities. Consequently, energy markets are then exposed to the same 
conditions as other commodity markets as private petroleum companies will deliver energy at 
the best price and ensure adequate and reliable supplies so that government intervention is 
minimal, unless market failure is presented. Efficient markets are attained by removing taxes, 
royalties, subsidies and maintaining transparent trading rules and regulations.
185
 





 have generally adopted statist policies, while 
energy importers, particularly members of the International Energy Agency (IEA), such as the 
US, have adopted market-based policies. Australia has adopted a wholly free market or liberal 
energy policy based on limited government interference in energy policy. The underlying 
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assumption is that free markets and private oil and gas companies will best serve Australia’s 
interests in providing optimal market outcomes in terms of both price and balancing supply 
and demand. 
This is evident in Australia’s first Energy White Paper in 2004, released by the Howard 
Government, which acknowledged the decline of Australia’s liquid fuel balance and, rather 
than raising energy as an issue of security, argued for the export of surpluses in all other 
energy categories including UGR, uranium and coal.
188
 The policy implication of the 2004 
White Paper solidified Australia’s place as a net energy exporter and the policy objective to 
increase energy liberalisation in Australia’s national interest.
189
 The latest Energy White 
Paper, released in 2015, reiterates its predecessor consolidating the market-led energy policy 
for Australia: 
Our guiding principle is that markets should be left to operate freely, without 
unnecessary government intervention. Competition, productivity and investment 
will deliver reliable and cost competitive energy to households and business.
190
 
Further, the broad National Gas Objective of the Australian Energy Market Commission is to 
‘promote efficient investment in, and efficient operation and use of, natural gas services for 
the long-term interests of consumers of natural gas with respect to price, quality, safety, 
reliability and security of supply of natural gas’.
191
 
However, the release of the Finkel Report in early 2017 raised political concerns about the 
adequacy of current domestic energy supply in Australia. This is supported by the recent 
findings of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
192
 and Australian 
Energy Market Operator (AEMO)
193
 questioning the Turnbull government’s ‘hands-off’ 
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approach to energy security. The reports highlights the concern about projected shortfalls in 
domestic energy supply which has created an environment of uncertainty and confusion for 
some Australian states
194
 with the most expensive electricity prices in the world being 
47.13 cents per kilowatt hour in South Australia.
195
 
In January 2015, Queensland began exporting UGR and LNG to Asian markets, representing 
development of UGR for export rather than to serve the domestic market. In 2016, 5,127 
UGR wells were reported as producing CSG and total LNG production for 2015–2016 was 
92.63 ML (49,265 tonnes).
196
 Most of Queensland’s UGR is currently produced from the 
Fairview and Spring Gully areas in the Bowen Basin, where development has been 
concentrated on coal seams at around 300 metres depth, and the Walloon Coal Measures in 
the Surat Basin, where CSG is typically obtained from coal seams located at depths between 
300 and 600 metres. 
The three LNG export port facilities in Queensland have brought ‘increased uncertainty and 
complexity’
197
 to the East Coast domestic electricity market.
198
 The volatility of the UGR 
sector, according to the ACCC, is based on the following: 
 export contracts have favoured the export market based on longer term contract and 
historically high LNG prices $10–16 per gigajoule 
 commercial and industrial users are unable to access reasonably priced LNG 
 the expression of interest or auction processes are unprecedented in wholes gas supply 
where users need to bid their prices and later find out if they have been shortlisted 
 limited supply of gas to the domestic market due to long-term export contracts has 
created unfavourable negotiating conditions 
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The LNG market has become ‘heated’ and the high prices that LNG producers can demand 
for export has significantly affected the domestic supply of LNG in Australia. An example of 
this is described by the ACCC: 
One of the LNG projects is currently planning to export a volume of LNG above the 
minimum requirements for 2018 under its long-term export contracts. The volume in 
excess of the minimum contractual export commitments could have been used to 
supply additional gas into the domestic market.
200
 
The laissez faire approach taken by the Queensland government has created a forecast 
production supply of 224 petajoules per annum in 2018, down from 330 petajoules per annum 
produced in 2017. The AEMO predicted a UGR shortfall in domestic supply of up to 107 
petajoules in 2018 and 102 petajoules in 2019, creating increased gas prices in the Eastern gas 
states of Australia.
201
 Government non-intervention in the LNG supply side, coupled with the 
Finkel Inquiry proposal to increase domestic LNG production to create greater domestic 
energy security, has led the federal government to pressure state governments to lift state 
moratoriums on gas exploration in Victoria, New South Wales and Northern Territory. 
A period of mergers and acquisitions and investment of large oil and gas companies resulted 
in four major LNG production operations in Queensland and three major consortia—
Gladstone LNG project (GLNG) (Santos (operator, 30%), Petronas (27.5%), Kogas (15%) 
and Total (27.5%)); Australia Pacific LNG (APLNG) (Origin (upstream operator, 37.5%), 
Conoco-Phillips (37.5%) and Sinopec (25%)); Queensland Curtis LNG (QCLNG) 
(Queensland Gas Company (QGC) operator (a BG subsidiary, recently purchase by Shell) 
with minor stakes in QCLNG owned by CNOOC and Tokyo Gas); and Arrow Energy (owned 
50:50 by Shell and PetroChina).
202
 The opportunity to develop a CSG–LNG industry for 
export led the three consortia and Arrow Energy to undertake ‘rapid expansion of production’ 
to service international energy markets the scale of which was ‘unprecedented in Australia’.
203
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This led to a policy and regulatory approach of the Queensland government as a rule-based 
adaptive management framework for addressing the cumulative impacts of the UGR industry 
including: 
 The creation of the Office of Groundwater Impact Assessment 204  advising the 
Queensland government on the nature and extent of UGR impact on groundwater systems 
and the creation of ‘make good agreements’ between the landholder and the company 
regarding how the impact on the landholder’s water bore is to be addressed through either 
monetary compensation, deepening of water bores into other aquifers, drilling a new water 
bore or providing alternative access to water. 
 The CSG Compliance Unit aimed to provide a ‘one stop monitoring and enforcement 
service’
205
 by placing government staff in Gasfields regions to address public inquiries 
and concerns. 
 The GC 206  to facilitate landholder engagement and provide recommendations to 
government departments and Ministers on the implementation of land access laws. 
 The Land Access Framework (LAF), consisting of the LAC,207 to suggest how oil and 
gas companies communicate and negotiate with landholders in creating land access 
agreements. 
The four key regulatory and policy measures aimed at developing the rapid expansion of the 
LNG export industry in Queensland have created unparalleled effects on land use and land 
access,
208
 examined in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis. 
As discussed in Sections 2.9.3 and 3.5, the additional Water Trigger regulations were 
implemented by the EPBCA.
209
 The Water Trigger prohibits a CSG or large coal mining 
development from taking an action which results, will result or is likely to result in a 
significant impact on a water resource.
210
 The Water Trigger regulation does not have a 
retroactive effect which could be applicable to already approved projects at the time of 
enactment. However, the Arrow Energy LNG–CSG project did require additional 
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Commonwealth EPBCA approval under the Water Trigger as the project was pending 
approval at the time of the Water Trigger enactment. The additional Water Trigger approval 
created a one year project delay and altered the project scope significantly.
211
 
Morrow notes the irony of Australia’s domestic energy shortfall, given the country’s huge gas 
reserves.
212
 The higher price of LNG set by export markets will flow into higher domestic 
prices and this has led to a deterioration of public support for UGR. Australia is a high cost 
producer and as Asian prices fluctuated downwards projects slowed down—reducing 
availability of natural gas for domestic markets even before the companies were able to begin 
actual LNG export. Morrow observes that if the government wishes to develop UGRs, it will 
need to identify the risks, regulate them well and communicate with the public. Australia has 
become a cautionary tale to many policymakers in Canada. As stated by Sabonis-Helf, ‘the 
idea that entering the world market may imperil the domestic market is a strong message’.
213
 
In July 2017, the Australian Government implemented the Australian Domestic Gas Security 
Mechanism (ADGSM).
214
The ADGSM allows for the control of LNG exports in the event of 
a significant domestic gas supply shortfall. The ADGSM is designed to ensure a sufficient 
supply of gas to meet the needs of Australian consumers by requiring, if necessary, LNG 
projects to divert supplies to the domestic market, to limit exports or find offsetting sources of 
new gas. As of September 2017, this broad policy recommendation (which does not quantify 
‘sufficient supply’) has not been enacted by the federal government. 
Delivered in 2017, the Finkel Review confirms the place of UGR policy in Australia as a 
‘transition fuel’ to ensure the National Energy Market’s reliability and security in a gas-fired 
generation. However, the current policy conditions of high gas prices in Australia and tight 
supply are attributable to the majority of UGR being contracted for export and, therefore, 
unavailable for the domestic market. Therefore, the review echoes the UGR sector’s calls for 
state governments to adopt evidence-based regulatory regimes to manage UGR project risks, 
rather than introduction regulatory moratorium. 
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3.5.3 Canada 
In 2011, federal, provincial and territorial energy ministers endorsed a collaborative approach 
to guide action on shared priorities on energy through the Energy and Mines Ministers’ 
Conference. The collaborative approach provided a shared vision that ‘Canada is a recognized 
global leader in secure and sustainable energy supply, use, and innovation’.
215
 The vision was 
supported by a preliminary series of common principles to guide action on shared priorities 
to: 
Acknowledge the need for an adequate and reliable supply of energy Recognize the 
importance of socially and environmentally responsible development, transportation 
and use of energy Pursue a market-oriented approach to energy policies governed by 
effective, efficient and transparent regulatory systems Recognize that federal, 
provincial and territorial cooperation is essential while respecting distinct 
constitutional jurisdictions and government authorities.
216
 
The Pan-Canadian Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, released in 2016 and 
endorsed by all Canadian provinces, is founded upon a number of principles including 
collaboration and transparency; climate change, social and environmental responsibility; and 
energy security and sustainability.
217
 The Pan-Canadian Framework acknowledges the 
pivotal role of British Columbia’s UG within its energy strategy:  
B.C. has an abundance of natural gas, which is a lower carbon fuel that will play a 
critical role in transitioning the world economy off of high carbon fuels such as coal. 
B.C. is developing the resource responsibly, and provincial legislation will make the 
emerging LNG sector the cleanest in the world. B.C. is also electrifying upstream 




Canada also holds a market-orientated approach to regulate supply, demand, prices and trade 
in its energy system. However, some Canadian provinces, such as British Columbia, have 
created state-based intervention policies through the Crown Corporations. 
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Canada produces 16.2 billion cubic feet of UGR per day, with 7.9 billion cubic feet exported 
(primarily to the US) and 8.3 billion cubic feet consumed domestically.
219
 British Columbia’s 
Natural Gas Strategy is based on the aim of creating a secure and sustainable natural gas 
sector for domestic development and export. The following policy principles are laid down by 
the policy to ensure British Columbia maintains current and future development of new UGR 
markets; ensures a reliable, abundant supply; maintains competitiveness; maximises the 
benefits of natural gas development; ensures environmentally responsible development; and 
build partnerships to promote development.
220
 
Stakeholder interests, including First Nations, ‘community engagement’ and ‘the shares 
values of Canadians’ is evident in the Canadian Energy Policy and British Columbia’s UGR 
policy.
221
 Collaboration at a federal and municipal level is also found in the New West 
Partnership established in 2010, encompassing British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan, 
creating Canada’s largest interprovincial barrier-free trade and investment market. An energy 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed by the three provinces in 2010, 




British Columbia has arguably more effectively observed and applied the IEA Golden Rules 
for a Golden Age of Gas which suggests policy principles allowing regulators and operators to 
address environmental and social aspects of UGR.
223
 In particular, integration and 
engagement with local communities, residents and other stakeholders ‘into each phase of a 
development starting before exploration; provide sufficient opportunity for comment on 
plans, operations and performance; listen to concerns and respond appropriately and 
promptly’.
224
 These policy objectives have been woven into the creation of the OGC in 
British Columbia, representing a greater role for the state in managing energy policy on behalf 
of the citizens of British Columbia. 
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3.6 Comparative Historical Context of Australian and Canadian 
Agricultural Policy 
3.6.1 State Intervention 
The push to increase agricultural production has driven structural changes in Australian 
agriculture with resulting impacts on production regimes, access to markets and the nature of 
farming to create a highly diverse sector. Australian agriculture has undergone a radical 
transformation that has seen protectionist agrarian policies disappear from the Australian 
policy landscape.
225
 Commodity oversupply based on a fixed base price system for farmers, 
including in 1990–1991, led to the subsequent collapse of Australia’s competitiveness in the 
world wool market and hastened the pace of deregulation in Australia.
226
 The deregulation of 
Australian agricultural industry commenced in 1985, including the complete deregulation of 
dairy in 2000, one of Australia’s most recognisable agricultural commodities.
227
 
Contemporary Australian agriculture is among the most deregulated in the world. 
The landscape of Australian agriculture during the second half of the twentieth century has 
largely been dominated by the policies to increase the nation’s competitive advantage on the 
world stage.
228
 The policy language reflects the objectives of efficiency, competitiveness and 
market-led supply and demand. Many of the processes and programs associated with the 
reforms to achieve these policy goals were developed and driven from within Treasury and 
the PC, rather than the ‘rural heartlands’ of farming and farmers.
229
 This is an important point, 
as it cuts to the very nature of how farming and rural production systems are understood in the 
Australian legislative context. 
Two government advisory boards advise the Australian Department of Agriculture and Water 
Resources, the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Scientists 
(ABARES) and the PC within the Treasury Ministry. Their mandate is to review and make 
recommendations for government assistance for industry. The PC hearings and reports receive 
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program funding for fixed terms to review agricultural policy to ensure ‘national agricultural 
policy remains open to external scrutiny’.
230
 PC reports have been instrumental in structuring 
the negotiations surrounding the deregulation of wheat and dairy in Australia while taking 
into account the relevant private sector interests. 
ABARES has also had a direct and continuous impact in advocating ‘the dismantling of 
federal government price and income stabilisation policies since the 1970’s by providing 
economic information on specific sector production’.
231
 Significantly, the PC, ABARES and 
the creation of the NFF extended to the creation of the NFF document, Farm Focus: The 
1980’s,
232
 which advocated reducing assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, 
ending agricultural protectionism and liberalising trade.
233
 
After Canada’s Confederation, legislative measures to develop agriculture and assist 
producers became a permanent fixture on the Canadian legal landscape, both at the federal 
and provincial levels. The federal and provincial governments have been very active in 
promoting agriculture through the development of rural areas,
234
 agricultural research 
stations,
235
 technical assistance to farmers and regulatory mechanisms to control livestock 
diseases
236




Canadian agriculture law has been significantly transformed based on federal and provincial 
regulations with the objectives of 1) encouraging agriculture and assisting those involved in 
agricultural production, 2) promoting fair trade in agricultural products, and 3) ensuring 
agricultural product and food safety and quality.
238
 In comparison to Australia, the Canadian 
Government consistently operates with higher financial assistance, market protection and 
supply chain management systems in its prime agricultural sectors.
239
 Since the late 1960s, in 
Australia, agricultural protectionism has been replaced by reducing financial and regulatory 
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support for agriculture. In Australia, subsidy support across the agricultural sector is 3%, 
compared to 15% in Canada. 
The Constitution Act, 1867
240
 provides the Parliament of Canada and the legislature of each 
province and territory the power to ‘make Laws in relation to Agriculture’.
241
 An example of 
this is the dairy sector in Canada. In this commodity sector, the Canadian Government almost 
exclusively manages its domestic market and a set of regulatory instruments fix prices and 
quotas for dairy farmers based on the cost of production and that of controlled supply 
governing domestic milk and milk products.
242
 Comprehensive import controls have ensured 
a highly protected supply management chain.
243
 Similarly, the Australian dairy sector, until 
1999, operated under a two-price regulator scheme with domestic prices set higher than 
export returns to protect dairy producers from market entry of lower-priced and unsubsidised 
New Zealand dairy products under the Closer Economic Relations Agreements.
244
 
Since 2000, the Australian dairy industry has been deregulated via the Dairy Structural 
Adjustment Program (1999)
245
 and all states repealed legislation governing sourcing and 
pricing of drinking milk and the state milk authorities, which administered these controls, 
were wound up from 1 July 2000. With few exceptions, Australian agriculture now operates 
in a largely deregulated market with farmers acting as independent participants in a 
competitive marketplace requiring farmers to manage their supply chains.
246
 The 
implementation of Australia’s National Competition Policy from 1992–1995 drastically 
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In contrast, the Canadian Government regulates dairy production via the Canadian Milk 
Supply Management Committee created in 1966 under the Canadian Dairy Commission 
Act
248
 and chaired by a federal Crown Corporation. The Canadian Dairy Commission is 
responsible for dairy policy and has representatives from provincial marketing boards and 
provincial governments.
249
 Canada’s Crown Corporation the Canadian Dairy Commission, 
external to the Canadian Department of Agriculture, has been responsible for implementing 
key features of national dairy policy and advising the minister of agriculture on key dairy 
regulations.
250
 The Canadian Dairy Commission remains a strong advocate of supply 
management and takes a defensive stance to policy change. With the Canadian Dairy 
Commission as the central policy player of Canadian Dairy, protectionist regulation favouring 




Therefore, the Canadian Dairy Commission has constructed a system that encompasses both 
industrial and fluid milk producers that is vertically integrated across provincial divisions.
252
 
Another contrast is seen in Canadian agricultural export trade policy, where provincial 
governments demand and have received a right to be consulted in international trade 
negotiations.
253
 Therefore, provincial governments can exercise their regulatory authority over 
intra-provincial marketing and dairy production. 
3.6.2 Agricultural Land Protection 
In Queensland, the recent repeal of the SCL Act and introduction of the RPIA and the RIDA 
regime are direct results of increasing regulatory concerns to protect and sustain agricultural 
activities during and after UG activities have taken place on private agricultural land. The 
RPIA provides a single integrated legislative framework that captures existing policies 
including strategic cropping land policies. This legislation is intended to protect and preserve 
the most valuable agricultural land and manage impacts of development on that land. 
                                                 
248 RSC 1982, c 15. 
249 William Coleman and Grace Skogstad, ‘Neo‐liberalism, policy networks, and policy change: Agricultural 
policy reform in Australia and Canada’ (1995) 30 (2) Journal of Political Science 242. 
250 Dairy Processors Association of Canada, Regulatory Framework (2015) <http://www.dpac-
atlc.ca/framework.php>.  
251 Canadian Dairy Commission Act, RSC 1985, c 15. 
252 James D. Forbes, Institutions and Influence Groups in Canadian Farm and Food Policy (Institute of Public 
Administration, 1985) 34. 
253 Grace Skogstad, ‘The State, Organized Interests and Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy: The Impact of 
Institutions’ (1992) 25(2) Canadian Journal of Political Science 319, 327. 
120 
In relation to competing land uses, the debate has centred on PAAs—land that is particularly 
suited to the state’s agriculture industry, whether for food or fibre production. The 
Queensland Legislature implemented the RPIA to manage, among other things, ‘the impact of 
resource activities and other regulated activities on areas of regional interest; and the 
coexistence, in areas of regional interest, of resource activates and other regulates activities 
with other activities, including, for example, highly productive agricultural activities’.
254
 
Agricultural areas are defined as one or more areas used for a priority agricultural use, 
whether it also includes other areas or features, including, for example, a regionally 
significant water source, and is either i) shown on a map in a regional plan as a PAA or ii) 
prescribed under a regulation.
255
 
Additionally, a priority agricultural land use is defined as ‘highly productive agriculture of a 
type identified in a regional plan for an area of regional interests; or of a type prescribed under 
a regulation for an area of regional interest’.
256
 However, non-agricultural uses are not defined 
or considered in the RPIA. Rather, agricultural land uses are simply defined as ‘highly 
productive agricultural areas, or agricultural land uses with significant infrastructure 
investment or agricultural land uses that have the potential to be significantly impacted by 
resource activities and have limited scope to modify their agricultural practices in response to 
these impacts’.
257
 The broad purpose of the RPIA is to protect PAAs, PLAs, SCAs and 
strategic environmental areas, each of which are classified as ‘areas of regional interest’.
258
 
As stated by Williams, Milligan and Stubbs, ‘It is a defensible proposition that the only 
development activities that should be acceptable in a region are those that allow the landscape 
to maintain its function indefinitely. It would be folly to secure one natural resource while 
putting at risk renewable long-term resource use’.
259
 The broader question of these competing 
land uses is the balance between energy and commodity security.
260
 It is the role of the law to 
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attempt to balance and protect the interests of both the agricultural and UG industries. 
Agricultural landholders are understandably reluctant to allow their prime agricultural land to 
be used for UGR extraction. However, even if a farmer owns the fee simple land, in both 
Australia and Canada a government (federal, state or provincial) has the right to grant a 
license to petroleum titleholders to drill wells to extract UG. This tension between the 
interests of the landholder and titleholder is subject to critical analysis in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Land use legislation in Canada, similar to Australia, assigns roles to provincial ministries and 
municipal governments in the creation, implementation and monitoring of compliance with 
official plans or development plans. The approach taken by most provinces to regulating land 
use is to enact specific land use regulations for both rural and urban land planning 
legislation.
261
 The general framework for planning legislation is the promulgation of an 
official community development plan at the regional or local level set out in legislation.
262
 
While the detailed development of these plans is usually the concern of regional or local 




Agricultural land protection in British Columbia operates as a form of provincial-level zoning 
that takes priority over local land use regulations by creating comprehensive land use 
regulations to protect their agricultural land base. The provincial ALR comprises land that 
was zoned for agricultural purposes by the relevant local government authority as at the 
establishment of the reserve in 1973, plus additions and minus removals approved since then 
by the Agricultural Land Commission (ALC). In general, land in the reserve may not be 
subdivided or used for a non-farm use without the approval of the ALC. Local governments 




British Columbia’s pioneering province-wide implementation of the ALR is one of the 
earliest international examples of a legislated agricultural land use protection framework. The 
ALR currently includes 4.7 million hectares of land, for which subdivision and non-
agricultural uses are severely restricted. According to the Census of Agriculture for British 
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Columbia, of the 19,759 farms comprising the total farm area in British Columbia in 2011, 
61.7% was pasture land (tame or seeded pasture and natural land for pasture) while cropland 
accounted for an additional 23%.
265
 With a similar comparative size of farm operations in 
British Columbia of 29,925 farms to Queensland’s 28,000 farms, an analysis of British 
Columbia’s alternative agricultural ALR zoning regime is pertinent and a baseline to explore 
alternative regulation to Queensland’s current RPIA regime. 
The passing of Bill 24, the Agricultural Land Commission Amendment Act 2014,
266
 thrust the 
issue of coexistence of ALR lands and oil and gas development into the spotlight in British 
Columbia. The amendment essentially split the ALR regions into two zones consisting of 
Northern and Southern British Columbia and six regional panels. This effectively and clearly 
defined the scope of provincial ALR oversight and represents an example of coexistence 
between agricultural and oil and gas land uses. Zone 1 representing 10% of total ALR land 
(Okanagan 224,977 ha; Island 116,207 ha; and South Coast 148,207 ha) and Zone 2 




The PRRD and Northern Rockies Regional Municipality, where the majority of UGRs are 
located, falls within Zone 2 and under the ambit of the Delegation Agreement between the 
ALC and OGC. Where the combined total area occupied by the existing and proposed oil and 
gas activities is greater than 20 ha per quarter section, an ALCA Application is required to be 
made via local government for permission to use ALR land for non-farm purposes. The 
authority lies with the Delegation Agreement to determine whether to approve these 
applications. 
In British Columbia currently, there are 4,620,858 ha (11,418,388.79 ac) included in the ALR, 
representing 5% of the total provincial area.
268
 The highest amount of ALR land in the 
Regional District is in the communities of Fort St John and Dawson Creek. According to the 
2011 Census of Agriculture, 823,498 ha (2,0349,07.87 ac) are being farmed in the PRRD, 
which accounts for 64% of the region’s ALR.
269
 Fort St John and Dawson Creek are situated 
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above the Montney Shale Gas Basin. Consequently, resource development of shale gas and 
vast ALR lands must coexist in British Columbia. 
Pursuant to s 26 of the ALCA
270
, the ALC can enter into an agreement to allow governments 
or authorities to exercise the ALC’s power to decide applications for non-farm use. The ALC 
has exercised power to enter into an agreement with the OGC relating to certain oil and gas 
non-farm uses within the ALR. The OGC is consequently delegated the power of decisions 
over oil and gas activities on ALR land in the PRRD, where shale gas activities and 
contestation with agricultural land use is most prevalent in the province. 
Alongside the development of the LNG industry in British Columbia is the land use clustering 
system regulating restrictions on all non-farm activities on protected agricultural land to 
encourage farming and safeguard farmland with the enactment of the province-wide ALR in 
1973.
271
 Public sentiment supporting the ALR stems from a desire to secure local food 
production, maintain the local agricultural economy and protect the environment. 
Environmental groups expend considerable effort encouraging the government and the 
general public to continue support for the protection of agricultural land.
272
 
Both jurisdictions face similar challenges in managing the interests of agricultural landowners 
and commercial UGR exploitation. Striking a ‘balance’ between competing interests, as stated 
by the Gas Supply and Demand Action Plan, to achieve ‘coexistence’ between traditionally 
farming communities in resource-rich areas and energy companies attempting to exploit 
subsurface resources has been a polarising debate in Queensland.
273
 
In the case of British Columbia, the role of the state has been to protect agricultural land 
through a series of regulatory mechanisms including the ALR, ALCA and the Delegation 
Agreement.
274
 In contrast, Queensland has relatively less institutional and administrative 
                                                 
270 Agricultural Land Commission Act, SBC 2002, c 36, s 33. McCall v. British Columbia (Agricultural Land 
Commission) [2012] 443 BCSC. (application to have properties removed from reserve on basis of 
unsuitability for soil-based farming dismissed; new hearing directed; not appropriate for court to interfere in 
commission's mandate by making order of mandamus). 
271 Robert Androkovich, Ivan Desjardins, Gordon Tarzwell, and Peter Tsigaris, ‘Land Preservation in British 
Columbia: An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Underlying Public Support and Willingness to Pay’ (2008) 
40(3) Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 999. 
272 Ryan Green, Case Studies of Agricultural Land Commission Decisions:  The Need for Inquiry and Reform 
(2006) < http://www.elc.uvic.ca/documents/ALR%20Final%20Report%20(FINAL-2).pdf>.  
273 Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland Gas Supply and Demand 
Action Plan, Discussion Paper (2016) <ttps://www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/805552/gas-
action-plan-5107-discussion-paper.pdf> 10. 
274 As examined in Chapter four of this thesis. 
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bodies to represent the interests of agricultural landowners. This has led Hester and Harrison 
to observe that this lack of regulation has led to ‘conflicts between agriculture and CSG strike 
with particular force in some of Australia’s most productive farming areas, including the 
Darling Downs…where the national interest in prime farmland comes into play’.
275
 The 
impact of this regulatory approach on agricultural landowners is outlined in detail in Chapter 
5. 
Table 1 illustrates the many similarities of the petroleum and agricultural policies of 
Queensland and British Columbia. The policy focus of ensuring the state has an active role in 
regulating and upholding the policy of protecting agricultural land during UGR activities 
without compromising the agricultural industry is upheld in British Columbia. This is in 
contrast to the overly export-focused wealth maximisation commercial UGR policies in 
Queensland. This also demonstrates the more active role of the state as manager and 
controller of the exploitation of UGR in British Columbia compared to the policy position of 
Queensland with a minimal government participatory approach. 
Table 1: Comparison of Petroleum and Agricultural Policy and Regulatory Factors 
Factors Queensland British Columbia 
Petroleum Policy 
 Controlled development of UGR resources 
and export  
 















 Minimalist state intervention  
 
 Role of the state as regulator  
 














 Oil and Gas Administrative Bodies regulation 
and decision making powers  
 














                                                 
275 R.E. Hester and R.M. Harrison, Fracking (The Royal Society of Chemistry, 2015) 167. 
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 Discretionary Principles-Based regulation to 
adjust to changing conditions 
 
 Crown as the owner of UGR resources 
 



















Source: Compiled by author. 
Another key divergence in policy is the focus and prioritisation of agriculture in a highly 
regulated environment in Canada. This is evident in a number of specific regulatory 
authorities, including the ALC and its interaction with petroleum activities and land use and 
access. Importantly, British Columbia starts with a prioritisation of agricultural land 
protection, requiring petroleum companies to prove their need to access prime agricultural 
land and ‘do no harm’ to the future viability of the land itself via a transparent and codified 
statement of agricultural land rehabilitation. Secondly, the petroleum policy with 
collaborative oversight of the UGR sector in British Columbia is found in the regulatory 
powers of the OGC, for example, the capacity to overrule a petroleum license application. 
This is in contrast to Queensland’s GC, which has very little regulatory and policy scope in 
acting as an ‘independent’ administrative body limited in to power to reviewing and making 




The comparison of Queensland and British Columbia’s UGR policy demonstrates that 
Queensland has arguably failed to develop a coherent policy framework to develop UG 
without compromising agricultural land while balancing multiple competing interests of 
stakeholders. Consequently, there is a need to review and re-evaluate Queensland’s regulation 
and policy framework. The policy and regulatory framework of British Columbia is a useful 
point of reference and comparative jurisdiction, due to the many similarities between 
Queensland and British Columbia in the need to create wealth, export UG and protect the 
existing agricultural sector in a similar political, legal and policy framework. Additionally, 
both states utilise the licensing and contracting system for the regulation of UGR resources. 
                                                 
276 Gasfields Commission Act 2014 (Qld) s 7. 
126 
A number of policy changes in Queensland’s current UGR framework could encourage the 
coexistence of multiple stakeholder interests in the development of UGR on agricultural 
lands. Queensland’s UGR policy should consider a greater regulatory role of the state in the 
granting of agricultural land use and land access for UG activities. Rather than embracing a 
UGR policy solely focused on commercialisation and export, a shift in policy towards the 
safeguarding of domestic UGR reserves, agricultural land and domestic gas prices must 
embrace a policy of UGR exploitation that creates effective regulation in managing 
competing interests. This is a fundamental policy shift for Queensland with a focus on 
domestic energy security and the viability of its agricultural sector, rather than commercial 
partnership with oil and gas companies for the exploitation of UGR for export. 
3.7 Sources of Conflict and Confluence of Agriculture and Petroleum 
Policies 
The commercialisation of LNG for export on long-term contracts has driven the rapid 
development of UGR by the LNG consortia in Queensland.
277
 This has led to major impacts 
as projects have progressed and regulators have struggled to address the issues related to land 
use and land access. At the heart of this is conflict over the coexistence of agricultural 
activities and UGR extraction, which has been recently compounded by LNG shortages in 
eastern Australia. The site and focus of this conflict is the farm gate where energy producers 
and farmers attempt to negotiate the terms of coexistence through land use access agreements. 
Arrow Energy’s Surat Gas Project covers an area of approximately 8,600 km
2
 in the Darling 
Downs, a region renowned for its agricultural productivity. Sixty per cent of this area is 
considered a PAA as regulated by the RPIA.
278
 As previously described, a PAA is defined in s 
8(1) of the RPIA as one or more areas used for agricultural land use and is either shown on a 
                                                 
277 ‘The dynamic between the capital needs of LNG producers and the long-term supply needs of LNG buyers has 
shaped the structure and pricing of LNG purchase and sale agreements. Buyers assume “volume risk” by 
agreeing to purchase certain volumes over time for delivery to a specified market on a take-or-pay basis, 
while producers assume “price risk” by agreeing to a price tied to the value of gas in the destination markets, 
which is then subject to periodic recalibration under a price review mechanism. 6 Under the typical “take or 
pay” model, the buyer is required to purchase the contracted quantity of LNG over the duration of the 
contract, and must pay for the contracted quantity even if they do not take delivery, subject to limited volume 
and/or destination flexibility rights, depending on the contract… Importers in key Asia-Pacific jurisdictions 
such as Japan and South Korea typically enter into long-term contracts with terms of 10 to 25 years’. Haig 
Oghigian, Lisa Henneberry, and Joe Jones, Squire Patton Boggs, ‘LNG Contracts in the Asia-Pacific Region: 
Disputes on The Horizon?’ (2017) 14(4) Oil, Gas and Energy Law Intelligence 1, 2. 
278 Cindy Chen and Alan Randall, ‘The Economic Contest Between Coal Seam Gas Mining and Agriculture on 
Prime Farmland: It May be Closer than We Thought’ (2013) 15(3) Journal of Economic and Society Policy 9. 
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map in a regional plan as a PAA or prescribed under a regulation.
279
 A priority agricultural 
land use is highly productive agriculture of a type identified in a regional plan for an area of 
regional interest or prescribed under a regulation for an area of regional interests pursuant to s 
8(2) of the RPIA.
280
 Strategic cropping land is defined as land that is or is likely to be highly 
suitable for cropping because of a combination of the land’s soil, climate and landscape 
features and the SCA is found in the strategic cropping land trigger maps pursuant to s 10 of 
the RPIA. 
Interestingly, if a resource activity is proposed to be carried out on land considered both a 
PAA and strategic cropping land area, the assessor need only be satisfied the resource activity 
meets the required outcomes in sch 2 of the PA Act that, among other criteria, the resource 
activity will not result in a loss of more than 2% of the land classified as a PAA and a loss of 
more than 2% of the productive capacity of priority agricultural land use on the property.
281
 
This is different to the criteria for managing impacts of resource activities on strategic 
cropping land, which states that the activity must not have a permanent impact on the strategic 
cropping land and the impact will be no more than 2% of the property. Ensuring a resource 
activity does not have a permanent impact on strategic cropping land is arguably a broader 




‘Coexistence’ is essential to UGR regulation, as recognised by the Office of the Chief 
Economist that ‘it has been increasingly important for the CSG industry to have a deep 
understanding of key issues in relation to developing and managing sustainable coexistence 
with the agricultural industry’,
283
 and is fundamental to the development of CSG, 
necessitating its consideration through adequate regulation and policy goals. Selecting 
appropriate regulatory tools for land use and land access regulation is essential in managing 
UGR at the cumulative level to promote long-term sustainability with the agricultural sector. 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommends and 
promotes transparency to create effective regulation and advises State’s to ‘adhere to 
                                                 
279 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8(1). 
280 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8(2). 
281 Regional Planning Interests Regulation 2014 (Qld) sch 2 s 3(b). 
282 Regional Planning Interests Regulation 2014 (Qld) pt 3 s 9(2). 
283 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (Cth), Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the 
Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas in Queensland (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) 
<https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-Economist/Publications/Documents/coal-seam-
gas/Socioeconomic-impacts-of-coal-seam-gas-in-Queensland.pdf>  18. 
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principles of open government, including transparency and participation in the regulatory 
process to ensure that regulation serves the public interest and is informed by the legitimate 
needs of those interested in and affected by regulation’.
284
 Given that the UGR industry must 
work with agricultural landholders, this is a particularly important regulatory issue that can 




The Unconventional Gas Inquiry’s Interim Report into the operation of the UGR was released 
in June 2016. The report represents the latest in a series of state and federal government 
inquiries into the Australian UG industry. It explores, among many policy issues, the viability 
of current Australian regulation in protecting agricultural land from UGR activities and 
exploration. The 18 recommendations that emerge from the report display a heightened level 
of political scrutiny into the operation of the UG industry and its potential long-term effects 
on agriculture and rural communities. In its findings on UGR industry governance and 
regulatory systems, the report reflects on the patchwork of differing policy approaches by 
state and territory legislation in stating, ‘the unconventional gas mining industry is a long way 
from having adequate regulation, oversight and operation’.
286
 
In British Columbia, Agricultural Planning Regulation plays a significant role in how UGR 
land access and land use is managed with agricultural lands. In comparison, the DILGP in 
Queensland regulates land use zoning protection and agricultural land use approvals, rather 
than the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries. Farmland preservation and global 
competitiveness of the agricultural sector have been the driving forces in influencing 
agricultural land use planning in British Columbia. This is evident in its establishment of the 
ALR and a quasi-judicial ALC tribunal to provide ‘the cornerstone of planning for agriculture 
and heightening certainty for persons engaged in farm businesses and support industries’.
287
 
Important elements in the legislation include a clear mandate for the ALC that is focused 
                                                 
284 OECD, Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance (2012) 
<https://www.oecd.org/governance/regulatory-policy/49990817.pdf> 8. 
285 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (Cth), Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the 
Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas in Queensland (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) 
<https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-Economist/Publications/Documents/coal-seam-
gas/Socioeconomic-impacts-of-coal-seam-gas-in-Queensland.pdf> 46. 
286 Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Unconventional Gas 
Interim Report (2016) 25. 




specifically on protecting farmland. This primary focus been maintained for over 40 years 
despite changing governments. 
The Right to Farm Act and ALCA protects farm practices and extends this stability to areas of 
land use conflict.
288
 The policy language in the legislation incorporates local government 
plans consistency with the ALCA, providing a necessary link to extend the provincial 
legislation into the domain of local land use planning and decisions. The ALCA provides a 
mechanism for land owners, including governments, to apply to the ALC to exclude or 
include land in the ALR, to approve subdivisions and to permit non-farm uses. 
Official Community Plans (OCPs), as enforceable regulatory plans, are the foundation of 
stability for local frameworks. Typically, OCPs include vision or goal statements, agricultural 
objectives and specific policies for agricultural lands. The OCP is supported by the zoning by-
laws which provide regulations for designated agricultural land uses, contributing to the 
stability of the framework. An example of an integrated and comprehensive legislative 
framework is in the South Peace River Regional Area, where a local development plan, 
regional agricultural plan and ALR and Community Planning Guidelines operate to maintain 
and secure a productive agricultural resource base. The South Peace River Area is situated on 
the Monteny UGR tenement. 
The Delegation Agreement provides a comprehensive set of regulations that define permitted 
oil and gas uses on agricultural land and conditions and procedures for when the ALC must be 
involved in application processes in the Northern Rockies and Peace River Regions.
289
 Since 
2004, the Delegation Agreement has been in place and decision-making power over specific 
oil and gas activities on ALR land delegated to the OGC. The key purpose of the Delegation 
Agreement is to ‘further the one window regulation of the oil and gas sector in British 
Columbia and seek ways to streamline and improve the review and approval processes for oil 
                                                 
288 Farm Practices Protection (Right to Farm) Act, RSBC 1996, c 131. 
289 British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement (2013) 
<https://www.bcogc.ca/node/5759/download>. The delegation agreement is limited in that it only applies to 
the oil and gas sector. It is limited to ‘operators’ (article 9); and ‘producers’ (article 10) for a waste storage, 
treatment or disposal facility. “Operator” and “producer” are defined in the definitions section of the 
agreement. For example, a proposed non-farm use for a camp, borrow site, or water storage site, etc., by a 
non-operator, is outside this agreement and these applications are submitted via the regular ALCA non-farm 
use process to local government. Likewise a non-farm use proposal for a waste storage, treatment, or disposal 
facility by a non-producer is also outside this agreement. 
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and gas activities and ancillary activities on agricultural reserve lands while preserving 
agricultural lands and encouraging the farming of agricultural lands’.
290
 
The ALCA process requires public consultation, disclosure and comment from local 
governments. All applications for non-farm use in the ALR are submitted to the local 
government before being submitted the OGC. Local governments then review the application 
and determine if they will forward the application to the ALC for decision with or without a 
recommendation or comment.
 291
 Local government zoning, therefore, plays a role in 
determining land use and a proposed use may require re-zoning at the local level in meeting 
one of the key purposes of the ALCA to ‘encourage local governments…to enable and 
accommodate farm use of agricultural land and uses compatible with agriculture in their 
plans, bylaws and policies’.
292
 
Agricultural planning is not treated with the same regulatory scrutiny in Queensland. Rather, 
it is the Department of State Development that authorises large-scale UGR projects outside of 
local, regional and state planning laws. A ‘coordinated project’ as regulated by the State 
Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) (SDPWO Act) requires 
approval.
293
 For example, the Gladstone LNG Project, representing 435 km of UGR pipeline 
and the development of CSG fields in Roma, Emerald, Injune and Taroom and a LNG export 




The impact assessment process under the SDPWO Act is also the subject of a bilateral 
agreement between the Queensland and Australian Governments in relation to environmental 
assessment under the EPBCA and approval under pt 9 of the EPBCA was also granted to the 
Gladstone LNG Project. Therefore, the SDPWO Act and Department of Infrastructure and 
Planning manage and determine the impact assessment process for UGR projects. This is in 
contrast to the delegated ALC and OGC administrative bodies granting approvals for UGR 
activities on agricultural land via three tiers of agricultural land use planning at local, regional 
                                                 
290 Agricultural Land Commission, Message from the Chair (2013) 
<http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/p63919/97838E.pdf>.  
291 Agricultural Land Commission Act, SBC 2002, c 36, s 18. 
292 Agricultural Land Commission Act, SBC 2002, c 36, s 6(c).  
293 State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) s 35. 
294 The Coordinator-General’s Evaluation Report for an Environmental Impact Statement, Gladstone Liquefied 
Natural Gas – GLNG Project (2010) <https://www.statedevelopment.qld.gov.au/resources/project/gladstone-
liquefied-natural-gas/cg-report-gladstone-ing.pdf>.  
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and provincial levels of government based on the Local Government Act, Farm Practices 
Protection Act, Agricultural Land Commission Act, Land Title Act and the Water Act. 
The exploitation of the UGR industry for export purposes creates a regulatory ‘cross roads’ 
for the Queensland Government—the need to consider the economic benefits of the industry 
against the perceived dis-benefits and impacts of the industry on agricultural farmland and 
communities. The distrust and anxiety this has created is evident. As stated by Hunter and 
Chandler in reference to Australia’s petroleum policy, ‘at the very least, the near horizon is 
likely to involve some introspection and reconsideration of current policy regarding new 
developments and efficient (petroleum) implementation’.
295
 
3.8 A New Unconventional Gas Resource Policy for Queensland? 
The petroleum policy implemented by British Columbia could serve as an example of a policy 
framework that embraces the coexistence between agricultural land and UGR. The regulatory 
bodies established by the Provincial Government in British Columbia seek to manage the 
interests of a thriving agricultural sector while balancing the projected increase in LNG 
extraction on farming land. British Columbia has secured a system of land use access and 
landowner appeal that establishes clear regulatory oversight and management of likely land 
impacts prior to the granting of petroleum licences. 
LNG has and will continue to be a major contributor to state wealth and holds enormous 
potential to drive export dollars in both jurisdictions. In Australia, the headlong rush to grant 
UGR licences in Queensland has created an artificially high price for LNG which is currently 
affecting the cost of LNG for domestic consumers. This raises issues relating to national 
energy security and the Australian Federal Government has responded by signing a Heads of 
Agreement in October 2017 with producers to increase production to assist in meeting 
domestic supply.
296
 Yet, there is no government intervention to contain or intervene in LNG 
pricing. This exemplifies the arms-length relations with energy businesses and reliance on a 
market solution to economic and energy supply issues. 
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Similarly, the Australian Government continues to adopt a light touch approach to agricultural 
regulation with one of the lowest commodity subsidy systems in the world. This has produced 
an agricultural sector that must independently manage supply chains with limited government 
support. The effects on specific commodity sectors like the dairy industry are well 
documented and provide evidence of the Australian emphasis on market-led and laissez faire 
approaches to its agricultural sector. 
Given this background, it is not surprising that Australia has adopted a ‘liberal-pluralist’ 
approach to the coexistence of LNG on agricultural lands.
297
 The policy framework to manage 
land use, land access, administrative oversight, environment impact and cumulative social 
impact has been formulated in this tradition. Policy failures and the inability to tackle 
coexistence in Queensland has led to continuing confrontation between farmers and energy 
companies—confrontation which has been referred to the Senate Inquiries and Parliamentary 
Commissions to resolve. The resulting recommendations amount to incremental changes that 
have been largely ineffective in foregrounding the central issue of the state’s role in managing 
coexistence.  
With a similar legal, cultural and economic tradition, Canada provides a salutary lesson for 
Australia. Canadian agricultural production is protected and, in comparison to Australia, is 
highly regulated. While the liberal market tradition prevails, statist interventions in the 
agricultural sector remain as evidence of the value of agricultural land preservation for current 
and future generations. The notion of the ‘public good’ contained in both Australia and 
Canadian policy regulation is evident in the establishment of the ALR, OGC and ALC to 
manage multiple stakeholder interests. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the fundamental policy 
differences and similarities between Queensland and British Columbia, particularly in terms 





                                                 
297 Andrew Leigh, ‘Trade Liberalisation and the Australian Labour Party’ (2002) 48(2) Australian Journal of 
Politics and History 487.  
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Figure 1: Overarching UG Regulatory Framework of Queensland 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Figure 1 provides the overarching legislation of the UGR regulatory framework of 
Queensland—the PGPSA and PA—and its subordinate regulation—the Petroleum and Gas 
(Production and Safety) Regulation 2007 (Qld) and its associated guidelines and codes of 
practice regulating petroleum activities. Environmental protection obligations relating to UGR 
are imposed through the EPA stipulating that petroleum tenures may only be granted once the 
petroleum license holder has received an EA categorised as ‘environmentally relevant’ 
activities under the EPA. Agricultural land access regulation is governed primarily through 
the RPIA and RIDA approvals (explored in Chapter 4) and the LAC established by the 
PGPSA (examined in Chapter 5). Finally, water management activities are regulated by the 
PGPSA in relation to hydraulic fracturing and Water Act 2000 (Qld) (WA) for UGR activities 
effecting underground and aquifer systems. 
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Figure 2: Overarching UG Regulatory Framework of British Columbia 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
As illustrated in Figure 2, British Columbia’s UGR framework consists primarily of the 
PNGA, the OGAA and its associated policy guidelines and regulatory direction notices by the 
OGC. Environmental protection at the provincial level is regulated by the Environmental 
Management Act 2003 and the EPMR, which applies only to Crown land and does not apply 
to private subsurface oil and gas activities associated with an operating area. The EPMR 
provides the statutory authority to the OGC for the management and protection of 
environmental values and water management. Access to agricultural land is governed by the 
ALR and OGC Delegation Agreement 2013 and the Agricultural Land Commission Act 2002. 
The Delegation Agreement grants regulatory powers to the OGC to decide on applications for 
permission for non-farm use of identified ALR lands for oil and gas activities and ancillary 
activities. 
3.9 Conclusion 
The similarity of socio-political systems and the relative infancy of UGR operations in 
Canada and Australia from the 1980s onwards have created seemingly similar UG policies. 
However, British Columbia has chosen to approach the regulation of its prime agricultural 
land as a natural resource in a different manner to Queensland. Australia has a similar 
agricultural history to Canada. In the mid-twentieth century, Australia protected its agriculture 
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industries through tariffs and trade restrictions to encourage agricultural production as a 
valued export. With the introduction of deregulation and market-led policies in the 1980s 
onwards this protectionism fell away. In Canada too, the rise of market-led policies confirms 
the competitive approach to agricultural markets, yet the state and federal governments 
continued to protect agricultural industries via regulation and supply chain protections. 
From the 1970s onwards, political interest focused on energy security and export-led resource 
industry activity in both jurisdictions. This has exposed the differences in the approaches of 
both Commonwealth countries towards land use and agricultural land protection. In the case 
of British Columbia, regulation and administrative bodies such as the OGC, with the mandate 
of providing a single-window approach for permits and approvals for petroleum licences. The 
purpose case in the OGAA also requires the OGC to promote the sound development of the 
oil and gas industry, inter alia, by ‘fostering a healthy environment, a sound economy and 
social wellbeing’.
298
 Conversely, in the case of Queensland, the GC has limited regulatory 
power pursuant to s 7 of the GCA. Both countries have vast frontier areas, a need to 
accumulate transparent scientific geotechnical data and a shifting policy landscape against a 
backdrop of an increasingly changing global petroleum market. 
This chapter has demonstrated the many similarities identifiable in the contest between 
managing the interests of the state’s citizens with an emphasis on the export of petroleum 
resources. Each state has comparable legal systems and constitutional monarchies of the 
Commonwealth. Both countries were founded as agrarian colonies of the UK and have turned 
to the development of their natural resources for export. Their development of UGR and 
licensing and concession system to develop these resources are also similar. The focus on 
commercial export, arguably without adequate consideration for land use and land access 
protection in managing interests of its citizens and private oil and gas corporate actors, has 
emphasised commercial investment over creating enduring value in Queensland. To shift this 
policy emphasis, Queensland requires a fundamental alteration to its policy framework to 
ensure transparent, accountable and inclusive principles-based regulation. A detailed analysis 
of the central elements for land use and land access regulatory framework is found in 
Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
                                                 




CHAPTER 4: REGULATING LAND USE CONFLICT 
4.1 Introduction 
Petroleum legislation necessarily provides land access for titleholders to exploit UGRs 
situated onshore. Whether the activity takes place on the surface of the land or below the 
surface of the land, the activity of extraction unavoidably involves the use of the land.
1
 In 
undertaking the extraction of such resources, the regulatory framework designed by the state 
to authorise land use is a fundamental tool in not only regulating and managing petroleum 
activities, but mitigating and balancing its impact on agricultural land. Effective regulation 
must be transparent, predictable and consistent with the overarching policy objectives of the 
state.
2
 Therefore, the regulatory framework of land use legislation must be constructed as a 
function of the outcomes the state seeks to accomplish in the management of its petroleum 
resources. 
Both the petroleum and agricultural sectors are of critical importance in Queensland and are 
often managed in conjunction, frequently with conflicting policy objectives to either preserve 
and productively farm land or exploit it.
3
 Given the importance of regulation in establishing 
the management of petroleum activities, especially in areas where established agricultural 
activities occur,
4
 this chapter examines the regulatory structure of the zoning, authorisation 
and exclusion of UGR land use tools and functions when operating on agricultural land.
5
 Such 
an examination seeks to address three critical research questions. First, what is the current 
regulatory framework for the management of UG exploitation on land used for agriculture? 
Second, are the regulatory tools utilised effective in managing conflicting land interests in the 
                                                 
1 Cameron Moore, Natural Resources Law (Thompson Reuters, 2016) 111. 
2 Energy Task Force, Securing Australia’s Energy Future (2004) 
<http://www.efa.com.au/Library/CthEnergyWhitePaper.pdf> 51-3. For a comprehensive examination of the 
principles of effective regulation see Chapter 2. 
3 Refer to Chapter 3 for a detailed consideration of conflict in UGR production in agricultural areas in Queensland 
and British Columbia.  
4 Such as the Darling Downs, located on the Surat UGR Basin of Queensland. As stated within the Darling Downs 
Regional Plan: 
‘The northern area of the Darling Downs region is experiencing intensive development in the resources and 
energy sector. The influence of this sector on communities within the northern Darling Downs has been most 
significant within the last five years. This area encompasses the majority of the Surat Basin, as well as rich 
agricultural and farming lands. Agriculture, including forestry, has traditionally been its key economic base. 
It features strong livestock (including the largest cattle sale centre in the southern hemisphere in Roma) and 
timber production markets (including a series of regionally significant cypress and hardwood sawmills)’. 
Queensland Government, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Darling Downs 
Regional Plan (2013). 
5 Priority Agricultural Areas (PAA’s) as defined within the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8.  
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development of UGRs? Third, are there alternative regulatory tools available that may better 
manage the interests of the state in benefitting from commercial UG production while 
balancing the needs of agricultural land use? 
This chapter seeks to establish that land contestation creates conditions ripe for ex ante 
regulatory assessment to evaluate whether the chosen regulatory approach of adaptive 
management will effectively promote land use coexistence in Queensland. This chapter uses a 
functional analysis of the different models of agricultural land use zonings and authorisations 
and UGR administrative bodies in British Columbia and Queensland, noting the similarities 
and differences before leading into potential recommendations to guide future regulation in 
Queensland. 
To address the research questions raised throughout this chapter, the regulatory framework of 
Queensland, comprising primary petroleum legislation, subordinate regulation, administrative 
body functioning and land use zoning is analysed. Further, the chapter examines how 
principles-based and rule-based regulations,
6
 as differing regulatory approaches to land use, 
are applied in both Queensland and British Columbia to provide a detailed and comprehensive 
analysis of how the management of UGR on agricultural land operates in both jurisdictions. 
4.2 Adaptive Management as a Regulatory Approach 
As explored in Chapter 2, the regulation of UGR activities and its impact on agricultural land 
use has been one of the most pressing concerns for law-makers in Queensland. The State’s 
adaptive management approach has led to significant regulatory reform since the early 2000s, 
given the impact of CSG extraction on agriculture and its landholders.
7
 The selection of 
adaptive management as a regulatory approach in Queensland’s UGR industry has created a 
regulatory environment that requires constant additional regulations, quasi-regulations and 
guidance notes.
8
 This can result in a landscape where the complexity of regulation creates 
                                                 
6 As considered in-depth in Chapter 2. 
7 This conflict is well documented in the literature. Jonathan Fulcher  and Martin Klapper, ‘Coal seam gas 
exploration and production in NSW: the new access argument’ (2011) The APPEA Journal 51(2) 688-688; 
Linda Connor and Phil McManus, ‘What's mine is mine(d): Contests over marginalisation of rural life in the 
Upper Hunter, NSW’ (2013) 22(2) Rural Society 166; Meg Sherval and Kristian Hardiman, ‘Competing 
Perceptions of the Rural Idyll: Responses to threats from Coal Seam Gas Development in Gloucester, NSW, 
Australia’ (2014) 45(2) Australian Geographer 185; David Lloyd, Luke Hanabeth and William E. Boyd, 
‘Community perspectives of natural resource extraction: coal-seam gas mining and social identity in Eastern 
Australia’ (2013) 10 Coolabah 114. 
8 A detailed examination of adaptive management can be found within Chapter two. 
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‘unintended consequences and perverse incentives as the original outcomes are buried under 
sedimentary layers of fresh red tape’.
9
 
When applied to the regulation of UGR extraction, passive adaptive management can create 
ineffective regulation due to its similarity to rule-based regulation, leading to regulatory 
inconsistencies and rigidity and requiring constant amendment to existing legislation and 
processes.
10
 For example, a passive adaptive management, as an ineffective regulatory 
approach, will led to ambiguity in rules or laws, creating inherently imprecise or open 
textured regulation.
11
 At over 808 pages, the PGPSA relies on rule-based regulation within its 
legislatively entrenched rules to regulate petroleum activities via new amendments each time 
a new regulatory situation arises.
12
 An ineffective regulatory approach in this sense, relates to 
the ability of the Queensland government to respond to complex and changing land use, the 
increasing prevalence of UGR operations on agricultural land and an effective response to 
overlapping stakeholder interests. To date, Queensland’s regulatory response to these 
concerns has been to continue to take a passive adaptive management approach—that is, to 
adopt further rules and conditions, rather than interpreting and revising regulatory provisions, 
the hallmark of ‘learning’ in a regulatory setting. 
Coexistence is the regulatory aim and policy of the RPIA. The stated purpose of the RPIA is 
to ‘manage…coexistence, in areas of regional interest, or resource activities with other 
activities, including, for example, highly productive agricultural areas’.
13
 The term 
‘coexistence’ in regulation must be interpreted or else create uncertainty and have different 
meanings depending on the context or viewpoint the interpreter.
14
 This creates ‘conflict and 
confusion’,
15
 particularly where an individual regulatee is the subject of overlapping or 
competing rules emanating from federal, state and local governments or from different 
government agencies, as will be explored in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 of this chapter. 
                                                 
9 Catherine Allan, Adaptive Management of Natural Resources, Proceedings of the 5th Australian Stream 
Management Conference. Australian rivers: making a difference. Charles Sturt University, Thurgoona, New 
South Wales 26. 
10 Allan, ibid. 
11 Passive adaptive management is defined as having a ‘strong focus on implementation, in particular the 
implementation of an historically informed best practice or policy, followed by review of that 
implementation’. Claudia Pah-Wostle, Pavel Kabat, Jörn Möltgen, Adaptive and Integrated Water 
Management: Coping with Complexity and Uncertainty (Springer, 2007) 65. See Chapter two for a 
comprehensive discussion of adaptive management. 
12 Arie Freiberg, Regulation in Australia (The Federation Press, 2017). 
13 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 s 3(1)(ii). 
14 Freiberg, above n 12, 208. 
15 Ibid. 
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In comparison, active adaptive management emphasises objective principles designed to 
account for complex and collaborative regulatory spheres. Evaluation is central to adaptive 
management as an integral part of implementation and requires adequate planning and 
resources to encourage collective responsibility for understanding and managing natural 
resources.
16
 Active adaptive management then embraces a regulatory design based on clear, 
streamlined, transparent and predictable processes and reducing levels of prescription in 
removing inconsistencies between agencies and departments.
17
 
When applied incorrectly, adaptive management is an ineffective regulatory approach for 
allowing UGR industry growth while balancing coexistence.
18
 In the event of an ineffective 
regulatory approach, bad regulatory design will give rise to poor tool choice creating 
regulatory burdens and gaps.
19
 As recognised by Queensland’s Gas Supply and Demand 
Action Plan Discussion Paper, ‘uncertain and delayed approval timeframes in regulatory 
processing create an administrative cost burden for the (UGR) sector and impacts negatively 
on investment attractiveness. Reducing delays may generate significant commercial benefits 
for the sector (UGR)’.
20
 
Adaptive management is not classified as a theoretically accepted regulatory approach by 
scholars, due to its traditional application as an environmental management system.
21
 
Therefore, the misinterpretation of adaptive management to guide regulation can create 
adverse irreversible effects on agricultural activities due to the substantial lag time that exists 
between the undertaking of UG mining and observing/measuring the consequential adverse 
effects of such rule-based regulation.
22
 Such an approach is very much reactive, as the State 
responds to regulatory issues as they occur, rather than trying to anticipate and legislate for 
problems prior to the activity taking place. Such reactive responses are visible in Queensland. 
                                                 
16 Neils G Roling G and Janice Jiggins, ‘Agents in Adaptive Collaborative Management: The Logic of Collective 
Cognition’ in Louise E Buck, Charles C Geisler, John Schelhas and Eva Wollenberg (eds), Biological 
Diversity: Balancing Interests through Adaptive Collaborative Management (CRC Press, 2001) 145. 
17 Stephen Dovers and Catherine Mobbs, ‘An alluring prospect? Ecology, and the requirements of adaptive 
management’ in Nicholar Klomp and Ian Lunt (eds.) Frontiers in Ecology: Building the links (Elsevier 
Science Ltd, 1997) 39. 
18 Nicola Swayne, ‘Regulating Coal Seam Gas in Queensland : lessons in an adaptive environmental management 
approach?’ (2012) 29(2) Environmental and Planning Law Journal 163. 
19 Stephen Breyer, ‘Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives, and Reform’ (1979) 
92(3) Harvard law Review 547; Dieter Helm, ‘Regulatory Reform, Capture, and the Regulatory Burden’ 
(2006) 22(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 169. 
20 Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland Gas Supply and Demand Action Plan 
Discussion Paper (2016) 23. 
21 Swayne, above n 18, 163. Refer to Chapter 2 for types of regulation and a discussion of adaptive management 
and its failings as a regulatory instrument. 
22 Allan, above n 9, 5. 
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For example, UGR exploration and production licensing processes do not have a single 
overarching regulatory oversight body or agency in Queensland to provide support for 
individual proponents to navigate the major approvals required from 12 different agencies 
(from state and federal governments).
23
 This lack of overarching coordinating mechanism 
results in ‘uncertainty, complexity, time delays and costs for proponents’.
24
 
The broad range of overlapping land use and planning legislation applicable to UGR on 
agricultural land in Queensland has created a complex array of regulatory instruments and 
oversight bodies, giving rise to ‘substantial scope for unnecessary regulatory burden to be 
imposed’.
25
 Such regulatory burden may impact the State’s ability to effectively manage, 
protect and rehabilitate priority agricultural lands. Such poorly designed regulation may, as 
stated by the QCA, ‘create unnecessary compliance costs, delays or uncertainties. There are 
tangible deadweight economic losses associated with the poorly designed regulations’.
26
 In 
Queensland, land use associated with petroleum activities is subject to development consent 
requirements under the EPA.
27
 An Authority to Prospect
28
 and subsequent petroleum lease
29
 
is authorised under the PGPSA and, at the same time, an application for development consent 
under the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) may be also be required.
30
 If a UGR activity falls outside 
the area of a petroleum lease (e.g., ancillary facilities), then it will require both an assessment 
under the PGPSA, RPIA and relevant local planning scheme for development approvals.
31
 
4.3 Poor Regulatory Tool Choice 
As previously examined in Chapter 2, particular issues arising from poor regulatory tool 
choices include: 
a) duplication of agencies and departmental regulatory oversight of activities 
                                                 
23 Government Departments responsible for the regulation of UGR at the state level in Queensland include: The 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, the 
Department of Energy and Water Supply and the Department of  Infrastructure, Local Government and 
Planning.  
24 Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, above n 20, 20. 
25 Queensland Competition Authority (Qld), Final Report: Coal Seam Gas Review (January 2014) 
<http://www.qca.org.au/getattachment/aaaeab4b-519f-4a95-8a65-911bc46cc1d3/CSG-investigation.aspx> 26. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 316; See generally, Environmental Protection Act 
199 4(Qld) ch 3 pt 2. 
28 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 32. 
29 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) div 7. 
30 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 33; See generally the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) ch 
3. 
31 Note that prima facie, an activity authorised under the PGPSA and subject to a petroleum lease is exempt from 
local government planning schemes. 
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b) inconsistent and poorly defined regulatory objectives leading to ineffective 
deployment of approvals 
c) a lack of timeliness and appellate ability for actors in granting approvals 
d) highly prescriptive and rule-based regulations, which may create public doubt to the 
wider community being sought, where regulations are complex to understand 




One of the hallmarks of a principles-based approach to regulation is clarity on ‘who decides 
how and when management practices will be changed…[regulation] will not be successful if 
used by management agencies as a basis for postponing difficult decisions that need to be 
made in the face of resource constraints and scientific uncertainty’.
33
 Therefore, successful 
implementation of principles-based regulation using an active adaptive management approach 
will be outcome orientated, promoting clarity and transparency of regulation and streamlined 
administrative authorities in managing a single portfolio.
34
 Applying a principles-based 
approach as a regulatory structure for management agencies, or administrative authorities in 
the case of the petroleum sector, must ensure sufficient flexibility and responsiveness within a 
broader regulatory framework.
35
 This will allow administrative agencies to alter their 
regulatory approach in response to new regulatory conditions. 
Consequently, this chapter examines the current administrative authorities charged with 
regulatory or monitoring roles in UGR activities in Queensland. In particular, the role and 
scope of the three facilitative oversight administrative authorities in Queensland—the GC, 
Officer of Groundwater Impact Assessment (OGIA) and CSG Compliance Unit—will be 
explored in this chapter. Queensland’s oversight administrative authorities will then be 
compared to British Columbia’s comparative UGR management agency, the OGC, to 
determine whether there may be lessons learned from the alternative approach (principles-
based regulation) to the oversight of UGR and agricultural land uses. An analysis of the OGC 
and ALR framework, set within the regulatory framework of British Columbia, and 
comparing the solutions to regulatory issues in managing the differing land uses may provide 
                                                 
32 Freiberg, above n 12. 
33 Swayne, above n 18, 167. 
34 Robert Argent, ‘Components of Adaptive Management’ in Catherine Allan and George Stankey (eds), Adaptive 
Environmental Management (Springer, Netherlands, 2009) 26. 
35 Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice 
(Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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ideas for changes in Queensland to achieve effective land use regulation and promote 
coexistence. 
4.4 Legal Framework Regulating Conflicting Activities 
4.4.1 Outline and Objective of the Land Use Zoning Systems 
The land use zoning system for the allocation of petroleum titles on agricultural land has been 
used in many jurisdictions, including Australia, Canada, the US and the UK.
36
 The 
international context for land use law reform is provided in the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development in 1992,
37
 where 172 nation states endorsed the Rio 
Declaration for achieving sustainable development, the core of which is a commitment to the 
three pillars of sustainability—economic efficiency, environmental protection and equity. 
Principles 3 and 4 of the Declaration demonstrate this imperative: 
Principle 3: The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations. 
Principle 4: In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection 
shall constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be considered 





 establishes the land use goals of encouraging sustainable human settlements and 
integrating environmental considerations into development decisions.
40
 Urban and regional 
planning and regulation are at the core of land use law and are the means by which 
governments influence the private sector to create sustainable land use planning. Thus, land 
use regulation consists of a variety of restrictions and authorisations for the development of 
property in the interest of a state’s citizens while encouraging economic efficiency, 
environmental protection and equity. 
At a broader level, competing land use interests require regulatory tools to implement land use 
plans, which entail goals, objectives and action steps to achieve the state’s aims in differing 
                                                 
36 John R. Nolon, ‘Comparative Land Use Law: Patterns of Sustainability’ (2006) 23(3) Pace Environmental Law 
Review 855. 
37 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992). 
38 Ibid. 
39 Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. GAOR, 46th Sess., Annex 2, 





 Zoning is a commonly used authorisation regulatory tool which ‘divides a locality 
into different districts based on the uses allowed in each district’.
42
 Zoning consists of 
development permits which articulate the spatial allocation of land use through a set of legally 
enforceable texts and maps creating a licensing and approvals system of authorisation. Zoning 
regulations divide land into conceptual districts (‘zones’) of similar form, function and 
character in an attempt to manage multiple possible uses of land based on their levels of 
protection.
43
 Zoning may also be considered as the main legal instrument for the control and 
ordering of the production and of the appropriation of the built environment.
44
 
An effective land use zoning authorisation regulatory tool imposes ‘rules for the present, the 
crafting of ordinance (zoning tool) should consider the future as the comprehensive land use 
plan does’.
45
 Zoning, as with other regulatory planning law regulatory tools, seeks to 
transparently outline to landholders and private actors the extent of their property rights and 
need for zoning approvals by indicating the potential permissible development activities 
occurring on specifically zoned areas.
46
 Zoning regulations operate and achieve their stated 
purpose via three levels of permissibility into zones—permitted without consent, permitted 
with consent or prohibited.
47
 UGR activities in both Queensland and British Columbia are 
allocated as being permitted with consent in agricultural land zoning areas. Yet, the 
agricultural zoning frameworks for both jurisdictions differ in scope, aim and regulatory 
enforcement and are explored later in this section. 
By dividing land into discrete districts of similar form, function and character, zoning 
regulations establish, in advance of applications for development permission, the 
permissibility of land use in each zone. Through a table the relevant regulations then specify 
what may or may not be developed in each zone. Although, theoretically, zoning regulations 
consist of spatial boundary maps, tables identifying permitted or prohibited uses in the zone 
and definitions specifying the permissibility of activities for each land use, zoning regulations 
                                                 
41 Daniel P. Selmi, James A. Kushner, Edward H. Ziegler, Joseph F. C. DiMento and John Echeverria, Land Use 
Regulation: Cases and Materials (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2017). 
42 Fennie van Straalen, Thomas Hartmann and John Sheehan, Property Rights and Climate Change: Land Use 
under Changing Environmental Conditions (Routledge, 2017) 120. 
43 Susan Thompson and Paul Maginn, Planning Australia: An Overview of Urban and Regional Planning 
(Cambridge University Press, 2012).  
44 Barlow Burke Jr., Understanding the Law of Zoning and Land Use Controls (Lexis Nexis, 2013). 
45 Straalen, Hartmann and Sheehan, above n 42, 122. 
46 Leslie Stein, Principles of Planning Law (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
47 David Farrier and Paul Stein, The Environmental Law Handbook: Planning and Land Use in NSW (UNSW 
Press, 4th ed., 2006). 
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may be complex and ineffective.
48
 For instance, a heavily rule-based land use zoning scheme 
will provide a number of narrowly defined zoning uses and activities contained within a 
single zoning regulation. This creates complexity of legal interpretation and application 
processes both for landholders and zoning activity applicants alike in developing multiple 
land uses in a single zoned area.
49
 
Smith and Parmenter argue an overly complex land use zoning regulatory system and its 
associated administrative authorities can affect the legal permissibility of an activity via the 
over-burdensome system simply degenerating into a series of ‘checks and balances’.
50
 This 
allows private actors seek to fit regulatory definitions of ‘permissible’ development in specific 
zones, rather than administrative authorities and regulation allowing assessment of proposals 
on their merits. Stein similarly argues where a development is to take place in a zone, a rigid 
legal system will mean the focus on the investigation will be on rigid rules concerned with 
planning, rather than the planning merits of what is proposed.
51
 
4.4.2 Importance of Land Use Zoning in the Regulation of Conflicting Activities 
As examined in Chapter 3, a significant concern for landholders is the impact of UGR 
activities on important agricultural areas, such as strategic cropping lands. It is recognised that 
UGR extraction holds the potential to affect the future viability of fertile agricultural areas 
that lie above UGR seams.
52
 Agricultural land use zoning and subsequent approvals of 
petroleum licenses on that agricultural land creates increasingly contested land use with 
debates over ‘what the land is for’, as demonstrated by the literature addressing this issue.
53
 
Historically, Australia has a strong agricultural sector that has changed considerably since the 
era of deregulation and market dominance in the 1980s and 1990s.
54
 The total effect of such 
changes is an impact on the scope and nature of the agricultural land use regime. Numerous 
                                                 
48 Selmi et. al., above n 41. 
49 Eileen Webb and Margaret Anne Stephenson, Land Law (Lexis Nexis, 2015). 
50 Craig B. Smith and Kelly E. Parmenter, Energy, Management, Principles: Applications, Benefits, Savings 
(Elsevier, 2015, 2nd edition).  
51 Leslie Stein, Principles of Planning Law (Oxford University Press, 2008). 
52 Michael Weir and Tina Hunter, ‘Property rights and coal seam gas extraction: The modern property law 
conundrum’ (2012) 2(2) Property Law Review 71. 
53 Saul Cunningham, Andrew Young, and David Lindenmayer, Land Use Intensification: Effects on Agriculture, 
Biodiversity and Ecological Processes (CSIRO Publishing, 2012); John Nolon, Protecting the Local 
Environment Through Land Use Law: Standing Ground: Standing Ground (West Academic, 2014); Nathalie 
J. Chalifour, Patricia Kameri-Mbote, Lin Heng Lye, John R. Nolon, Land Use Law for Sustainable 
Development (Cambridge University Press, 2006).  
54 Chapter two provides an examination of the historical development of Australia’s agricultural policy since 
deregulation. 
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qualitative studies have described how agricultural communities have experienced perceived 
instability and confusion about property ownership and legal rights when engaging with UGR 
titleholders.
55
 This is attributed, in part, to a lack of understanding and transparency in current 
land use and petroleum regulation.
56
 
British Columbia has faced similar issues of regulating competing land use zones as evident 
in its creation of the ALR in 1973 to prevent the re-zoning of land designated as farmland 
with the passage of the ALCA.
57
 The ALR strictly limits subdivision and non-farm activities 
and, at the time of inception, included all agriculturally zoned land parcels larger than 0.8 ha 
(1.97 ac).
58
 By placing all farm-zoned land in the reserve, restricting development and non-
agricultural uses, and requiring any applications for removal to prove no harm to local 
agriculture, the ALR protects much of the private land in the province. The longstanding 
widespread policy and regulatory support for the ALR restricting development on agricultural 
lands to protect farmers and farmland is evidenced in its enduring nature and operational costs 
of over $90 million per year paid by the State.
59
 
Approximately half of the land in the ALR is in the northern region of the province. Wheat is 
grown primarily in British Columbia’s Peace River Region in the northeast, part of the prairie 
grain belt east of the Rocky Mountains. In this region, more valuable crops such as canola 
have increasingly replaced wheat. The highest amount of ALR land in the Regional District is 
in the communities of Fort St John and Dawson Creek. According to the 2011 Census of 
                                                 
55 Fiona Mactaggart, Liane McDermott, Anna Tynan and Christian A Gerick, ‘Exploring the Determinants of 
Health and Wellbeing in Communities living in Proximity to Coal Seam Gas Developments in Regional 
Queensland’ (2018) 18 BMC Public Health 1; Meg Sherval and Kristian Hardiman, ‘Competing Perceptions 
of the Rural Idyll: Responses to threats from Coal Seam Gas Development in Gloucester, NSW, Australia’ 
(2014) 45(2) Australian Geographer 185; Andrea Walton, Rachel Williams and Rosemary Leonard, 
‘Community perspectives of coal seam gas development during two phases of industry activity: construction 
and post-construction’ (2017) 26(1) Rural Society 85.  
56 Everingham, Jo-Anne, Verónica Devenin and Nina Collins, ‘“The Beast doesn’t Stop”: The Resource Boom and 
Changes in the Social Space of the Darling Downs’ (2015) 24(1) Rural Society 42; Cornelia Butler Flora and 
Jan K. Flora, Rural communities: Legacy and change (4th ed, 2013 Westview Press); Glenn Albrecht and 
Bill Pritchard, Land of Discontent: The dynamics of change in rural and regional Australia (UNSW Press, 
2000). 
57 SBC 2002, c 36. 
58 Alison J. Eagle, David E. Eagle, Tracy E. Stobbe  and G. Cornelis van Kooten, ‘Farmland Protection and 
Agricultural Land Values at the Urban-Rural Fringe: British Columbia’s Agricultural Land Reserve’ (2015) 
81(1) American Journal of Agricultural Economics 282. 
59 Robert Androkovich, Ivan Desjardins , Gordon Tarzwell and Peter Tsigaris, ‘Land Preservation in British 
Columbia: An Empirical Analysis of the Factors Underlying Public Support and Willingness to Pay’ (2008) 
40(3) Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 999. 
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Agriculture, 823,498 ha (203,490,7.87 ac) are being farmed in the PRRD, which accounts for 
64% of the region’s ALR.
60
 
The Canada Land Inventory uses seven capability classifications for agriculture ranging from 
class 1 for Optimum potential, full range of crops to class 7 for no agricultural capability. The 
land classification in the PRRD illustrates the region has 0.3% level 1 lands located in the 
ALR, while approximately 8% of the ALR is class 2 land.
 61
 These lands are located north of 
Clayhurst, south of Dawson Creek, east of the British Columbian and Alberta border and west 
to as far as Valley View, Kilkerran and South Dawson. Another band of class 2 lands are 
located north of the Peace River near Cecil Lake, Flatrock, Rose Prairie, Montney and Charlie 
Lake. Other areas of class 2 land are in the area of Halfway Ranch and at various locations 
along the Peace River west of Bear Flat.
62
 Class 3 and class 4 lands included in the ALR are 
located throughout the Regional District, and account for 62% of the ALR. The Horn River 
Basin (78 Tcf marketable UG) near Fort Nelson and the Montney Basin (271 Tcf marketable 
UG) which underlines much of the Peace River Region.
63
 Consequently shale gas plays and 
vast ALR lands overlap in this region, leading to the ALC’s coordination of its non-farm use 
exclusionary regulations with the OGC of British Columbia.
64
 
Contestation between UGR licence holders and agricultural landowners is reflected in 
increasing pressure on agricultural land in British Columbia. These pressures are described by 
Dufty-Jones and Connell as farm income, food for national self-sufficiency and economic 
benefits via global agricultural markets while sustaining local agricultural economies, and 
vitality of rural communities and to protect and enhance the environment and ecosystems.
65
 
While the focus of land use contestation and UG exploitation has, to date, been on Aboriginal 
Communities in British Columbia,
66
 it is arguable as the Province seeks approval for the 
                                                 
60 Peace River Regional District, Regional Agricultural Plan Background Report (2014) <http://prrd.bc.ca/wp-
content/uploads/Background-Report-Final-November-2014.pdf>. 
61  F Last, M Hotz and B Bell, Land and its Uses — Actual and Potential: An Environmental Appraisal (Springer, 
2013). 
62 Green, Arthur, Siobhan McPhee, Aviv Ettya, Britta Rocker and Christina Temenos, British Columbia in a 
Global Context (An Open Education Resource Textbook) (BCcampus OpenEd, 1st ed, 2014) 
<https://opentextbc.ca/geography/chapter/6-6-case-studies/>. 
63 Natural Resources Canada, British Columbia’s Shale and Tight Resources (2017) 
<http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/energy/sources/shale-tight-resources/17692>. 
64 Diane Katz, Studies in Risk & Regulation: The BC Agricultural Land Reserve: A Critical Assessment (The 
Fraser Institute, 2009). 
65 Rae Dufty-Jones and John Connell, Rural Change in Australia: Population, Economy, Environment (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2014); Lindsay Greer, Stacey Tabert and Stewart Lockie, ‘Food, Coal or Gas? Community 
Action, Land Use Conflict and Procedural Fairness in the Surat Basin’ (2012) 
<https://researchonline.jcu.edu.au/34872/1/Food_coal_gas.pdf>. 
66 Dwight G. Newman, The Duty to Consult: New Relationships with Aboriginal Peoples (UBC Press, 2009). 
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construction of several LNG ports requiring an increase in UG drilling and wellheads, the 
contestation of agricultural land reserved areas and UGR will become increasingly apparent. 
Considering these multiple and often contrasting demands on the land and the complexities 
they generate, agriculture is a highly politicised regulatory space.
67
 It is also a multi-actor 
sector with decision-makers ranging from individual farmers to national law-makers, each 
with their own incentives, perspectives and priorities. 
Land use planning legislation has historically been regulated by local governments in 
Australia via zoning and development approvals, geographically confined within state 
boundaries in local planning instruments.
68
 Primary responsibility for the development of 
private lands rests with local governments. However, state-level public and crown land 
planning instruments are ‘triggered’ when land uses ‘(to) protect or give effect to State 
interests and is either a State planning policy or a regional plan’.
69
 
Effective land use regulation creates legitimate regulatory objectives warranting legal 
intervention in the relationship between agricultural land use and UGR titleholders and their 
mutual use of the land. Firstly, the state must promote the public interest in the development 
of its natural resources and not simply the interests of private parties. Secondly, the state must 
manage the implications of information asymmetry and ineffective land use zoning and 
exclusions between the two land uses. Thirdly, the state must adopt appropriate allocation of 
the regulatory objectives of UGR development on agricultural land to create mutual 
coexistence as the result of effective principles-based regulation.
70
 
4.4.3 Legal Framework Regulating Conflicting Activities 
In Queensland, following the review of the repealed SCL Act
71
 and the Land Access Review 
Implementation Report (2013),
72
 the current RPIA regime was enacted.
73
 The RIPA is the 
                                                 
67 Claire A. Dunlop and Claudio M. Radaelli, Handbook of Regulatory Impact Assessment (Edward Elgar, 2016). 
68 Planning Act 2016 (Qld) s 8. 
69 Planning Act 2016 (Qld) s 8 (2). 
70 Nicole Gurran, Australian Urban Land Use Planning Introducing Statutory Planning Practice in New South 
Wales (Sydney University Press, 2007). 
71 The Queensland Government reviewed the SCL regime in 2013 to review its effectiveness amongst resource 
companies concerns the regime was burdensome on their prospective petroleum turns. In summary the 
changes to the SCL and incorporated into the RPIA included introducing a lower threshold which would 
exempt development impacts from SCL assessments. Developments that produce a permanent impact on 
SCL land may have more of a change ‘of being allowed as exceptional circumstances’ under the RPIA. As 
part of the SCL Act repeal, the cropping history test provisions for land within the Strategic Cropping Land 
Management Area were removed. The cropping history test provided an opportunity to confirm land as non 
SCL based on its historic land use.  
149 
latest regulatory response aiming to promote coexistence between multiple land zoning 
regulations and development activities in creating a broad ‘areas of regional interest’
74
 
planning and zoning framework for agriculture, communities and the environment. The 
purpose of the RPIA is stated to: 
a) identify areas of Queensland that are of regional interest because they contribute, or 
are likely to contribute, to Queensland’s economic, social and environmental prosperity 
b) give effect to the policies about matters of State interest stated in regional plans 
c) manage, including in ways identified in regional plans— 
i) the impact of resource activities and other regulated activities on areas of 
regional interest, and 
ii) the coexistence, in areas of regional interest, of resource activities and other 




To achieve this purpose, the RPIA aims to provide a transparent and accountable process for 
the impact of proposed resource activities on areas of regional interest.
76
 The RPIA and the 
Regional Planning Interests Regulation 2014 (Qld) (RPI Reg) are aimed at delivering a 
‘responsive adaptive management’
77
 regulatory framework for the protection of agricultural 
land and the cumulative impact of UGR mining. The RPIA prescribes a new approvals 
process in the creation of RIDAs for ‘resource activities’ and other ‘regulated activities’ that 
are carried out in ‘areas of regional interest’, unless the person holds or is acting under ‘a 
regional interests development approval’. 
                                                                                                                                                        
72 Land Access Implementation Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Land Access Implementation Committee 
Report (30 August 2013) 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2014/5414T5893.pdf>. 
73 The RPI regime consists of the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld); Regional Planning Interests 
regulation 2014 and creates and regulates twelve regional zoning plans in total namely: the South East 
Queensland Regional Plan (2017); Cape York Regional Plan (2014); Central West Regional Plan (2009); 
Cape York Regional Plan (2014); Far North Queensland regional Plan (2009); Gulf Regional development 
Plan (2000); Mackay, Isaac and Whitsunday Regional Plan (20012); Maranoa-Balonne Regional Plan (2009); 
North West Regional Plan (2010); South West Regional Plan (2009) and Wide Bay Burnett Regional Plan 
(2011). The RPI regime has also released eleven policy guidelines in total.  
74 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 3. 
75 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 3. 
76 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 3(2). 
77 Poh-Ling Tan, David George and Maria Comino, ‘Cumulative risk management, coal seam gas, sustainable 
water, and agriculture in Australia’ (2015) 31 International Journal of Water Resources Development 682. 
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Carrying out a ‘regulated activity’ is defined as likely to ‘have a widespread and irreversible 
impact on the area of regional interest and prescribed under a regulation
78
 for the area’.
79
 In 
contrast, a ‘resource activity’ is defined as an ‘activity for which a resource authority is 
required to lawfully carried out or an authorised activity for the authority or proposed 
authority under the relevant resources Act’.
80
 Two of the mentioned ‘Resource Acts’ are 
PGPSA and PA Act, both regulating CSG activities. Further, a resource authority is stated as 




The RPIA acknowledges the use of regional plans to promote coexistence of resource 
activities in areas of regional interest. The RPI Reg framework identifies and protects areas of 
regional interests to ensure a balance between protecting ‘priority land uses’ (such as farming 
on highly fertile land) and supporting diverse economic development.
82
 The four areas of 
regional interests are PAAs, PLAs, SCAs and strategic environmental areas.
83
 PAAs are 
defined as areas used for a priority agricultural land and either shown in a regional zoning 
plan as a priority agricultural land area or prescribed under a regulation.
84
 A priority 
agricultural land use is ‘highly productive agriculture of a type identified in a regional plan for 




A petroleum activity on a PAA is exempt from needing a RIDA approval where the resource 
activity applicant: 
a) enters agreement of the land owner and the activity ‘is not likely to have a significant 
impact on the priority agricultural area or area that is in the strategic cropping area and the 
                                                 
78 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 12 
(1) A Resource Act is any of the following— 
(a) Geothermal Energy Act 2010; 
(b) Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009; 
(c) Mineral Resources Act 1989; 
(d) Petroleum Act 1923; or 
(e) Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004. 
79 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 17. 
80 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 12. 
81 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 13(e). 
82 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) sub-div 2.  
83 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 7. 
84 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8(1). 
85 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 8(2). 
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activity is not likely to have an impact on land owned by a person other than the land 
owner 
b) the activity is carried out for less than 1 year, or 
c) the activity is pre-existing before the RPIA was introduced in 2014.86 
Further, a petroleum survey licence, a data acquisition authority or a water monitoring 
authority under the PGPSA is exempt from the RPIA and the RIDA approvals regime as it is 
not defined as a ‘resource activity’.
87
 A resource activity is defined as having an impact on the 
PAA if the resource activity has an impact on the suitability of the land to be used for a PAA 
or, in the case of SCL, if a resource activity has an impact on those factors (land’s soil, 
climate and landscape feature) that make the area highly suitable, or likely to be highly 
suitable, for cropping.
88
 A significant impact is broadly defined as being an impact ‘that is 
important, notable or of consequence, having regard to its context or intensity’.
89
 Further, for 
a significant impact to be ‘likely’ to have a significant impact, ‘a lack of scientific certainty 
about the potential impacts of an activity will not in itself justify declaring the activity 
unlikely to have a significant impact on the area of regional interest’.
90
 
This broad definition of a likely ‘significant impact’ requires each RIDA application to be 
assessed on a case by case subjective basis. A subjective standard is arguably a lower 
threshold to prove than an objective-based definition, or a land class system as in British 
Columbia, that specifies the types of resource activities that do constitute a significant impact. 
For example, Appendix I of British Columbia’s OGC – ALR Delegation Agreement
91
 
outlines specific resource activities and facilities that are objectively permitted on ALR lands 
according to objective criteria (analysed in Section 4.5 of this thesis). 
The RPIA also adopts and integrates the previous SCL Act policy framework of protecting 
SCL areas defined as ‘land that is, or is likely to be, highly suitable for cropping because of a 
combination of the land’s soil, climate and landscape features’
92
 or identified by the SCL 
trigger map as being areas of regional interest. The Darling Downs, for example, is located 
                                                 
86 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) div 2. 
87 Queensland Government, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, RPIA Statutory 
Guideline 04/14 (2017) 2. 
88 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 22. 
89 Queensland Government, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, RPIA Statutory 
Guideline 02/14 (2017) 2. 
90 Ibid.  
91 British Columbia, Oil and Gas Commission, ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement (2013) 
<https://www.bcogc.ca/node/5759/download>. 
92 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 10(2).  
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within the Eastern Darling Downs SCL Zone and the Western SCL Zone extends to Roma.
93
 
Both of these zones are located over the Surat UGR basin. If an SCL Area is situated within a 
PAA, then the PAA criteria and RIDA application procedure apply. That is, whether the SCA 
criteria are met or not is irrelevant in deciding that part of the application where the overlap 
occurs. However, the SCA criteria must be met for all areas where no overlap occurs.
94
 
Schedule 2 of the RPI Reg provides criteria for assessment or decisions of a proposed 
resource activity (such as CSG extraction) in the SCL areas.
95
 This criteria requires an RIDA 
applicant to identify whether an activity will have a ‘permanent impact’ on SCL. An activity 
has a ‘permanent impact’ on SCL if, when the activity is carried out, the land cannot be 
restored to its pre-activity condition. Pre-activity condition is defined as ‘the condition of the 
land’s soil as identified and analysed within one year before the making of a RIDA 
application to be carried out on the land’.
96
 Therefore, the SCL requirement for restoration of 
lands to its pre-activity condition is higher than that of a PAA likely significant impact as 
‘restoring the land means that the land is not only returned to its pre-activity use but that it is 
also returned to its pre-activity productive capacity or potential productive capacity’.
97
 
As UGR facilities and wells are classified as temporary infrastructure,
98
 it is not likely that 
UGR activities will likely have an evident permanent impact on SCL or significant impact on 
PAA land immediately. This is because the UGR well itself may be remediated and the soil 
rehabilitated, but the flow back of UGR produced water could arguably create permanent 
impacts to surface and groundwater systems if not adequately treated. In a study by Ali, 
Strezov, Davies and Wright, water found downstream of UGR activities pointed to high metal 
content including aluminium, iron, manganese, nickel and zinc.
99
 This would likely impact 
future farm soil and cropping viability to agricultural lands reliant on surface and underground 
water aquifers. Therefore, even though UGR wells are temporary in nature, the impact to 
                                                 
93 Queensland Government, Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Strategic Cropping Land Zone Map 
(2017) <https://www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/171564/scl-zone-map.pdf>.  
94 Queensland Government, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, RPIA Statuary 
Guideline 03/14 (2017).  
95 Regional Planning Interests Regulation Schedule 2. 
96 Queensland Government, Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, RPIA Statuary 
Guideline 09/14 (2017) 3. 
97 Ibid, 3. 
98 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 442. 
99 Ali Al-Ibrahim, Vladimir Strezov, Peter Davies and Ian Wright, ‘Environmental impact of coal mining and coal 
seam gas production on surface water quality in the Sydney basin, Australia’ (2017) 189(9) Environmental 
Monitoring Assessment 408.  
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underground aquifers is long term and permanent, as examined in Sections 4.4.3 and 4.7 of 
this chapter. 
The other significant exemption of the RPIA is of pre-existing activities. Resource activities 
are exempt from requiring a RIDA where the resource authority for the petroleum activity 
was issued or granted before 30 January 2012.
100
 Prior to 2012, the majority of UGR activities 
and LNG export contracts had already commenced in some agricultural areas of Queensland, 
for example, in the Darling Downs.
101
 
PAAs include the major dryland and irrigated cropping areas of the Darling Downs situated in 
the Murray-Darling Basin. The Murray-Darling Basin represents 20% of Australia’s total 
agricultural land area, but contributing almost 40% of the annual gross value of agricultural 
production.
102
 Irrigated agriculture is the major user of the Basin’s water resources (currently 
around 40%) and contributes around 37% of the Basin’s agricultural output.
103
 Key 
agricultural products from the Basin are fruit and nuts, vegetables, table and wine grapes, 
dairy, rice, cotton, grain, sheep and beef cattle. In 2012–2013, irrigation in the Murray-
Darling Basin accounted for around 50% of Australia’s irrigated agricultural production and 
was worth around A$6.8 billion.
104
 
The Darling Downs is recognised as the ‘food bowl’ of Queensland, accounting for an 
estimated quarter of the State’s agricultural production.
105
 This fertile black volcanic soil 
region
106
 lies above some substantial UGR basins—the Surat, Bowen and Clarence–Moreton. 
The Surat Basin is a geological basin that extends across an area of 270,000 km
2
. Two thirds 
of the basin occupies a large part of Southeast Queensland and the remainder is in northern 
New South Wales. The communities in this region are situated above the GAB, the largest 
                                                 
100 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 99. 
101 John Williams, An Analysis of Coal Seam Gas production and Natural Resources Management in Australia 
Issues and Ways Forward (2012) <http://www.aie.org.au/AIE/Documents/Oil_Gas_121114.pdf>.  
102 John Quiggin, Sarah Chambers and T. Mallawaarachchi, Water Policy Reform: Lessons in Sustainability from 
the Murray Darling Basin (Edward Elgar, 2012).  
103 Murray-Darling Basin Authority, The Socio-Economic Implications of the Proposed Basin Plan (May 2012) < 
https://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/archived/revisedBP/PBP_socioeconomic_implications.docx> 35. 
104 Murray-Darling Basin Authority (Cth), Towards a Healthy, Working Murray-Darling Basin: Basin Plan 
Annual Report 2013–14 (MDBA Publication No 46/14, 2015). 
<https://www.mdba.gov.au/sites/default/files/pubs/Basin-Plan-annual-report-2013-14.pdf>34. 
105 Nina Collins and Jo-Anne Everingham, Energy resources from the food bowl: An uneasy co-existence. 
Identifying and managing cumulative impacts of mining and agriculture (2013) Research Paper, Sustainable 
Minerals Institute, University of Queensland: Brisbane, Australia. 
106 The Darling Downs region is known for its rich, black volcanic soils, producing most of Queensland’s wheat, 
oilseeds and approximately half of its maize. The region also has sheep, cattle and dairy farms and an 
intensive livestock industry.  
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and deepest artesian basin in the world,
107
 and rely on the GAB for access to subsurface water 
for agricultural activities. 
The RPIA includes regional plans that address a broad range of land use regulation and 
zoning, of which agriculture is one use among an array of other equal planning land uses. For 
example, PLAs are identified through regional planning governed by the Planning Act 2016 
(Qld)
108
 and include the existing settlement area of a city, town or other community that is to 
be protected for the future growth of the existing settled area.
109
 
In comparison to Queensland’s RPI Reg land use zoning regime, British Columbia holds one 
of the most established agriculture-specific land use protection regimes in North America. 
British Columbia and Quebec have enacted comprehensive land use regulations to protect 
their agricultural land base. British Columbia manages the ALR with a ‘protective, 
exclusionary and far-sighted response’
110
 to avoid social and economic calamities, such as 
reduction of agricultural land, exacerbation of natural hazards and increased economic 
inequities. Other provinces have included the protection of agricultural land in the land use 
policies established to guide local land use planning, similar to Australia. 
British Columbia’s ALR is one of the earliest international examples of legislated agricultural 
land preservation or ‘farmland freeze’
111
 through land use regulation.
112
 The ALR is the result 
of unique legislation and by-laws responding to local conditions, yet stemming from the threat 
of urban sprawl to agricultural production and lands. The ALR creates classes of agricultural 
land classified via the Canada Land Inventory agricultural interpretation (as previously 
                                                 
107 Commonwealth of Australia, Future Directions for the Management of the Great Artesian Basin (2015) 
<http://www.gabcc.gov.au/sitecollectionimages/resources/dfd46067-0d59-4056-a51d-
29f641bfcc4e/files/gab-future-directions.pdf>. The GAB stretches over 1,700,000 square kilometres and 
provides the only source of fresh water through much of inland Australia. Water emerges naturally from the 
Basin through cracks in the rock encasing the water, into springs, shallow water tables or into creeks and 
rivers creating a permanent water source even during dry periods. Most springs and leakages occur on the 
edges of the Basin where water is close to the surface. The Strategic Management Plan, endorsed by the 
Australian, New South Wales, South Australian, Queensland and Northern Territory governments in 2000, is 
a strategic framework for responsible groundwater and related natural resource management in the GAB. 
108 Planning Act 2016 (Qld), Ch 2.  
109 Queensland Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning, RPIA Statutory Guideline 04/14 
<https://www.dilgp.qld.gov.au/resources/planning/planning/statutory-guideline-04-14.pdf> 3.  
110 Danielle Noble, Regional planning and British Columbia's agricultural land reserve: A case study of land use, 
development and policy impacts in the Central Okanagan Valley (Masters Thesis, Wilfrid Laurier University, 
Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, 2004) 19. 
111 Barry Smith, ‘The Farmland Preservation Program in British Columbia’ in Wayne Caldwell, Stew Hilts and 
Bronwyn Wilton, Farmland Preservation: Land For Future Generations (University of Manitoba Press, 
2017) 20. 
112 Denver V.Nixon and Lenore Newman, ‘The efficacy and politics of farmland preservation through land use 
regulation: Changes in southwest British Columbia’s Agricultural Land Reserve’ (2016) 59 Land Use Policy 
227.  
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discussed in this chapter), derived from climate, soil variability and topography data, ranging 
from class 1 to 7 (class 1 being the highest quality agricultural land).
113
 Additionally, the ALC 
examines the agricultural potential of the parcel and surrounding lands by looking at 
agriculture capability ratings in addition to factors related to productivity, yield and 
suitability.
114
 According to Noble: 
The ALR is a policy tool that has perhaps been a far-sighted response to avoid social 
and economic calamities, such as reduction of opportunities, loss of visual amenity 
and agricultural land, exacerbation of natural hazards, elimination of resource based 
jobs, unsightly urban sprawl, health problems and inequities…it has served to 
preserve agricultural lands…without this framework, B.C. planning direction and 
land-use would be noticeably different.
115
 
The ALR is the first example of integrated planning based on arable land protection in Canada 
and one of the first agricultural land zoning protection tools in North America. Since 2009, 
the ALR totals roughly 5% of British Columbia’s area.
116
 This figure is relatively small 
because of the provincial landmass and plates, with three quarters of the land base begin about 
1,000 metres in elevation resulting in the relative scarcity of agricultural land. However, as an 
indication of the quality of its ALR land base, British Columbia accounts for over 5.8% of 
Canada’s total annual gross farm receipts, 9.6% of all farms, 7.7% of all cattle, 14.2% of all 
chickens and 19.4% of all land grown fruits, berries and nuts.
117
 The ALR provides evidence 
of the State’s policy of protecting arable land as a critical social, environmental, economic 
commodity for the future of food production for British Columbia. 
From a regulatory or administrative perspective, the ALR creates an overarching framework 
in the form of agricultural zoning that must be followed throughout the province. The ALR 
seeks to accommodate and respond to other dynamics that impact land uses, such as 
technological advances, farming practices, production costs, population and income growth, 
international competition and provincial agricultural policies. Noble postulates that the 
concern of loss of agricultural land flows from three elements: 
                                                 
113 As previously discussed in Section 3.2. 
114 Green, Arthur, Siobhan McPhee, Aviv Ettya, Britta Rocker and Christina Temenos, British Columbia in a 
Global Context (An Open Education Resource Textbook) (BCcampus OpenEd, 1st ed, 2014) 
<https://opentextbc.ca/geography/chapter/6-6-case-studies/>. 
115 Noble, above n 110, 40. 
116 Diane Katz, above n 64. 
117 Smith, above n 111, 20. 
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1) Economic, social and environmental interests depend heavily upon the quality and 
quantity of agricultural land. Agricultural land consists of cropland, pastureland, 
rangeland, and managed forests. The functions of these landscapes provide important 
commodities for the marketplace, but also have intangible functions such as ecological 
performance, air and water purification and aesthetic values. 
2) The conversion of agricultural landscapes to development projects hinders many 
aspects of production and natural functioning, a trend predicted to worsen in the 
foreseeable future. 
3) Dominant land use planning models have been very wasteful, commonly taking a 
dispersed pattern that abandons destitute and decaying urban cores while consuming rural 
landscapes with suburban sprawl.
118
 
Curran argues the importance of effective regulation of agricultural zoning for agricultural 
land use protection, ‘is in the provincial interest, and the provincial government is best able, 
to steward the long-term food system needs of the citizens of British Columbia. The ALR 
program and the Commission’s role is for the principle purpose of preserving the non-
renewable farmland base’.
119
 As Smith states, ‘it is impossible not to be impressed by the 
qualities of the political act which grasped the farmland nettle in British Columbia. It is 
skilful, logical, bold and strong’.
120
 
The land use conflicts with UGR extraction in British Columbia will likely be increasingly 
present in local agrarian communities in the ALR zoned areas where UGR development will 
occur.
121
 Therefore, maintaining agricultural production while enabling UGR resource use to 
occur in a streamlined approach between administrative agencies is essential to deliver 
effective and transparent regulatory framework to ensure long-term consistency of regulation. 
                                                 
118 Noble, above n 110 8-9.  
119 Deborah Curran, ‘British Columbia's Agricultural Land Reserve: A Legal Review of the Question of 
Community Need’ (2007) Smart Growth BC 4. 
120 Barry Smith, above n 111, 20, 22.  
121 The conflicts of First Nations in Northeastern British Columbia and UGR activities are beyond the scope of this 
thesis. However, Treaty 8 First Nations and their relationship with UGR private companies have been well 
documented in the literature. For example, see Annie L. Booth and Norman Skelton, ‘“There’s a Conflict 
right There”: Integrating Indigenous Community Values into Commercial Forestry in the Tl’azt’en First 
Nation’ (2011) 24(4) Society and Natural Resources 368. 
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The formation of the ALC is considered a major event in the evolution of regional planning in 
Canada and in planning for conservation, resource development and the environment.
122
 The 
ALC holds the following objects pursuant to s 6 of the ALCA: 
(a) To preserve agricultural land; 
(b) To encourage farming on agricultural land in collaboration with other 
communities of interest; and 
(c) To encourage local governments, First Nations, the government and its agents to 
enable and accommodate farm use of agricultural land and uses compatible with 
agriculture in their by-laws, plans and policies.
123
 
The ALC states its objective principles in s 20 of the ALCA, which takes a protective stance 
in prohibiting non-farm uses of ALR lands in stating a person ‘must not use’ agricultural land 
for non-farm uses unless permitted into the ALCA.
124
 The ALCA then goes on to permit an 
owner of agricultural land or a person with a right of entry to agricultural land to apply to the 
ALC for permission for a non-farm use of agricultural land.
125
 Therefore, before land in the 
ALR can be developed, the particular parcel must first either be removed from the reserve or a 
non-farm use or subdivision development must be permitted where the parcel remains in the 
reserve.
126
 This is in contrast to the RPI Reg regime, which identifies regional interest areas, 
gives effect to policies within regional plans and ‘manages’ the impact of resource activities 
in areas of regional interest through coexistence.
127
 An RIDA license then provides the 
approval for resource activities on agricultural lands to be carried out. 
4.4.4 Agencies Regulating Conflicting Land Uses in Agricultural Zones 
4.4.4.1 Protecting Priority Agricultural Land 
The RIDA process was introduced as a regulatory tool to uphold the effect of regional plans 
directed at resolving land use conflict. For example, the regional plans for central Queensland 
and Darling Downs focus on addressing ‘potential land use conflicts which may arise from 
the interaction between agriculture and mining—two vital pillars of Queensland’s 
                                                 
122 Smith, above n 111. 
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125 Agricultural Land Commission Act, 2002, SBC Ch 36, s 20. 
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 The RPIA makes it an offence to carry out a resource activity in an area of 
regional interest without obtaining an RIDA.
129
 Therefore, unless a particular exemption is 
available,
130
 a proponent must make an ‘assessment application’ to the chief executive
131
 to be 
granted an RIDA to undertake resource activities in an area of regional interest. An ‘eligible 
person’, meaning a person who holds or has applied for an EA or resource authority for the 
resource activity, and a person who intends to carry out a regulated activity in an area of 
regional interest may apply for an RIDA.
132
 
The process outlined in the RPIA for obtaining a RIDA is similar to the process for the 
granting of certain environmental authorities under the EPA
133
 or development approvals 
under the Planning Act 2016 (Qld).
134
 In particular, the applicant must notify underlying 
landowners (and potentially the broader public, depending on the land use categorisation) of 
its application. Submissions may be made on the application and the application may be 
referred to other agencies for assessment and advice (including local government and the 
GC).
135
 The RPIA requires an assessment application to be publicly notified if the proposed 
resource activity is in a PLA (as stated in the RPI Reg)
136
 or the chief executive has given the 
applicant a requirement notice requiring the applicant to notify the application.
137
 
Notification of an application provides the opportunity for the community to express their 
views about a particular proposal and for the government to consider these views when 
deciding an application. If a proposed resource activity is to be carried out in a PLA, the local 
community’s views are considered in assessing the level of impact of the proposal on the 
                                                 
128 Queensland Government, Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning, Darling Downs 
Regional Plan (2015) <http://www.dilgp.qld.gov.au/resources/plan/darling-downs/darling-downs-regional-
plan.pdf> 1. 
129 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 16. 
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future of the town.
138
 There is no similar provision or statutory avenue for mandatory public 
notification for proposed resource activities to take place on a PAA. However, the CSG 
Compliance Unit or GC may receive complaints from communities affected by resource 
activities. Although, as examined in Section 4.5.2 of this chapter, both the CSG Compliance 
Unit and GC lack statutory powers to require public disclosure of these complaints. Rather, 
the administrative authorities act in an oversight capacity. For example, the GC may advise 
the chief executive on an RIDA if: 
(a) the application relates to a resource activity in a priority agricultural area, the 
strategic cropping area or a priority living area; and 
(b) either— 
(i) the application is notifiable; or 




However, there is no recourse mechanism to hold the chief executive to account, should they 
not follow the recommendations of the GC. 
Once a decision on the application is made by the chief executive of the Department of 
Planning, Infrastructure and Local Government, they must notify the applicant and affected 
land owners of the decision, and that decision can be appealed to the Land Court
140
 by the 
applicant or affected land owners aggrieved by the decision.
141
 The assessing agency may 
recommend conditions to form part of any RIDA approval.
142
 This places a ‘standard’ on 
conditions under the RPIA and provides a means for proponents to challenge a condition 
placed on an approval decision for lack of relevance or reasonableness. The onus of proof is 
firmly on the applicant for a RIDA to show that an appeal in respect of that RIDA by a land 
owner or affected land owner should be dismissed.
143
 The RPIA contains a provision 
requiring the chief executive to ask the GC for advice about any application of a resource 
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activity in a PAA, SCA or a PLA and is either notifiable or for which (in the chief executive’s 
opinion) the ‘expected surface impacts are significant’.
144
 
It remains important for the state to ensure its regulatory authorisation tools maintain a 
flexible, collaborative principles-based approach to provide effective process with 
transparency. For example, it is important to ensure efficiency of the GC to perform its 
important advisory role in a timely manner. However, there is no timeframe imposed on the 
GC to provide this advice (unlike assessing agency advice under the RPIA, which must be 
given generally within 20 business days).
145
 This creates the risk of delay in the approval 
process. 
The RPIA also states that a RIDA ‘attaches to the land despite any change in the land’s 
ownership or occupation’.
146
 Noting that the RPIA contains no mechanism for transfer of 
RIDAs, it appears that the legislative intention of an RIDA is similar to a development 
approval under the Planning Act 2016 (Qld) and will ‘run with the land’ without the 
requirement for reviewing an RIDA when a land title is transferred to a new registered 
proprietor.
147
 There is a plethora of government agencies managing differing approvals under 
the RPIA.
148
 For example, a PAA will be assessed by the DILGP. However, a PAA that 
includes one of more regionally significant water sources and SCA is managed by the 




As previously discussed, SCLs are evident in a number of UGR producing regions. For 
example, in Chinchilla, located in the Darling Downs region, where the agricultural industry 
accounts for 45.5% of all businesses, followed by construction (13.8%) and the rental and real 
estate industry (7.3%).
150
 Currently, there are four key proponents carrying out CSG activities 
in Chinchilla—Arrow Energy (A$6 billion), Origin Energy (A$20 billion—APLNG project), 
QGC (BG Group) (A$15 billion—QCLNG project) and Santos. Chinchilla has provided land 
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147 Queensland’s property law regulatory framework is found within the Property Law Act 1974 (Qld). 
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for 12 QGC (BG Group) and two Origin gas well sites.
151
 A large area of land in the Upper 
Condamine region of the Western Downs has been declared as SCL. SCL categorises certain 
zones or land to protect highly productive or prime cropping areas from both mining and 
urban development. 
While it is a hallmark of a principles-based regulatory system
152
 to have broadly drafted 
legislation to ensure discretion exists to respond to new regulatory issues as they arises, the 
RIDA process seems to provide a lack of detail and enforceability regarding GC advice to the 
chief executive and the transparency of RIDA applications and reasoning for development 
approvals.
153
 Enforceability of GC advice may improve the strength of internal processes of 
the RIDA system to establish an independent and transparent regulatory process in a legally 
enforceable framework that may also provide agricultural community assurance.
154
 
Transparency regarding the RIDA application process by creating mandatory public 
disclosure processes for proposed resource activity approvals on PAAs may also assist with 
providing the UG sector with certainty and predictability. 
Further, regulatory complexity and duplication, as evident in the three differing governmental 
agencies
155
 with oversight of the RPIA regime, can create an environment for ‘creative 
compliance’
156
 as UGR operators operate in an uncertain regulatory environment. A lack of 
objective standards and appropriate measurement criteria to determine whether objectives and 
standards have been met encourages regulatory gaps and the operation of ineffective 
regulatory tools. British Columbia may provide a potential alternative regulatory framework 
in its agricultural land zoning regime, the ALR, and collaborative regulatory tool in the form 
of a MOU between two authorising administrative bodies, the ALC and OGC.
157
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4.4.4.2 The Agricultural Land Commission 
In its early years, the ALC’s main function was that of fine-tuning the set of land parcels 
included in the ALR.
158
 Since then the administration of the ALR has changed, as has the size 
and composition of some of the lands in the ALR, due to the passing of Bill 24 dividing the 
ALR in two zones, requiring the ALC to provide more ‘flexibility in land use in Zone 2 to 
allow activities such as food processing and potential oil and gas development’.
159
 The use of 
regional ALR plans and subregional and issue-specific plans are designed with a view to 
outlining the various land and resource management goals for a particular area based on an 
assessment of either Zone 1 or Zone 2 areas.
160
 
Bill 24, the Agricultural Land Commission Amendment Act 2014, was enacted in May 2014. 
According to s 4.2 of the Agricultural Land Commission Amendment Act 2014, the ALC now 
operates via split administration zones categorised as either Zone 1 or Zone 2. Zone 1 
includes the Island Panel Region, the Okanagan Panel Region and the South Coast Panel 
Region. For the purpose of s 4.1(d), Zone 2 consists of: 
a) The geographic area of British Columbia within the boundaries of the following 
regional districts and regional municipalities, as those boundaries existed on January 1, 
2014: 
i) Regional District of Bulkley-Nechako 
ii) Regional District of Fraser-Fort George 
iii) Regional District of Kitimat-Stikine 
iv) Northern Rockies Regional Municipality 
v) PRRD 
vi) Skeena-Queen Charlotte Regional District 
b) All the land in British Columbia that is not within the boundaries of a regional district 
or a regional municipality, as those boundaries existed on January 1, 2014.
161
 
Zone 2 consequently includes the North panel regions, the Interior and Kootenay, which 
produces 15% of British Columbia’s agricultural output and contains 90% of provincial ALR 
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lands (4,132,308 ha or 10,211,155.45 ac).
162
 Zone 2 contains 85% of the best soils (class 1 to 
4), of which 72% are located in the Peace River Region. Land located in Zone 1, representing 
10% of the ALR lands (489,391 ha or 1,209,311.5 ac) retains the following standard ALR 
aims: 
a) preserve agricultural land 
b) encourage farming on agricultural land in collaboration with other communities of 
interest 
c) encourage local governments, First Nations, the government and its agents to enable 
and accommodate farm use of agricultural land and uses compatible with agriculture in 
their plans, by-laws and policies.
163
 
In making recommendations, the ALC must give weight to a differing mandate in Zone 1 and 
Zone 2.
164
 In Zone 1, weight must be given to the following values in descending order of 
priority: 
a) agricultural values, including the preservation of agricultural land and the promotion 
of agricultural purposes 
b) environmental and heritage values, but only if: 
i) those values cannot be replaced or relocated to land other than agricultural 
land, or 
ii) giving weight to those values results in no net loss to the agricultural 
capabilities of the area 
c) economic, cultural and social values.165 
In making recommendations to land located in Zone 2, the board must give weight to the 
considerations set out in ss 4.3(a)–(d), in descending order of priority:
166
 
a) the purposes of the commission set out in section 6 
b) economic, cultural and social values 
c) regional and community planning objectives 
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d) other prescribed considerations.167 
Consequently, protection of agricultural land and encouragement of farming is not the first 
priority of the ALC when making decisions concerning ALR lands in Zone 2. Criterion (d) 
has particularly raised concerns of threatening food security and food sovereignty due to its 
broad scope and wording being relied upon to prioritise oil and gas activities taking place on 
ALR lands to align with economic values. 
Six panels are established, representing the six panel regions—Interior, Island, Kootenay, 
North, Okanagan and South Coast.
168
 Each panel has at least two members, including the vice 
chair from the Panel Region plus all other members of the Commission who reside in the 
Panel Region.
169
 These panel representatives have full authority to make final regulatory 
decisions in their own Panel Region. The North Panel Region is the hub of UGR activity in 
British Columbia and holds a significant proportion of ALR lands regulated by the ALC. 
Subject to s 11.2, whereby the chair of the commission may refer an application to the 
executive committee, the chair of the commission must refer an application under ss 17(1)(b) 
or (c) or 17(3), 20(3), 21(2), 29(1) or 30(1) in relation to land located in a panel region to the 
panel established for the panel region.
170
 It must be noted, there has been both criticism and 
support of the effects of Bill 24 in creating a two-tier zoning system for the ALR.
171
 However, 
the creation of regional panels as an act of flexibility and transparency in regulatory decision-
making arguably is evident within the ALR system. 
The RPIA regime, as it is currently implemented, has an evident lack of consistency and 
coordination between government agencies, exemptions and an absence of principles-based 
regulatory approaches applied to the protection of PAAs and SCLs. For example, the DILGP 
administers the RPI framework; the Department of Energy and Water Supply administers the 
PGPSA, Gas Supply Act 2003
172
 and Energy and Water Ombudsman Act 2006
173
; the 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection administers the Coal Seam Gas Water 
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 and administers CSG environmental authorities pursuant to the 
EPA and ‘make good’ agreements under the WA. 
There is no streamlined single entity agricultural system in Queensland, as in the case in 
British Columbia where non-agricultural use of farmland is solely regulated by the 
independent ‘single-window’ administrative authorities the ALC and OGC. The OGC and 
ALC provide regulatory oversight of the UGR sector and agricultural land use without 
overlapping government departmental mandate. Any non-farm use of ALR land that is not 
designated in the ALCA as a farm use or identified as a use permitted in an ALR is 
prohibited, unless that use is otherwise allowed under the ALCA.
175
 All oil and gas 
developments and activities are classified as non-farm uses.
176
 Since 1976, the ALC has 
facilitated oil and gas activities on ALR land by working ‘collaboratively with the industry to 
develop a process of allowing the non-farm use of land in the ALR for oil and gas 
activities’.
177
 The passing of General Order #4473/76 in 1976, facilitating ‘accommodation’ 
of the oil and gas industry on ALR lands less than 2 acres (ac), stated:
 
General application to all land within the designated Agricultural Land Reserve Plan 
of the Peace River-Liard Regional District to the effect that oil and gas sites and 
ancillary buildings and equipment occupying an area less than 2 acres, exploratory 
sites and ancillary buildings and sump pumps, and required road and gathering and 
flow line rights-of-way be allowed, provided that the well site or exploratory site is 
rehabilitated to its original or better topographical and soil conditions when 
abandoned and any pipeline that is constructed for gathering purposes does not 
unduly restrict the agricultural use of the land and that during construction of the 




Therefore, General Order #4473/76 required sites to broadly ‘be restored to a condition as 
good or better than existed prior to the development’
179
 for oil and gas activities on ALR land 
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between 1976 and 1995. As this is a broad reclamation requirement, flexibility is encouraged 
in the review of Schedule B of a surface lease requirements used to assess the reclamation of 
existing developments and all Schedule B reports are to be submitted to the OGC for 
review.
180
 Provisions of the ALCA include issuing a stop work order, prescribing additional 
remedies to restore the land, seeking a court order or levying a penalty if the ALCA is 
contravened and if the soil is not adequately reclaimed or protected.
181
 
Similarly to the RPI regime, the ALC, since 1976, has viewed oil and gas activities in the 
ALR as being ‘temporary’ in nature and vitally important to the economic wellbeing of 
British Columbia.
182
 Despite this, the ALC acknowledges that: 
The ALC has, and continues to view the land use as temporary, albeit likely long 
term, and its accommodation was predicated on the commitment from industry to 
restore the land back to an agricultural standard equal to, or better than, that which 
existed prior to development.
183
 
The 2002 Amendment to the ALCA
184
 provided the ALC with the ability to delegate 
decision-making powers to an ‘authority’.
185
 This provided the regulatory platform for the 
ALC to delegate its powers and collaborate with another administrative authority or local 
government over specified non-farm uses on ALR lands. The ALC has exercised its 
delegation powers to enter into an agreement with the OGC relating to certain oil and gas 
non-farm uses in the ALR.
186
 However, it is noted that the ALR – OGC Delegation 
Agreement applies only to ALR land within the Peace River Region. This is differentiation 
from the Zone 1 and Zone 2 designation granted by the Agricultural Land Commission 
Amendment Act 2014,
187
 as the ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement applies only one of the 
panel regions in Zone 2, the PRRD and the Northern Rockies Regional Municipality.
188
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Applicants submitting applications outside of these areas that impact ALR lands must acquire 
ALC approval prior to the OGC adjudicating on the application.
189
 
Consequently, the OGC holds power to make decisions guided by the ALCA and regulations 
of agricultural lands and oil and gas development.
190
 Therefore, the OGC has assumed these 
powers, through the Delegation Agreement, to make decisions relating to UGR activities on 
ALR lands according to the purpose of the ALC—which is to preserve agricultural land and 
encourage and enable farming.
191
 The aim of the ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement is to 
encourage, enable and accommodate farming on agricultural land while sustainably 
developing onshore shale gas activities on ALR land.
192
 Ultimately, to minimise impact on 
agricultural land, any ALR land on which shale gas activities take place must take into 
account ‘the optimal combination of total area disturbed and location of the activity in relation 
to current and planned agricultural operations and agricultural capability of the land’
193
 in 
British Columbia. Such an approach may assist Queensland in planning future CSG activities 
on agriculture land. 
4.4.5 Improving Queensland’s Land Use Zoning to Protect Agricultural Land 
In Queensland, as analysed above, the current land use legislation applicable to UGR 
activities and relevant approvals include the PGPSA, RPIA, GCA, Planning Act 2016 (Qld), 
EPA, EPBCA (when triggered regulating matters of national environmental significance) and 
the Water Act Qld 2000 (Qld). Petroleum projects are generally required to obtain land access 
tenure from the Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation 
(DEEDI) and an EA from the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection. In 
comparison, the comparative regulation of land use applicable to UGR in British Columbia 




 and ALCA. The OGC and ALR solely regulate and 
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govern land use access and externalities for petroleum activities on ALR land in British 
Columbia. 
An example of the regulatory burden founded in the RPIA is the relationship between the 
chief executive and the GC. Pursuant to s 46 of the RPIA, the chief executive is required to 
seek advice from the GC, Queensland’s administrative UGR oversight body, about an 
assessment application if the application relates i) to an activity for which a resource authority 
is required and where the activity is proposed, ii) in a PAA, a SCA or a PLA and either the 
application is modifiable or, iii) in the chief executive’s opinion, the expected surface impacts 
of the resource activity are significant.
196
 
As Queensland’s RPI regulatory framework is based on a passive adaptive management 
regulatory approach, the RPIA is a highly unusual system of land use regulation articled by its 
broad RIDA approval scheme for ‘areas of regional interests’ governed as a purely planning 
instrument—yet managing competing and differing land use zoning types. It provides broad 





 leading to uncertainty of its legislative objectives. This prescriptive 
regulatory framework for resource activities on PAAs and SCLs has led to unnecessary 
regulatory gaps and duplication. The result has been regulatory reviews, confusion and 
uncertainty for agricultural land-holders in Queensland and unnecessarily complex regulatory 
processes for the petroleum industry. 
In comparison, the ALC – OGC Delegation Agreement provides a unique and innovate 
principles-based regulatory approach to achieve its objective in protecting ALR lands while 
coexisting with UGR activities.
199
 This involves a continuing regulatory discussion between 
the two regulatory administrative bodies in their regulation and decision-making powers and 
provides a comparatively more effective regulatory approach based on principles of 
transparency and simplicity in a sustainable zoning framework ensuing collaboration between 
UGR in agricultural zoning since the 1970s. 
It is important to note the RPI is just one regulatory framework relating to land use 
coexistence in Queensland. While the RPIA is administered by the Department of Planning 
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and Infrastructure, the GC is enacted via the GCA,
200
 and the Gasfields Commission Review 
was under the portfolio of the Department of State Development.
201
 The land access laws 
operating between agricultural landholders and oil and gas companies are administrated by 
the Department of National Resources and Mines based on the LAC, established under the 
PGPSA, and the CSG Compliance Unit
202
. 
The PGPSA permits petroleum titleholders to take or interfere with underground water in the 
area of the tenure if the taking or interference happens during the course of or results from the 
carrying out of another authorised activity for the tenure. There is no limit to the volume of 
water that may be taken by the petroleum titleholder
203
 and underground water taken by a 
petroleum titleholder is deemed ‘associated water’ which may be used for any purpose and 
within or outside the area of tenure.
204
 The allowance of groundwater access and use by 




When using or accessing groundwater, petroleum titleholders have an obligation to comply 
with the underground water management framework under the WA. The Office of 
Groundwater Impact Assessment is established by the WA and regulates UGR water 
management issues, such as hydraulic fracturing fluids and cumulative groundwater impacts 
via ‘make good’ arrangements.
206
 A make good measure for a water bore includes a) ensuring 
the bore owner has access to a reasonable quantity and quality of water for the bore’s 
authorised use or purpose, or b) carrying out a plan to monitor the bore, including, for 
example, by undertaking periodic bore assessments, or c) giving the bore owner monetary or 
non-monetary compensation for the bore’s impaired capacity.
207
 
The CSG Compliance Unit is administered via the Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines with the aim of responding to landholders’ complaints and to coordinate landholder 
groundwater monitoring by landholders themselves through the ‘CSG net’—it is not a unit 
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dedicated to overseeing complaints. The role of the GC, in comparison to its counterpart in 
British Columbia, the OGC, warrants further comparative analysis to determine whether 
amendments to the GC operation could deliver its desired aim of objective of coexistence 
with landholders with the onshore UGR industry in Queensland.
208
 
4.5 Petroleum Administrative Authorities in Regulatory Oversight 
The OECD recommends the establishment of regulatory oversight institutions ‘to actively 
provide oversight of regulatory policy procedures and goals, support and implement 
regulatory policy, and thereby foster regulatory quality’.
209
 The role of any sector-specific 
administrative authority is to implement the regulatory framework in assisting the state to 
achieve its specified objectives. In Queensland, the current policy objective to create an 
effective petroleum regulatory regime is stated as: 
Maximising the gas sector’s potential, supplying gas to households and business 
users in sufficient quantities at affordable prices and being internationally 
competitive, while balancing the needs of landholders, local communities and 
traditional owners and maintaining environmental safeguards.
210
 
Yet, when public powers are delegated, there is a need to create controls and limits. As has 
been recognised by the Queensland Government in its 2016 Gas Supply and Demand Action 
Plan Discussion Paper: 
Providing accurate, evidence-based information to the community and key 
stakeholders will help build the trust needed to support future industry development. 
A key aspect of this may be to create an independent ‘single source of truth’ that 
gathers information, reports on industry performance and translates information into 
an easy-to-understand and easy-to-use format.
211
 
An administrative authority operates to coordinate the development, management and 
regulation of land uses, approvals and development of a state’s resources. Therefore, a single 
comprehensive and dedicated administrative authority with clear and consistent regulatory 
mechanisms to interact with other administrative bodies is essential to develop inter-
governmental and inter-ministerial oversight of UGR licences, contracts and operations on 
agricultural land. 
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4.5.1 Comparison of Unconventional Gas Resource Oversight Agencies to Achieve 
Objectives 
The GC was enacted via the GCA from 2012 onwards as a response to perceived conflicts of 
agricultural land uses and landholders and UGR activities in Queensland.
212
 It was intended 
that the GC would ‘manage and improve the sustainable coexistence of landholders, regional 
communities and the onshore gas industry in Queensland’.
213
 The GC operates as an 
independent oversight administrative body to facilitate complaints of landholders and advise 
relevant ministers in certain circumstances: 
(a) facilitating better relationships between landholders, regional communities and 
the onshore gas industry; (b) reviewing the effectiveness of government entities in 
implementing regulatory frameworks that relate to the onshore gas industry; (c) 
advising Ministers and government entities about the ability of landholders, regional 
communities and the onshore gas industry to coexist within an identified area.
214
 
The primary role of the GCA lies in its facilitation of relationships between landholders and 
UGR activities. The GC consists of one commissioner, who acts as chair, and up to six part-
time commissioners with differing portfolios including communications, policy and 
engagement and corporate services. 
The delivery of the Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission Queensland and 
Associated Matters (Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission) has led to a 
reorganisation of the GC, with commissioners formerly having positions in the Queensland 
Farmers Federation
215
 and Cotton Australia. However, one commissioner remains the chief 
technical officer to APPEA.
216
 
According to the GC, it has facilitative powers and certain specific powers, such as the power 
to compel onshore gas companies (and their contractors) and landholders to provide the GC 
with the information or documents required for the effective and efficient carrying out of the 
Commission’s functions.
217
 However, it is clear the GC does not hold any regulatory power 
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nor does it adopt a role ‘of being an advocate for landholders, nor of addressing individual 
cases, neither of which (is) required by statute, both of which were, and still are, expected by 
many landholders’.
218
 Criticisms of the GC and its independence raised by landholders are: 
 the Commission does not represent landholders but represents the CSG industry and 
government 
 commissioners are not members of landholder peak bodies yet one commissioner is a 
member of APPEA 
 some commissioners are conflicted in the discharge of their duties 
 when issues are raised with the Commission the response is often in a noncommittal 
‘form’ letter and advice is not forthcoming.
219
 
Therefore, there is a lack of understanding between the GC, its ‘powers’ and its tangible 
ability to aid landholders with UGR activities on their agricultural land. The GC does not hold 
regulatory powers to investigate, mediate, arbitrate or make binding decisions concerning 
individual disputes between agricultural landholders and UGR activities. Therefore parts of 
the GCA
220
 provide an avenue for review of government entities policies and quasi-regulation 
of the UGR sector. However, the other stated purposes of the GCA provide evidence of a 
more general role of providing advice and aid to the relevant ministers and government. It 
does not explicitly state a built-in policy adjustment governance and regulatory framework. 
This creates a lack of ‘regulatory teeth’ and has given rise to stakeholders raising issues of 
confusion about the roles and responsibilities of the GC, the lack of awareness about the work 
of the Commission behind the scenes, the lack of an independent and accessible source of 
information for landholders about dealing with CSG companies, and the need for a better way 
to reach agreement and deal with disputes about conduct and compensation than having to 
resort to court.
221
 This led to the creation of the Terms of Reference for an independent review 
into the GC and its effectiveness in relation to managing multiple interests between the UGR 
industry, regional communities and landholders.
222
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Based on perceived inadequacies, on 18 December 2015, the Queensland Government 
commissioned an independent review of the GC. This review was managed by the 
Department of State Development with Robert Scott appointed as the independent reviewer. 
The purpose of the review, as outlined in the terms of reference, was to: 
(a) evaluate whether the GC is achieving its purpose 
(b) evaluate whether the functions given to the GC are sufficient to allow it to effectively 
manage disputes about land access and other disputes between resource companies 
and landholders 
(c) evaluate whether the functions given to the GC should include a role in managing or 
facilitating responses to public health and community concerns arising from onshore 
gas activities 
(d) investigate whether an alternative model, such as an independent Resources 
Ombudsman, is needed to provide a mechanism for dispute resolution between 
resource companies and landholders 
(e) investigate whether harmonisation between the CSG Compliance Unit and the GC 
would provide efficiencies and improve dispute resolution between resource 
companies and landholders 
(f) any other relevant matters the reviewer considers appropriate.223 
On 1 December 2016, the Minister for State Development and Minister for Natural Resources 
and Mines announced the release of the independent report and the government response. The 
government’s response detailed a range of measures to be adopted based on the review report 
including: 
a) a renewed focus by the Commission on extension and communication activities to 
improve the availability of information on the CSG industry particularly for landholders 
b) establishing a Land Access Ombudsman to deal with disputes between landholders 
and resource companies n in relation to CCAs 
c) structural and operational changes to the GC that will enable it to work more 
effectively 
d) developing in consultation with stakeholders improved approaches to negotiation and 
alternative ways to resolve land access disputes.
224
 
                                                 




Among the independent review recommendations was a refocus to ‘be the trusted advisor to 
government and stakeholder representative bodies on strategic issues including the status of 
the coexistence model’.
225
 The review also recommended an overhaul of the dispute 
resolution framework to establish arbitration as an alternative to Land Court litigation to 
provide a simpler and legally binding resolution for both parties and established an 
independent dispute relation body to assist with disputes about CCAs.
226
 
Further, the harmonisation of the GC and CSG was called for via more effective 
communication, strategic functions and the CSG Compliance Unit to be equipped with legal 
powers to issue penalty infringement notices for breaches of the mandatory provisions of the 
LAC pursuant to the PGPSA.
227
 In delivering the final review, it was noted there was 
‘significant opportunities for improvement in the overall operation of the GC and in the 
perception of it by a large number of stakeholders particularly landholders…(including) the 
failure to adequately address some of its statutory functions; and the sub-optimal strategic and 
operational planning and reporting’.
228
 There has not been any substantive legislative 
amendment to the GCA since the review nearly a year after its report was released.
229
 It is 
evident Queensland has been slow to react to the mounting criticism and concern relating to 
the operation and purview of the GC. The scope of the GC is to manage and facilitate 
complaints by landowners in relation to CSG activities. The review noted the Commission 
had reported over 90 enquiries from 44 landlords (2014–2015), but had failed to demonstrate 
how enquiries were managed and whether the enquiries were resolved.
230
 
In comparison, the OGC in British Columbia has a statutory requirement to close out and 
resolve enquiries and complaints and can refer complaints to the Oil and Gas Appeal 
Tribunal, an independent legal body that reviews decisions, orders, penalties and offices made 
by the OGC within 30 days.
231
 The OGC has a clear and transparent mandate to facilitate, 
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evaluate and report on the outcomes of complaints and enquiries. The operation of the OGC is 
reviewed regularly by the Canadian Standards Association and this formal review process is 
publically available for review and comment. The operation of the OGC and the GC are 
starkly different when referenced to their respective abilities to regulate and resolve conflicts. 
At present, multiple stakeholders receive and handle complaints from landholders, including 
the CSG Compliance Unit in the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, the 
Department of Environment and Heritage Protection, the GC and local governments. As 
acknowledged by the Queensland Government, ‘this can result in frustration amongst 
members of the community due to the lack of clarity regarding who to contact to ensure their 




In 1998, the OGC was enacted in British Columbia to substantially increase production of 
UGR and to explore the Western Canadian Sedimentary Basin.
233
 The necessity for more 
efficient regulation was stressed by the 1998 Golder Associates study, as highlighted by the 
recommendation that: 
The key element in terms of comprehensive, long-term progress is establishment of 
a highly committed group of Government and Industry representatives working 
cooperatively toward achievable goals. The Provincial Government must recognize 
the regional uniqueness of the current situation and allow those responsible for 




Therefore, the OGC was enacted to simplify approvals required for oil and gas exploration 
and development, avoiding overlapping legislation, inconsistent legislative application and an 
overly complex approval processes. The OGC, staffed with a group of officers dedicated to 
the consideration of applications necessary for upstream activity, with single-window 
authority over all of the principal approvals required for oil and gas development, was the 
means to achieve a streamlined approval process. 
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The result of this policy objective was a MOU between government and the oil and gas 
industry, signed in February 1998.
235
 The MOU provided for an Oil and Gas Initiative, the 
goal of which was to ‘make British Columbia one of the most attractive places in North 
America for oil and gas investment’.
236
 Once the MOU was signed, it was quickly determined 
that the best means of streamlining the regulatory approval process would be to allow all 
essential approvals to be available from a ‘single window’. According to Rankin et al, this 
‘allowed greater control by government in an industry which has a significant impact on 
government revenue and public policy’.
237
 
The stated purposes of the OGC are to regulate oil and gas activities in British Columbia in a 
manner that: 
i) Provides for the sound development of the oil and gas sector, by fostering a healthy 
environment, a sound economy and social well-being; 
ii) Conserves petroleum and natural gas resources; 
iii) Ensures safe and efficient practices; and 
iv) Assists owners of petroleum and natural gas resources to participate equitably in the 
production of shared pools of petroleum and natural gas.
238
 
The OGC holds the power to issue key approvals in relation to oil and gas activities and 
pipelines.
239
 Further, the OGC holds plenary powers relating to heritage, environmental and 
water management from the Forest Act,
240
 Forest Practices Code of British Columbia Act
241
 







 and Water Sustainability Act.
245
 
According to s 11 of the OGAA, the OGC may establish and appoint an advisory committee 
of the Commission. In general, the advisory committee has a mandate to assist the 
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Commission in discharging its responsibility to consider or inquire into any matter and to 
report its findings and advice to the board.
246
 Division 2 of the OGAA created the Oil and Gas 
Appeal Tribunal to create an appellate tribunal system for land holders or any eligible persons 
to review OGC decisions.
247
 Eligible persons have the ability to request a review of specified 
administrative decisions and permitting decisions.
248
 Requests for review must be made 
within 30 days of the determination in question and reviews are carried out by designated 
officials in the commission. The Oil and Gas Appeal Tribunal provides appeal process 
systems, independent of the commission, whereby appeals will be heard and decided. 
Further, the SRB of British Columbia assists in resolving disputes between landowners and 
companies that require access to private land to explore for, develop or produce Crown-
owned subsurface resources such as oil, gas, coal, minerals and geothermal.
249
 The SRB 
provides another avenue of independent appeals and decision-making relating to 
compensation, compliance, terms of entry onto land and rent renegotiation. 
Pursuant to the EPMR,
250
 the British Columbian Government has established environmental 
objectives. The OGC must consider the Government’s environmental objectives in deciding 
whether or not to authorise an oil and gas activity with respect to ‘water, riparian values, 
wildlife and wildlife habitat and old-growth management areas, resource features and cultural 
heritage resources’.
251
 The board of the OGC has the power to make regulations under the 
OGAA, primarily of a technical nature, and has exercised its regulatory power to make 
regulations related to pre-application consultation and notification requirements, geophysical 
exploration (seismic activities), drilling and production activities, pipelines and LNG 
facilities, levies and security. The commission also has the power to grant approvals under the 
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 and Water Act.
256
 To do so, the OGC may exercise 
its power to conduct inspections and audits.
257
 
On finding a contravention, the OGC may exercise a further new power to impose monetary 
penalties, referred to as ‘administrative penalties’ in the OGAA. The OGC may impose 
monetary penalties for any contraventions of the OGAA.
258
 The monetary penalty provisions 
are backed up with substantial civil liability sanctions. For example, the OGC may enforce a 
penalty by registering it with the Supreme Court of British Columbia and such registration is 
deemed to be a judgment of the court for the payment of a debt. The OGC may also make any 
orders it views as necessary to mitigate public safety risks. As a consequence of these 
regulatory powers, the OGC has far more regulatory reach with adequate ‘teeth’ to address 
concerns pertaining to UGR development on agricultural lands in Canada. 
4.5.2 Regulatory Power 
Queensland and British Columbia have adopted different regulatory models to manage land 
use conflicts arising from the development of UG. The analysis of different administrative 
bodies demonstrates the differing aims, scope and regulatory powers invested in Queensland’s 
and British Columbia’s regulatory agency models. Having compared the differences via 
functional analysis, it is now relevant to turn attention to whether British Columbia offers 
appropriate alternative regulatory tools effective in managing conflicts of interest and whether 
these regulatory tools could be applied to Queensland. 
A comparative analysis of the GC in Queensland and the OGC in British Columbia reveals 
stark differences in regulatory powers. A myriad of powers is granted to the OGC acting as a 
‘single-window regulatory agency with responsibilities for overseeing oil and gas operations 
in British Columbia, including exploration, development, pipeline transportation and 
reclamation’.
259
 Further, the core role of the OGC includes: 
Reviewing and assessing applications for industry activity, consulting with First 
Nations, ensuring industry complies with provincial legislation and cooperating with 
partner agencies. The public interest is protected through the objectives of ensuring 
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public safety, protecting the environment, conserving petroleum resources and 
ensuring equitable participation in production.
260
 
Consequently, the OGC is involved in each step of the UGR activity cycle ranging from 
consultation with industry, applications, permits review and assessment, compliance and 
inspection and site reclamation and restoration. 
In contrast, the GC, as a comparable statutorily-enacted body, has a broad and ill-defined 
advisory role to facilitate ‘better relationships’ and liaise with landholders, review the 
effectiveness of government entities and advise and make recommendations to ministers and 
government entities about the onshore gas industry. In this respect, it is evident the GC has an 
advisory ‘arm’s length’ role to the Queensland Government.
261
 
A strong compliance approach, beyond monitoring, allows the OGC to take specific action 
and enact particular powers—for example, in relation to recovery of orphan sites and 
management of technical and safety issues—to align policy with overall government 
environmental standards. The OGC has been mandated to act as a ‘policy architect’, which 
includes clear lines of responsibility within the policy and legislative structure from the 
commission to the local governments. 
In Queensland, the GC acts as an advisory body only and does not have the same range of 
powers as the OGC, particularly in compliance, which means it can only act in a limited 
regulatory fashion. The OGC enjoys the ability to act as a legislative and regulatory 
‘watchdog’ based on a principles-based regulatory administrative authority, where the 
Commission is the architect of compliance regulation and policy variations. The 
circumscribed and limited role of the GC appears to underline the Queensland Government’s 
tacit support for the resource sector as the key state economic driver for the state. 
This assumption seems well-founded, given the rate at which new UGR wells are drilled—
1,563 wells were drilled in 2013–2014 and 700 wells in 2015–2016, amounting to 5,127 wells 
producing CSG
262
—and the limited regulatory changes to the PGPSA and the GC purview. 
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As stated by Senator Canavan in welcoming the increase in production from Australia Pacific 
LNG at its Curtis Island facility near Gladstone: 
As the third Queensland LNG project to begin production from a second train, the 
$25 billion APLNG project demonstrates the extent to which the Australian 
resources sector underpins the national economy and drives growth.
263
 
Similar to Queensland, British Columbia has also recognised the economic future and 
importance of shale gas to ‘fuelling its economy’.
264
 However, the OGC starts with an 
assumption that energy is a competing land use interest on arable land requiring government 
support and protection. As stated by Minister Rich Coleman, Leader of the Opposition in the 
British Columbia Legislative Assembly: 
British Columbia has the potential to be a global leader in environmentally 
responsible natural gas development and export. We are building partnerships and 
collaborating with other jurisdictions to ensure B.C.’s natural gas policies and 
programs provide efficient environmental assessment and regulatory oversight.
265
 
This strong compliance and regulatory process is managed by the OGC and close 
collaboration with other statutory bodies responsible for other natural resources, such as the 
ALC and the Forest Appeals Commission.
266
 
The GC, as governed by the GCA, was enacted to improve ‘the sustainable coexistence of 
landholders, regional communities and the onshore gas industry in Queensland’.
267
 The key 
functions of the GC are facilitating better relationships between landholders, regional 
communities and the onshore gas industry; reviewing the effectiveness of government entities 
in implementing regulatory frameworks that relate to the onshore gas industry; and advising 
ministers and government entities about the ability of landholders, regional communities and 
the onshore gas industry to coexist within an identified area.
268
 However, unlike the OGC in 
British Columbia, which is granted the power to regulate and make approvals of UGR 
licenses and access the ALR lands, the powers of the GC are to review government entities, 
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advise ministers and government departments, make recommendations and obtain advice on 
UGR activities and the effectiveness of regulatory frameworks.
269
 
The limited functions and transparency of the GC have been called into question and 
examined in the Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission in 2016.
270
 The review led 
to a number of recommendations, including provision for penalty infringement notices under 
the provisions of the LAC and PGPSA. The review states this recommendation would 
potentially increase agricultural landholders’ ‘confidence’ in the regulation of UGR, 
compliance and enforcement of the GC and the CSG Compliance Unit.
271
 Increased 
regulatory scope and powers of the GC and CSG Compliance Unit to issue penalty notices 
would arguably create a more streamlined ‘single window’ approach to UGR regulation, in a 
similar fashion to the OGC in British Columbia. 
The OGAA of British Columbia confers the regulation of oil and gas activities to the OGC to 
grant approvals, enforce compliance and oversee technical safety. The mandated purpose and 
aims of the OGC are outlined as follows: 
a) To regulate oil and gas activities in British Columbia in a manner that: 
i) provides for the sound development of the oil and gas sector, by fostering a 
healthy environment, a sound economy and social well-being 
ii) conserves petroleum and natural gas resources 
iii) ensures safe and efficient practices 
iv) assists owners of petroleum and natural gas resources to participate equitably 
in the production of shared pools of petroleum and natural gas.
272
 
British Columbia’s approach has broad authority under a wide variety of Acts and regulations 
to regulate oil and gas activities and operational standards for oil and gas activities. 
The OGC, a Crown Corporation and agent of the Crown, collaborates and regulates diverse 
stakeholders, including First Nations and the petroleum industry, ‘to provide efficient and 
effective oversight of oil and gas activity’.
273
 The OGAA mandates the OGC to regulate the 
oil and gas industry to ensure sound development of British Columbia’s oil and gas resources. 
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Accordingly, the OGC is responsible for developing processes to accept and review industry 
applications related to oil and gas activities and/or pipeline activities (falling within provincial 
jurisdiction). To approve such applications, the OGC must ensure that the application is in the 




The Oil and Gas Appeal Tribunal was established by the OGCA.
275
 Eligible persons have the 
ability to request a review of specified administrative decisions and permitting decisions.
276
 
Requests for review must be made within 30 days of the determination in question and 
reviews are carried out by designated officials in the commission. The Oil and Gas Appeal 
Tribunal provides appeal process systems independent of the OGC. 
The Delegation Agreement encourages, enables and accommodates farming on agricultural 
land while sustainably developing onshore shale gas activities on ALR land.
277
 Ultimately, to 
minimise impact on agricultural land, any ALR land on which shale gas activities take place 
must take into account ‘the optimal combination of total area disturbed and location of the 
activity in relation to current and planned agricultural operations and agricultural capability of 
the land’
278
 in British Columbia. The OGC reviews applications and, once approved, inspects 
and monitors construction, operation and reclamation. The OGC is also responsible for 
reviewing and approving land tenure, water use, forest harvesting, waste disposal and 
potential heritage impacts. 
Queensland has a decentralised community engagement and administrative authorities to 
receive and handle complaints from the community (including the CSG Compliance Unit in 
the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, the Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection, the GC and local governments). Due to the ‘frustration amongst members 
of the community’,
279
 the Queensland Gas Supply and Demand Action Plan Discussion Paper 
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British Columbia’s UGR policy has developed in response to similar technical, stakeholder 
conflict and regulatory challenges to Queensland. The OGC also presents Oil and Gas Land 
Use reports periodically to provide transparency to industry, First Nations and landholders of 
surface area used for UGR surface activities, and documents the percentage of change from 
the prior reporting period. No such reporting system exists in Queensland. A detailed 
comparison of the UGR Administrative Bodies in Queensland and British Columbia is 
illustrated in Table 2. Importantly, it demonstrates the fundamental differences in the policy 
scope between the GC of Queensland and OGC in British Columbia, particularly in terms of 
the law-making and regulatory powers. 
Table 2: Comparison of Unconventional Gas Administrative Bodies in Queensland and 
British Columbia 
Factors GC (Queensland) OGC (British Columbia) 
Legal Powers The remit of the GC is as an advisory 
and facilitating oversight power to 
the State Government. 
The purpose of the OGC is to regulate oil 
and gas activities in British Columbia, 
inter alia: 
(a) provides for the sound development of 
the oil and gas sector, by fostering a 
healthy environment, a sound economy 
and social wellbeing 
(b) conserves petroleum and natural gas 
resources 
(c) ensures safe and efficient practices 
(d) assists owners of petroleum and 
natural gas resources to participate 
equitably in the production of shared 
pools of petroleum and natural gas.281 
Policy Scope The GC has the authority to review 
(but no decision-making powers): 
(a) the effectiveness of government 
entities in implementing regulatory 
The OGC is an agent of the government 
and has the legal capacity to pass 
resolutions relating to regulations; grant 
permits for oil and gas activities; 
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frameworks that relate to the onshore 
gas industry 
(b) advising ministers and 
government entities about the ability 
of landholders, regional communities 
and the onshore gas industry to 
coexist within an identified area 
(c) in response to requests for advice 
from the chief executive under the 
RPIA about assessment applications 
under that Act, advising that chief 
executive about the ability of 
landholders, regional communities 
and the resources industry to coexist 
within the area the subject of the 
application 
(d) making recommendations to the 
relevant minister that regulatory 
frameworks and legislation relating 
to the onshore gas industry be 
reviewed or amended 
(e) making recommendations to the 
relevant minister and onshore gas 
industry about leading practice or 
management relating to the onshore 
gas industry 
(f) advising the minister and 
government entities about matters 
relating to the onshore gas 
industry.282 
reviewing and assessing applications for 
industry activity; consulting with First 
Nations; ensuring industry complies with 
provincial legislation ‘ in the public 
interest’ having regard to environmental, 




The GC has the function of 
facilitating better relationships 
between landholders, regional 
The OGC may make regulations 
respecting consultation and notifications 
for the purposes of authorisation 
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communities and the onshore gas 
industry284 (no power to make 
binding regulations or 
recommendations). 
respecting environmental protection and 
management and oil and gas permits.285 
The OGC may ‘negotiate and enter into 
agreements with any person, including 
the government of British Columbia, the 
government of Canada, the government 
of another province or of a territory, a 
local government, a First Nation or with 
an official or agency of any of them’.286 
The purposes of the OGC also include: 
(a) to provide for effective and efficient 
processes for the review of applications 
for permits and to ensure that applications 
that are approved are in the public interest 
having regard to environmental, 
economic and social effects 
(b) to encourage the participation of First 
Nations and aboriginal peoples in 
processes affecting them 
(c) to participate in planning processes 
(d) to undertake programs of education 
and communication to advance safe and 
efficient practices and the other purposes 




There is no review or appellate 
functions of GC advice, since all 
advice is non-binding and advisory 
only. 
The OGC Oil and Gas Appeal Tribunal is 
established to hear appeals. An eligible 
person may appeal to the appeal tribunal, 
of a decision made under s 71, for a 





The GC operates as an oversight 
agency for UGR activities in 
Queensland in conjunction with the 
CSG Compliance Unit and Office of 
The OGC represents a single framework 
to regulate all oil and gas activities and 
regulations. Regulatory responsibility is 
delegated to the Commission through the 
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Groundwater Impact Assessment. It 
has no decision-making powers or 
regulatory responsibility. 
OGAA and includes specified enactments 
under the Forest Act, Heritage 
Conservation Act, Land Act, 






The GC acts independently and 
without any delegation or MOU. The 
RPI Reg regime is administered by 
the DILGP.  
The ALC has exercised power to enter 
into an agreement with the OGC relating 
to certain oil and gas non-farm uses 
within the ALR in the Peace River 
Region. This means the OGC acts as the 
ALC and makes decisions guided by the 
ALCA and regulations. 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Table 2 underlines the conclusion that Queensland’s GC is an oversight and facilitative body 
only, in comparison with British Columbia’s OGC with regulatory, appellate and 
policymaking powers. It must be noted, UGR regulatory powers are vested solely in the 
Natural Resources Minister and the Department of Natural Resources and Mines, with 
oversight and facilitation only powers vested in a number of administrative bodies in 
Queensland, namely the GC, CSG Compliance Unit and OGIA. 
4.5.3 Managing Conflicting Interests 
Queensland’s current RPI Reg regime requires individual landowners to raise land use 
conflicts. To test the regulation, an agricultural landholder must lodge a formal complaint 
with one of the oversight bodies (the GC, CSG Compliance Unit or OGIA). If a matter is 
further disputed, a landholder must seek a determination from the Land Court as a planning 
exercise to determine whether a UGR activity is in breach of an RIDA. The emphasis is 
firmly on the individual landowner to prove a case. 
British Columbia favours asserting greater state oversight and control through regulatory 
checks and balances beginning from agricultural land zoning in the ALR through to the 
ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement to regulate oil and gas activities on agricultural land.
289
 
The OGC is charged with balancing a broad range of environmental, economic and social 
considerations. In achieving its aim to provide ‘oil and gas regulatory excellence for British 
                                                 





 the OGC oversees all regulatory aspects of UGR operations, including 
exploration, development, pipeline transportation and reclamation. Regulatory responsibility 
of the Commission extends from the exploration and development phases, through to facilities 
operation and, ultimately, decommissioning, while landholder appeals are heard and 
addressed by the Oil and Gas Appeal Tribunal. 
The management of agricultural land use and UGR activities in both jurisdictions is illustrated 
in Figures 3 and 4, demonstrating the similarities and differences of the approval processes for 
UGR license holders to exploit on agricultural lands. 
Figure 3: Relationship of RIDA Process and GC in Queensland 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
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Figure 4: Relationship of Non-Farm Use Approvals ALR Process and OGC in British 
Columbia 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
As illustrated in Figures 3 and 4, the process for the approval of UGR activities on 
agricultural land in Queensland and British Columbia is similar. In each system, an 
application for use of farmland is needed, approval may be granted by either the 
administrative authority or the ministerial department and UGR activities commence as 
regulated by the relevant petroleum legislative framework. However, the differences between 
these systems lie in the cohesiveness of the regulatory system and collaboration between 
petroleum administrative bodies, governmental departments and agricultural land use 
regulatory systems. 
The GC and OGIA bodies hold advisory and facilitative powers only. Both bodies hold the 
capacity to ‘advise the chief executive’ on matters relating to UGR water impacts
291
 or RIDA 
assessments.
292
 Similarly, the CSG Compliance Unit aims to investigate and facilitate 
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landholder complaints relating to CSG land access. Over two separate government 
departments—the Department of Natural Resources and Mines and the DILGP—the three 
UGR oversight bodies in Queensland do not hold regulatory powers over UGR activities. The 
DILGP Chief Executive holds the only law-making power in relation to approving UGR 
activities in PAAs. The regulatory capacity of UGR decisions remains with the Department of 
Natural Resources and Mines Minister in granting authorities to prospect
293
 and petroleum 
leases by competitive tender who must then work in conjunction with the minister for the 
DILGP for an approval for non-excluded UGR activities in PAAs.
294
 
In comparison, as illustrated in Figure 3, the ALC and OGC both hold regulatory, policy and 
judicial powers relating to ALR lands and UGR activities in British Columbia. The 
facilitation of the ALC – OGC Delegation Agreement provides for a ‘streamlined’ single-
window approvals and regulatory process for UGR activities on ALR lands in the Peace River 
Region (Zone 2). Both regulatory oversight and tribunal bodies act as independent bodies, 
with the OGC acting as the ALC and making decisions guided by the ALCA and regulations. 
Petroleum permits are granted by the OGC in conjunction with approval for UGR activities 
on ALR lands. Provisions of the ALCA include issuing a stop work order, prescribing 
additional remedies to restore the land, seeking a court order or levying a penalty if the ALCA 
is contravened and if the soil is not adequately reclaimed or protected. Oil and gas non-farm 
use applications to the OGC are then referred to local government and the Ministry of 
Agriculture independently for any comment. 
4.6 Exclusion as a Regulatory Tool 
In Queensland, key exemptions exists for exploration of both petroleum and minerals which, 
consequently, are categorised as resource activities that do not require an RIDA and include 
petroleum survey licences, data acquisition authorities, or water monitoring authorities as 
regulated by the PGPSA.
295
 More than one prospecting permit may be issued over the same 
land and the time period granted for a prospecting permit varies between one month and one 
year for a district permit, while a parcel prospecting permit has a term of three months.
296
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petroleum tenure holder may apply for a data acquisition authority to allow the applicant to 
carry out: 
a) geophysical surveys on land (the ‘data acquisition land’) contiguous to land in the area 
of the tenure to enable the applicant to acquire data relevant to authorised activities under 
the tenure 
b) the entering of the data acquisition land to carry out the geophysical surveys.297 
Further, a petroleum survey licence provides tenement holders the right to enter land to survey 
the proposed route of a pipeline or the suitability of land for a petroleum facility licence. It 
can be granted for a maximum of 12 months and allows the conduct of activities that have a 
‘minimal impact on the land’, however, there are no area limitations.
298
 The Queensland 
Government will grant a petroleum survey licence by taking into consideration the applicant’s 
‘financial and technical resources and ability to manage a survey’ to work out the ‘suitability 
of the area of the licence for the pipeline or petroleum facility’.
299
 
The RPIA provides another layer of exemptions for resource activities which, therefore, do 
not require a RIDA where: 
1) consent is obtained by a landholder to explore or extract resources on a PAA, or 
2) the activity carried out for less than one year, or 
3) the resource activity is a ‘pre-existing’ resource or regulated activity.300 
A resource activity is considered to be ‘pre-existing’ if commenced before the land in 
question became land in an area of regional interest (i.e., the activity was being carried out 
lawfully on the land prior to the induction of the RPIA in 2014).
301
 For example, a resource 
activity can be carried out lawfully on land if: 
 it is carried out under a resource authority or EA 
 the application for either authority adequately detailed the location, nature and/or 
extent of the expected surface impacts of the activity 
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 no further authority or approval is required to be obtained in relation to the location, 
nature or extent of the expected surface impacts of the activity.
302
 
Therefore, policy intent here is to exempt activities lawfully operating before an area is 
declared an area of regional interest. Resource activities can also be carried out with the 
agreement of the land owner and are exempt from requiring RIDA approvals where: 
a) a CCA applies 
b) the applicant has entered into a voluntary agreement with the land owner about the 
resource activity 
c) the resource activity is not likely to have a significant impact on the PAA or the SCA 
d) the resource activity is not likely to have an impact on land owned by a person other 
than the land owner.
303
 
In effect, this means that resource companies are exempt from RIDA approval where there is 
a CCA. As a CCA is required prior to advanced activities being undertaken on land, this 
essentially bypasses the RIDA approvals process and it is only when preliminary activities are 
undertaken that approvals are required. 
An ‘impact’ is defined as limiting ‘the suitability of the land to be used for a priority 
agricultural land use’
304
 for PAAs or impacting ‘the land’s soil, climate and landscape 
features that make that area highly suitable, or likely to be highly suitable, for cropping’
305
 for 
SCAs. For UGR preliminary or advanced activities to be approved in SCAs, defined as 
agricultural cropping land, ‘the activity needs to demonstrate to have an impact for less than 
50 years except under exceptional circumstances’.
306
 As previously examined in this chapter, 
it may be difficult to ascertain UGR well impacts in 50 years for geological reasons, whereby 
agricultural land can likely regenerate in this time. 
Resource and regulated activities must not be likely to have a ‘significant’ impact on the 
relevant PAA. A ‘significant’ impact is an impact that is important, notable or of 
consequence, having regard to its context or intensity. According to RPIA Guideline 02/14, 
                                                 
302 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 24. 
303 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s22. 
304 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 27 (a). 
305 Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 (Qld) s 22(c).  
306 Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the 




‘Whether or not an activity is likely to have a significant impact on the SCA depends on the 
scale and the effect of the impact on the SCA’.
307
 The Australian Government Department of 
Environment’s Matters of National Environmental Significance, Significant Impact 
Guidelines 1.1 provides guidance on what may constitute a ‘significant impact’ on a matter of 
national environmental significance under the EPBCA.
308
 
Unlike other jurisdictions Queensland sees the application of the precautionary principle 
where uncertainty exists to be irrelevant. Its view has been stated thus: 
If there is scientific uncertainty about the impacts of an activity and potential 
impacts are serious or irreversible, the precautionary principle is applicable. 
Accordingly, a lack of scientific certainty about the potential impacts of an activity 
will not itself justify that the activity is not likely to have a significant impact on the 
area of regional interest.
309
 
A typical ALR exclusion application involves detailed land use proposals, an agricultural 
specialist report, public hearings, and, frequently, local government support or opposition. 
The application is determined by ALC commissioners who work in conjunction with ALC 
staff members and visit the site in question before deciding the fate of the application. 
Applications can then be rejected outright, approved outright or receive partial approval (for 
either some of the land or for some of the intended uses). 
Stobbe et al examines over 30 years of zoning decisions and the factors that impact decisions 
to change zoning to non-agricultural uses for two agricultural regions in British Columbia—
the City of Abbotsford and the Saanich District on Vancouver Island.
310
 The study used 
logistical regression models to test the impacts of spatial, political and other factors on 
outcomes for 81 exclusion applications near large urban centres. By applying for exclusion, a 
landowner indicates belief that it is more valuable from a private perspective to remove the 
land from agricultural use. The ALC must then determine whether the private gains outweigh 
the social loss, if there is any. A total of 1,758 ha or 4,344.113 ac of land were involved in 
ALR exclusion applications for Abbotsford and the Saanich peninsula between 1974 and 
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 In the study, it was found that 60 out of the 90 cases were permitted exclusion or 
partial exclusion from the ALR regime. 
The average requested area for exclusion was significantly lower for approved applications 
than for those that were denied, with respective means (medians) of 14.0 (4.1) ha and 30.6 
(13.4) ha.
312
 The impact of parcel size was significant or nearly significant for all models, as 
smaller parcels of land were associated with more exclusion approvals. In addition, the 
proportion of a parcel requested for exclusion is clearly a negative factor. Applications 
comprising less than the entire parcel area are more likely to be approved for exclusion, 
possibly because they come from landowners who present plans to enhance agricultural 
activity on the remaining portion of the land. 
In comparison, oil and gas activities and ancillary activities located on the identified ALR 
lands are exempt
313
 from the requirement of an application under the ALCA for permission of 
a non-farm use where: 
i) the oil and gas activity and ancillary sites for which the combined total area occupied 
by existing and proposed activities is less than 20 ha 
ii) pipelines and surface facilities directly related to the operation of a pipeline 
iii) conversions of existing oil and gas activity site to an oil and gas activity of ancillary 
site for which no new land is required for facilitates, camps, sumps, borrows and 
produced water storage sites.
314
 
The average size of a multi-well pad for drilling and fracturing UGR operations is 3.5 ac 
(1.4 ha). Therefore, sites with less than 14 wells would likely be exempt from the ALR – 
OGC Delegation Agreement and only consent by the ALR landholder would be needed in this 
scenario.
315
 The ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement also states impact on agricultural land 
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and agricultural operations can be minimised by locating activities on land that is classified as 
British Columbia Land Capability for Agriculture Class 7. Further, a pre-development site 
assessment is required to help ensure soil conservation and effective reclamation potential.
316
 
The ALR includes non-farm use of cultivated land where any of the following apply: 
 the proposed activities are located on the land to utilise existing disturbance 
 there are no practicable alternatives to locate the activities on lands identified in 1–4 
 locating the activities elsewhere would have a more significant impact on productive 
agricultural land 
 locating the activities elsewhere would have a more significant impact on existing or 
planned agricultural operations 
 locating the activities elsewhere would have an unacceptable incremental impact on 
residents’ use and enjoyment of their property 
 locating the activities elsewhere would have an unacceptable incremental impact on 
public and worker safety or significant environmental values.
317
 
Similar to Queensland, a number of exemptions for UGR activities on ALR lands apply 
within the Delegation Agreement. For example, a range of oil- and gas-related activities are 
permitted on ALR lands, including geophysical exploration, pipelines and related facilities, 
power lines that are adjacent to roads, and up to three well sites.
318
 These exception provisions 
have remained unchanged since the enactment of the first oil and gas and ALR – OGC 




However, some safeguards do exist to protect agriculture on those lands. For example, 
proponents who apply for additional non-farm use activities on ALR lands must submit a pre-
development site assessment to help ensure soil conservation and effective reclamation and 
plan the location of the activities to minimally impact agriculture, such as by avoiding higher 
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quality lands and siting facilities on non-cultivated lands. The ALC and OGC states that, for 
the determination of oil and gas activities or ancillary activities using Appendix I, proponents 
are required to complete area calculations to determine, on a section basis or equivalent, the 
combined total area occupied by existing and proposed oil and gas activities.
320
 For purposes 
of area calculations, a section or equivalent is described as: 
a) the legal section for activities located inside the Peace River Block (i.e., Section 1, 
Township 86, Range 17, W6M) 
b) the equivalent area of four units starting sequentially in the SW corner of the Block in 
the National Topographical System for activities outside the Peace River Block (i.e., units 
1-2-12-11; 3-4-14-13; etc.; Block E, 94-A-11).
321
 
However, the following activities are exempt in the calculations of combined total area: 
 pipelines (if underground), including temporary workspace required for construction 
purposes that will be reclaimed at the same time as the pipeline right of way 
 a single riser site that is directly related to the operation of a pipeline and is less than 
or equal to 1 ha 
 electric power lines with single-pole structures 
 seismic lines (including cut lines made by hand or machine in the course of 
geophysical exploration) and temporary use sites for geophysical exploration (including 
camps) where the seismic lines and sites are immediately reclaimed following the 
completion of the geophysical exploration, if such reclamation is required by permit or by 
OGAA 
 temporary winter access that is constructed in frozen conditions where no roadbed 
development is required 
 temporary use sites for ancillary activities (e.g., log decking sites, workspaces, 
campsites, geotechnical investigation areas, storage sites, etc.) where: 
o the site is only used during the construction phase of an oil and gas activity, and 
will be immediately reclaimed following the completion of the construction phase 
of the oil and gas activity 
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o no surface soil stripping or significant compaction or rutting (as compared to 
adjacent site) is reasonably expected to occur, an if such things do occur, the 
disturbed area is immediately reclaimed 
o the site will be available for farm use after the construction phase of the oil and gas 
activity has been completed.
322
 
In planning oil and gas activities on ALR lands, applicants are expected to ‘minimise 
disturbance to ALR land and agricultural operations by limiting the extent of disturbance to 
what is necessary to safely and appropriately conduct the activity’.
323
 Appendix II of the ALR 
– OGC Delegation Agreement provides a hierarchy of land types where oil and gas activities 
must be located to minimise impact on agricultural operations.
324
 Therefore, in comparison to 
Queensland, a number of exemptions for UG activities exist on ALR lands. Comparative to 
the RPI exemption regime, however, the Delegation Agreement does provide a 
comprehensive and transparent process to facilitate UGR activities and their minimal 
disturbance of ALR lands. 
4.7 Regulating Water Use 
Both agriculture and natural resource extraction require water use and both impact on the 
sustainable use of groundwater. Groundwater extraction in the Queensland Darling Downs 
region for farming and coal mining in the area commenced in the 1960s, resulting in a loss of 
stream flow.
325
 Tan, Baldwin, White and Burry and George acknowledge that water supply 
for the irrigated agriculture and towns from the Central Condamine Alluvium, in the Murray-
Darling River System, comes from groundwater that is over allocated and displaying 
symptoms of declining water quality and quantity, ‘Current extraction is assessed at 67 GL/a 
(gigalitres per annum), while the best available scientific data estimates the sustainable 
groundwater system yield is closer to 40 GL/a’.
326
 This is an important regional issue as 
current groundwater use is unsustainable in the Darling Downs area. The Darling Downs 
region has already experienced water stress due to over allocation and overuse of groundwater 
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resources historically, as identified in the Murray-Darling Basin Plan.
327
 Landholders have 




Despite attempts at water reforms by Australian states and territories over the past two 
decades, the ‘Millennium’ drought, which commenced in 1997, brought to a head the over 
allocation of water in the important Murray-Darling Basin and the degradation of the basin’s 
water-related ecosystems. This resulted in the Australian Parliament enacting a new Water Act 
2007 (Cth) requiring the development and implementation of an integrated water resources 
plan for the Murray-Darling Basin (Basin Plan). The Basin Plan aims to achieve a healthy 
working basin through the establishment of new long-term average sustainable diversion 
limits that reflect an environmentally sustainable level of water use (or ‘take’). These 
sustainable diversion limits are limits on the volumes of water that can be taken for 
consumptive purposes (including domestic, urban, industrial and agricultural use) and are set 
at both a catchment and a Basin-wide scale. The Basin Plan will recover large quantities of 
surface and groundwater to meet the environmental needs in the Condamine–Balonne 
catchment, however, GAB water is specifically excluded from the Basin Plan.
329
 
UGR production in Queensland requires groundwater extraction to liberate CSG from coal 
cleats, thereby improving gas recovery. Consequently, the sustainability of associated water 
produced during UGR extraction is a significant regulatory concern due to its high salinity 
and variable chemical composition if left untreated.
330
 This has led to calls for an alternative 
cumulative impact baseline monitoring system of groundwater of crucial importance to 
agriculture, as argued by the Australian Dairy Industry Council: 
An assessment and monitoring system needs to provide independently verified 
baseline data and on-going monitoring data to transparently identify potential 
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There are a number of groundwater systems located in the GAB and these include the 
Condamine Alluvium catchment in the Surat Basin, which can have highly variable rainfall 
patterns which occur periodically between high intensity rain and extended periods of 
drought.
332
 During periods of low rainfall, irrigated agriculture in the Surat Basin is highly 
dependent on groundwater extracted from the Condamine Alluvium groundwater system.
333
 
According Tan et al, approximately 90% of the water taken from the Condamine Alluvium 
between 2005 and 2006 was for the irrigation of crops.
334
 It has been found that there has 
been a decline in the standing water level of the Central Condamine Alluvium from 1960 to 
2008. The use of the Condamine Alluvium by the agricultural industry highlights the 
importance of appropriate management of water extraction during UGR operations.
335
 
A number of studies have documented the effect of UGR exploration and extraction on 
agricultural regions of Queensland, primarily in the Darling Downs region.
336
 A consistent 
concern among agricultural landholders is continued water access necessary for future ‘dry’ 
farming agricultural areas reliant on underground water bores due to typically low rainfall in 
some areas. Consequently, UGR activities, if ineffectively regulated, may be a threat to water 
security, particularly in recurring drought areas and potential groundwater quality and 
quantity effects on agricultural areas where UGR development takes place.
337
 In 2012, the 
Queensland Water Commission identified three main areas of impact on water resources from 
                                                 
331 Australian Dairy Industry Council, Submission No 46 to Select Committee on Unconventional Gas Mining, 
Inquiry into Australia’s Legislative Regulatory and Policy Framework for Unconventional Gas Mining, 15 
March 2016. 
332 Martin Thoms and Melissa Parsons, ‘Identifying spatial and temporal patterns in the hydrological character of 
the Condamine–Balonne River, Australia, using multivariate statistics’ (2003) 19 River Research and 
Applications 443. 
333 Worley Parsons, Groundwater Risks Associated with Coal Seam Gas Development in the Surat and Southern 
Bowen Basins Final Report (2013) < https://www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/106015/act-
5-groundwater-risks-report-text.pdf>. 
334 Tan et. al., above n 327, 38. 
335 Chantelle A.Rebello, Sara J.Couperthwaite, Graeme J.Millar, Les A.Dawes, ‘Understanding coal seam gas 
associated water, regulations and strategies for treatment’ (2016) 13 Journal of Unconventional Oil and Gas 
Resources 32, 32. 
336 Rosemary Leonard, Rod McCrea and Andrea Walton, ‘Perceptions of Community Responses to the 
Unconventional Gas Industry: The Importance of Community Agency’ (2016) 48 Journal of Rural Studies 
11; Ralph Brown, Shawn Dorins and Richard Krannich,‘The Boom-Bust-Recovery Cycle: Dynamics Of 
Change In Community Satisfaction And Social Integration In Delta, Utah’ (2005) 70(1) Rural Sociology 28; 
Rod McCrea, Andrea Walton and Rosemary Leonard, ‘Developing a Model of Community Wellbeing and 
Resilience in Response to Change’ (2016) 129(1) Social Indicators Research 195. 
337 Andrea Walton, Rachel Williams and Rosemary Leonard, ‘Community Perspectives of Coal Seam Gas 
Development during Two Phases of Industry Activity: Construction and Post-Construction’ (2017) 26(1) 
Rural Society 85.  
199 
UGR activities—impacts on water levels in coal seams from the extraction of water during 
mining activity; damage or pollution to an aquifer, as some degree of interconnectivity exists 
with coal seams; and the release of ‘produced’ water.
338
 
Alongside concerns relating to groundwater depletion in UGR activities is the concern of 
varying amounts of associated water produced from each UGR well. Produced water occurs 
when coal seams are dewatered—water from the well is high initially and decreased as the 
water flows from the coal cleats to the surface. This flow of water decreases over time, as the 
gas is released from the coal cleats, leading to an increase in CSG until depletion.
339
 As there 
is potential for associated water to impact the environment if it is released onto land or to 
surface waters and left untreated, concentration limits for water quality parameters are set to 
maintain a minimum impact upon the natural environment. The National Water Commission 
conservatively estimates water production from CSG wells in Queensland at up to 




Therefore, the Australian Government, through state legislation, regulates the use and 
discharge of associated water for all companies who operate UGR wells in the Surat Basin. 
The associated water is regulated by the WA for physical and chemical parameters and the 
concentrations required are dependent on the application for which the associated water is to 
be used.
341
 Other legislation that may control the use of UGR water, depending upon how it is 
to be managed and used, include the Water Supply (Safety and Reliability) Act 2008 (Qld), 
where operators undertake a water supply service such as supplying treated CSG water for the 
purposes of a municipal drinking water supply, and Waste Reduction and Recycling Act 2011 
(Qld), for authorising particular and general beneficial uses of CSG water and what would 
otherwise be CSG-related wastes.
342
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The PGPSA grants a petroleum title holder the right to access groundwater within the 
applicable land.
343
 Therefore, a petroleum license holding may: 
a) take or interfere with the water in the course of, or resulting from, the carrying out of 
an authorised activity for the tenure 
b) use this water for carrying out of another authored activity for the tenure 
c) take or interfere with the water for use in the carrying out of another authorised 
activity for the tenure.
344
 
Consequently, the title holder may take or interfere with underground water if the taking or 
interference occurs during authorised activities as ‘associated water’ falling within the 
definition of underground water when carrying out authorised petroleum activities. There is 
no specific limit as to the volume of water that may be taken during authorised activities.
345
 
The distinction is also important because the WA provides that all water and entitlements to 
the use, flow and control of all water in Queensland are the State’s. 
The WA makes it an offence to take, supply or interfere with water unless authorised under 
the WA. However, s 188 of the PGPSA provides an exception to this requirement, thereby 
legalising the taking or interfering of underground water without further licences under the 
WA.
346
 The UGR water regulatory regime in Queensland remains ambiguous, therefore, 
whether a petroleum operator extracts water (as considered by the WA) while exercising their 
underground water rights that do not actually meet the requirement of the definition of 
‘underground water’. As stated by Brockett, ‘The potential for any long term, material 
environmental impacts to be felt long after the CSG industry has come and gone and the 
relevant proponents have exited, is that any potential remediation costs may fall on the public 
purse. This issue deserves greater attention from regulators’.
347
 There has been substantial 
analysis of the issue of hydraulic fracturing and its impact on underground water, however, 
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The Minister for Natural Resources and Mines has the ability to declare any land as excluded 
land under the PGPSA,
349
 however, the legislation does not specify certain categories of land 
(such as land near water sources or residences) to be excluded (as is the case with the MRA 
Act). Owners of land have limited rights of objection under the PGPSA.
350
 There is no 
general right to object to the grant of a tenement as is the case under the MRA Act.
351
 An 
owner of land may, however, require an authorised officer of the Minister to call a conference 
for the purposes of discussing any concerns they have in relation to any actual or proposed 
activities conducted on their land.
352
 Continuous reforms to the petroleum regulatory 
framework related to water in Queensland has resulted in the complex framework, whereby 
the PGPSA permits petroleum tenement holders to exercise their underground water rights, 
which are exempt from complying with water licensing requirements under the WA. 
However, a petroleum license holder must comply with scientific requirements set out in ch 3 




The adaptive management regulatory approach has created the position of multi-layered 
duties on UGR titleholders alongside obligations to compensate landholders and ‘make good’ 
any harm caused. However, the amendments to the WA do not operate and apply to UGR 
operations retrospectively, attracting criticism as ‘an afterthought’ as the amendments were 
introduced once the State’s three largest UGR projects were approved in 2012.
354
 
One of the most critical issues of UGR activities impacting agricultural land uses is the 
impact of UGR extraction on water resources. The issues identified in the Murray-Darling 
Report acknowledge the potential impact of UGR on groundwater reserves, particularly on 
local acquirers within the GAB network.
355
 This is of critical importance, given the reliance 
by agricultural landholders on surface and groundwater systems and the fact that much of the 
land where UGR occurs is located in agricultural land used for cropping and grazing. In 
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recognising this issue, the Queensland Government enacted the OGIA, governed by the WA, 
in regulating the use of water during UGR activities.
356
 Additionally, Queensland has also 
needed to address concerns relating to water produced from CSG activities. The processing of 
produced water (often called associated water or CSG water) is regulated under s 111A of the 
PGPSA, inserted in amendments in 2012 in response to farmer concerns.
357
 The produced 
water is treated to remove salts and other chemicals and then disposed of. Such disposal relies 
on the beneficial use of the water extracted, since it cannot be reinjected into the producing 
formation. 
The impact of UGR on water, the possibility of contamination and the constant threat of 
drought conditions is a constant and frequent source of concern to agricultural landowners 
who rely on quality water sources for agricultural production. Despite reports and legislative 
reviews of the UGR sector in Queensland, the OGIA has not yet embraced innovative 
monitoring techniques or widened its scope to incorporate the latest water monitoring 
technologies to assist in meeting landowner concerns. The Queensland Competition Authority 
recognises that the regulatory framework for UGR water is complex and that there is: 
significant scope to streamline and remove duplication in arrangements relating to 
public drinking water, waste tracking and for the assessment of bores affected by 
CSG water extraction. Consideration should also be given to consolidation of the 
regulation of CSG water into a single portfolio to enhance synergies between the 
various areas of government with expertise in CSG water regulation.
358
 
Therefore, the PGPSA and WA regulation of water in the UGR sector arguably falls short of 
achieving policy objectives of promoting an effective petroleum sector and maximising the 
sector’s potential due to burdensome, rigid, unclear and complex regulations. 
A report by John Crippen and Berger estimates that CSG water produced during peak 
production from 2018 to 2024 will vary from 140 GL/y to 300 GL/y.
359
 In response to public 
concern over UGR, recent amendments to the WA have focused on protecting the rights of 
directly impacted bore users through mitigation of immediate and longer-term impacts on 
individual farmers. Specifically, management mechanisms require UGR companies to 
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<https://www.business.qld.gov.au/industries/mining-energy-water/resources/land-environment/ogia>. 
357 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 111A. 
358 Queensland Competition Authority (Qld), Final Report: Coal Seam Gas Review (January 2014) 
<http://www.qca.org.au/getattachment/aaaeab4b-519f-4a95-8a65-911bc46cc1d3/CSG-investigation.aspx> 58. 
359 John Crippen Berger Ltd. 2012. ‘Forecasting Coal Seam Gas Water Production in Queensland’s Surat and 
Southern Bowen Basins: Technical Report.’ Prepared for State of Queensland (Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines). 
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monitor and assess the impact of the exercise of underground water rights on water bores; 
enter into ‘make good’ agreements with the owners of the bores; and prepare underground 
water impact reports, if required, that establish underground water obligations, including 
obligations to monitor and manage impacts on aquifers and springs.
360
 Therefore, where the 
UGR activity has created an impact on the acquirer, the UGR license holder must: 
i) monitor and assess the impact of the exercise of the underground water rights pursuant 
to s 185 of the PGPSA 
ii) enter into a make good agreement with the landholder, which may include deepening a 
pump, deepening a well, increasing the size of a well pump, drilling a new bore into a 
different aquifer, supplying water from a different location, or entering into an 
arrangement for financial compensation pursuant to s 409 of the WA. 
Significantly, the rights of bore users only come into play after the grant of a petroleum 
authority and the commencement of mining. Rights given to landholders relate to negotiating 
land access with the miners and to compensation (not related to water) that many regard as 
not commensurate with the damage to the farming enterprise or to their land or to the 
inconvenience that they suffer, although some farmers report substantial compensation.
361
 
Even if the monetary compensation were made more substantial, arguably it would still relate 
only to impacts suffered by individuals and not to the community. 
The Queensland Energy and Water Ombudsman is a broad dispute resolution mechanism for 
landholder complaints which regulates a number of energy commodities (electricity, gas and 
water) rather than being specifically dedicated to petroleum.
362
 The ombudsman investigates 
and resolves disputes involving consumer contracts with energy and water supplies. Due to 
the recognition of the ombudsman acting as a consumer-based dispute body, rather than a 
body dedicated to direct the relationship between landholders and resource companies, 
Agforce (Queensland’s peak agricultural body) stated in its submission to the GC Review: 
AgForce is of the view that the most effective role for the GFC is to engage with 
[broader] rural communities, industry, Government and business rather that resolve 
individual landholder disputes and complaints. Thus reiterating our view that an 
                                                 
360 Water Act 2000 (Qld), Pt 5.  
361 Tan, George and Comino, above n 77, 682. 
362 Energy and Water Ombudsman, Home Page (2017) <http://www.ewoq.com.au>.  
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independent arbitrary body is better suited to fulfil this position and supported by the 
existing functions of the GFC at a [broader] level.363 
The CSG Compliance Unit and the OGIA provide two additional oversight bodies aimed at 
being ‘one stop shops’
364
 for all enquiries and complaints relating to CSG. The CSG 
Compliance Unit may issue penalty infringement notices for breaches of the mandatory 
provisions of the LAC administered by the PGPSA. The OGIA is funded by an onshore gas 
industry levy and provides corporate and administrative support in overseeing the 
groundwater impacts of petroleum and gas industries. Due to the number of CSG companies 
and projects operating in the Surat and southern Bowen areas, a cumulative management area 
has been declared under ch 3 of the WA. Consequently, the OGIA is responsible for 
production of the Underground Water Impact Report for the Surat and southern Bowen 
cumulative management area. The Report’s models offer water usage predictions and are a 
tool to manage the impacts of underground water extraction by CSG companies. It also 
assigns responsibility to petroleum tenure holders and ensures measures and programs are in 
place to respond to impacts on underground water. 
In comparison, water use by resource companies in British Columbia is controlled by the 
OGC and the OGAA. The OGC’s ability to make regulations in respect of groundwater is 
found in s 2 of the OGAA: 
(2) The Lieutenant Governor in Council may make regulations authorizing the 
minister responsible for administering the Water Sustainability Act 
(a) to establish, for the purposes of paragraph (c), a designated watershed or portion 
of a watershed, in accordance with regulations, if any, respecting the classification 
of watersheds made under section 103 (3) (b), 
(b) to identify, for the purposes of paragraph (c), either or both of the following: 
(i) an aquifer, in accordance with regulations, if any, respecting the classification of 
aquifers made under section 103 (3) (c); 
(ii) a groundwater recharge area, and 
(c) to establish, for the purposes of section 36 (1), an environmental measure in 
relation to paragraphs (a) and (b). 
                                                 
363 Scott, above n 212, 58. 
364 Ibid, 6.  
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In accessing groundwater, a Water Sustainability Act
365
 authorisation for the water use is 
required immediately.
366
 Oil and gas operators obtain a water licence from the OGC and 
approval for from the landholder is needed for access to the private land. 
The OGC is therefore designated as Regional Water Managers and Assistant Regional Water 
Managers by the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource 
Operations, with the authority to administer the Water Sustainability Act
367
 in regards to water 
licensing for the oil and gas sector. Mandatory licensing and approvals enable the OGC to 
monitor and track water consumption and withdrawal locations, thereby bettering sustainable 
water management. The OGC Water Licensing Regulations states the following objective: 
Efficient and equitable access to Crown water resources to support sound 
development of the oil and gas sector, in a manner ensuring environmental 




A water licence is commonly used as authority to access water for activities exceeding a two 
year period. These activities will include well drilling and well completions over a number of 
years in a lease area, road maintenance or winter access requirements, or establishing 
permanent water infrastructure (e.g., a pipeline) as part of a water supply strategy. Water 
license rights are granted under s 7 of the Water Sustainability Act
369
 in relation to UGR 
operators. These rights are predominantly to divert and beneficially use the quantity of water 
specified in the licence; store water; construct, maintain and operate the works authorised by 
the licence and related works necessarily required for the proper diversion or use of the water 
or the power produced from the water; make changes in and about a stream necessary for the 
construction, maintenance or operation of the works referred to above; or to otherwise 
facilitate the authorised diversion.
370
 
Water licences associated with oil and gas or related activities will generally be issued with 
terms of 5 to 20 years. Where activities associated with a water licence are to be carried out 
on private land, such as pumps or access roads, applicants are encouraged to develop a surface 
agreement with the land owner. A surface agreement is not required to be submitted with the 
                                                 
365 SBC 2014, c 15. 
366 Oil and Gas Activities Act, SBC 2008, c 36, s 32. 
367 SBC 2014, c 15. 
368 British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, Water License Application Manual (2016) 
<http://www.bcogc.ca/node/11009/download>.  
369 SBC 2014, c 15. 
370 British Columbia Oil and Gas Commission, above n 369, 9. 
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application, but may be requested by the Regional Water Manager. In cases where a surface 
agreement with the private land owner cannot be developed, applicants contact the OGC. 
The ‘make good’ arrangements, water and energy ombudsman and the multiple compliant 
units which comprise the land use regulatory framework are arguably unique to Queensland. 
The delay costs arising from this complex land use oversight regime may reduce the 
profitability for all participants and the sector’s ability to claim a ‘social licence to operate’ as 
the basis of fair and equitable conduct. This means the current land use regime operates at 
cross-purposes in terms of the GC objective of obtaining coexistence between competing 
interests. This has led to the Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission recommending 
a refocus on the functions of the GC to a more strategic level in becoming ‘the trusted advisor 




4.8 Conclusion: Which System of Regulation has the Capacity to Implement 
Queensland’s Coexistence Objectives? 
This chapter argues that much UGR activity in Queensland is taking place in a context of 
regulatory failure. It has been demonstrated that the regulatory regime serves to stimulate and 
drive the economic value of the energy sector, often at the expense of the private interests and 
concerns of agricultural landowners. Queensland’s prime agricultural sectors in the Bowen 
and Surat Basins have witnessed an unprecedented growth in exploration which has created 
uncertainty and resulted in frequent complaints from agricultural landowners. The limited 
opportunities to seek landholder redress, the perception of environmental damage to land and 
underground aquifers and the perceived lack of government oversight has become the popular 
perception of UGR operation. This has led to CSG moratoriums in other Australian states. For 
example, other Australian states have also sought to implement provisions to allow the 
exclusion of highly productive lands from UGR exploration. In Victoria, landholders may 
apply to the minister for Resources to have agricultural land excised from a license where the 
economic benefit of the land for agricultural purposes is greater than the work proposed in the 
licence.
372
 Today, Queensland uses the GC as an advisory body with limited powers to 
                                                 
371 Scott, above n 212, 5. Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 (Vic) s 26B(1). 
372 Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 (Vic) s 26B(1): 
    (1)     On the application of an owner or occupier of agricultural land, the Minister must excise the land from the 
area covered by a mining licence or prospecting licence if— 
        (a)     the licensee consents to the excision; or 
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administer and manage coexistence between agricultural and energy land uses, its two 
dominant economic sectors. 
Effective principles-based regulation provides a transparent and streamlined approach to 
promoting coexistence of UGR activities on agricultural lands in British Columbia. For over 
40 years, British Columbia has focused on implementing its policy of developing its UGR 
resources while providing strong regulatory oversight and protection mechanisms in a 
specialised agricultural land protection administrative body and tribunal. While the system 
may face further challenges as UGR exploration ramps up to meet global demand, the 
framework to manage coexistence is already in place. British Columbia awards UGR approval 
on ALR lands under a discretional system while stipulating approval conditions within the 
ALR – OGC Delegation Agreement. This objective principles-based discretionary system 
serves to facilitates a collaborative relationship between agricultural and energy land use. It 
also supports the development of UGR, without disadvantaging agriculture and the 
communities who farm the land. 
The continued growth and development of the energy sector in both jurisdictions is 
undisputed. Both the Queensland and British Columbian Governments have demonstrated 
interest in pursuing a robust export industry for UGR. The similarities in attempting to 
balance land uses of petroleum and agriculture are found within their respective land use 
regimes. The role of the state in mediating between two sectors or privileging one above the 
other calls into question how the state manages these conflicts in the public interest. 
In Queensland, an individual landholder must commence proceedings to have a UGR activity 
on their agricultural land reviewed. The landholder must prove their case in Queensland with 
their own resources and the onus of appellate proceedings in contesting a RIDA approval for 
UGR activities. The advisory body of the GC does not have a strong history of defending 
individual landholders and its independence and effectiveness has been called into question in 
2016 with the ordering of its independent review. In British Columbia, there are clear 
                                                                                                                                                        
        (b)     the Minister decides, in accordance with section 26D, that there would be greater economic benefit to 
Victoria in continuing the use of the land as agricultural land than in carrying out the work proposed to be 
carried out on that land under the licence. 
    (2)     An application for excision must be made to the Minister in writing within 30 days after 
the owner or occupier receives a copy of the statement of economic significance provided in relation to the 
land. 
Note that coal seam gas activities are regulated by the Mineral Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 
(Vic) s 4. 
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regulatory avenues for dispute resolution to take place well before an individual case arises. 
Whereas in Queensland, the State has abrogated its responsibility to the level of the individual 
landholder and distanced itself from the role of active ‘watchdog’ in managing land use 
coexistence between the two sectors. 
In British Columbia, the State’s role is to arbitrate between the two land uses and the 
administrative regulatory bodies look at the value of both sectors and make a determination at 
the agency level rather than at the individual level. The legislative paradigm that underpins its 
role as either as advisor ‘at arms-length’ or to seek to assist those who are affected by the 
UGR industry in regulating the approvals of UGR activities on ALR lands. In Chapter 5, 
further evidence of Queensland’s abrogation of State responsibility and regulation of 
coexistence is examined through an analysis of the CCA land access regime. 
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CHAPTER 5: REGULATING LAND ACCESS CONFLICT 
5.1 Introduction 
A significant issue in the regulation of UG extraction is the impact of the use of land for 
resource activities. As explored in Chapter 2, the most effective regulatory approach to 
manage competing interests is based on principles of flexibility. This includes a set of 
regulatory principles that are accessible and easily applied to the management of UG activities 
on agricultural land. 
Queensland’s land access regime provides the statutory and policy framework for accessing 
private land to undertake resource activities and to compensate for associated impacts. The 
PGPSA introduced a LAF with the specific aim of reducing land and resource conflicts with 
landholders directly associated with the expansion of UG exploitation and effectively creating 
coexistence in interests. This chapter considers whether the current land access regulatory 
framework for the regulation of UG extraction in Queensland is effective in meeting this 
objective. In considering this question, this chapter also examines whether any alternative 
regulatory tools or approaches exist to effectively manage multiple interests when developing 
UG on agricultural land. 
The main issue addressed in this chapter is the role of state control in the regulation of land 
access arrangements. In 2016, Queensland enacted a new land access legislative structure 
under the MERCPA. The MERCPA is the most recent legislative instrument to be introduced 
by the State to encompass resource extraction activities. The impetus to create the MERCPA 
is based on the requirement for a single unified Act to consolidate regulatory functions 
common to each of the Resource Acts (minerals, petroleum, geothermal energy and carbon 
capture and storage) and to provide common processes that apply to all resource titles, 
including administering and regulating compensation and land access agreements. 
The effectiveness of this regulatory regime is measured against the continuing goal of the 
Queensland Government to support the resource sector by consolidating the Acts covering the 
minerals and coal, petroleum and gas, geothermal, and greenhouse gas storage sectors. In 
analysing the effectiveness of government regulation in the management of land access and 
compensation agreements for UG extraction, this chapter considers the divergence between 
regulation and landholder requirements while proposing collectivisation of landholders’ 
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interests as a potential alternative regulatory tool and mechanism in negotiating and reaching 
UGR land access agreements. 
5.2 Regulation of Land Access as a Tool to Managing Conflicting Interests 
The extraction of UGR requires access to land for long periods of time, usually between 10–
20 years.
1
 This access is required for many purposes, including geological and seismic 
surveying and assessment and data collection to confirm the extent of the resource. Land 
access is a fundamental component of UGR regulation, since access is required for the 
purpose of boring wells and the establishment of equipment and plants to secure the 
extraction of UGR, creating a burden on the landholder.
2
 
When a state develops its petroleum resources, it grants a petroleum lease or license, as an 
authorisation regulatory tool, to a titleholder and UGR activities begin on a property.
3
 
Petroleum titles are, therefore, granted over privately held freehold land and may create 
conflicting interests with the private fee simple landholder by legislating the preliminary 
negotiation and subsequent appellate process for land agreements. Often, in Queensland, the 
Crown grants leases over land which operates as an agricultural businesses for the 
landholder.
4
 This creates the potential for conflicts regarding land access, since agricultural 




The rights between parties, particularly of the private landowner, are only partly defined by 
the legislation, which allows parties flexibility to add their own terms in ancillary agreements 
which purport to bind the landholders.
6
 These land access agreements may be classified as 
authorisation regulatory tools, acting as permits and certification to commence UG activities 
in Queensland. The statutory provisions, which on face value give extended effect to 
agreements between the landowner and third parties, can interact in complex ways creating 
inadequately drafted compensation agreements that may be difficult to interpret for 
landholders, or have unintended effects. 
                                                 
1 Debra Kaden and Tracie Rose, Environmental and Health Issues in Unconventional Oil and Gas Development 
(Elsevier, 2015). 
2 Maria Mastalerz, Miryam, Glikson and Suzanne Golding, Coalbed Methane: Scientific, Environmental and 
Economic Evaluation (Springer, 2015). 
3 As regulated by the PGPSA in Queensland and PNGA in British Columbia. 
4 Agricultural communities are located above the Surat Unconventional Gas Basin, such as the Darling Downs 
Region as examined within Chapters three and four of this thesis. 
5 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 83. 
6 As regulated by the MERCPA and Land Access Code 2016 (Qld). 
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The question of regulation for land access agreements and landholder negotiation and 
compensation has been considered by a number of petroleum-producing jurisdictions, 
including Australia, Canada
7
 and the US.
8
 However, the question arises as to whether the 
method of regulating land access agreements should be rule-based and heavily regulated, or 
principles-based and collaborative, potentially allowing multiple landholders to negotiate a 
collective land access agreement. This question is particularly pertinent and important for 
Queensland, which has undertaken reviews of its land access regulation since the introduction 
of the LAF in 2010
9
 and its review in 2012 by the Land Access Implementation Committee 
Report.
10
 The reviews have been prompted, in part, by criticism from the agricultural 
communities in regions affected by UG extraction, including the Darling Downs. As explored 
in Chapter 3, the ownership of UG lies with the State in Queensland. However, once the State 
has granted a petroleum lease and the petroleum titleholder commences advanced petroleum 
activities on private fee simple or freehold land, the petroleum titleholder must negotiate a 
land access agreement via a CCA, opt-out agreement or deferral agreement to gain access to 
land for petroleum production and exploration activities. 
When establishing a regulatory framework for the exploitation of UGR, the state, as the 
petroleum regulator, must determine the optimal method of permitting UGR activities on 
agricultural land while protecting agricultural land sustainability and landholder interests. 
This gives rise to another issue that must be considered, the optimum level of protection for 
landholders when negotiating land access agreements. The challenge then, for regulators, is to 
create effective regulation with enough objectiveness and applicability to changing 
circumstances to allow petroleum titleholders to define land access compensation in a 
transparent system that balances the value of the economic gain in extracting UGR resources 
and the protection of landowner interests.
11
 
                                                 
7 Jed Chong and Milana Simikian, Shale Gas in Canada: Resource Potential, Current Production and Economic 
Implications (Library of Parliament, 2014). Kathryn Garvie and Karena Shae, ‘Oil and Gas Consultation and 
Shale Gas Development in British Columbia’ (2015) 184 BC Studies 73. 
8 Daniel J. Soeder, Unconventional: Natural Gas Development from Marcellus Shale (Geological Society of 
America, 2017). 
9 The Land Access Framework currently consists of the Land Access Code 2016 (Qld); the Regional Planning 
Interests Act 2014 (Qld); Gasfields Commission Act 2014 (Qld) and provisions of the Petroleum and Gas 
Production and Safety Act 2004 (Qld) and the Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 
2014 (Qld). 
10 Land Access Review Panel, Land Access Framework—12 Month Review Report of the Land Access Review 
Panel (Queensland Parliament, February 2012) 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2012/5412T341.pdf>. 
11 Jostein Aarrestad, ‘Resource Extraction, Financial Transaction and Compensation in an Open Economy’ (1979) 
81(4) Scandinavian Journal of Economics 552. 
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Land access negotiations and contractual arrangements between petroleum titleholders and 
landholders have been consistently complex and a pressing regulatory issue for Queensland 
since the commencement of UGR activities in the early 2000s. The management and 
regulation of the conflicting interests of UGR and agriculture was recently highlighted in the 
Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission: 
Landholders expressed an overwhelming sense of powerlessness from the perceived 
imbalance in the land access framework and their inability to afford the legal and 
technical expertise necessary to understand the impacts on their land from CSG 




Therefore, land access agreement regulation and state intervention is justified to promote 
public policy objectives of information transparency and allocation of costs, as noted by 
Boulle et al.
13
 The question of petroleum exploration that arises in relation to land access is 
what is an effective regulatory tool and framework for the exploitation of petroleum to 
effectively manage landholder interests to ensure wealth generation while managing the social 
impact and interests of Queensland’s agricultural landholders? 
Landholders in Queensland are subject to State and provincial petroleum exploration 
regulation requiring access to State-owned UGR in private land. This is due to petroleum 
leases not creating an interest in land, but being classified as personal property in the common 
law Torrens title system of property, as explored in Chapter 3. As a fee simple landholder is 
able to control access onto their property, a breach is considered a tortious trespass. Therefore, 
an unauthorised entry onto a person’s property requires statutory protection and leasing for 
the proponent. As stated by Boulle et al: 
Petroleum statutes generally provide for compensation rights for owners of land 
including occupiers and fee simple owners of land in relation to the activities of 
titleholders on private land.
14
 
                                                 
12Robert P. Scott, Independent Review of the Gasfields Commission Queensland and Other Associated Matters 
(2016) 6. 
13 Laurence Boulle, Tina Hunter, Michael Weir and Katherine Curnow, ‘Negotiating Conduct and Compensation 
Agreements for Coal Seam Gas Operations: Developing the Queensland Regulatory Framework’ (2014) 17(1) 
The Australasian Journal of Natural Resources Law and Policy 43, 43. 
14 Ibid.  
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5.3 Landholder Negotiation and Compensation Agreements 
The current regime for resource development in Queensland is one particular example of the 
use of statutory land access agreements. According to s 27(2) of the PGPSA, the State 
reserves an exclusive right to enter and carry out any petroleum-related activity or to authorise 
others to carry out a petroleum-related activity over land which, immediately prior to the 
resource title being issued, was owned by the state. Significantly, this statutory reservation 
allows the State to authorise others to carry out a petroleum activity, but does not expressly 
reserve any right for the State to authorise others to enter private land for any non-petroleum 
activity. The State reservation of petroleum resources creates potential conflicts regarding 
land access, as private landholders must negotiate access and compensation agreements with 
petroleum titleholders. 
As previously examined in Chapter 3, differing regulatory processes exist in Queensland for 
preliminary activities and advanced activities. Preliminary activities are those involving little 
or no direct impact, such as walking on land, surveying the property or taking soil samples.
15
 
The most pertinent point here is that there is no obligation to obtain the landholder’s consent 
before preliminary activities can be undertaken and a titleholder is able to enter the land once 
the 10 business days have lapsed. 
The requirement for entry notices
16
 was upheld in O’Connor v Arrow (Daandine) Pty Ltd,
17
 
where the Supreme Court of Queensland confirmed that entry onto land was unlawful and the 
construction of a pipeline was restrained until a valid entry notice was served.
18
 Therefore, an 
agricultural landholder must continue to operate a business while preliminary activities take 
place on their lands, without recourse to compensation or an appeal to modify the terms of the 
entry notice conditions.
19
 However, an authorised activity carried out on the land that is less 
                                                 
15 Pursuant to sch 2 of the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld), a ‘preliminary activity’ 
means an ‘authorised activity that will have no impact, or only a minor impact, on the business or land use 
activities of any owner or occupier of the land on which the activity is to be carried out’. Examples of 
preliminary activities are: ‘walking the area of the permit or licence, driving along an existing road or track in 
the area, taking soil or water samples, geophysical surveying not involving site preparation, aerial, electrical 
or environmental surveying and survey pegging’. 
16 As regulated by the Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) div 2. 
17O’Connor v Arrow (Daandine) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 432. 
18O’Connor v Arrow (Daandine) Pty Ltd [2009] QSC 432, 48. 
19 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2. 
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than 100 ha and used for intensive farming or broadacre agriculture
20
 is classified as an 
advanced activity and may be entitled to compensation. 
It is noted this carve-out does not apply to large agricultural properties over 100 ha, which 
remain classified as preliminary activities and do not require compensation. Further, an entry 
notice is not needed for the commencement of preliminary activities if the entry is authorised 
under the PGPSA for a resource authority, such as a petroleum authority to prospect or a CCA 
pursuant to the MERCPA which provides alternative obligations for entry or an opt-out 
agreement has already been entered into between parties. 
By contrast, an advanced activity includes an authorised activity for the authority other than a 
preliminary activity which includes, for example, levelling of drilling pads and digging sumps 
and earthworks associated with pipeline installation.
21
 Before a petroleum titleholder can 
commence advanced activities on private land in Queensland, a petroleum titleholder must 
enter into a statutory agreement regarding access. Entering into a land access agreement is 
crucial for all parties as it promotes negotiation and discussion and, if effectively regulated, 
manages the potential for conflicting interests as it ensures that the parties have a coordinated 
the framework for land access. 
A land access agreement seeks to outline how and when the land contained within the 
authority to prospect and under an exploration permit is to be accessed and how authorised 
activities are to be conducted and include provisions articulating the particulars of any access 
agreement. Therefore, the primary purpose of a land access agreement is to address the 
compensation liability of the affected landholder and define the agreed basis for 
compensation. There is no express restriction on the matters that may be included in a land 
access agreement, although its terms must not be inconsistent with the PGPSA and the 
mandatory provisions of the LAC. 
                                                 
20 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2 provides the example of ;and used for dryland 
or irrigated cropping, plantation forestry or horticulture or a dairy, cattle or sheep feedlot, puffery or poultry 
farm as broadacre agriculture.  
21 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2 provides the following examples of Advanced 
Activities:  
•levelling of drilling pads and digging sumps 
•earthworks associated with pipeline installation 
•vegetation clear-felling 
•constructing an exploration camp, concrete pad, sewage or water treatment facility or fuel dump 
•geophysical surveying with physical clearing 
•carrying out a seismic survey using explosives 
•constructing a track or access road 
•changing a fence line. 
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In 2010, the Queensland Government created the LAF, aiming to ‘foster improved 
relationships between the agriculture and resources sectors to set out consistent processes that 
are clear, fair and reasonable for all parties’.
22
 The authority to enter into private land, for a 
specified purpose such as for UGR exploration activities, is primarily managed through CCAs 
for advanced activities as defined in the PGPSA, MERCPA and LAF. The outlined policy 
objectives of the 2010 LAF included facilitation of improved relations between resource 
companies and landholders; providing a consistent, transparent and equitable process to 
facilitate access to private land for resource exploration and development; and defining a clear 
and consistent process to negotiate agreed terms for conduct of resource activities and 
compensation.
23
 Key features of the LAF included: 
 a requirement that all resource authority holders (RAHs) must comply with a single 
Land Access Code 
 an entry notice requirement for ‘preliminary activities’ (i.e., those that will have no or 
only a minor impact on landholders) 
 a requirement that, subject to certain exemptions, a CCA be negotiated before a RAH 
comes onto a landholder’s property to undertake ‘advanced activities’ (i.e., those likely to 
have a significant impact on a landholder’s business or land use).
24
 
The Land Access Review Panel reviewed the LAF in 2011 and delivered its findings in 2012 
and 2014, finding the framework had ‘not achieved its policy objectives to the extent 
anticipated’
25
 due to the complexity, conduct, compensation and diversity in land use and 
resource activities. Following the review, a Six Point Action Plan was established with 
regulatory priority actions established for the Queensland Government. The primary 
recommendations were 1) to review of heads of compensation in CCAs, 2) the Land Court 
jurisdiction to be expanded to review CCAs, and 3) allowing parties to opt-out of the LAF.
26
 
The terms of the opt-out agreement are discussed later in this chapter. 
                                                 
22 Queensland Government, Guide to Queensland’s New Land Access Laws (2010) 
<http://www.fof.org.au/uploads/media/landaccessguide_Nov2010.pdf>.  
23 Land Access Review Panel, Land Access Framework—12 Month Review Report of the Land Access Review 
Panel (Queensland Parliament, February 2012) 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2012/5412T341.pdf>. 





In 2013, the Land Access Implementation Committee delivered a subsequent report on the 
progress of the implementation of the Six Point Application Plan. The report did not iterate 
any substantial changes to the land access regime, rather, it focused on assessing the LAF and 
its effectiveness. After revising the recommendation to review the heads of compensation in 
CCAs, the Committee elected not to review the heads of compensation as planned, but as 
‘landholder/resource authority holder negotiating practice is evolving naturally…the 
Committee argues it would not be prudent for the government to intervene to further legislate 
heads of compensation’.
27
 It did, however, recommend education programs for all parties and 
greater transparency in the market to better inform the position of landholders in negotiating 
CCAs and balance negotiation power. It is noted that there was no guidance on what 
constitutes an ‘education program’ or a specific definition of ‘greater transparency in the 
market’. Hence, the LAF was general in nature and did not address the specific challenges 
Queensland landholders face when negotiating a land access agreement. 
Secondly, in 2013, legislative changes were not expanded to include extended powers for the 
Land Court to make determination on matters relating to conduct and negotiations of CCAs. 
At this point, this was seen as a recommendation that would still require review. Thirdly, the 
opt-out policy allowing both parties, at the election of the landholder, to opt-out of a CCA 
was not yet in effect, but was planned as a legislative enactment and to ensure mandatory 
LAC provisions would still apply in this circumstance to avoid ‘regulatory short cuts’.
28
 The 
recommendations of the Committee, while providing certainty in some areas, raised further 
questions which were marked for further consideration, if and when the Government chose to 
implement some or all of those recommendations. Therefore, the report did not recommend a 
fundamental shift in the law relating to negotiation processes and successive State 
Government administrations have been slow to implement recommendations. 
For example, the Guide to Land Access, released in 2016, implemented some of the 
recommendations of the Committee’s recommendations, six years after the creation of the 
LAF. Along with the release of the guide was the enactment and operation of the MERCPA 
(operational from September 2016). Previously, CCAs were regulated by the individual 
resource Act applicable to the activity—for petroleum activities this was the PGPSA. The 
MERCPA was enacted to create an amalgamation and standardisation of a single framework 
                                                 
27 Land Access Implementation Committee, Parliament of Queensland, Land Access Implementation Committee 
Report (30 August 2013) 
<http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/Documents/TableOffice/TabledPapers/2014/5414T5893.pdf> 2. 
28 Ibid, 6. 
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regulating previous land access provisions and CCA regulations. The MERCPA requires that 
it should be read and interpreted in conjunction with the relevant resource Act, in this context 
the PGPSA.
29
 The MERCPA also makes broad amendments to key areas of the current 
resources legislation including: 
 changes to the land access regime for resource authorities, including the restricted land 
regime 
 a new overlapping coal and CSG tenure framework (Overlapping Tenement Regime) 
 standardisation of provisions relating to dealings, caveats and associated agreements. 
As the MERCPA has been operational for just over a year, it is not possible to ascertain how 
the PGPSA and MERCPA will work alongside each other in the face of inconsistent or 
overlapping regulations of CCAs. As recognised by Weir, ‘Until that issue is resolved the 
unfortunate position appears to be that reference to both acts is required to determine when 
compliance with the PGPSA is impossible or if both statutes need to be satisfied’.
30
 
The primary purpose of the MERCPA is to implement the 2012 LAF recommendations to 
expand the Land Court’s jurisdiction over CCAs and enact opt-out agreements as an 
alternative to CCAs to improve the private land access framework.
31
 The effectiveness of 
MERCPA and the recommended reforms provide the opportunity to measure the Queensland 
Government’s policy goal of ‘establishing greater certainty through the reduction of the 




Pursuant to s 45 of the MERCPA, the introduction of opt-out agreements is intended to 
provide greater flexibility in the management of relationships between landholders and RAHs, 
particularly in situations where parties already have an existing relationship. Further, the 
MERCPA allows for the creation of deferral agreements which allows the parties to defer the 
creation of a CCA until a later date as agreed by the parties and after the resource company 
has accessed the land to undertake advanced activities. This provision has not as yet been 
tested through litigation, but the intent is clear. Allowing petroleum titleholders to defer 
creation of a CCA appears to create greater uncertainty for landholders and gives permission 
                                                 
29 Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 6. 
30 Michael Weir, ‘Granting of Shale Gas Licenes, Land Access and Property Rights in Australia’, in Tina Hunter, 
Handbook of Shale Gas Law and Policy (Intersentia, 2016) 149. 
31 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum (2014), 2. 
32 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Bill 2014, Explanatory Memorandum (2014), 1. 
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to titleholders to continue activities without the protection of an agreed set of conditions to 
access land and compensation to landholders. Further, there is provision for an access 
agreement to allow access by a titleholder to land outside the petroleum authority to access 
petroleum authority land.
33
 This may impact landholders’ access to their lands, if it is deemed 
that the land in question is required to maintain access to UGR. 
An opt-out agreement provides an alternative to entering into a CCA or a Deferral Agreement. 
It is a legally binding arrangement between a landholder and resource company where the 
landholder agrees to opt-out of negotiating a CCA.
34
 However, a resource company is exempt 
from 10 day entry notice requirements where a landholder and the resource company have 
entered into an opt-out agreement or CCA and there is no statutory negotiation process or 
dispute resolution process, as the Land Court will not be able to examine the issue of 
compensation liability.
35
 Given these provisions, a CCA is arguably the preferable option to 
the opt-out agreement process which is not subject to any review, determination or appeal 
mechanism by the Land Court. 
As examined above, the MERCPA establishes separate processes for resource companies to 
obtain access to land depending on the nature of the planned activities. In contrast to access to 
land for preliminary activities, the PGPSA, LAC and MERCPA place greater obligations on 
petroleum companies before access may be obtained for advanced activity. Advanced 
activities, as previously examined, are authorised activities with significant impact on the 
business or land use activities of any owner or occupier of the land on which the activity is to 
be carried out.
36
 The parties are obliged to negotiate an access agreement with an owner or 
occupier within 20 business days. If an owner or occupier has not made an access agreement 
within 20 business days, the owner or occupier is taken to have refused the agreement. An 
owner or occupier must not, however, ‘unreasonably refuse’ to make an access agreement.
37
 
This is ill-defined in the Act and is yet to be tested. A person also may not enter into private 
land to carry out an advanced activity for a resource authority, unless each owner and 
occupier holds a CCA, deferral agreement or opt-out agreement.
38
 
                                                 
33 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) ss 502-536. 
34Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 45. 
35Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 45. 
36 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) sch 2. 
37 Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 48. 
38 Mineral and Energy Resource (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 43. 
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Before negotiations commence in relation to a CCA, the PGPSA requires that notice of 
negotiations be given to the parties, comprising the petroleum titleholder and the eligible 
compensation claimant. Negotiation of a CCA consists of three distinct stages. First, the 
negotiation of a CCA between a RAH and landholder commences as regulated by the LAC by 
serving a notice of intention to negotiation for a minimum of 20 business days. Second, if the 
agreement of a CCA cannot be reached, a conference held by the Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines may be held for alternative dispute resolution (ADR) by an 
appropriately qualified person independent of the State.
39
 Finally, the parties may apply to the 
Land Court for determination as to compensation and CCA terms.
40
 
The MERCPA duplicates the previous s 502 of the PGPSA in distinguishing between private 
land within the area of petroleum authority as ‘authority land’ and private land outside of the 
petroleum authority area that a petroleum titleholder may reasonable need to cross over to 
enter the authority land as ‘access land’ according to a resource authority. ‘Access rights’ over 
‘access land’ include the right to cross the access land if it is reasonably necessary to allow 
the titleholder to enter the authorised area and carry out activities on the that land, if the 
occupier of the land has agreed orally and in writing to the exercise of the rights.
41
 According 
to s 48 of the MERCP, an owner or occupier of access land must not, if asked by a RAH, 
‘unreasonably refuse’ to make an access agreement with the holder. Further, if an owner or 
occupier has not made an access agreement within 20 business days after being asked to make 




A RAH landholder must ‘use all reasonable endeavours to negotiate’ a CCA or a Deferral 
Agreement with each owner and occupier of private or public land on which UGR activities 
are proposed to be carried out or are being carried out.
43
 ‘Reasonable endeavours’ is not 
defined in the MERCPA and, as such, there is no defined legal review relating to the 
requirement to manage the issues that may inevitably arise in negotiation. For example, 
‘reasonable’ to an agricultural landholder may suggest that the negotiation takes into 
consideration the ‘dignity and input of generations into the family farm’.
44
 These issues are 
                                                 
39 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 734C. 
40 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 983.   
41 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 47. 
42 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 48(3). 
43 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 85. This standard has been taken from 
the previous s 153 of the Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld). 
44 Boulle, et.al, above n 13, 74. 
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intangible and not within the remit of the current MERCPA and there is no test of 
‘reasonableness’ that can assist in defining what is meant by this term. The Select Committee 
on Unconventional Gas Mining is critical of this broad standard and Queensland’s LAF in 
stating it ‘not only highlights the lack of power and support landholders feel in relation to land 
access, it also indicates the overall level of complexity associated with land access involving 
unconventional gas mining’.
45
 The LAC refers to ‘good faith’ negotiations when entering a 
land access agreement.
46
 The standard of good faith, while again vague and ill-defined, is 
useful when interpreting the meaning of ‘reasonable endeavours’. Section 5.3.2 discusses the 
LAC and the commonly used benchmark of good faith negotiations in greater detail. 
5.3.1 Conduct and Compensation Agreements 
Negotiation between the petroleum titleholder and the landholder is required as a process 
designed to balance the business and related interests of the respective parties before a 
titleholder can enter the landholder’s land to undertake advanced activities that have a 
significant impact on the landholder’s use of the land. The content of CCAs is partly 
structured through the LAC incorporated guidelines setting out standard requirements. 
However, a CCA is a compensation agreement unenforceable to the extent it is inconsistent 
with the PGPSA or the LAC.
47
 For example, the holder of an authority to prospect need not 
enter into a CCA if the holder already has a right to enter the land. Entry is to preserve life or 
property or because of an emergency that exists or may exist, or the landholder is an applicant 
or respondent to a Land Court application to determine compensation.
48
 
In the event that a CCA is agreed upon by both parties, the RPIA exempts this circumstance 
from requiring a RIDA approval. In effect, this removes CCAs from the regulatory scope of 
the RPIA in circumstances that cover PAAs. If parties cannot negotiate a land access 
agreement, either may apply to the Land Court for review of compensation that has been 




                                                 
45 Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Unconventional Gas 
Interim Report (2016) 23. 
46 Land Access Code 2016, 2. 
47 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 533(2). 
48 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 500A(a),(e),(f). 
49 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 96. 
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The PGPSA does not restrict the terms or conditions of the CCA. However, a CCA must 
address the compensation liability that is owed by the holder of the petroleum authority to the 
landholder for any ‘compensatable effect’, including: 
 deprivation of the possession of the land’s surface 
 diminution of the land’s value 
 diminution of the use made of the land or any improvement on it 
 severance of any part of the land from other parts of the land or from other land of the 
landowner 




A CCA may cover both monetary and non-monetary forms of compensation
51
 and 




The MERCPA prohibits landholders or occupiers from unreasonably refusing to make an 
access agreement with a RAH 20 business days after being asked to make an agreement.
53
 
The RAH or landholder may then apply for determination of the Land Court to decide the 
access agreement and in determining whether access to land is reasonable.
54
 However, the 
Land Court may only vary an access agreement if there has been a ‘material change in 
circumstances’ since the initial grant of the CCA. Materiality has been defined as ‘of moment 
or of significance, not merely trivial or inconsequential. If reliance is placed on a change in 
amenity, the impacts must be more than minimal’.
55
 The Land Court will then consider 
reviewing compensation to a ‘reasonable amount to fairly compensate the landholder, in light 
of the character, duration and frequency of the change in circumstances’.
56
 A ‘material 
change’ in circumstances is generally applied to the effect of the activity and is the focus of 
any appeal of CCA compensatory provisions as to whether there has been any change in 
                                                 
50 Samantha Hepburn, Mining and Energy Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 199. 
51 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 543(2)(b)(i). 
52 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 532(4)(b). 
53 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 48. 
54 Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) ss 49, 50. 
55 Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4, 28. See also Devon CC v Allens Caravans (Estates) 
Ltd (1962) 14 P&CR 440, 441; East Barnet Urban DC v British Transport Commn [1962] 2 QB 484, 490.   
56 Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4, 153. See Mineral and Energy Resources (Common 
Provisions) Act 2014 (Qld) s 53. 
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compensatable effects not addressed by the original compensation. If there has been, and the 
change is significant or important, then grounds will exist for a review.  
The definition and scope of the concept material change in circumstances was addressed in 
the recent landmark case Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4. 
Nothdurft represents the first time the Land Court has accessed the new MERCPA powers, 
pursuant to the OGC recommendations, to determine and amend compensation in CCAs due 
to a ‘material change in circumstance’. In Nothdurft, the plaintiffs sought a determination to 
recognise the actual impacts and future impacts of the CSG activities on their property. The 
Land Court held that there had been a ‘material change in circumstances’ since the initial 
CCA between the plaintiffs and QGC occurred in 2006.
57
 The property concerned in the case 
consisted of a 348.9 ha beef cattle property and manure spreading business in Chinchilla, 
Queensland. On and around the property are 36 UGR wells, 17 high point vents, three flaring 
locations and two Field Compression Stations are regulated by two petroleum leases, one EA 
and a CCA. 
In interpreting the meaning of a ‘material change in circumstances’ as an: 
increase in scale or intensity, a change to the way the activity is conducted, or an 
unanticipated (or unauthorised) impact of the activity might result in a material 
change to the compensatable effect of the activities…must be of moment or of 
significance, not merely trivial or inconsequential. If reliance is placed on a change 
in amenity, the impacts must be more than minimal.
58
 
The Land Court awarded the landholders an amount of A$60,500 by way of additional 
compensation for the material change in substances arising from some exceedance of noise 
conditions in the CCA, representing a portion of the their total claim
59
 of A$150,000 in 
additional compensation. The importance of the Nothdurft decision lies in the Land Court’s 
definition of a material change in circumstances. To trigger the Court’s review function, the 
Land Court held that the change must be material to the compensation agreement. This 
                                                 
57 QGC’s activities on the property are part of a coal seam gas project known as QCLNG Project. That project 
entails gas extraction from coal seams in the Surat Basin. The gas is piped to local compression and 
processing facilities and then transported by an underground pipeline network to Curtis Island near Gladstone. 
There, the gas is turned into liquefied natural gas for export markets. Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & 
Ors [2017] QLC 4. 6. 
58 Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4, 26-28. 
59 The plaintiffs alleged a material change in circumstances due to: Non-compliance with noise limits; 
Discontinuance of untreated CSG water supply; Gases emitted; Incorrect well locations; Owners’ time and 
resources responding; Dust - contamination of rainwater tanks; Perceived health risks in living in or around 
this gasfield; Need to relocate place of residence and relocate Western Downs Spreading and Contracting 
office and depot. Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4, 41. 
223 
requires ‘a focus on effect rather than activity’.
60
 Thus, a change that does not result in any 
change to the compensatable effects suffered by the landholder will not be reviewable under 
the MERCPA. Not every change in compensatable effect will be reviewable. The change 
must be ‘material’ to the agreement about compensation—that is, of significance or 
importance and not merely trivial or inconsequential. If reliance is placed on change in 
amenity (as was the case in Nothdurft) the impacts must be more than minimal. 
As evident in Nothdurft, The Land Court’s review will be limited to identifying the 
compensatable effect attributable to any material change and determining whether additional 
compensation is justified in respect of that change. Identifying a material change will not 
provide a basis for a wholesale review of the compensation originally agreed between the 
parties. At this stage, there is no clear definition of ‘minimum’ or ‘significant or important’. 
For example, the effect on the land of a major UGR installation (such as a flaring facility) is 
minimal, however, the cumulative effects on the landholders via noise, traffic and intrusion on 
their lands has not been incorporated into the judgement. 
Shortcomings in the CCA framework were also revealed in the recent case Australia Pacific 
LNG Pty Ltd v Golden & Ors.
61
 The case concerned APLNG who sought access to two 
properties west of Wandoan for the purpose of drilling, constructing and operating a number 
of petroleum wells, associated infrastructure and flow lines on each property. After 
unsuccessful negotiations, APLNG issued formal negotiation notices under the negotiated 
access and compensation regime of the PGPSA. The parties were unable to reach agreement 
within the set negotiation period (20 business days following the issue of the negotiation 
notices). Accordingly, after expiry of that period, the landholders issued an election notice, 
nominating for the negotiations to be referred to arbitration for resolution.
62
 Muir JA granted 
the injunction to withhold the landholders from forcing APLNG to attend arbitration to settle 
on terms of the land access. However, as the parties signed a CCA after the granting of the 
injunction, the Court of Appeal was not required to make a determination due to the 
interpretation and inconsistency of provisions in the MERCPA concerning ADR:
63
 
                                                 
60 Nothdurft & Anor v QGC Pty Limited & Ors [2017] QLC 4, 28. 
61 Australia Pacific LNG Pty Ltd v Golden & Ors [2013] QCA 366. 
62 Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 2004 (Qld) s 537A. 
63 Australia Pacific LNG Pty Ltd v Golden & Ors [2013] QCA 366. Queensland Parliamentary Committee, 
Mineral and Energy Resources (Common Provisions) Bill 2014, (Report No. 46 Agriculture, Resources and 
Environment Committee) 42. 
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This confusion is created because the notice given under s 88 of the MERCPA apparently 
contemplates the parties agreeing to an ADR process, whereas the requirement under s 90 of 
the MERCPA for the parties to ‘use reasonable endeavours’ to finish the ADR process and 
the right to apply to the Land Court under s 96 of the MERCPA both operate by reference to 
the expiry of a period after delivery of the election notice. Neither of the latter provisions 
expressly requires agreement on the ADR process to have been reached or the other party to 
attend. Further confusion is created by inconsistency between the intent of the legislation and 
the provisions seeking to give effect to that intent. As Muir JA recognised, the MERCPA 
appears to be directed towards requiring parties to reach a negotiated agreement (through 
ADR, if required) and, failing that, for the Land Court to determine compensation. However, 
the legislation provides an example of a form of ADR (namely arbitration) that is not directed 
towards facilitating negotiations, but which can instead result in a quasi-judicial determination 
of rights between parties, potentially in their absence, with very limited rights of appeal.
64
 
In relation to compensation and land access amounts, in C.M. Fitzgerald & Anor v Struber & 
Anor,
65
 Member PA Smith determined compensation in respect of mining areas at an annual 
rate of $10/ha per year and access areas at $5/ha per year for the current landowners. In the 
later case of Eacham Abrasive Blasting Pty Ltd v Gundersen & Anor,
66
 Member Smith 
granted compensation sums of $10/ha per year for the area covered by mining and $5/ha per 
year for access in respect of the renewal of a mining lease in the Mareeba area. Wallace & 
Ors v Bottomer & Ors
67
 and Pryce v Stuber & Anor
68
 determined compensation for the 
mining area in question be payable at $10/ha per year in respect of the mining area and $5/ha 
per year in respect of the access area.
69
 
It is important to note that, with the exception of Nothdurft, current case law concerning 
compensation and land access concern mineral tenements rather than petroleum tenements. 
To date, there is limited case law of UG CCA compensation in Queensland, however, the 
similarity between compensation provisions in the MRA Act and PGPSA reflect the low 
compensation figures provided in these cases. This is instructive and demonstrates the judicial 
                                                 
64 James Plumb and Andrew Shute, Negotiated access to land in Queensland – is this the end of ADR? (2014) < 
<http://www.carternewell.com/page/Publications/Archive/Negotiated_access_to_land_in_Queensland_is_thi
s_the_end_of_ADR/>.  
65 Fitzgerald & Anor v Struber & Anor [2009] QLC 0076.   
66 Eacham Abrasive Blasting Pty Ltd v Gundersen & Anor [2014] QLC 38.   
67 Wallace & Ors v Bottomer & Ors [2015] QLC 23.   
68 [2016] QLC 1.  
69 A discussion concerning the application of ‘good faith’ as a standard for effective negotiation of land access 
agreements is found within Section 5.3.2 of this Chapter below.  
225 
interpretation applicable to the LAF, which does not recognise the cumulative impacts to 
landholders and the ‘aversion (to UGR activities) in the rural property market’.
70
 
5.3.2 The Land Access Code 2016 (Qld) 
According to s 804 of the PGPSA, a person who carries out an authorised activity for a 
petroleum authority must not unreasonably interfere with anyone else carrying out a lawful 
activity. To ensure this duty is carried out, the LAC was introduced in 2010 to provide a 
voluntary ‘best practice’ guide for CCA negotiations and mandatory provisions concerning 
the conduct of authorised activities on private land. The stated intention of the LAC is to 
balance the interests of the agricultural and resources sectors including through best practice 
guidelines for effective regulation and ‘good faith’ between operators and the 
owners/occupiers of private land.
71
 
According to s 36 of the MERCPA, 
A regulation may make 1 or more codes for all Resource Acts (each a land access 
code) that— 
(a) states best practice guidelines for communication between the holders of 
resource authorities and owners and occupiers of land, public land authorities and 
public road authorities; and 
(b) imposes on resource authorities mandatory conditions concerning the conduct of 
authorised activities on land.
72
 
Where there is a requirement to negotiate in good faith, ‘good faith’ encompasses ‘the notion 
of fidelity (or faithfulness) to the bargain’.
73
 As stated by Allsop P: 
A promise to negotiate … genuinely and in good faith with a view to resolving 
claims to entitlement by reference to a known body of rights and obligations, in a 
manner that respects the respective contractual rights of the parties, giving due 
allowance for honest and genuinely held views about those pre-existing rights is not 
vague, illusory or uncertain.
74
 
                                                 
70 Peabody West Burton Pty Ltd v Mason [2012] QLC 0023. 
71 Land Access Code (2016) pt 2. 
72 ‘Resource Acts’ means the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld), Petroleum and Gas (Production and Safety) Act 
2004 (Qld), Petroleum Act 1923 (Qld), Geothermal Energy Act 2010 (Qld) and the Greenhouse Gas Storage 
Act 2009 (Qld).  
73 Jack O’Connor, ‘The Enforceability of Agreements to Negotiate in Good Faith’ (2010) 29(2) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 177, 202.  
74 United Group Rail Services v Rail Corporation of New South Wales [2009] NSWCA 177, 639. 
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There are certain inherent difficulties when discussing the concept of ‘good faith’ which relate 
primarily to the role of the state. On one hand, the state is owner of the public asset (UGR) 
and the grantor of the interest in land to a petroleum titleholder and recipient of royalties that 
this activity will produce. On the other hand, the state also has an obligation to represent the 
interest of private landholders under whose land the UGR asset is situated. This potential 
conflict of interest has been observed in numerous qualitative studies
75
 and the National 
Office of the Chief Economist Review of the Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas in 
Queensland
76
 resulted in the recommendation that ‘Regulation of the (UGR) sector should 
support coexistence, including ensuring that the landholder’s agreement is sought for access 
to their property, that landholders are fairly compensated, and that prime agricultural land and 
water resources are not compromised by development activity’.
77
 
The aim of providing fairness for landholders may provide the impetus to establish an 
independent regulatory tool to provide assistance and appellant applications for landholders to 
navigate the ‘good faith’ requirement in this difficult and complex regulatory regime.
78
 This is 
proposed to manage the generality, relatively scarce regulatory framework and lack of 
significant conduct standard for the parties. One option is to adopt a principles-based, 
independent regulatory tool to address any disadvantages facing landholders that currently 
exist under MERCPA, which may be construed as favouring petroleum titleholders. 
A review of the previous Land Access Code 2010 (Qld), in accordance with the LAF review 
process, included comments from landholders and companies who believed that limited 
outcomes were achieved through dispute resolution: 
There is little incentive for good faith negotiations or timely resolution of a dispute. 
Stakeholders noted that, where negotiations broke down, the process tended to drag 
on indefinitely, frustrating all involved and costing time and money…landholders 
indicated they were generally more concerned about the conduct of resource 
companies on their property as it relates to their business rather than just the issue, 
                                                 
75 Cindy Chen and Alan Randall, ‘The Economic Contest Between Coal Seam Gas Mining and Agriculture on 
Prime Farmland: It May Be Closer than We Thought’ (2013) 15(3) Journal of Economic and Social Policy 1; 
Phil McManus and Linda H. Connor, ‘What's mine is mine(d): Contests over marginalisation of rural life in 
the Upper Hunter, NSW’ (2013) 22(2) Rural Society 166. 
76 Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (Cth), Office of the Chief Economist, Review of the 
Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Seam Gas in Queensland (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015) 
<https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-Economist/Publications/Documents/coal-seam-
gas/Socioeconomic-impacts-of-coal-seam-gas-in-Queensland.pdf>. 
77 Ibid, 2.  
78 Boulle, et.al, above n 13, 2.  
227 
per se, of compensation. In summary, stakeholders did not see the Land Court as a 
viable, timely and cost-effective way to resolve disputes.
79
 
The LAF review also revealed that stakeholders requested further guidance as to what 
constitutes negotiating in ‘good faith’.
80
 DEEDI-authorised officers undertaking conferences 
in dispute resolution were criticised as inadequately trained for mediation or other dispute 
resolution methodologies, limiting the value of this part of the process. A number of 
recommendations were received by the LAF review to ‘require that only trained and 
accredited mediators undertake conferences and implementing an arbitration process that is 
binding rather than a guiding mediation that may not result in an outcome’.
81
 The key 
criticism of ADR in the land access process is that ‘there is no decision making power vested 




The Association of Mining and Exploration Companies states: 
Landholder rights relate to the use of the surface of the land. However access to 
those mineral rights often means infringing on the rights of the landholder. 
Therefore, negotiation between the owner of the mineral rights and the landholder 




The Queensland Resource Council noted the previous Land Access Code 2010 (Qld) focused 
on maximising compensation rather than building effective working relationships in good 
faith: 
Unfortunately, a perverse outcome of Queensland’s land access laws is that the land 
access process has become focused on maximising compensation with little priority 
on building effective working relationships to ensure there is a minimal impact on 
the landholder business or enjoyment of the land.
84
 
The imbalance in bargaining position under the current state laws was also noted by the NFF, 
which stated: 
                                                 
79 Land Access Review Panel, Land Access Framework 12 Month Review Report (2012) 
<https://www.dnrm.qld.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/193090/land-access-review-panel-report.pdf> 12. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid, 18. 
82 Ibid, 11. 
83 AMEC, Submission No 34 to Productivity Commission, Inquiry Into The Non-Financial Barriers To Mineral 
And Energy Resource Exploration, March 2013, 8.  
84 Queensland Resources Council, Submission No 13 to Productivity Commission, Inquiry into the non-financial 
barriers to mineral and energy resource exploration, 2013, 3. 
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The NFF’s view is that a forced negotiation, where the landholder does not have the 
option to refuse an agreement, is not an equal or fair negotiation. Fixed outcome 
negotiation provides an unfair advantage to well-resourced mining and gas 
companies, which employ skilled professionals to negotiate these types of 
agreements on a regular basis.
85
 
It is noted that there is rare agreement and accord between bodies involved in UGR 
exploration, including the Association of Mining and Exploration Companies and NFF. 
However, both these bodies agree that the current regime is inadequate in representing the 
interests of landholders. The purpose of the updated version of the LAC is to ‘balance the 
interests of the agricultural and resource sectors to address issues related to land access for 
resource exploration and development’.
86
 
The LAC provides generalised guidelines for resource Acts, pursuant to the MRA Act, 
PGPSA, PA Act, Geothermal Energy Act 2010 and the Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009, in 
a broad ‘one size fits all’ regime for tenement holders and prospective tenement holders 
seeking to obtain access to landowner properties for the purpose of exploration and 
extraction.
87
 Therefore, the LAC is not formulated to manage the unique needs of agricultural 
landholders and CSG petroleum tenement holders. 
The LAC contains two key sections—‘Good Relations’ is based on general voluntary 
principles for communications between parties, negotiation agreements, communication 
before and during the carrying out of activities and after completion activities;
88
 and 
Mandatory Conditions on activities conducted under the resource authority in Part 3. 
Mandatory Conditions of the LAC include induction training for staff and contractors; using 
existing access points, roads and tracks if possible on a property; minimising disturbance to 
people, livestock and property; taking reasonable steps to ensure there is no spread of weeds 
and pests; prior agreement of camp locations; collecting rubbish or waste produced in 
carrying out authorised activities; and closing gates grids and fences.
89
 
The LAC is limited in specific detail and guidelines to assist resource companies and 
landowners in resolving conflicts in a situation when land access is contested. Rather, it 
provides a general framework of principles for land access agreement based on general 
                                                 
85 National Farmers Federation, Submission 171 to Select Committee on Unconventional Gas Mining, Inquiry into 
Unconventional Gas Mining, 14 March 2016, 3. 
86 Land Access Code (2016) pt 1. 
87 Land Access Code (2016) pt 2. 
88 Land Access Code (2016) pt 1. 
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principles of ‘good faith’, ‘adequate consultation and negotiation’, ‘transparency’ and 
‘cooperation’: 
Good relationships between these groups, assisted by adequate consultation and 
negotiation, will improve transparency, equity and cooperation across the sectors 
involved and creates a more level playing field for all.
90
 
The framework to manage negotiation of CCAs is limited to a paragraph in the LAC: 
Agreements between the landholder and holders should clearly articulate what has 
been agreed to between the parties and comply with the relevant resource Acts. In 
the course of negotiations, the parties should endeavour to stay in regular contact 
and work together to reach a mutually acceptable and practical agreement.
91
 
Resource companies must ‘minimise disturbance’ to people and a landholder’s livestock and 
property, although no further guidance is given as to what constitutes ‘minimal disturbance’. 
The LAC also states: 
(1) If, in carrying out authorised activities, a relevant person becomes aware of any 
potential adverse impact, caused by the activities, on a landholder’s livestock or 
property, the relevant person must immediately notify the landholder of the potential 
impact; 
(2) If a relevant person injures or kills a landholder’s livestock, the relevant person 
must immediately notify the landholder of the injury or death of the livestock; and 
(3) If a relevant person damages a landholder’s property, the relevant person must— 
(a) Immediately notify the landholder of the damage; and 
(b) Repair the damage as soon as practicable.
92
 
Therefore, a resource holder must ‘immediately notify’ a landholder where the activity holds 
a potential adverse impact, rather than prohibiting the authorised activities to take place, 
where adverse impacts are likely to people, livestock or property. A resource holder must only 
immediately notify the landholder of the injury or death of livestock, rather than providing 
any adequate compensation for the damage caused. 
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This is a key element of concern for agricultural landholders, particularly dairy and other 
husbandry farmers. Further, if damage is inflicted to landholder’s property, the resource 
holder must immediately notify and repair the damage. No guidance is given on the extent of 
repair and whether rehabilitation must take place to ensure the landholder’s property is 




The LAC is a generalised approach to land access as it applies to all types of resource 
companies and, therefore, does not consider the specific environment and the contested nature 
of land access agreements with CSG petroleum tenement holders. Land access has historically 
been the subject of dispute between resource companies and agricultural landowners. As 
stated by Nader QC: 
If the law is to proceed on the basis that it does now, namely no agreement then 
arbitration, this thing is not going to make any difference to it…The hard, cold 
bottom line is still what it always has been. As long as the act contains these 
arbitration clauses, farmers are virtually at the mercy of the miners.
94
 
Although the LAC provides a unique and aiding approach for land access agreements in 
providing ‘best practice’ guidelines for petroleum titleholders, it does not place any statutory 
requirements on landholders.
95
 During the Land Access Review Report of 2012, it was 
recommended that more stringent requiring on obligations on landholders and petroleum 




The general voluntary principles found in Part 2 of the LAC concerning good relations 
between parties including advising the landholder of any significant changes to operations or 
timing, promptly paying compensation agreed with the landholder and being responsible for 
all authorised activities and actions being undertaken by employee. This is intended to ensure 
mandatory regulations concerning negotiation procedure will be enforced.
97
 Although the 
LAC is based on achieving transparent and effective land access agreements, the lack of 
enforcement and compliance via mandatory provisions create a lack of enforcement by 
                                                 
93 Land Access Code (2016) pt 2 s 14. 
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government agencies. Further, petroleum titleholders are not adequately informed of their 
obligations in accessing land and how to ensure compliance with LAC mandatory provisions 
as there is no enforcement of its provisions. 
5.3.3 Conduct and Compensation in British Columbia 
In British Columbia, the longstanding land access regime for petroleum, mineral and pipeline 
development is contained in the PNGA.
98
 The PNGA, similar to Queensland, provides for 
compensation for landholders affected by UGR activities. However, unlike the regulation of 
CCAs by the Department of Natural Resources and Mines in Queensland, the PNGA is 
administered by the SRB, a quasi-judicial statutory authority. The PNGA s 17 regulates entry 
onto private land and prohibits entry, occupation or use of land to: 
a) to carry out an oil and gas activity 
b) to carry out a related activity, or 
c) to comply with an order of the OGC, unless the entry, occupation or use is authorised 
under: 
d) a surface lease with the landowner in the form prescribed, if any, or containing the 
prescribed content, if any, or 
e) an order of the (Surface Rights) board.99 
When the petroleum titleholder cannot acquire consent and a surface lease by the landholder 
as required by s 17 of the PNGA, the operator may apply to the SRB, as a Mediation and 
Arbitration Board,
100
 with broad jurisdiction over determinations of compensation of any 
surface lease, license, permit, authorisation or other contract.
101
 Similar to Queensland, a 
person may not enter, occupy or use land to carry out geophysical exploration, the equivalent 
to preliminary activities, unless the person has entered into an agreement with the owner of 
the land authorising the entry, occupation or use.
102
 Once more advanced activities such as 
building roads, drilling wells or laying pipelines commence, a petroleum titleholder must 
negotiate a surface lease with the private landholder. 
                                                 
98 Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSBC 1996, c 361. 
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The criteria for determining an amount of compensation to be paid by a UGR titleholder 
periodically or otherwise, the SRB may consider, without limitation, the following issues: 
a) the compulsory aspect of the right of entry 
b)  the value of the applicable land 
c) a person's loss of a right or profit with respect to the land 
d) temporary and permanent damage from the right of entry 
e) compensation for severance 
f) compensation for nuisance and disturbance from the right of entry 
g) the effect, if any, of one or more other rights of entry with respect to the land 
h) money previously paid for entry, occupation or use 
i) the terms of any surface lease or agreement submitted to the board or to which the 
board has access 
j) previous orders of the board 
k) other factors the board considers applicable 
l) other factors or criteria established by regulation.103 
In determining the amount of compensation, the SRB may consider any change in the value of 
money and of land since the date of the grant of the surface lease.
104
 Further, the appeals 
process is outlined in s 155 of the PNGA, whereby the SRB, on its own motion of on 
application, may reconsider an order of the board and may confirm, vary or rescind the order. 
The SRB provides a mediation and arbitration service for UGR titleholders and landholders 
unable to agree to the terms of access of a service lease by the landholder or UGR 
company.
105
 A corresponding order made once the SRB has mediated a dispute is a Right of 
Entry Order which authorises the right of entry, subject to the terms and conditions specified 
in the order, and must, as a condition of the order, require the person who is seeking the right 
of entry to pay to the landowner, on account of rent, if any, or compensation.
106
 
The PNGA contains detailed provisions on initial compensation for land access and also for 
the review of initial compensation orders and compensation for additional damage caused 
during operations. Division 6 outlines the process whereby the SRB may require additional 
                                                 
103 Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSBC 1996, c 361, s 154(1). 
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compensation where a) the exercise of the right of entry causes damage to the land or other 
land of the owner or occupant or causes loss to the owner or occupant, or b) it is the owner or 
occupant of land immediately adjacent to land that is subject to a right of entry and the 
exercise of the right of entry causes damage to the adjacent land or causes loss to the owner or 
occupant.
107
 The negotiation of amendment to a surface lease or order allows a UG surface 
titleholder or the landholder to serve notice requiring negotiation of an amendment to the 
rental provisions in the surface lease or order. If either party do not agree to an amendment of 
the rental provisions in the surface lease or order to which the notice relates within 60 days 
after receipt of the notice, either party may apply to the board to resolve the disagreement.
108
 
Finally, all surface leases, the terms of the right of entry and rental provisions must be 
submitted to the SRB, within 90 days after the date the right holder acquired right of entry, 
with the following information: 
a) the legal description and size of the land subject to a surface lease 
b) a description of the nature of the interest conferred by a surface lease 
c) the terms and conditions of a surface lease 
d) the date a surface lease is entered into and, if applicable, amended.109 
The SRB may then publish the surface lease on the internet or by other electronic means for 
review by other landholders and to provide a record of current surface leases.
110
 The SRB has 
provided a Surface Lease Database for public access of all surface leases between oil and gas 
companies and private landholders. The database includes particulars of all surface leases 
with the parties names removed to ensure anonymity. The database was created to ‘increase 
transparency and assist landowners in negotiating agreements when oil and gas companies 
seek access to private land’.
111
 
Unlike Queensland’s LAC, which includes both voluntary and mandatory principles, the 
OGAA
112
 contains a mandatory Consultation and Notification Regulation created by the OGC 
applicable to surface leases.
113
 The regulation stipulates that a person who intends to carry out 
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and oil and gas activity on a landowner’s land must provide to the land owner an invitation to 
consult on the applicant’s proposed activities. Further, a notification must be given with 
respect to the applicant’s proposed activities if an existing building or structure owned by the 
local authority is within the notification and consultation distance—the petroleum titleholder 
must provide an invitation to consult to a local authority, the government of Canada or to 
Aboriginal persons in the applicable circumstances—such as an existing building or structure 
owned by the local authority being within 3,300 metres for a facility that is a processing plan, 
pump station or compression station or within 1,500 metres for a well site less than 5 ha or 
1,800 metres for a well site 6 ha or more.
114
 
The OGAA Consultation and Notification Regulation ss 11 and 13 require the content of the 
notice and the content of the invitation to consult to include specific particulars of the 
proposed activities, how the proposed activities are being carried out, the notification distance 
and a statement advising that the person may provide written response within 21 days 
accepting or rejecting the proposed activities with an application to the SRB for review. The 
invitation to consult must also propose a description of the: 
a) approximate order in which the proposed activities will be carried out and of their 
approximate timing; 
b) for each phase of the proposed activities, a description of 
i) the nature and extent of reasonably foreseeable noise, dust and odours that will 
be caused by the proposed activities, 
ii) the measures that will be taken to mitigate the negative effects of noise, dust 
and odours, and 




As explored in Chapter 4, there is a MOU between the OGC, as the Crown Corporation 
responsible for regulating oil and gas activities in British Columbia, and the ALC. Similarly, 
the OGC and SRB also have a MOU. The OGC holds broad regulatory responsibilities for oil 
and gas activities from the exploration and development of UGR subsurface tenure through to 
facilities operation and decommission (explored in Chapter 4). In comparison, the SRB is an 
independent quasi-judicial body responsible for granting rights of entry orders, determining 
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compensation for surface leases and mediating and resolving disputes concerning 
compensation for surface access between landowners and resource titleholders, including 
petroleum, minerals, geothermal and coal mining. 
The OGC – SRB MOU seeks to ensure communication, collaboration and coordination 
between the two bodies with landowners and parties conducting UGR activities,
116
 including 
specifically that the SRB will notify the OGC when it receives an application for right of 
entry or for mediation and arbitration
117
 and the OGC will notify the SRB when it receives an 
application requiring private land access on which the applicant indicates surface access 
issues have not been resolved.
118
 This provides an integrated process between the departments 
and there is regular contact and communication underlined in the MOU. 
The standard terms and conditions of surface leases are found in the Surface Lease Regulation 
of the PNGA which requires each surface lease must state as a minimum that a) no surface 
area covered by the lease shall be used for purposes other than those set out in the lease unless 
the grantor of the lease consents in writing to such other use; b) no surface area covered by 
the lease shall be reduced except with the consent in writing of the grantor and grantee; c) if 
the grantee of the lease fails or neglects to pay rentals or to make payments pursuant to the 
terms thereof and such default shall continue for a period of 90 days after demand therefor 
shall have been made, the grantor may terminate the lease; and d) the grantee of the lease 
may, upon not less than 90 days’ notice to the grantor, terminate the lease on or after the 
expiration of the second year of its term.
119
 
Unlike Queensland, British Columbia does not routinely refer to prescriptive mandatory 
surface lease terms. Rather, the PNGA outlines minimum requirements, preferring a flexible 
approach allowing proponents to subjectively negotiate lease terms in individual 
circumstances, taking into consideration specific and particular landholder requirements. 
While this may be seen as more of a ‘light touch approach’ to regulating surface leases, this 
approach reflects a principles-based approach to regulation, underlining the transparency in 
providing a Surface Lease Database, collaboration between the SRB and OGC and a 
streamlined and simple process to encourage landholders and petroleum titleholders to 
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collaborate and find common ground. Additionally, the CAPL, a voluntary association of 
petroleum companies, provides a standard form of petroleum lease which includes a 
harmonised template and provides guidance for the UG industry nationally. 
Figures 5 and 6 summarise and compare the statutory negotiation process for land access 
agreements in Queensland and British Columbia. Queensland’s land access regulatory 
structure relies upon three primary pieces of legislation or codes—the LAC, MERCPA and 
PGPSA. Due to the recent merge of parts of the PGPSA into the MERCPA, there remains 
some duplication and overlap in the regulation of advanced and preliminary activities, as the 
broad entry requirements are now found in the MERCPA, while the definition and scope of 
petroleum activities is still found in the PGPSA.
120
 Compensation, agreements and entry 
requirements differ substantially between preliminary and advanced activities, which may 
cause confusion and conflict due to the complexity of the differing regulations found in the 
three regulating Acts. 
Conversely, as shown in Figure 6, British Columbia holds a single legislative Act, the PNGA, 
with a dedicated as a quasi-judicial body to undertake a range of functions to promote 
simplicity, accessibility and transparency. These functions include appellate review 
mechanisms of surface right leases, termination of surface rights and damages for loss 
suffered by landholders. 
Figure 5: Statutory Negotiation Process in Queensland 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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Figure 6: Statutory Negotiation Process in British Columbia 
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
Table 3 provides a functional analysis of the land access regime of Queensland and British 
Columbia. As shown in the table, there are many similarities, however, the primary difference 
lies in a single dedicated quasi-judicial body found in British Columbia. This is opposed to 
Queensland, where the Land Court hears matters regarding land and natural resources broadly 
ranging from appeals against land valuations to determining compensation for resource 
activities and land access. Queensland’s opt-out agreement, while in preliminary stages of 
implementation since commencing operation in 2016, ostensibly provides a step towards a 
more principles-based approach by attempting to ‘balance the interests of landholders’ 
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Table 3: Comparison of Land Access Agreement Functions 
Factors Queensland British 
Columbia 
Opt-out agreement   
Appellate Review Process   
Dedicated Quasi- Judicial Body   
 
Broad stakeholder collaboration 
and consultation regulations 
  
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
While there are similarities between both systems, the complexity and confusion that attends 
the Queensland regulatory framework appears largely absent in British Columbia. The 
regulatory framework in place has eventuated from the basic regulatory premise that 
agricultural land is a valuable sector to the economy in British Columbia and, therefore, 
requires a system that places its protection and longevity within the remit of a clear and 
transparent regulatory system. 
5.3.4 Right to Veto—A Real Solution? 
The MERCPA is intended to improve the Queensland LAF by attempting to amalgamate the 
five resources Acts applicable to natural resources. It remains to be seen whether these 
reforms will achieve the intended outcomes and whether regulators demonstrate and appetite 
to listen to the many criticisms from landholders to improve the viability and transparency of 
the current system. Currently, the reforms from the Land Access Committee have not been 
fully implemented or tested and the heads of compensation recommendation has been 
dismissed. The case law that exists in relation to CCAs has demonstrated a lack of 
consistency and a low threshold when recommending compensation. Landholders are forced 
to access judicial avenues to settle grievances, which is both costly and time-consuming, 
demonstrating a ‘last resort’ approach to managing CCAs. 
In comparison, British Columbia has a longer history in managing landholder and land access 
conflict with natural resources and has developed a highly flexible, transparent and, arguably, 
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more effective regulatory framework. The surface lease regulatory framework attempts to 
balance the interests of both parties in reaching a land access and compensation. The SRB, as 
a quasi-judicial body and through its collaborative MOU with the oversight administrative 
body the OGC, provides an example of a principles-based regulatory approach. 
The current land access laws in Queensland remain rule-based regulatory frameworks broadly 
emphasising ‘good faith negotiations’ and an appellate process as a last resort to the Land 
Court. British Columbia may provide an alternative approach in creating a collaborative and 
transparent quasi-judicial process for determining compensation, the terms of surface leases 
and terminating land access agreements. Another regulatory option proposed in Queensland to 
mitigate petroleum titleholder and landholder conflict is a regulatory ‘Right of Veto’, enabling 
the landholder the right to refuse access and extraction of UGR on private lands. Three recent 
attempts by former Greens Senator Waters to introduce the legislative right of veto took place 
in 2011, 2013 and 2015 in the form of the Landholders’ Right to Refuse (Gas and Coal) Bill 
(Cth) (Right to Refuse Bill). The Bill sought to: 
Make gas or coal mining activities undertaken by a constitutional corporation 
without prior written authorisation from landholders unlawful; and ban 
constitutional corporations from engaging in hydraulic fracturing operations for coal 
seam gas (CSG), shale gas and tight gas.
122
 
In March 2015, the Senate referred the Landholders’ Right to Refuse (Gas and Coal) Bill 
2015 to an inquiry process. Specifically, in relation to experiences of agricultural landholders 
and UG activities, the Inquiry into the Landholders’ Right to Refuse (Gas and Coal Bill) 
(Right to Refuse Bill Senate Inquiry) found: 
Resource activities on farmland can present challenges for landholders when going 
about their ordinary business, and the risks or damage to their property that can 
result. For example, ditches dug for pipe construction can make it difficult for 
farmers to traverse their property and can lead to livestock injuries.
 
The opening and 
closing of farm gates is also an issue.
123
 
A number of regulatory issues throughout the Right to Refuse Bill Senate Inquiry were 
identified by private landholders in relation to the coexistence of CSG activities, including: 
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 competing water use—the committee received evidence that farmers face restrictions 
on their water use while petroleum companies enjoy unrestricted access 
 air pollution and noise from mining and UG extraction, such as the noise and pollution 
from the increased number of diesel trucks in the area, and noise from compressor stations 
and flaring 
 concern that contamination near food production areas would prevent farmers from 
supplying national vendor declarations, which would jeopardise their access to local and 
export markets 
 the inability to manage risk associated with damage caused by contamination related 
to CSG extraction on neighbouring properties, particularly as insurance companies do not 
insure against this risk.
124
 
The Right to Refuse Bill was rejected on each attempt, most recently by the 2015 Right to 
Refuse Senate Inquiry.
125
 In its dissenting report, the Senate stated: 
The committee considers that this bill is an excessive and unworkable response to 
concerns that landholders may have about gas and coal activities. The committee 
also does not consider that it was provided with sufficient credible scientific 
evidence during the inquiry to justify a ban on hydraulic fracturing.
126
 
The Right to Refuse Bill and the Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry both stressed the 
delicate balancing act between the political expediency involved in fostering and supporting a 
strong CSG industry, against the rights and responsibilities of the agricultural sector and 
private landholder access agreements. 
Despite the debate about the nature of landholder property rights causing conflict between 
agricultural landholders and petroleum titleholders in particular, instilling a right to veto 
would arguably be fundamentally incompatible with Australia’s Torrens title common law 
legal system. As stated by Gray and Gray: 
To claim ‘property’ in land is to arrogate at least a limited form of sovereignty over 
the land and to allege that one has some emotion or investment-backed security in it. 
To have ‘property’ in land connotes, ultimately, a deeply instinctive self-affirming 
sense of belonging and control; and it is precisely this sense of possessory control 
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which identifies the two proprietary estates acknowledged today in English law, the 




The State, as resource owner, has the right and obligation to regulate its petroleum resources 
for petroleum development. Therefore, the Queensland Government is responsible for the 
management of access agreements between leases it grants to petroleum landholders, while 
protecting the rights of fee simple and freehold private landowners in accordance with the 
national interest. 
The allocation of secure title and ensuring the appropriate return to the community for 
extracting petroleum resources and collecting rent on a taxation system is necessary for the 
development of State assets.
128
 Arguably, allowing a right of veto for private landholders to 
refuse petroleum titleholders and, tangentially, the State to access and develop petroleum 
resources is considered inconsistent under Commonwealth Law and detrimental to the best 
interests of its citizens. 
Ultimately, balancing petroleum titleholder interests, public interests and private landholder 
rights requires ‘internalised acceptance’ that the right to veto is not a viable regulatory option 
in the public interest. If landholders are aggrieved and not fairly represented in the current 
regulatory process and if the right to veto is not in the public interest, what remains? Evidence 
supports the notion that landholders are currently ‘disenfranchised’ by the current system and 
the onus is upon the individual single landholder to prove, with limited resources and skills, 
that resource activities on their lands will negatively impact that land. A potential solution to 
the imbalance between resource companies and the individual landholder is the concept of 
collectivisation—grouping common interests together in a regulated coalition to encourage 
greater representation and visibility of landholder agendas. 
5.4 Collective Bargaining as a Regulatory Tool to Manage Conflicting 
Interests 
In terms of statutory land access agreements, negotiation procedures are aimed at producing 
transparent and effective long-term contracts accommodating the needs of both landholders 
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and petroleum titleholders. Land access is required for numerous activities over a project’s 
lifecycle, from geological and seismic surveying to drilling, extraction, inspection and 
processing. From the perspective of agricultural landholders, extended access to land by 
titleholders can lead to feelings of ‘disenfranchisement’
129
 and uncertainties. Concerns from 
landholders have led to demands for more transparency of land access agreements. This trend 
is increasingly prevalent in Queensland’s UGR regions, as stated by Cheshire et al: 
it is particularly profound in mining-intensive regions where the number of actors 
with a stake in local decisions can be high, but weakly organised, and where mining 
companies (as powerful corporate actors) are formulating their own sets of rules and 
expectations about where their own, and others’, responsibilities lie. Under such 




Given this background, the collective action of farmers to create an affiliation to redress the 
balance between corporate and community interest may play an important role in delivering 
public goods, non-commodity outputs and environmental services.
131
 Collective action can be 
classified as action taken by a group to achieve common interests. For the purpose of this 
chapter, collective action is defined by Marshall and Scott as ‘the action taken by a group 




As observed by Meinzen-Dick et al, collective action also entails ‘the involvement of a group 
of people, shared interests, common and voluntary actions to pursue those shared interests’.
133
 
Vanni distinguishes two types of collective action, i) cooperation: bottom-up, farmer-to-
farmer collective action; and ii) coordination: top-down, agency-led collective action.
134
 
Potential collective action through collective bargaining in negotiating CSG CCAs between 
agricultural land holders and petroleum titleholders is classified as the first type of collective 
action (i.e., cooperation). 
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Socio-cultural literature recognises that collective negotiation and collaboration requires 
‘trust, voice, reciprocity and a disposition to collaborate for mutually beneficial ends’.
135
 The 
literature also identifies a four-tier criteria framework to assess whether collective action in 
relation to natural resources will be successful: 
1) resource system characteristics 
2) group characteristics 
3) institutional arrangements 
4) external environment.136 
The first requirement necessitates the use of shared information so that parties may access 
resource system characteristics in a practical and clear manner. Information asymmetry is 
critical to the implementation of collective action, particularly in the agricultural sector as 
found by van Caenegem et al.
137
 In the case of land access negotiations, landholders require 
strong information dissemination to collaborate efficiently and be informed of their 
negotiating position. One option for the creation and release of these resource systems might 
be a form of collective landholder coalition, a successful model in the US, explored in 
Section 5.5. 
The concept of complementarity conditions, a branch of social capital theory, illustrates the 
necessity of collective action in reaching higher levels of economic compensation.
138
 A 
situation where agricultural landholders are not gaining equitable compensation for the use of 
their prime agricultural land and loss of productivity during negotiations of CCAs brings 
about the necessity of a ‘complementarity condition’.
139
 Therefore, when the 
‘complementarity condition’ is met, other factors such as collective decision-making and 
collective information-sharing emerge as important determinants in reaching higher levels of 
compensation. The success of collective action is also dependent on institutional 
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Uetake presents a case study analysis of farmer collective action bodies in New Zealand in 
three case studies, the Sustainable Farming Fund, East Coast Forestry Project and North 
Otago Irrigation Company.
141
 The Sustainable Farming Fund consisted of 33 dairy farmers 
who launched the fund in 2000 to fund grass-root activities to address sustainable water 
management. The case study illustrates that collective action can produce larger benefits 
including scale merits, sharing knowledge and increasing capacity and tackling local issues. 
Additionally, collective action may reduce the costs of public goods provision (economy of 
scale) and may improve the coordination mechanisms for the joint provision of several public 
goods (economy of scope).
142
 
In many cases, a cooperative approach relies heavily on the local knowledge of stakeholders 
and on the possibilities to integrate this knowledge into the decision-making process.
143
 Thus, 
collective action increases the credibility and legitimacy of decision-making, but also allows 
the collecting and sharing of information at lower costs compared to the individual 
approaches. Although one of the barriers to collective bargaining is of ‘free riding’ members 
who do not contribute to the group activities and benefit from active member’s activities, this 
can usually be displaced by incentive mechanisms in in collective bargaining groups 
including trust, solidarity reciprocity and reputation.
144
 
Porter defines industry clustering as ‘a geographically proximate group of interconnected 
companies and institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities’.
145
 Active clustering is defined by interaction and functional relationships, 
knowledge sharing, and collaborative and competitive forces that drive innovation. Nauwelers 
and Reid describe regional innovation as ‘the set of economic, political, and institutional 
relationships occurring in a given geographical area that generates a collective learning 
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process leading to the rapid diffusion of knowledge and best practice’.
146
 The nature of 
clustering, as outlined by Davies et al, is defined as ‘organizations [that] are both in 
competition and cooperating with one another simultaneously in different areas of their 
activities, but overall continuing to develop and reinforce the benefits of coexistence’.
147
 
Participation in clusters offers competitive advantages due to their flexibility, sharing of 
information and resources, and links to other networks and opportunities. 
When negotiating CCAs, many landholders may have limited access to legal information and 
oil and gas governance materials. Consequently, forming a cluster is one way to ensure an 
equitable result for all farmers in a certain geographic area located within oil and gas 
extraction activities. Therefore, horizontal collaborations can take place among landowners, 
possibly initially within a local food supply chain and governed by the CCA, using a 
collective bargaining law framework. In conjunction, vertical relationships for private and 
public oil and gas actors can develop and reinforce the benefits of coexistence. 
5.4.1 Competition Law 
Collective bargaining can be classified as a transactional regulatory for the negotiation of 
contracts by a collective group as agreements based on negotiation creating an enforceable 
undertaking.
148
 This is in contrast to a pure authorisation regulatory tool such as a CCA land 
access agreement. Collective bargaining is used in multiple sectors to reduce information 
asymmetry and promotion of effective contractual outcomes for multiple parties originally 
used by workplace unions in Australia.
149
 Further, collective bargaining often employs 
objective conduct standards for negotiation to guide parties or to require them to adhere to 
behaviours and procedures that are conductive to transparent and effective negotiation 
procedures. 
The Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) permits small businesses to seek a form of 
validation, through either the ACCC notification or authorisation regime, to create a collective 
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 Collective bargaining ‘grants protection from liability concerning 
anti-competitive behaviour to any number of businesses including farms that seek to negotiate 
agreements as a group’.
151
 A small business is permitted to lodge a collective bargaining 
notice with the ACCC if the small business has made or proposes to give effect to a contract 
that contains a cartel provision, exclusionary provision or a price-fixing provision and the 
expected value of the contracts between the parties does not exceed the limit of A$3 million 
in any 12 month period or A$5 million for primary production contracts.
152
 
The introduction of the ACCC notification system was intended to be a ‘cheap, simple and 
speedy mechanism to allow collective contractual negotiations to take place’.
153
 However, the 
number of collective bargaining authorisation applications far exceeds that of collective 
bargaining notifications in the agricultural sector. The lack of uptake of the notification 
avenue may be due to the inflexibilities associated with identifying individuals, targets and 
low transaction thresholds between A$3–5 million. In comparison, collective bargaining 
authorisations are applicable to both current and future members of a group, with conditions 
permitted by the ACCC. 
The ‘public benefits’ test requirements must be met by the ACCC’s evaluation of the potential 
collective bargaining arrangement for either an authorisation or notification must be in 
adherence with the tests found in ss 90(5A) and 90(5B) of the Competition and Consumer Act 
2010 (Cth), which state that the ACCC shall not authorise a provision of a proposed contract, 
arrangement or understanding that is or may be a cartel provision, unless it is satisfied in all 
the circumstances that: 
 the provision, in the case of s 90(5A), would result or be likely to result or, in the case 
of s 90(5B), has resulted or is likely to result, in a benefit to the public 
 that benefit, in the case of s 90(5A), would outweigh the detriment to the public 
constituted by any lessening of competition that would result or be likely to result if the 
proposed contract or arrangement were made or given effect to, or in the case of s 90(5B), 
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outweighs or would outweigh the detriment to the public constituted by any lessening of 
competition that has resulted or is likely to result from giving effect to the provision.
154
 
To satisfy the above collective bargaining tests the ACCC will analyse: 
The relevant market affected by the potential collective bargaining conduct; the 
counter factual; application of the ‘future with-and-without test’ whereby the ACCC 
compares the public benefit and anti-competitive detriment generated by the conduct 
in the future if the authorisation is granted with those generated if the authorisation 




If the ACCC is satisfied that any public benefit resulting from the cartel provision, 
exclusionary provision or price-fixing provision does not or would not outweigh the public 
detriment resulting from the provision, the Commission may issue an objection notice.
156
 
The ACCC is also given the power, on the grounds of public benefit, to authorise collective 
bargaining conduct or other conduct constituting cartel conduct or a misuse of market power 
under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). The ACCC must make a determination 
within the relevant period of six months, beginning on the date on which the application was 
received by it.
157
 If the Commission has not determined the application within that time, the 
authorisation is deemed to have been granted. If the Commission prepares a draft 
determination within the six months and determines an extension of not more than six months 
with the agreement of the applicant, then the period is extended by the agreed period of time. 
The period may also be extended by the holding of a conference.
158
 
The principles guiding the application of authorisation which must be satisfied to grant a 
collective bargaining arrangement are: 
1) it is for the parties seeking authorisation to satisfy the Australian Competition Tribunal 
that benefit to the public is likely and that there will be sufficient public benefit to 
outweigh any likely anti-competitive detriment 
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2) the Australian Competition Tribunal is required to consider the likely shape of the 




3) the task referred to in list item (2) above will generally entitle an understanding of the 




4) it is not appropriate to consider the present state of the market and compare it with the 
likely future state of the market if the conduct were to be authorised, instead the 
comparison is to involve considering the future state of the market with and without the 
conduct in question 
5) it is doubtful that past benefits may be relied on in support of an application for 
authorisation
161
 except to the extent that the past may be indicative of the future. 
Although the CCA does not provide a legislative definition of what constitutes the satisfaction 
of the ‘public benefits test’, the common law sheds light on the interpretation of the test. 
Authorisations and notification proceedings to date have given rise to the confirmation of the 
following elements: 
1) a broad view must be taken of what constitutes a benefit for the public162 
2) the term ‘the public’ refers to the Australian public163 
3) the benefit must be something of value to the community generally164 
4) a benefit to a narrower segment of the community will only constitute a public benefit 
if it can be demonstrated to serve an acknowledged end of public policy or be otherwise 
beneficial to the community generally
165
 
5) efficiency is a major consideration (including allocative, productive and dynamic 
efficiency) but it is not an exclusive one, and should be assessed in regard to the welfare 
impacts of those efficiencies
166
 
6) a benefit to a narrower segment of the community will generally be given less weight 
than a benefit to the community generally
167
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8) where there is a material change in circumstances surrounding a previously authorised 
agreement, its continuation may no longer be of benefit to the public.
169
 
Although collective bargaining in Australian competition law has historically been utilised by 
commercial businesses in competition with another to form a vehicle to equalise bargaining 
positions, there has been a rise in agricultural groups collectively bargaining to create a level 
playing field between producers, processors and retailers. 
5.4.2 Collective Bargaining in Agriculture 
In response to concerns of the agricultural industry to access collective bargaining 
arrangements
170
 a dedicated agricultural unit, the CCA, was enacted in 2015 led by the first 
agricultural commissioner, Mick Keogh: 
The Agriculture Consultative Committee (‘ACC’) was established by the ACCC to 
provide advice and information on issues affecting the agriculture sector that fall 
within the scope of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (the Act), and to 
provide a forum where competition and consumer law concerns related to the 
agriculture sector can be considered and addressed collaboratively.
171
 
The CCA aims to realign the balance of bargaining power of farmers with processors and 
major retailers. This continual imbalance has been investigated in a number of inquiries 
including a Senate investigation in 2011.
172
 
The ACCC analysis of collective bargaining applications rests on the extent of cost sharing 
and, consequently, overall cost reduction between bargaining participants which will give rise 
to a public benefit. For example, in the Queensland Chicken Growers Association 
Incorporated Authorisation,
173
 the ACCC identified cost savings as including ‘a reduction in 
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the number of hours spent negotiating; a decrease in legal and expert advisory costs; and 
efficiencies in pooling limited resources of smaller applicants’.
174
 The significance of 
transaction cost savings during negotiation, access to expert and legal advice and the pooling 
of resources will arguably create a strong public benefit of the collective bargaining of 
agricultural landholders. 
The ACCC’s analysis is based on a three-tiered framework which must be satisfied for 
collective bargaining applications to be successfully approved: 
1) participation in the bargaining group should be voluntary 
2) limiting the number of participating businesses so that the bargaining group only 
covers a relatively modest market share 
3) limiting collective boycotts.175 
The ACCC collective bargaining criteria has saliency when applied to landholders in 
negotiating CCAs, namely, forming a voluntary collective bargaining group with limited 
membership numbers in a region, covering a modest market share of agricultural businesses, 
and the absence of a collective boycott against UG targets. 
There is evidence to suggest that the ACC could be expanded to encompass competition and 
redress the power of agricultural landholders to create oversight of CCAs and, ultimately, a 
more balanced relationship between parties, which bears similarities in the relationship 
between growers and major retailers. There are obvious similarities to landholder negotiations 
with resources companies. As stated by Paragreen et al, ‘due to the importance of the 
industry’s macroeconomic contribution to the state and its rapid growth, landholders retain 




5.4.3 Collective Bargaining in the Unconventional Gas Sector 
ACCC authorisations have recently been relied upon by the UG industry. This indicates a 
precedent of willingness to enter into collective arrangements with other parties by the CSG 
sector in Queensland. A number of general authorisations to a variety of prima facie anti-
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competitive arrangements have been granted to UG companies and LNG facilities by the 
ACCC in the following cases: 
1) conditional authorisation to Chevron Australia Pty Ltd, Chevron (TAPL) Pty Ltd, 
Mobil Australia Resources Company Pty Ltd and Shell Development (Australia) Pty Ltd 




2) authorisation to the North West Shelf joint venture participants with entitlements to 
produce domestic gas (domgas) to engage in joint marketing of domestic gas produced 




3) authorisation to joint venture participants in a proposed PNG Gas Project for the joint 
marketing of gas produced by the Project
179
 
4) Woodside Energy Ltd and Benaris International Pty Ltd and jointly market and sell 
their shares of the Otway Gas Project joint venture’s liquefied petroleum gas to a common 
customer or common customers
180
 
5) APLNG conditional authorisation to discuss, make and give effect to arrangements 
regarding the sequencing and timing of scheduled maintenance works, and associated 




The Australian Pacific LNG Pty Ltd authorisation sought an arrangement to discuss, make 
and give effect to arrangements regarding the sequencing and timing of scheduled 
maintenance works, and associated shutdowns and outages, in LNG facilities in Curtis Island 
in the Port of Gladstone (LNG Facilities).
182
 The ACCC granted the authorisation based on 
the satisfaction of the public benefits test as the authorisation would potentially result in 
‘increasing the efficiency of undertaking LNG maintenance and reducing the likelihood of 
major disruptions to domestic gas markets, which could occur if multiple maintenance events 
at the Applicants’ facilities overlap’.
183
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However, a conditional authorisation was granted due to the potential of information 
asymmetry in domestic gas markets documenting when facilities are offline for maintenance. 
Consequently, the collective bargaining authorisation allows the applicants to sell excess gas 
in large quantities or purchase gas from domestic markets when increasing LNG production. 
Therefore, the ACCC granted the collective bargaining notification with the condition that the 
applicants must: 
Publicly disclose maintenance schedule information that they have shared with one 
another, and to ensure that information remains accurate. This is intended to give all 
market participants access to information regarding the maintenance scheduled at 




Evidently, in the situation where stakeholders have expressed concern regarding information 
asymmetries or other potential anti-competitive effects, the ACCC will grant a conditional 
authorisation based on public disclosure. In the case of potential collective bargaining 
arrangements with agricultural landholder applicants and UG targets, any concerns raised 
about information asymmetries or impact on the competitiveness of CCAs could be negated 
by the granting of a conditional collective bargaining determination to disclose collective 
bargaining arrangements. 
The ACCC considers transaction and time costs associated with contracting a significant 
element of public benefits to be harnessed by a collective bargaining arrangement: 
These transaction costs can be lower where a single negotiating process is 
employed, such as in collective bargaining arrangements, relative to a situation 
where a series of individual negotiation processes are necessary. The ACCC 
considers that to the extent these transaction cost savings do arise they are likely to 
constitute a public benefit.
185
 
The central public benefit of authorising a collective bargaining group to collectively 
negotiate of lowering transaction costs by sharing negotiation costs provides a platform for 
the utilisation of collective bargaining provisions by agricultural landholders. Numerous 
authorisations and notifications for farmers have involved the recognition that farmers and 
agriculturalists are naturally disadvantaged when bargaining and the enhancement of their 
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ability to have greater input into contractual arrangements is not classified as anti-
competitive: 
In many cases, the ACCC has identified that individually, businesses have a limited 
degree of input into their contracts being offered ‘take it or leave it’ terms and 
conditions. These circumstances do not always lead to the most efficient contract. 
The ACCC has often accepted that collective bargaining arrangements can provide 
participants with an opportunity for greater input into contracts and accordingly 
deliver the opportunity for more efficient contracts.
186
 
5.5 New York Joint Landholders Coalition 
The comparative case study of US shale gas landowner coalitions provides a potentially 
instructive illustrative example of the success of collective action and empowering landholder 
groups facing mining activities in their community. Comparative to Australian UGR 
operations, shale gas extraction and exploration in the US is longstanding and has been in 
operation since 1825 in New York. Thus, legislative and policy issues in the US as a ‘mature 
State’ for shale gas are much more developed in some aspects than in Australia. 
As the US is common law legal system, with some aspects of civil law codification, rather 
than the strictly common law legal system of Australia, landowners own the minerals, oil and 
gas beneath their land and negotiate compensation with a corresponding extraction lease with 
an exploring company, thus transferring their mineral rights to an oil and gas company to 
develop the shale gas.
187
 In 1953, Texan courts declared that landowners may reserve mineral 
rights and the oil and gas contained in the case Benge v Scharbauer,
188
 thereby enabling the 
mineral estate to be severed from the surface estate.
189
 
In the event of severance, the mineral estate dominates in terms of exploration and extraction 
and the mineral lessee assumes the same rights owed to the mineral estate owner since the 
leasing document is perceived as a temporary transference of ownership. According to 
Timmens, ‘the owner of the mineral estate may lease the minerals to third parties for 
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exploration, but law only requires that the lessee (i) notify surface owners of the intent to 
explore and drill’; (ii) have access to as much land as is necessary to explore and drill’.
190
 
There are further differences between US and Australian petroleum exploration and extraction 
regulation, providing evidence that Australian regulation is indeed more stringent than the US 
regulatory system. For example, the owners of the mineral estate are only required to inform 
the surface estate when drilling is imminent on their property due to the Texas Natural 
Resource Code of 2007.
191
 Additionally, the mineral estate may use as much surface water 
from the leased land as is reasonably necessary to carry out operations, given that the use is 
not wasteful, and it may inject wastewater into subsurface formations.
192
 Moreover, the 
mineral estate does not accept responsibility for the full restoration of the property nor is it 
required to pay surface damages as long as the damage is not unreasonable.
193
 However, in 
some US states, landowner coalitions have formed and successfully negotiated favourable 
contracts protecting their agricultural lands. US state governments and some private entities 
have exercised the power of eminent domain to take land for public use.
194
 What constitutes 
public use has long been the subject of debate among legal practitioners and academics to 
ascertain an equitable standard for land acquisitions in the US.
195
 
Despite regulatory differences of petroleum ownership and extraction, the US example of 
rural landowners’ collaboration and collective action is a case on point illustrating the 
potential of the use of collective bargaining for Queensland’s agricultural landowners. In the 
Marcellus Shale Gas Basin lies the Southern Tier Region in New York State, where from 
2011 rural landowners have formed grassroots organisations aimed at collectively bargaining 
with natural gas companies over the terms of development leases in their region.
196
 These 
collectives are identified as ‘landowner coalitions’ in the Southern Tier Region of New York, 
consisting of 35 groups representing 800,000 ac of rural landscape owned by more than 
20,000 landowner members representative of 20% of the land in this region.
197
 As such, these 
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coalitions exert considerable influence over a substantial portion of the terrain considered 
attractive to gas drilling. 
The initial impetus for forming a landowner coalition between members was to secure greater 
compensation for rural landowners when negotiating oil and gas leases. However, the scope 
of the landowner coalition has now grown, according to Jacquet and Stedman: 
Become the de facto managers of natural resource development across vast and 
largely contiguous landscape scales. Besides setting rates of compensation, the 
leases these groups negotiate with energy companies serve as legally-binding 
operating agreements that can influence environmental and community outcomes.
198
 
A study by Jacquet and Stedman in 2011 performed semi-structured interviews focusing on 
the timelines, motivations, outcomes and organisational structures of the landholder coalitions 
and their members with 16 principle leaders of each of the 12 land owner coalitions in the 
Southern Tier Region of New York State.
199
 The two largest landholder coalitions are 
informal and volunteer-led organisations found in Steuben and Tioga Counties, claiming 




Both groups have a leader or spokesperson and a central committee of volunteers that 
coordinates membership and activities. Comparatively, other coalitions are formed by a 
handful of neighbouring property owners or a leasing consultant who is typically paid a per-
acre fee upon successful negotiation. The first more structured coalition model is arguably 
suited to the Queensland context, as agricultural landholders forming a collective bargaining 
group would require an audit of membership, central committee and a structured approach to 
negotiations while reporting to the ACCC. However, unlike collective bargaining groups, 
coalitions do require a small per-acre fee to offset legal costs upon negotiating a leasehold 
agreement. 
Emerging from Jacquet and Stedman’s 2011 study was the finding that the financial 
compensation incentive for members represented the primary motivation among both 
members and organisers. Some interviewees also indicated that members expanded their 
motivations for collective action to include the protection of private property and 
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environmental protection. An interviewee in the study stated, ‘you can almost put money as 
number two, now. The biggest thing is the protection of private assets and private property, 
and just the knowledge. Not being taken advantage of and protecting yourself’.
201
 
Consequently, it appears landholder coalition negotiations have the potential to influence 
natural resource management across a large area of the New York State. For example, some 
coalitions require environmental protections above those required by the New York State 
Department of Environmental Conservation regulations such as additional water testing.
202
 
A state wide peak body, the Joint Landowners Coalition of New York (JLCNY) comprises of 
the leaders in individual coalitions and actively produce information dissemination, 
negotiation strategies, lobbying and advocacy at the state and federal government levels. The 
JLCNY’s mission statement is ‘To foster, promote, advance and protect the common interest 
of the people as it pertains to natural gas development through education and best 
environmental practices’.
 203
 The JLCNY is a registered organisation founded in 2010 and 
consisting of 77,000 landholders in control of one million acres across 14 counties. 
The JLCNY filed a lawsuit in 2014, objecting to a lack of political objectiveness during a 
hydraulic fracturing study being conducted by the New York Department of Conservation and 
Department of Health to allow hydraulic fracturing to begin in the Marcellus Shale region.
204
 
The court dismissed the lawsuit on 14 July 2014, based on the arguments that the group 




JLCNY appealed the ruling on 24 July 2014,
206
 Governor Cuomo ultimately banned hydraulic 
fracturing across New York in December 2014 and the final review of the environmental 
impact study was issued in June 2015. Although the JLCNY does not collectively sign leases 
on behalf of the 35 coalitions in New York, it provides legal advice, social capital resources 
and lobbying outreach activities. Landowner coalitions distribute information to their 
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members on common leasing violations to watch for, catalogued reported violations and legal 
advice on how to best respond to the violations.
207
 
Comparatively, benefits from collective bargaining are similar to US landholder coalitions as 
collective bargaining offers lowered transaction costs for UG targets through negotiating 
multiple standardised leases. However, it is noted the US civil law system arguably favours 
the inclusion of landholders as they are direct resource rights holders and financial 
beneficiaries to oil and gas leases. 
For example, the concept of ‘good faith’ bargaining is found in the US Capper-Volstead Act 
of 1922,
208
 which provides basic protection for agricultural growers to collectively negotiate 
on product price.
209
 A number of US states have adopted legislation requiring ‘good faith’ 
bargaining, meaning that intermediaries must negotiate with an agricultural association.
210
 
Defining and legislating for ‘good faith’ negotiations with a collective body of agricultural 
landholders to create a land access agreement may arguably provide a number of advantages 
including equitability in parties bargaining position, improving information distribution to 
landholders, and, arguably, facilitating an effective LAF. 
5.6 Challenges and Opportunities 
Collective bargaining is traditionally founded on competition law exemption to create an 
arrangement where two or more competitors come together to negotiate with a supplier or a 
customer over terms, conditions and prices.
211
 A CCA represents a commercial venture 
whereby homogenous small businesses, being agricultural landholders, will collectivise to 
negotiate terms of compensation and land access. 
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The Agricultural Competitiveness Green Paper
212
 recognises the issue of farmers being 
unable to negotiate a fair return of compensation for the use of their agricultural land by 
mining activities and to limit the effects of mining to their land: 
Stakeholders expressed a concern that the quality of their agricultural land and their 
life on the farm were being affected by mining activities adjacent to or on their land. 
Some stakeholders suggested that farmers get a return from mining activities on 
their land, through a share of royalties.
213
 
Contractual agreements are normally reached between farmers and oil and gas companies 
pertaining to the conditions of access (with a view to minimising disruption and loss of 
amenity) and the compensation payable to the land holder. 
According to the PC’s Inquiry into Mineral and Energy Resource Exploration,
214
 ‘In sparsely 
stocked grazing areas, land holder concerns about exploration activity on their land are not as 
great as in areas where land is intensively cropped and irrigated’.
215
 For example, from 2011–
2014, 4,500 land access agreements were negotiated between land holders and CSG 
companies across the Surat and Bowen basins in Queensland.
216
 The potential for conflict 
between exploration and agricultural activities tends to rise with the intensity of land use and 
the magnitude of the potential impact. According to the Association of Mining and 
Exploration Companies: 
Landholder rights relate to the use of the surface of the land. However access to 
those mining rights often means infringing on the rights of the landholder. Therefore 
negotiation between the owner of the mining rights and the landholder rights takes 
place such that the infringement on the rights is appropriately compensated.
217
 
The PC’s inquiry 
218
 also noted the disadvantages in farmer and oil and gas companies’ 
negotiations in protecting prime agricultural land while coexisting with UG exploration and 
extraction: 
                                                 
212 Agricultural Competitiveness Taskforce, Parliament of Australia, Agricultural Competitiveness Green Paper 
(2014). 
213 Ibid, 21. 
214 Productivity Commission, Inquiry into Mineral and Energy Resource Exploration, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2013. 
215 Ibid, 130. 
216 APPEA, Record Number of Land Agreements signed in Queensland (2013) 
<http://www.appea.com.au/media_release/record-number-of-land-agreements-signed-between-gas-
companies-and-queensland-farmers/>.  
217 AMEC, Submission No 34 to Productivity Commission, Inquiry Into The Non-Financial Barriers To Mineral 
And Energy Resource Exploration, March 2013, 2. 
218 Productivity Commission, above n 214, 132. 
259 
Most rural land holders are at some disadvantage in undertaking negotiations with 
explorers. There is an asymmetry of experience as most land holders will have little 
or no previous experience in negotiating access agreements and compensation—
such negotiations will most likely be a ‘one-off’. There is also an asymmetry of 
information regarding the potential impact of the exploration activity. The land 
holder will have limited knowledge and experience from which to evaluate the 
impact of exploration activities on rural land. Further, there is an imbalance of 
power due to the involuntary nature of the negotiations. In most jurisdictions the 
legislative framework requires land holders to allow explorers to access their land, 
subject to the negotiated terms and conditions of the access agreement.
219
 
The Agricultural Competitiveness White Paper
220
 announced a two-year pilot program (2015–
2016) and A$13.8 million awarded to the Rural Industries Research and Development 
Corporation to work with other Research and Development Corporation’s to develop and 
deliver training and materials ‘to provide farmers with knowledge and materials on 
cooperatives, collective bargaining and innovative business models’.
221
 The pilot program is 
focused on equalising bargaining power between farmers dealing with large processors, 
traders or retailers. This model offers opportunities to extend the benefits of collectivisation to 
agricultural landholders. 
As previously stated, the test for the ACCC to object to a collective bargaining authorisation 
or notification application is found in the ‘public benefits test’: 
If the ACCC is satisfied that any benefit to the public that has resulted or is likely to 
result or would result or be likely to result from the provision does not or would not 
outweigh the detriment to the public that has resulted or is likely to result or would 
result or be likely to result from the provision, the ACCC may give the applicant a 
written notice (the objection notice) stating that it is so satisfied.
222
 
Public benefit is not defined in the Competition and Consumer Act, however, the ACCC has 
stated that the term should be given its widest possible meaning. In particular, it includes, 
‘anything of value to the community generally, any contribution to the aims pursued by 
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Consequently, the ACC model of collective bargaining may result in claims of subverting the 
public interest if financial benefits flowing to state governments from mining rents are 
diverted into compensation to farmers, rather than into social welfare provisioning. There is a 
case for the agricultural landholder community to be given special consideration given the 
statements of the Select Committee that ‘the lack of power and support landholders feel in 
relation to land access…indicates the overall level of complexity associated with land access 
involving unconventional gas mining’.
224
 
Further, as previously stated, analysis of case law of ACCC agricultural collective bargaining 
authorisations reveals the ACCC’s analysis is based on a three-tiered framework. These 
conditions would have to be met before a collective bargaining application could be granted 
by the ACCC. It is likely a small collective bargaining group of agricultural landholders of 
10–20 members, for example, the coming together of landowners in specific regions (e.g., the 
Chinchilla agricultural landholders), would not be contradictory to the ACCC requirement 
that the group hold a small market share without cartel or collective boycott activity and with 
voluntary membership. 
However, it is noted a limitation to the collective bargaining vehicle is the lack of mandatory 
enforcement of negotiations and outcomes. A collective bargaining authorisation or 
notification does not force groups to come to an agreement, rather, it allows an opportunity to 
represent landholder interest in a coordinated and managed approach to empower and benefit 
potential negotiations between agricultural landholders and resource companies.
225
 
Van Caenegem et al’s study focused on the characteristics that indicate success in collective 
bargaining vehicles for farmers in the context of retailer and processor negotiations. These 
characteristics are applicable across a range of agricultural negotiation contexts and the 
features of the agricultural sector remain the same. For example, Emery argues that 
interdependence, that is, cooperation and collaboration among groups of farmers, is essential 
for farmers to actually achieve independence from the structures of finance capital and 
‘monopsony’ behaviour of large purchasers such as supermarkets: ‘Individualism promotes 
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the pursuit of self-interest while mystifying collective interests, whereas actual independence 
requires demystification and the pursuit of collective interests’.
226
 
Van Caenegem et al summarises the following elements as being key and unique to 
agricultural landholders and their ability to uptake collective bargaining: 
 Notions of individualism among farmers are a recurring feature and have been 
identified across a number of studies and contexts, notably, farmer decision-making, 
natural resources management and climate adaptation. We can, thus, extrapolate that we 
might reasonably expect to find the same to be true in the area of collective bargaining. 
 Farmers may be over-represented in a smaller number of ‘standalone’ personality 
types where there are striking similarities and multiple behavioural inhibitors to 
cooperative behaviour across these personality types. 
 Trust, created through long association and the sharing of knowledge and resources 
(and the manner in which this occurs) is a feature of cooperative behaviours. Finding ways 
to increase social capital may be conducive to creating social norms where cooperative 
behaviours are acceptable. 
 Information and available resources may not be enough to influence farmer decision-
making. Alternative delivery mechanisms that are embedded in farmer communities may 
be key to influencing behavioural change.
227
 
The following key elements are necessary to overcome limitations to collective bargaining 
and to ensure successful collective bargaining in agriculture: 
1) strong social cohesion and trust within the group 
2) information dissemination involving peak agricultural industry 
3) providing training in leadership, bargaining and negotiation skills to agricultural 
landholders who will represent collective bargaining groups.
228
 
Successful collective bargaining in agriculture to date has been led by peak organisations—
including the Australian Dairy Farmers, Victorian Farmers Federation, Western Australian 
Broiler Grower Association, and Tasmanian Farmers and Graziers Association—to ensure 
strong social cohesion, trust among members, an avenue for information dissemination and 
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leadership and negotiation resources. Therefore, combining agricultural bodies’ expertise, 
such as within the ACC, with agricultural landholder local knowledge may enable collective 
bargaining to negotiate UGR CCAs. 
Secondly, the characteristics of the group will most likely be small in size, as members of the 
collective bargaining group may most likely part of an agricultural peak body and will be 
representative of a certain region (e.g., Dalby).
229
 This will allow participants to increase their 







 locally devised and simple rules can be used to 
encourage ‘institutional thickness’ in collective action within a given territory linked with the 
combination of ‘human capital’ (knowledge resources), ‘social capital’ (trust, reciprocity and 
other social relations) and ‘political capital’ (capacity for collective action). 
5.7 Conclusion: How will Landholder Input Create a more Effective Land 
Access Regime? 
The stated intention of the LAC and MERCPA in Queensland is to balance competing 
interests in land access negotiations through best practice guidelines, notice provisions and 
appellate functions of the Land Court for ‘good faith’ negotiations between petroleum 
titleholders and owners and occupiers of private land. The provisions in the MERCPA do not 
appear to support greater transparency and certainty for landholders. While it purports to offer 
a centralised system of land access, the devil is in the details. For example, the provision 
relating to opt-out agreements and deferral agreements appears to support the primacy of the 
petroleum titleholder rather than acting to support landholders. The Government continues the 
rhetoric in support of balancing conflicting interest while simultaneously watering down 
legislation which offers the opportunity for grievances and landholders’ challenges to the 
current regime. It has, in effect, moved the goalposts for landholders in favour of titleholders. 
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There are limited opportunities for landholders to redress the current imbalance in the current 
regulatory system. The recent Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry Interim Report has made 
far-reaching and broad recommendations to address the effects of the CSG industry and the 
current CCA regulations.
233
 Regulatory reviews have tended towards recommending a 
centralised system of land access arrangements. However, this has in part led to further 
uncertainties and duplication, adding more layers of regulation and regulatory burden for 
landholders and does not simplify the land access regulatory regime. There is mounting 
evidence from case law, regulatory reviews and criticism from bodies involved in the land 
access regime that it is flawed. 
In comparison, British Columbia has sponsored transparency and a simple appellate and 
support regulatory regime for landholders throughout the process of entering into surface 
agreements. A comparative system is not available to a landholder in Queensland, as a 
landholder may only appeal to the general Land Court where there has been a ‘material 
change in circumstances’ to review compensation. Currently, the terms on which this is 
adjudicated is ill-defined and requires individual legal action by landholders who often do not 
have access to the time, resources and knowledge to mount a credible case. 
A regulatory tool that may offer redress to the regulatory balance is collective bargaining. It is 
a flexible and transparent vehicle that has been used successfully in different contexts in the 
agricultural and UGR sectors. When monitored and regulated by the ACCC, collective 
bargaining could provide a vehicle for landholders to form a collaborative body and increase 
‘good faith’ bargaining when reaching a CCA. In applying a principles-based regulatory 
approach, collective bargaining may be an effective transactional regulatory tool in 
negotiating land access agreements. The monitoring of collective bargaining may be 
conducted by a quasi-judicial administrative body, such as the SRB model in British 
Columbia, or an administrative body specifically tied to agriculture, such as the CCA, to 
ensure parties commit to collaborative and transparent negotiation of land access agreements. 
While collectivisation will require political support, the first step in moving towards 
collective bargaining in CCAs is to gain support and organisation via membership in 
agricultural communities in key UGR regions of Queensland. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction, Hypothesis and Research Questions 
This thesis discusses how a resource-rich state like Queensland can meet the challenge of 
creating an effective regulatory regime balancing the commercial exploitation of UG activities 
on agricultural lands. The main focus of this thesis has been on how Queensland can use its 
legal framework in regulating land use and compensation agreements by utilising regulatory 
tools to encourage coexistence of the development of UGR where those resources impact on 
fertile agricultural land. 
UGR occupies a unique role in the growth of the world’s non-carbon energy market. Since the 
assent of the Paris Agreement,
1
 the drive to meet sustainable energy goals has been solidified 
while creating an intense debate internationally and in individual nation states. UGR has been 
hailed as one solution to a non-carbon energy future in a ‘Golden Age of Gas’
2
 and countries 
including Australia and Canada have rushed to embrace this energy source, since it enables a 
transition from the burning of oil and coal to the generation of energy from carbon free 
sources. 
Queensland has been enthusiastic in its development of CSG tenements across some of the 
State’s most productive agricultural land in the Bowen Basin
3
 and Surat Basin
4
 regions. 
Queensland has chosen to support the development of UGR through a land use zoning and 
land access agreement system that encourages petroleum titleholders to develop UGR 
tenements and reap the economic rewards of the international export market. This is contrary 
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of the Parties, Paris: United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 541/13 (2015). The Paris Agreement’s central aim 
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area near Injune in 1998. Queensland Department of Natural Resources and Mines, Queensland’s Petroleum 
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to the position of other states like Victoria, who have chosen to place a moratorium on the 
CSG industry based on public distaste for the perceived environmental impacts of hydraulic 
fracturing. 
Queensland has become Australia’s leading UGR state, legislating policies based on adaptive 
management, including the PGPSA, RPIA, MERCPA and LAC, which support the rapid 
expansion of CSG, despite public concern on the use and access to agricultural land.
5
 The 
rapid exploitation of the resource has created political, economic and social externalities. Of 
these externalities, the conflict between resource companies and landholder interests has 
assumed primacy and created the greatest regulatory challenge. 
In seeking to solve the nexus between the economic benefits of UG exploitation and the 
cumulative impacts on agricultural landholders, successive Queensland administrations have 
sought to balance the needs of resource companies with its stated objectives to create a system 
of ‘effective’
6
 regulation that balances the interests of both parties through ‘coexistence and 
independent oversight’ of the UGR sector.
7
 The introduction of the current petroleum 
regulatory regime in 2004, in the enactment of the PGPSA, the LAF introduced in 2010 and 
recently amended in 2014
8
 and MERCPA also enacted in 2014, represent the State’s 
contemporary response to this conflict. Legislative reviews highlight the political and 
economic requirement for effective natural resource regulation to consider how the state will 
maximise the broader economic benefits of UGR while sponsoring regulatory frameworks 
which encourage coexistence with other sectors.
9
 
The hypothesis examined in this thesis is that there are aspects of Queensland’s current 
regulatory framework for UGR development that are ineffective in managing conflicting land 
interests in the extraction of UG and that a more effective regime could be identified. In 
testing this hypothesis, the thesis critically analysed the capacity of the current Queensland 
UGR land use and land access regulatory framework to manage conflict, utilising a 
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comparative functional analysis. This thesis has analysed a number of resource functions 
including petroleum policy, regulatory legislative frameworks and tools, statutory reviews of 
land use zoning, compensation and land access arrangements, and case law testing cumulative 
impacts of UGR activities on agricultural land. 
The thesis has not focused on a detailed evaluation of the environmental impacts of hydraulic 
fracturing or the cumulative impacts on soils, water and vegetation, as this has been the 
traditional topic of many scientific
10
 and regulatory studies of UGR.
11
 Rather, this thesis 
focuses on the principles and policies relating to the overall framework of effective 
development and coexistence of Queensland’s onshore CSG resources. In particular, this 
thesis focuses on the analysis of the land use, land access and compensation regimes which 
optimise the opportunity to find a resolution between the competing interests of resource 
producer and landholder. 
In developing this analysis, there is a tacit acknowledgement that ‘conflict’ has been 
interpreted in a narrow legal sense. That is, the broader socio-political debate relating to the 
development of UGR and community opposition to the industry is outside the frame of 
reference for this thesis. Instead, the thesis has remained narrowly focused on the functional 
analysis of the legal frameworks which may or may not drive towards coexistence and the 
diminution of conflict between the two sectors. 
The thesis hypothesis has raised five specific supplementary research sub-questions. Firstly, 
what is the land use conflict associated with UG extraction on agricultural land? Secondly, 
what is the current regulatory framework for the regulation of UG extraction in Queensland? 
Thirdly, are the current regulatory tools utilised by Queensland effective in managing 
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conflicting land interests in the development of UGR? Fourthly, are there alternative 
regulatory tools effective in managing these conflicts of interest? Finally, if there are more 
effective regulatory tools how could they be applied to the Queensland context? 
This chapter presents a summary of the research findings. In addressing the research 
questions, this thesis critically analysed the capacity of the Queensland’s current regulatory 
framework for UGR development on agricultural land and considered specific instances of 
regulatory gaps, omissions and regulatory complexity in the application of the State’s 
regulatory tools. The regulatory tools analysed are the role of the state, UGR policy, land use 
regulatory legislative framework, relevant administrative bodies and regulation of land access 
and landholder compensation agreements. This thesis has considered whether these tools 
encourage effective regulation in promoting coexistence of land interests in the extraction of 
UG in Queensland and compares them with the frameworks and regulatory tools employed by 
British Columbia to manage UGR and agricultural land conflicts. Using a functional legal 
methodology, this thesis utilised an analysis of regulatory frameworks in both jurisdictions to 
not only analyse the current capacity of Queensland’s regulatory system to manage conflict, 
but also to offer recommendations to change the Queensland’s system of regulation to 
engender greater coexistence between UGR and agricultural land. 
6.2 Principles of Unconventional Gas Regulation 
Chapter 2 analysed the theoretical principles under the broad moniker of ‘effective’ 
regulation. This analysis demonstrated that the State interprets regulatory ‘effectiveness’ in 
the administration of petroleum legislation by adopting one of two differing policy 
approaches, rule-based or principles-based. The analysis determined that rule-based regulation 
is rigid, prescriptive and favours compliance and enforcement against a complex welter of 
rules that are continually reinforced and amended to meet new conditions. In this paradigm, 
compliance tends towards complexity and obfuscation as new rules are added to existing rules 
to manage emerging conditions in the resource industry, rather than a re-examination of the 
purpose and intent of the regulatory system. 
This provides a context to Queensland regulation which, since the 1990s, has moved swiftly 
to encourage the exploration and extraction of UGR as a key political and economic 
imperative. The desire to exploit the petroleum resources has created conflicting priorities 
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with agricultural landowners and this conflict has been managed via a rule-based prescriptive 
approach. 
In Chapter 2, two approaches to the adoption of adaptive management as a regulatory tool 
were examined. To be successful, adaptive management must be ‘active’ in managing 
conflicting agendas by instituting clear measures and objectives, rather than serving to create 
excessive regulation ‘burdens’ and ‘gaps’. Queensland’s current regulatory approach is 
classified as ‘passive’ adaptive management due to its complex, ambiguous and inflexible 
UGR regulatory framework. 
The potential for ongoing management conflict is probed in an analysis of the externalities 
which emerge from a rule-based prescriptive approach, namely, ‘regulatory failure’, that is, 
ambiguity, poor regulatory tool choice, conflict and confusion (among stakeholders) and 
inadequate consultation which follows from the adoption of this paradigm. This serves to 
establish the premise that, in the absence of effective regulatory frameworks capable of 
managing conflict, resource development becomes uncontrolled and purely market-led which 
confines the role of the state to a monitoring and compliance body rather than the broader 
definition of the state’s role as arbiter of the ‘public interest’. 
The analysis of effective regulatory principles in both Queensland and British Columbia 
concluded that to effectively regulate and develop its UGR resources, Queensland requires a 
substantial re-examination of its UGR regulatory framework. Rather than regulation being 
based solely on passive adaptive management and commercial export of LNG, Queensland’s 
regulatory framework needs to refocus the development of its UGR resources in a 
collaborative and principles-based approach for the benefit of both the UGR and agricultural 
sectors. 
6.3 Managing Identified Conflicting Interests 
Chapter 3 considers the UG policy of Queensland and conflicts with UG extraction on 
agricultural land. This serves to determine whether Queensland effectively manages multiple 
interests in the development of UG. This analysis demonstrated that UG policy is crucial in 
guiding the regulation of UGR, as the framework to determine the state policy on resource 
development. 
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An analysis of Queensland’s policy framework demonstrated that the contemporary national 
political thrust towards greater exploitation of UG for export purposes has created pressure on 
Queensland to produce ever greater quantities of the resource. One consequence of this drive 
is a lag in regulatory frameworks to anticipate and manage the underlying conflict with other 
sectors, particularly agricultural landholders. Only Queensland is producing commercial 
quantities of UGR which provides a political and policy context in which UGR extraction is 
the key political imperative and which may obscure the requirement to control and manage 
the impact of UGR on other sectors. 
There are similar pressures in British Columbia which is sufficiently similar in political, 
economic and legal systems to provide a useful comparison to Queensland’s chosen approach 
to exploiting UGR. In British Columbia, despite the growing interest in UGR extraction, there 
are established policy guidelines to manage conflicting interests, both agricultural and 
resource based, within a broader policy framework that does not privilege one sector over 
another. This chapter notes, however, that British Columbia is a model rather than an ideal 
and complete solution for the deficiencies of the Queensland regulatory system. It is perhaps 
self-evident that no one jurisdiction can be transplanted into another. It is important, therefore, 
to acknowledge the historical, contextual and cultural differences between jurisdiction and 
policy objectives. 
To generate options of comparison for the coexistence of Queensland’s UGR, the British 
Columbia UGR policy framework, which focuses on effective regulation of resources while 
maintaining a productive agricultural land base, was analysed. British Columbia’s regulation 
has proceeded from the historical premise that the agricultural industry and landholders are 
valuable to the State and it is in the public interest to maintain agricultural lands as a State 
asset. The ALR is the primary administration and judicial lynchpin to assess all other 
activities and land uses that might impact on valuable agricultural land. 
The commonality of internal legal systems of Australia and Canada provides the opportunity 
to compare and contrast the intent and effects of policy development in Queensland’s and 
British Columbia’s respective UGR regimes. The analysis of the UGR policies concluded that 
to create coexistence of its UGR and agricultural resources, Queensland requires a substantial 
re-examination of its petroleum policy framework and administrative bodies. 
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6.4 Land Use Regulation 
Chapter 4 examines Queensland’s land use regulatory regime permitting resource activities in 
areas of regional interest. This chapter analysed differing models of land use zoning approvals 
for petroleum activities and corresponding oversight administrative bodies to achieve 
overarching policy objectives of the State. Specifically, Queensland’s new RPI regieme 
provides an approvals process for UGR activities on PAAs to manage land use interests and 
create coexistence. The RPIA regulatory framework provides an important land use tool 
permitting UGR activities in agricultural areas once an approval is given by the DILGP or has 
the landholders’ consent and is ‘not likely to have a significant’ impact on the agricultural 
area. 
Land use zoning tools in combination with an administrative regulatory body, such as the 
ALC model in British Columbia, have been demonstrated as being effective in creating 
favourable conditions for coexistence by clearly stipulating the principles and regulatory 
conditions for UGR activities on agricultural land. The ALC also ensures that UGR 
companies operate within a framework with regulatory oversight and a quasi-judicial tribunal 
framework that allows the State to fulfil its goal of creating value in the UGR sector and 
enabling UGR titleholders to maximise their return. Queensland’s land use regulation does 
not have a similar model of mandatory collaboration and regulatory powers between the three 
government departments and three administrative authorities with jurisdiction over UGR 
activities operating on agricultural lands. In this situation, the potential for overlap and 
regulatory gaps is magnified and there is evidence to suggest that this has and is occurring in 
Queensland. The GC is the State’s response to provide a single body to manage landholder 
interests and complaints, however, the 2016 review of this body demonstrated that that the 
Commission is not adequately filling this independent facilitative role. 
The experience of the ALR and OGC in British Columbia demonstrates that independent 
regulatory bodies, with appellate avenues for landholders, and a principles-based regulatory 
legislative framework contributes to the effective regulation of UGR, enabling administrative 
bodies to have a wide discretionary role to implement the State’s UGR policies to maximise 
the value of UGR resource development. It also enables administrative authorities to actively 
participate in managing UGR activities to encourage coexistence and supervise the conditions 
of production and resource development, to ensure that the activities of UGR titleholders are 
aligned with State interests. 
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The Australian PC has demonstrated that overlapping regulatory structures creates regulatory 
failure, gaps and burdens and thus inhibits effective UGR development. The current 
administrative authority structure fails to encourage principles-based regulation and 
coexistence of Queensland’s UGR resources on PAAs. This is because the regulation and 
oversight of UGR is undertaken by three different State Government departments, under three 
administrative oversight bodies, with no clear objective or collaboration between these 
entities focused on implementing coexistence objectives. 
An analysis of the single UGR authority in British Columbia, the OGC, demonstrates that the 
creation of such a regulatory administrative authority is capable of securing legal and 
administrative competence to implement the objective of principles-based effective regulation 
of UGR development for the benefit of British Columbia and its citizens. The ALC, as the 
single agricultural land protection regulatory administrative authority and its MOU with the 
OGC, demonstrates the creation of such an arrangement which serves to provide the forum for 
collaboration and coexistence of UGR development in agricultural land zones. 
6.5 Regulating Land Access and Compensation 
In Chapter 5, the negotiation and award of land access agreements assessed whether the 
allocation of land access agreements in Queensland encourages effective regulation to manage 
competing interests. The issues of UG exploitation on agricultural land raised several issues 
specifically related to mandatory land access agreements that must be negotiated before a 
petroleum titleholder commences advanced activities. The analysis of the land access system 
of compensation agreements demonstrated that the regulation of access to land for the 
development of UGR and the negotiation and agreement process for landholders is 
appropriate in states where the primary objective of the state is to balance the interest of 
titleholders and landholders. 
In the Queensland regulatory context, the negotiation of CCAs between titleholders and 
landholders is contained in the LAC which recommends the agreement is negotiated in ‘good 
faith’. The chapter examined the criteria of good faith as the measure to achieve the obligation 
between parties to ‘use all reasonable endeavours to negotiate’. It was noted in this chapter 
that Queensland has not sufficiently defined key terms including ‘good faith’ and ‘reasonable 
endeavours’ to provide a clear regulatory outcome against which case law can operate. 
Instead, judicial findings appear to favour resource companies and provide limited support 
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and advice for individual landholders to mount credible cases to ameliorate the effects of 
UGR exploration on their lands. The difficulty in interpreting unsubstantiated and general 
provisions has created complexity in the regulatory framework which permits UGR activities 
access to agricultural land. This has created unease and confusion among both titleholders and 
landholders and the State Government has been slow to step in where information 
asymmetries between the parties create negative externalities arising from land access 
agreements. 
A regulatory framework is required to allocate the costs and benefits of an economic sector in 
the most appropriate ways and to manage unacceptable risks to either party. The framework 
should also take account information asymmetries, which are particularly pertinent between 
landholders and titleholders in the CSG context. In these circumstances, the former may lack 
adequate information about the impacts of exploration, drilling and extraction, making it 
difficult to achieve good faith in negotiations of land access agreements. 
In undertaking this analysis, Chapter 5 examined other regulatory options available to 
Queensland to redress the balance between conflicting interests. A key recommendation is 
collective bargaining as a regulatory tool to promote effective methods of coexistence and 
agreement-making between UGR titleholders and landholders to maximise the opportunities 
for trust and build productive working relationships. 
6.6 A New Way Forward for Queensland Landholders 
The recent Unconventional Gas Senate Inquiry Interim Report has made a far-reaching, broad 
and highly critical analysis of the effects of the CSG industry and the current CCA 
regulations.
12
 Providing regulation for collective bargaining within the UGR regulatory 
framework may improve communication and strategic landholder engagement while offering 
a more streamlined and accessible process to manage land access compensation to deliver 
long-term improvements and coexistence with the onshore UG industry. These regulatory 
aims would support the current aim of the GCA to facilitate ‘better relationships between 
landholders, regional communities and the onshore gas industry’
13
 and supports the principle 
of coexistence between interests. 
                                                 
12 Senate Select Committee on Unconventional Gas, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into Unconventional Gas 
Interim Report (2016) 3. 
13 Gasfields Commission Act 2014 (Qld) s 7(a). 
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In Chapter 5, the use of collective bargaining in the US was offered as a model for coalitions 
of landholders to negotiate terms collectively with oil and gas companies. Although the US 
has a fundamentally different legal system, the experience of landholder coalitions is 
instructive in providing options for Queensland to consider. The information-sharing 
reciprocity between collation members and the opportunity to work towards a collective goal 
may offer greater opportunities to work towards good faith negotiations. This is in stark 
contrast to the current situation where landholders must work as individuals to comprehend 
and interact with complex legal provisions, with limited support from State bodies. 
It is likely collective bargaining would be embraced by the UG and agricultural sector, as both 
industries have previously utilised collective bargaining mechanisms when negotiating long-
term contracts. Further, the monitoring of collective bargaining by a quasi-judicial body such 
as the GC supported by the ACCC within the existing CCA may create a regulatory tool 
which satisfies Queensland’s UGR policy aim of coexistence of multiple interests for the 
benefit of its citizens. However, it must be noted that collective bargaining does not represent 
a complete solution to Queensland’s current regulatory rule-based regulatory system. Instead, 
it offers one option for the Queensland Government to consider in addressing the increasingly 
strident calls to ‘rebalance’ the interests of landholders, particularly in relation to land access 
of agricultural land. 
6.7 Conclusion 
This thesis has demonstrated there are aspects of Queensland’s UGR regulatory framework 
that fail to encourage effective coexistence of competing land interests in the extraction of 
UG. By critically analysing a number of petroleum regulatory functions and tools, this thesis 
demonstrates that in the areas of petroleum policy, legislative framework, land use zoning and 
land access agreements, Queensland’s UGR regulatory framework is not effective in 
managing multiple interests to create effective coexistence throughout the development of 
Queensland’s UGRs. 
By including an analysis of alternative UGR regulatory frameworks, particularly the 
regulatory framework of British Columbia, this thesis has demonstrated that there is a more 
effective way Queensland can regulate the development of its UGRs to encourage 
coexistence. The comparative functional analysis of this thesis has demonstrated that the 
approach to UGR development on agricultural lands in British Columbia has enabled a 
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balance between the protection of agricultural land and the continued development of a 
globally competitive UGR sector. This approach to UGR exploitation is premised on a 
collaborative approach to the effective development of UGR, accomplished through an 
integrated principles-based approach to regulation. 
Moving towards a broader acceptance that the regulatory structure of Queensland is flawed 
and will likely require substantial re-evaluations to move towards a principles-based 
regulatory approach, this thesis looks broadly at similar Commonwealth jurisdictions where 
there are alternative regulatory structures which provide functional examples of setting the 
conditions for coexistence of both UGR and agriculture for the benefit of the state’s citizens. 
The use of alternative regulatory tools, such as collective bargaining, to effectively negotiate 
and execute land access agreements provides an example of how regulation may encourage 
collaboration among landholders in finding sustainable, transparent and equitable 
arrangements to manage coexistence of UGR activities. Further, the research and analysis 
forming this thesis demonstrates that it is possible to implement a number of possible 
amendments and changes in Queensland’s UGR regulatory framework to encourage greater 
coexistence in the extraction of UG and ‘strike a better balance between the interests of 
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